By Leon L. Tucker
One of the most constantly intriguing aspects of wargaming with miniatures, for myself at any rate, has been the challenge to reproduce there the psychological element in combat. Time and again, in reading first-hand accounts of men and tactical commanders - up to the level of battalion command or even higher - one of the dominant characteristics of warfare is shown to be almost total lack of information regarding hostile strength, intentions, or even the real values of key terrain features. The tactical commander almost never knows with any precision what formations the foe has already thrown at him, let alone what more may present itself in just a little while. Often, he does not even have a good idea regarding the preferences ot his own higher command or what more they may commit at any given time. Most importantly of all, perhaps, the tactical commander characteristically does not know beforehand whether a given day will bring total inactivity, minor raiding, purposeful reconnaissance, or real battle. He can take virtually nothing for granted, he is operating at a near vacuum of information, and at a high state of emotional stress. Moreover, he is too often not in harmony with his higher command or with persurnably friendly units. Innumerable relatively minor rivalries and dislikes add their bit to the mental burden born by tactical commanders. Small wonder that clear thinking is often impossible in the midst of battle. The wargame in miniature, because it is an essentially free-form game, can potentially reproduce in diluted form many of the psychological stresses which are operative in actual tactical combat. It it is to be done, the first imperative must be to prevent the players from being able to automatically assume that any particular given kind of battle with preknown foices, or any battle whatever, will necessarily take place. It is admittedly not feasible to have friends often assemble for a miniature battle and have them spend an evening literally staring at a sandtable with absolutely nothing happening, to do so would alienate friendships and lead to lack of interest in attending meetings at which you preside. Short of that however, is it useful to cultivate a reputation for unpredictable behavior. By doing so, players will not know beyond a doubt when to play cautiously, and when agressively. They will always tend to feel that their force is potentially or actually inadequate to the goals assigned them. By way of illustration, I once held a miniature battle in which a British 4-man Bren Gun crew and Carrier held up nearly a dozen German Panzers for a required 16 turns while an off-board bridgehead was evacuated; the feat was possible, and engrossing for both sides, because the German commander could not bring himself to believe that the British were being anything but extremely cunning, he kept detrucking infantry to explore every bush before he would push his armor forward. It only takes one or two such episodes to create a reputation. Thereafter, players will be forced to analyze every battle on its own terms, rather than by preconceived notion. Views of History As a result of the doctrines enunciated above, I hold views regarding the proper uses of history which may seem at first glance slightly peculiar. I use history to set the general tone within which a particular miniatures battle will take place, but deliberately avoid duplication of situations which in fact replicate actual reported incidents. If you tell a person that a coming battle will be cast within the mold of the Western Front in the autumn of 1944, he may easily refresh himself regarding the overall strategic situation prevailing, the weapons in use at that season, and the typical sorts of tactical engagements, but nothing more. He will not, by advance reading, be able to recognize in miniature an incident about which he has knowledge that the commanders on the spot did not then have. If, on the other hand, you lift an incident from an actual battle report, and set out to reproduce the historical terrain, forces, and objectives, then one or another of your players is quite likely to know at least as much about the incident as you, and in recognizing the incident act in ways that the historical commander could not act with his less complete knowledge. The following miniatures battle, which I designed recently, may serve as a suitable concrete illustration of some of my doctrine in actual application. The general historical setting is instantly recognizable to most wargamers, late September or October 1944, somewhere in or near the Saar, quite possibly in Patton's 3rd Army sector, southwards of the region soon to be immortalized at "the Bulge". Each player receives a typed page with the paragraph titled "Specific Situation", and a sheet marked "Scale Map" showing the game table and his particular route of approach onto the table area. Inspection of this material will not, however, reveal to any of the players an actual historical incident about which he might have advance knowledge. The slightly humorous fictional placenames and backgrounds are intended only to give the players a more or less familiar historical setting, to put them as nearly as possible in the boots typical tactical commanders of the time; to give them an overall notion of probable enemy weapons, strengths, and prevailing intentions. This particular battle is relatively straightforward in that the value of the key terrain feature, the town of Glicken-Glocken, is equally apparent to all participants, and in that there is bound to be a succession of direct head-on collisions between hostile forces. Each party, however, has not only to regard enemy actions with considerable trepidation, but is also induced to spend some amount of time "looking over his shoulder" so to speak, at peripheral aspects whose impact on the battle is hinted but not known. The American commanders, for example, have to deal with the subtle hint that Mount Bindleheim, to their rear, may potentially hold unknown danger, and they are not likely to have enough forces to afford to explore the region. Moreover, they have no idea of when, if ever, or in what strength, the raiding force will return, and of what role it may play in combat. The Germans have initially no knowledge at all of the raiders, that will come as a nasty surprise. They have a hint of slight disaffection between their commanders, which if taken up, could impose on play behavior that could totally mystify the Americans. The Germans have also some indications that their objective may involve hunting-out and saving elements of the overrun platoon. The result is bound to be more than a bit of humbling around on both sides in an atmosphere of great uncertainty, and partial incomprehension of hostile behavior. Very likely, the town will fall to the Germans fairly early in mid-game. It may or may not go back and forth one or more times. The most likely result will come down to the Germans ensconced in the town pinned there by American Task force Pin-Up to the westwards, suddenly assaulted on the eastern side by the return of Garbo. A truly desperate climax should result and it does not seem possible to predict with certainty which side will gain the outcome. Both sides should, however, have an exciting and exhausting time. I would like to wind up this article with a brief word about rules. There are numerous sets of WWII rules available, some more complex than others. Play will be affected by the particular set used, but I believe that the relationship is not very critical. Any respectable set of rules should give a good game. The Fog of War: General and Special Situations Back to Table of Contents -- Panzerfaust #59 To Panzerfaust/Campaign List of Issues To MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1973 by Donald S. Lowry. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com |