Most published articles dealing with Initial German options in Bulge were obviously conceived before the authors undertook a complete analysis of each component part of their plans. To say the least, this is putting the cart before the horse. In any conflict situation involving pre-set positions on one side together with full disclosure of that position and strategic objectives on the other side, a complete analysis of each segment of that position is a must. In order to find the line of least resistance to the objectives. this analysis must preclude any strategic planning. In Bulge, it is better to "tailor" the strategy to the tactical components rather than allowing a preconceived strategy to dictate the tactics to be employed. Failure to do so-will usually fail to fully exploit several key weak points in the American defensive posture.

One must ascertain the statistical benefits for each level of factor commitment against each American position first before considering the ramifications of each attack proposed on overall strategy.

An initial analysis of the position of the American 106/423 using PBM odds and surrounding attacks at 1-1 plus would reveal the following chances of eliminating that unit:

The benefits from each can then be analyzed In other respects, particularly in their relationship to attacks against 106/422. One quickly discovers that a 3-1+ against 423 can guarantee the German ability to have 422 surrounded regardless of the outcome when German units are left at UU-13 and 422 is attacked from SS- 15. One should then analyze the possibilities for each level of attack against 422 in relation to each level against 423 while varying the order of attack. The next step would be to postulate such questions as "Is the guarantee of destruction at 5-1+ against 423 vital, or can the 16+ attack factors saved by using a 3-1 with an 80% chance of success garner more benefits if utililized elsewhere?" The results of this approach to the German dilema in Bulge will consistently prove superior to selecting an overall strategy first and attempting to make each attack or move conform to the dictates of that plan. This supports the contention that utilization of good tactics and operations will often make the otherwise unsound strategic framework they operate in a success, whereas poor tactical implementation of a brilliant strategy can often result in disaster.

An excellent example of the later phenomenon is found In Don Lowry's classic article "Exploiting the Initiative In Bulge." (This article was copyrighted by the "International Wargamer" 1970, and was reprinted in "The General" March-May 1971, and it also appears in the Wargamer's Guide to the Battle of the Bulge.)

In that article, Don expounds at length on the virtues of using Hart's concept of the "indirect approach" rather than the use of a direct push aimed initially at Bastogne. This is a fine plan indeed, but his tactical deployment to secure that strategy leaves much to be desired. Lowry's suggestion is to move aggressively in the north and the extreme south (so as to draw defenders to these areas) while clearing the St. Vith-Clervaux road. Then we suddenly shift our power to the center and drive to Bastogne."

Don's initial error was an apparent failure to consider the possibilities from utilization of regiments of the same panzer division in separate attacks. In his plan, all the panzer regiments are stacked in "historical" divisions when attacking. The second, and even more critical fault, was an obvious failure to fully analyze his ill-conceived 4-1 attack against the 14th Calvary. Since the attack was undertaken with the goal of elimination, an examination of the CRT quickly reveals this attack to be a squander or a minimum of 12 vital attack factors. This is due to the fact that a 3-1 will eliminate that unit just as often, because the result of "contact" will eliminate 14 Cav just as well as a "D back" will. However, analysis of the supply and fortress rules should point out an even more "economical" method of dealing with the most mobile of American units. Placement of single VolksGrenadier regiments at TT-9 and TT-11 with no attack, while using the 24-32 factors spared from Lowry's plan against 196/423 and the Elsenborn area, will eventually result in the demise of 14 Cav in isolation. This method does tie down one not-so-vital supply road and the two German units for a few turns, but this must be weighed against gaining supply for one added attack and the possible loss of 12 attack factors in an exchange on Lowry's plan. If you insist on attacking 14 Cav on the initial turn, surround it as above and attack at 1-3 or 1-2. The 1-3 has an excellent chance of cutting the St Vith-Elsenborn road, wihile the 1-2 has a 40% chance of dropping 14 Cav. This points out the value of surrounding American units when possible, as it would take a 6-1 not surrounded to equal that 40% chance of success.

Personally, I favor the straight surrounding method on the initial turn with the option to attack at 1-2+ on a later turn if needed.

The obvious problem with this plan is a gross deficiency in its ability to eliminate American units. At best it will eliminate only 25.6% of the American HIM factors and only 16.4% on an average. These figures even include the probability of "elim" against 28/109, which is not the most preferred result.

Committing the German forces to a strategy where 50% of their attacks have absolutely no chance of destroying any American units in certainly grounds for court martial!

The following plans are designed from the results of a rather thorough statistical analysis and remedy virtually all of Lowry's errors.

Alpha Plan

Even without considering the effects of the ultimate demise of 14 Cal, this plan could result in an American casualty ratio of 46.2%; and it will average 23.2%, which is very close to Lowry's maximum results. The chart below points this out even more vividly. The percentages are results of an efficiancy test, in that they are an expression of the German attack factors in each attack that could result in losses divided into the average number of American factors lost in that attack.

Therefore in the catagory of eliminating American factors, the Alpha Plan makes a much more "efficient" use of its attack factors; because It takes better advantage of the exposed American units. Another line of comparison is to consider the the Alpha Plan attacks 10 American units and should eliminate 4.52 on an average and 9.00 potentially (45.2%/90.0%). but Lowry chose a plan that tackles 12 American units averaging elimination of 3.20 and 5.00 at best (26.7%/41.7%).

An obvious alternative to the Alpha Plan would be to utilize the German Panzer Regiments 310, 312 and 2/8, now cutting the St.Vith-Clervaux road, to bring the three-one vs. 106/422 up to a 5-1 and thereby make sure of its elimination of the first turn. Pulling a 5-3 unit from the 8-1 vs. 9/CCR to cut the road at PP19 reduces the odds against CCR to 7-1 (.680x4=2.720), but this option increases the overall odds of factors for elim to 18.560/22.560.

Beta Plan

Yet another, and even more radical, variation follows In what I call the Beta Plan. So many plans use the 6-1 vs. 28/109, that its numerous advantages, as brilliantly spelled out by Lowry, tend to become a little stale because most American opponents are used to the consequences.

The Beta Plan uses a 6-1 vs. 28/110 based on the following premise: a more direct approach can often be considered a surprise even if it is expected--provided it works. The Americans obviously anticipated a possible direct assault on Clervaux given their placement near and in that town.

The 6-1 vs. 28/110 also has many odius connotations for the American defense. On the result of D b 4/ Att adv 4, the 110th has the choice of retreating to either JJ28 or LL29; but then look at the German options: 28/110 to JJ28

Germans can put units at KK25-26, LL24 to 28, MM23-25, MM27-28 (the latter can serve to cut off retreat off 28/109), NN22-26, OO22 28/110 to LL29

This takes away LL28 and MM28 but adds KK27, thereby putting Bastogne and Houffalize in precarious positions.

As with the Alpha Plan, there is only one attack lacking the potential to eliminate an American unit; but this plan will average out slightly better with a 24% average casualty ratio. An analysis of the best odds of eliminating succeedingly higher numbers of American units by taking the best odds available for the first one and multiply the second best odds to get the chances for two units "elim" etc., is also enlightening.

Gamma Plan

I devised the Gamma Plan to improve the stats in the last chart. It guarantees the elimination of two- thirds of the 28th Infantry Division plus isolation of 14 Cav. This plan will produce more consistant chances of eliminating 3-5 American units but reduces the chances in the Elsenborn area somewhat. I usually play this one face to face with an opponent I feel superior to in the long run.

This is due to the better consistency and the improved results of a 7-1 over a 6-1 vs. 28/109 in FTF games. In PBM games against superior opponents, I recommend one of the other plans in hopes of enough of the longshots coming through to overcome any initial disadvantages.

Now that you have several Bulge plans and methods to rate them, you can pick which plan will have the best chances against the particular opponent for the day. However, do not be lulled into the supposition that Bulge is won or lost on the first turn. Utilization of statistical analysis on later turns should reap equal benefits.

In deference to Don Lowry, I must add that our fearless leader's plan predates mine by quite some time and he did not have the benefit of being able to analyze the multitude of articles since written, and I still would not care to bet against him against anyone in Bulge. But one must still remember that the Spitze comes before the Haupttrupp.