The men of the 31st Regimental Combat Team, 7th Infantry Division, on the east side of the Chosin Reservoir, had been under attack for virtually 80 straight hours by waves of Chinese. The men were staggering with mental and physical fatigue, the results of constant attacks, sub-zero weather and a shortage of supplies. At dawn on 1 December 1950, the commander, LTC Don Faith, and staff decided on a desperate breakout attempt to the south and the relative safety of the headquarters of the 1st Marine Division at Hagaru-ri. As a result of fatigue and the continuous combat, the breakout plans were poorly prepared, coordinated and disseminated. Many officers and men were not even informed that a breakout was being attempted until they saw the trucks forming up at 1100. The arrival of Marine close air support initially helped suppress enemy fire, but that "lift" to friendly morale disappeared when one aircraft accidentally dropped napalm on the front of the breakout column. As several officers admitted later, command and control was virtually lost from the start. Poor staff coordination and the lack of synchronizing all available firepower and maneuver forces led to a terrible situation. "The plan did not work and the mission failed because control was lost at the outset--and, in fact--the rifle elements failed to provide flank and rear security." With the loss of control of the flank and rear guards, the unit began to break apart under relentless enemy attacks. Communications were nonexistent and only a carefully established, well-disseminated operational plan could have rescued the situation. As the trucks full of wounded were halted by enemy fire and roadblocks, it became a situation of every man for himself. Despite many instances of individual heroism, most men who broke through the surrounding enemy forces kept going to the south without a thought for the wounded left behind. A unit had turned into a collection of individuals without direction or control. In the space of four days and five nights of continuous combat, 1,000 men, almost 30 percent of unit strength, were killed or captured. Many of these casualties occurred during the breakout attempt and were direct results of poor staff operations. Individual courage could not replace the failure of the commander and his staff to plan, coordinate and synchronize a complex maneuver in the face of a relentless foe. *Roy Appleman, East of Chosin: Entrapment and Breakout in Korea, 1950. Back to Table of Contents -- Battalion and Brigade Battle Staff Back to CALL List of Issues Back to MagWeb Magazine List © Copyright 2004 by Coalition Web. Inc. This article appears in MagWeb.com (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other articles from military history and related magazines are available at http://www.magweb.com