Background

The fruits of victory won at Talavera had been squandered both by the inability of the Spanish authorities to supply the British army with food and provisions and by the defeat of Venegas' army at Almonacid. Nevertheless, by the end of August, the Junta Central was pressing Wellington to participate in ambitious plans based on a fiction that the French were in retreat. Naturally, Wellington refused to co­operate, knowing that the recently rallied troops under Venegas and those which had served with Cuesta at Talavera were not capable of the ambitions of the junta.

This unpopular body, however, badly needed a success to sway the minds of the Spanish people. They therefore planned a general advance on exterior lines against a more numerous enemy -- neither of which proposal was advisable, even for a more capable body than the combined force under Venegas and Eguia (who had taken over from Cuesta). They were emboldened in their plans by the fact that the Duque del Parque, having assumed command of the Galician army following la Romana's appointment to the junta, had recruited that body up to a significant strength, although the units were widely scattered. His only serious lack was in cavalry, which the junta ordered rectified by the detachment of about 1,000 sabres from Eguia's army. These horsemen went by a circuitous route with their commander, the Prince of Anglona and joined del Parque near Ciudad Rodrigo; this brought the strength of cavalry in the army up to 1,500.

The French had virtually settled into winter quarters around Madrid by October and were not anticipating that they would be attacked. Thus, when news began to filter through that Spanish armies of some size were manoeuvring against them, there was surprise, even if no consternation, among their commanders.

Del Parque's Galician army was potentially the most dangerous of the Spanish Corps because of the number of regiments of the old regular army it contained, and the fact that their general, much like his predecessors, Blake and la Romana, had fed many of the new recruits into the old cadres and not into new regiments. Nevertheless, there were sufficient new regiments and recruits (who had had barely two month's training) that it could not be considered a seasoned body by any stretch of the imagination. It had, however, received a shipment of artillery from Britain and was relatively strong in this arm. The army comprised four divisions and one of these, containing the highest number of raw recruits, was to be left to guard the mountain passes into Galicia.

The French 6th Corps had been placed under the command of its senior divisional commander, Gen. de division Marchand, by Marshal Ney, whilst the latter took a short leave in Paris, and was in cantonments near Salamanca. It had not been brought up to strength following its return from chasing the British into Galicia at the beginning of the year and was thus relatively weak. Its men, however, comprised veterans from the Emperor's campaigns in Germany. It was against this force that del Parque began to manoeuvre by marching from Ciudad Rodrigo to Tamames, which he reached on 5th October. Here, he decided to invite the French to attack him: in this position, he posed a distinct threat to Salamanca and could almost count on some reaction.

Geography

Tamames lies at the junction of the Salamanca­to-Ciudad Rodrigo and Bejar-to-Ciudad Rodrigo roads; it thus covered the road to the important Pass of Bagos. Behind the town is a substantial ridge, which reaches some 1100 metres in height near the town and rises to 1500 metres further to the south-east. It is of some military significance if a means can be found to avoid outflanking efforts just in front of the town. The ridge was lightly wooded at the time and now bears a considerable pine forest, planted to provide a renewable lumber resource. The ridge has a relatively shallow slope at its front but this steepens rapidly as the crest is approached. Tamames, itself, was built around a central square which held the main church, although small ermitas (chapels) existed just above the town on the ridge slope and beside the road to Bejar on the east of the town. These were (and still are, although the one beside the road is ruined) very small buildings of no significant military importance. A mediaeval tower lies to the north of the town which is now partially ruined and somewhat inaccessible due to the tangled undergrowth on its approaches. Its status at the time of the battle is not known and it is not mentioned in the consulted reports.

Del Parque had spent the best part of a fortnight at Tamames before the battle and thus had plenty of time to prepare and reconnoitre. It is entirely possible, although not reported, that he had the approaches staked to indicate ranges for artillery and small arms, and was aware of the most likely point of attack by his enemy. His battle line initially ran from the point where the ridge peters out, on his left, to where a small arroyo descends from the ridge. He covered the left flank by stationing his entire cavalry force there and placed his infantry roughly parallel to the Bejar road, with two divisions in line, Martin la Carrera on the left just above the town, and Francisco Losada on the right -- both supported by artillery at intervals. His reserve comprised the division of the Conde de Belvedez (called Belveder by Sir Charles Oman) who was stationed on the reverse slope -- a ruse frequently used by Wellington -- close to a road, now used as a jogging track, which ran between two crests. Belvedez was thus not visible to an enemy approaching from the direction of the town. Finally, two battalions of light infantry, possibly 1o and 2o Rgtos. de Cataluna, were stationed in the town itself, which formed a "choke point" to divide the attacker's force.

After a march of some fourteen miles, Marchand's corps came in sight of the Spanish army drawn up in line of battle. Bearing in mind that the Spanish had gained only a single victory, at Bailen, prior to this (Talavera having not been fought primarily by the Spanish) and had suffered significant defeats at Medina de Rioseco, Ucles, Medellin and Almonacid, Marchand almost certainly believed he was about to add to the list. Leaving a reserve (Labassee's infantry brigade and supporting artillery, together with 25e dragons a cheval) behind the town and instructing Marcognet's brigade to attack Losada's left and two battalions of 25e Leger to pin his right, Maucune marched his brigade - six battalions of Marchand's division -- in an outflanking manoeuvre to the west of Tamames. He was supported by his divisional artillery, Mananne's light cavalry brigade of chasseurs a cheval and hussards and 15e dragons a cheval.

Del Parque watched this anticipated activity with some interest and ordered his infantry to refuse their left so as to form a line en potence to the original one and prevent the French from gaining an advantage.The Spanish cavalry were now positioned to outflank any attack on their infantry. Marchand's main attacking force began to ascend the ridge and, at the appropriate moment, deployed and sent out skirmishers. There were two remaining regiments of Spanish light infantry (Barbastro and Gerona) who could have deployed into skirmish order to compete with the French voltigeurs. We do not have any record of whether both or only one actually did so. As the skirmish developed, the French light cavalry brigade charged the centre of the Spanish line at an oblique angle. The Spanish cavalry were themselves, ordered to charge the French right flank but were, however, thwarted by two battalions of 69e Ligne infantry who managed to form squares and give a volley.

This proved more than the mixed regiments of poorly mounted Spanish horse could take and they went about in short order. Possibly due to the disorganisation caused by skirmisher deployment (Spanish troops were not considered adept at battlefield manoeuvre) or more likely due to the retreat of the Spanish cavalry, the French cavalry broke through the Spanish infantry, capturing an artillery piece in the process. This translation of a historical pamphlet, provided by the Tamames Local Authority, may give a clue: "The French Gen. Mananne*, at the front of the light cavalry, took advantage of an inopportune movement by the 2nd brigade of the Spanish troopers and managed to present a moment of the greatest hope to his army. The French proceeded to seize a cannon and penetrated into the middle of their disordered enemies."

*We could find no record of a French General Mananne present at the battle. It is possible that this is a misprint for "Maucurre" -- the infantry general commanding the division containing the 69e Regt., whose battalions formed the squares which saw off the Spanish cavalry. If that is the case, Maucune was either attempting to lead a cavalry charge, or the words "in front" mean he was simply ahead of the cavalry and protected their charge from that of the Spanish cavalry by getting his infantry into square. Otherwise, we suspect that Marianne might have been a staff officer.

It does not say that the French cavalry charged the Spanish line but we know from other histories that Lorcet's brigade did. A later passage in the leaflet suggests that the 2nd was the only Spanish cavalry brigade to be used in this attack.

All was not lost, however since, as the leaflet continues, due to "...the admirable courage of Don Martin de la Carrera which did not diminish in spite of his finding himself almost surrounded by the French and with his horse wounded by two musket balls and a bayonet stab..." and "...the gallant example of D. Gabriel de Mendizebal, who jumped to the ground [from horseback] to rally the soldiers and re­establish order..:" the disorder did not become a rout. Del Parque arrived at the scene and ordered Belvedez, together with the rest of the Spanish cavalry (i.e. 1st brigade) to join the battle. The now disordered French were thus suddenly confronted by a fresh Spanish division, through which the now rallied 1st division passed in good order and more horsemen on their flank. La Carrera's division turned and, together with Belvedez's men poured musketry into the French. This was enough to send them reeling back towards Tamames.

Meanwhile, Marcognet's attack on Losada had commenced but, without artillery support (their guns were left with the reserve) to reply to the Spanish cannonade, it rapidly stalled. Considerable slaughter was done to the French battalions by artilleryand musketry from the steady Spanish line are soon Marcognet's men were streaming back down the hill. 25e Leger, who had not seriously threatened Losada's right, retired once they saw the other combats go against their comrades.

So was achieved the second Spanish victory against French arms. Possibly more significant than that at Bailen because of the better quality of the troops they were fighting but of less importance, since there was little pursuit of the vanquished and no wholesale surrender as at Bailen. Sad to say, for Spanish fortunes, del Parque was soundly defeated six weeks later at Alba de Tormes, when part of his army was caught bivouacking on the wrong side of the river.