by Sean Sweeney
Most rules take account of the way units execute orders, but rules tend not to reflect a commander's trust in his units. Will his men fight? Will they obey orders? If he commits them too early will they feel 'ill used' and break? Can they be relied upon as a reserve - will they actually 'ride to the rescue' or sidle off? The unit's suspect loyalty affects the battleplan. Which troops should be used where? When should they be used? If you cannot rely upon units, do you keep them in reserve or use them as 'cannon fodder'? Should such troops be stiffened by your elite units? Will such troops only obey orders if you yourself are present? This is not a question of morale. 'A' class troops led by an independent general may not be given the opportunity to prove themselves. A key question is whether or not the commander is in control of his army or a hostage to his sub commanders. Historically, in prestanding army days, generals had to cobble together an army of differing loyalties. Alasdair MacColla's troops were more inclined to settle old scores with the Campbells or to minimise Covenanter actions in Ulster than to secure a Royalist victory. His troops could be relied upon to fight well, but might not turn up in time to participate! MacColla's own men had to deal with unreliable allies in Ireland in turn, not knowing if their backs would be covered. Would Prince Rupert's Irish troops fight harder knowing that they and their camp followers faced execution if captured? Would they be uneasy about their allies surrendering and leaving them to fend for themselves? Might they be less inclined to fight if the odds appeared too high (ED - or fight harder knowing the penalty for failure?). Irish troops fighting for France in the 18th century also faced execution if captured. Similar treatment faced African - Americans fighting in the Union armies during the ACW. There is also potential for troops to seek out their own targets. The Irish element of a French army when faced with an Anglo - Allied army would prefer to attack the English part. Such troops would have their own agenda, slightly but significantly different from the rest of the army's. A situation could also exist where a leader may not wish an ally to become too powerful. He may not wish to destroy an enemy, needing the threat to limit the power of his ally. There will also be a tendency for independent units to support each other before supporting their allies. Also, such independent units tend to resist attempts to split them up. HOW SHOULD ALL OF THIS RELATE TO THE TABLETOP? An independent command may be defined as a group of troops belonging to an army, sharing it's basic goals, marching to the same tune but slightly out of step. Thus having the potential to disrupt the rest. This forces the a general to take account of the politics of command. You can create councils of war and designate independent commanders. If you want you can indulge in all sorts of Machiavellian intrigues, drawing up endless contracts between allies. This is only possible if you have more than one player a side. If you are limited to one player a side you could dice at every opportunity but this will tend to slow the game too much. You can define your independent commanders as cautious in some circumstances, bold in others and generally as unreliable. Playing with 'Forlorn Hope' and an Ulster confederate army I've found that minor tinkering with the rules can have a knock on affect. Units decide whether or not to follow orders, thus forcing commanders to plan for the possibility of reluctance or non compliance. Specifically, my amendments to 'Forlorn Hope' are as follows: FORLORN HOPE
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