by CPT Michael Bentley, JRTC Ops Group Senior Aviation Planner
Returning to the Brigade Support Area from a 0600 resupply mission, aircraft Viking 648 receives a follow-on mission from the Battalion TOC. "648, Go to grid VQ12345678 and pickup four casualties and transport them to the CSH. " "648, Roger, does Viking CP (648's company headquarters) know about the change in mission?" "Negative, Viking CP cannot be reached on landline or radio. Can you attempt to raise them on the radio?" "Roger, break, Viking CP, this is Viking 648. " "Viking CP, this is Viking 648. " After three attempts, the crew gives up and departs on the mission. Halfway to the CSH, an SA-18 shoots Viking 648 out of the sky before the crew can get a mayday call off. Three hours later, the battalion and Viking command post (CP) have no idea they have lost an aircraft and crew. Sound familiar? If you have been through JRTC, it should be. During the past six rotations at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), two of the eight company command posts tracked by Observer/Controllers (O/Cs) were functional. This article will discuss the setup, manning and information management functions of the Aviation Company CP. Setup The simple layout of the CP affects greatly how a CP functions, both good and bad. "Where are the mission brief sheets?" or "Where is the logbook for 648?" or "Where is the ACO?" are questions heard too many times at the JRTC. Time is a precious resource ill spent on such routine concerns. The tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) -- there is no approved technique on how a CP should be configured. Rather, the commander with the first sergeant and company leadership must decide -- through trial and error or collective experience -- how the CP can best support the unit. Once the command team determines what works best, that knowledge must be incorporated into a unit standing operating procedure (SOP). There are three observed keys to success in Company CP operations.
2. Functional to the unit. Company sections need operation areas just like the battalion staff in the tactical operations center (TOC). There should be an area for the crew chiefs to close out logbooks, an area for mission planning, and an area for the radio telephone operator (RTO). This last point involves "other" activities that routinely occur in the CP. The CP is NOT an area for card playing, eating or congregating. There are tents that are available for these other activities. The CP OIC and NCOIC are the commander's CP "guard dogs" armed with sufficient "bite" to enforce his policies. All in the unit must understand they serve in the commander's name. 3. Planning and briefing. Crews need space for planning and briefing. The operative consideration in providing that space is separation. The preferred method is separate planning and briefing areas. If separate planning and briefing spaces are not possible, they should at least be separate from the operations area. The last thing a company needs are briefings with half the crews outside the tent trying to listen in and the other half crowded in on top of crews still engaged in planning inside an operations area. Manning Manning is critical to successful CP functions. The CP is the command and control hub for the unit, the mission-planning center, missions tracking, arms storage, and logbook maintenance. Even the best-organized CP will fail if manned improperly by soldiers not prepared for the job. Inexperienced warrant officers, inexperienced lieutenants or junior crew chiefs are not the ones to do these tasks. Nevertheless, units consistently place new warrant officers or new lieutenants as CP O/Cs and our RL III crew chief's as CP RTO. Six of the eight Cps had one of the above in place at any given time during their rotations. Although training on CP functions and operations would help, most of the time, green soldiers are handed the supervision of the central nervous system of the aviation company. They barely understand their own job. They are hardly ready for CP duty. TTP: So how does a commander staff his CP when there are barely enough crews to fly the company helicopters'? First he should announce early in the planning cycle (pre-deployment) that the CP is going to be staffed by trained, experienced soldiers who can function effectively as a team. One solution is to rotate the duty everyday between the platoons so that every third day each platoon leader has to provide an OIC and RTO for the CP. Not only does this give the platoon leader plenty of time to determine which crew he is going to use based on the commander's guidance, but it also puts some of the ownership of the CP on the platoon leader's shoulders. With this technique, the CP has an OIC and an RTO for each 12-hour shift and only one crew is down at any given time. Information Management FunctionsDoctrine hardly addresses TOC functions for a battalion; there is even less discussion of CP functions in an aviation company. Nevertheless, one can use the functions of a TOC and refine them for company use. Every member of the CP must understand those functions. Moreover, they must grasp how, individually and collectively, they contribute to the CP's success -- or its failure. There are four basic functions of the command post that everyone should understand: receive information; distribute information; analyze information; and submit recommendations to the commander. Although simple tasks to state and perform individually, they rarely happen singly. More commonly, they are interwoven simultaneously, and therein lays the art of an effective command post team. Receive information. The first part of information management is to ensure that information is received and recorded accurately. The CP receives a large volume of information from a variety of sources ranging from higher headquarters to aircrews on missions. Out of the eight CPs observed at the JRTC, only three used the DA Form 1348 to log information. Only one recorded the information correctly. The other two either did not enter data correctly or did not properly fill out the log (no times annotated, erratic or illegible information entered). The soldiers in the CP must monitor all communication sources and record information that is delivered. TTP: A suggested TTP is to copy the information coming in on a notebook and read it back to the source before transcribing any information on the DA Form 1348. Do not let the source go until the information is fully understood. This is an old technique. It is old because it has been tried many times and it works. Remember you are going to be the one to relay the mission to the commander and the crew. Speed remains important but accuracy is paramount. Example:
"Eagle 3, this is Viking CP. Send mission, over. " "Mission is one sling of CL V for Bulldog 3 from VQ123456 to WQ123456. Contact Bulldog on FH222 inbound. PZ and LZ are marked with a VS-17 panel, over. " "Roger. Eagle 3, understand mission is one sling of CL V for Bulldog 3 from VQ123456 to WQ123456. Contact Bulldog on FH222 inbound. PZ and LZ are marked with a VS-17 panel, over. " "Viking CP, this is Eagle 3. Affirmative, out. " With the readback complete, the person that received the information is ready to distribute the information and fill out the log sheet. They should enter the time the mission was received and from whom the mission came. What they log should mirror the readback, eliminating any chance of error and misinterpretation. Lastly, they should enter the action taken, such as notifying the mission crew to include the crew chiefs, informing the commander and logging the action with their initials. The initials are important in case there is a question on the details of the mission later. Distribute information. The commander must provide guidance on his information needs. While it remains true that the commander must know everything that is going on in his unit, some information requires immediate attention. Again, it is useful to refine TTPs used at battalion level for company operations. The battalion commander uses his Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs) to identify those needs. Everyone in the TOC should know those CCIRs and inform the battalion commander if one is met. TTP: Company commanders rarely publish their own CCIR for their units, but they should consider doing so. CCIRs at company level let the CP OIC/NCOIC know what is important without need for further debate. Again, it helps to oil the machine and have a smooth running CP. Here are two scenarios for distributing information to company personnel. The first scenario is time-critical information (change to mission, new mission or enemy in the assembly area). In this scenario, the functions work simultaneously. Remember, never distribute information that is not confirmed, and never present half the information to the commander. Time Critical
In the above scenario, the two functions, receiving and distributing information, occurred simultaneously because of the time-critical mission. In the next scenario, time is not a factor so we complete the DA Form 1348 before completing another action. Time not Critical
In the second scenario, the information is not time critical and there is no need to alert the commander immediately. When the commander arrives in the CP, he should be updated. If the mission moves and is earlier than expected, then the scenario may become time critical. By understanding the commander's intent, CCIR, whether or not the information is time critical, the OIC/NCOIC can run the CP effectively. Analyze Information. Given that the CP is the command and control hub for the unit, all information must be kept current. If that sounds like a sound grasp of the obvious, consider that during a recent rotation at JRTC in a 48-hour period, one CP never posted the enemy or friendly graphics. The reason stated by the OIC was, "The situation is changing constantly and I would have to update the map all the time." The OIC/NCOIC of the CP has the most important job in the company. Crews come to the CP expecting current information that may affect their mission. Enemy and friendly graphics affect all and must be kept as current as the battalion's graphics. TTP: One technique to do this is to send someone to the battalion TOC and receive updates every three hours. If three hours does not work, then every six hours, at a minimum, send someone to receive the update. Once the updates are received in the CP, they must be analyzed and changes posted to the graphics. Do not forget to log the action. If the graphics have not changed, post "No change as of xxxx." The Airspace Coordination Order (ACO) is another piece of information that is essential. Published daily at the JRTC, the ACO is usually effective at 0600. The ACO lists all active ranges, restricted operating zones (ROZs), active air corridors and downed aircrew recovery points that are active. TTP: When the ACO is published, the OIC/NCOIC must annotate changes, effective ROZs, and other data on the A2C2 overlay or map. If there are no changes to the ACO, then post "No change to the ACO as of xxxx." Once the changes have been posted on the map or overlay, post the ACO where crews can read and log the action. Here again is the time-critical scenario with column added to see how the information was analyzed. Time Critical
Because the information was current, the crew was able to depart rapidly and the mission succeeded. That might not have been the case if the crew had not received the change to the downed aircrew pickup point (DAPP) as published in the ACO or the enemy situation. Time and time again at the JRTC, crews depart the CP without current enemy graphics or changes to the ACO. They will be shot down by a SA-18 position that the battalion knew about, but the company did not have plotted on the map. Once the crew is on the ground, they proceed to a downed aircrew rally point (DARP) that is not active because they did not have the DARP changes from the ACO. The ultimate test of a CP is how well-informed aircrews are when they launch on a mission. It is, therefore, essential that the CP staff have the most current and most accurate information available. Equally imperative is that the information is easy for aircrews to use. That means making sure graphics are easy to read, ACO information is simple to understand and charts or kneeboard products are legible and accessible. Submit recommendations to the commander. Earlier, we discussed CCIRs and the idea of publishing them at company level for better understanding. The same is true with the commander's intent. For all to understand the commander's intent, he must publish it. Often at a battalion-level TOC, the commander's intent is on a chart or butcher board, seen by all. A company commander, however, rarely publishes his intent unless there is a mission for him to publish an order. That does not have to be the case. For example, the commander might decide that after mission support, force protection is the focus. The CP establishes specific force protection tasks and posts them in the TOC. Force protection improvement is the commander's intent. The CP OIC/NCOIC and unit leaders now know the commander's focus and take action accordingly. ConclusionsAviation Company command posts tend to be weak in units that deploy to the JRTC. The answer is to get back to the basics. Command Posts in aviation companies have operational responsibilities that literally cover hundreds of miles. They are literally the nerve center that connects these far-flung operational assets with the commander's brain. That means they have to be functionally laid out to allow for current operations, planning, and briefings to occur simultaneously. They need to be manned by experienced aviation soldiers trained and tested in staff functions. CP duty is not the place to familiarize green soldiers with field operations, especially at the JRTC. Commanders and their first sergeants need to develop CP SOPs and conduct home-station training with their units to ensure that every member of the company understands his role when his number is called for CP duty. Your unit -- especially your fellow aviator -- is counting on it. Back to Table of Contents -- Techniques and Procedures Back to CALL List of Issues Back to MagWeb Magazine List © Copyright 2005 by Coalition Web. Inc. This article appears in MagWeb.com (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other articles from military history and related magazines are available at http://www.magweb.com |