Don Lowry's OPERATION GREIF is an interesting variant on a game that was originally playable but historically inaccurate, Avalon Hill's BATTLE OF THE BULGE. While righting some of the wrongs, Lowry has added a few flaws of his own to the mixture.

The most striking is his assignment of movement rates, American infantry regiments are given a rate of 3 indicating they are motorized. In reality, the American infantry division was only "semi-motorized" in that all the organic transport in it was motorized; but the bulk of the infantry walked unless additional trucks were provided.

And in spite of American battlefield affluence, there were never enough trucks to go around. To reflect this one could introduce separate truck units (as in SPI'S BREAKOUT & PURSUIT), but I think it is permissable to ignore them and introduce a minor rule which will be presented later.

Motorization of the German paratroops is another matter. Obviously the von der Heydte was not motorized, but in general the parachute divisions were fully motorized, as befit their status as an elite branch of a politically favored service. While the two divisions in this game had seen hard fighting in France and Italy, I think it is a valid assumption that for an offensive this important they would be fully equipped at their standard scale of transport. Thus, these units shold also have a movement rate of 3.

Another error Mr. Lowry has made is the assignment of a movement rate of 5 to the German Panzer-grenadier regiments. This rate implies the units were equipped with full- or half-track vehicles - such was not the case. Of all such regiments in the game, only those of the Panzer Lehr Division were ever even nominally so equipped. Most of the Panzer divisions had only one half-track grenadier battalion, and most of the Panzer-grenadier divisions had none.

Thus it would be more fitting to assign to some of these regiments at rate of 3, while most would have a rate of 3* (that is, they move over roads at 4:1 ratio, like armored units).

In the table given below, the movement rates are based on the nominal equipment as of late 1943. Those who find the table inconvenient to use may treat all the grenadier regiments as 3 and comfort ourselves with the sophistry that by the Bulge, half-tracks were in such short supply that the regiments could be regarded as purely track-borne. It will take better records than I have access to to determine the answer.

Similarly, the HQ units of the Panzer and Panzer-grenadier divisions should be regarded as having a movement rate of 3* or at best 3. These units represent an amalgam of anti-tank, engineer, flak and other support units with a mixture of transport types.

Mr. Lowry has included German airpower on the grounds that they made a "dying gasp effort of respectable proportions." This is true in that Operation Bodenplatte, a carefully planned dawn attack on Allied airfields, destroyed several hundred aircraft on the ground. This success was tempered by the fact that no pilots were killed and the planes were quickly replaced. In adition, German secrecy has been so strict that the returning raiders were taken for the enemy by front line flak units and suffered severe losses.

One reason the operation took the form it did was that most of the pilots available were deficient in navigator training, and had to be led to predetermined targets by pathfinder aircraft. These pathlinders took very heavy casualties from the German flak as they returned, effectively putting the surviving aircraft out of action for lack of leadership.

The 150th Panzer Brigade, like the Einheit Steilau, was intended to confuse the enemy, and thus could not be attacked until it had been definitely identified as German. Thus it should be treated much like an ES unit when an enemy unit moves adjacent to it.

The original Avalon Hill rules were far from perfect themselves, and Lowry has done a basically good job on them. But there is still room for "improvement." For one thing, it is absurd to say that Allied units do not suffer any effects of isolation, or that once air superiority is established they have no need of ground supply lines. Aerial resupply could keep units alive, but just barely, and an Allied unit without fuel or ammunition was able to "do without" no more than were the Germans.

A major feature of the battle was the traffic control problems experienced by both sides. Avalon Hill made some effort to show this with their one-way traffic rule, but this does not go very far in recreating the terrific rongestion which occured at key road junctions.

To reflect the points brought out in the above discussion, I propose the following changes to the BULGE/GREIF rules:

Movement Rates

1. American Infantray regiments ON THE BOARD at the start of the game are treated as if they were not motorized, ie., a movement rate of plain 3. Beginning with the Allied 17/AM turn, or the first turn on which they are not isolated, whichever comes later, these become motorized for the rest of the game. All other Allied units have movement rates as shown.

2. All units belonging to the two German parachute divisions have a movement rate of 3. The von der Heydte unit, if not airdropped, may be brought on board as a normal reinforcement with a movement rate of 3.

3a. All Panzer and Panzer-grenadier division HQ units and all Panzer-grenadier regiments should have a movement rate of 3.

3b. Alternative to 3-a. The 901 and 902 Panzer grenadier Regiments (Lehr Division) have a movement rate of 5. The following Panzer-grenadier regiments have a movement rate of 3: 1SS, 3SS, 19SS, 25SS, 2, 8, 29, 60, 156, 10, 104, 115, and 129. All Panzer and Panzer-grenadier division HQs and the following Panzer-grenadier regiments have a movement rate of 3*: 2SS, 4SS, 20SS, 26SS, 304 and 11. A movement rate of 3* indicates that road movement is at a 4:1 ratio as is the case with movement rates of 4 and 5.

German Airpower

1a. The German may use five factors of tactical airpower in a manner similar to that of the Allied player, with this restriction. These may only be applied to battles which involve attacking German units which suffered a result of "Engaged" in either the previous German or Allied player turns. In other words, German tactical airpower may only be used in support of a previously existing combat situation.

1b. Alternative to I-a. The German player may, on any turn before the weather clears, apply his five airpower factors in an attempt to destroy Allied aircraft on the ground. The player announces his attack and rolls the die. The number rolled plus 2 is the number of airpower factors the Allied player loses from his total of twenty. When using this option, all five German air factors must be committed to the attack, and may not be used otherwise in the game.

OPERATION GREIF

Before the 150 Panzer Brigade has been revealed as being German, an Allied unit may not attack it without first "unmasking" it. Whenever an Allied unit moves into the Brigade's Zone of Control and announces it wishes to attack the brigade or enter its hex, the die must be rolled as with an Einheit Steilau unit. A result which would eliminate an ES unit merely "unmasks" the brigade and allows the Allied unit to attack it. For other results, follow the same procedure as with an ES unit.

The 150 Brigade can be unmasked only in the above manner, or it it attacks an Allied unit. It is recommended that the German player keep all his ES units and the 150 Brigade upside down until they are unmasked/eliminated so that the Allied player will not know where the brigade is.

ISOLATION AND SUPPLY

1. All units suffer the effects of isolation, regardless of nationality or the presence or absence of Allied air support. The effects of isolation are: all units whose movement rate is 3 have it reduced to 2: all other units have their movement rates~halved (fractions are retained, but can only be used in road movement); attack factors are halved, with fractions retained.

2. Once the weather has cleared, Allied units may not be eliminated due to isolation, but they still suffer the effects.

STACKING LIMITS

1. Stacking limitations apply during movement. Units are moved singly and may not enter a hex already containing three units of the same type as the unit being moved.

2. Units may not enter a road hex at the road movement rate if the hex contains any unit, other than one with 0-0 combat factors.

ATTACK ALONG ROADS

Any unit which enters enemy Zone of Control at the road movement rate has its attack factor halved in the ensuing combat, with fractions being retained. This includes Allied units which succeed in unmasking the 150 Panzer Brigade.