Strategy & Tactics #'s 158 and 159: Red Sun/Red Star; Zeppelin Command #22: Antietam Counter-Attack #4: Korea '95 Casus Belli Special Issue #7: Marengo S&T appears now to be concentrating on publishing experimental designs on off-the-beaten path subjects, highlighted by giving Joe Miranda a fairly free hand. Decision, while having come up with a good, basic marketing theory, seems incapable of following through on it consistently. Their development has been erratic, their success rate sporadic. For every Franco-Prussian War there is one of those Schettler abominations. In eschewing the XTR design philosophy of Fitting to Format, Decision seems to be unable to find a method that ensures a stability of performance. Perhaps that comes with the territory, of always trying something new and unusual. It also comes from not having a basic philosophy on which to fall back. To wit, we have the latest two S&T'ers, for which we have recruited two new reviewers. Our correspondent in Germany, Ulrich Blennemann, reports that Red Sun/Red Star, the #158 game on the Sino(Russo)-Japanese conflict in the late '30's, is a work with minor flaws that is well worth the rather immense effort it takes to play. This is a handsome magazine game, with a map by newcomer, Simonitch-trainee Joe Youst. (Ed. I met Joe several years ago at an Origins, where he was demonstrating his own designs on Korea and Sinai. The maps were marvelous, and Joe is a talent to watch.) I'm not a fan of Pavek counters, but these are probably his best.The game is well-developed, with clearly written rules, no mean feat considering their density. Some of the mechanics are quite intricate, and playing the game takes much "thought", resulting in turns which often run in excess of 30-40 minutes. Designer Mark Stille has come up with a lot for both players to do and many tactical-level decisions to make. There is lots of air, lots of artillery and some rather intricate, but sensible, ground combat mechanics. Take the air game. There are dogfights, rear-area bombing (wreaking havoc on supply lines), and interdiction. Ground combat uses Prepared Attack - before movement - and Hasty Attacks, during Movement. All ground combat includes the concept of Target Priority and features lots of trading of fire, especially in the artillery arm. The game's major drawback is the Track Replacement Point System, which appears to have been put in place by developer Kirk Schlesinger to replace the original SP marker/Roster Sheet system Stille had instilled (installed?). This is one of those Damned-if-you do ", etc. mechanics. Some people hate Roster Sheets, some hate loss markers. I don't like this track, which tends to somewhat warp unit strengths. However, I understand why it's there; I only wish a Roster Sheet alternate had been provided. If all of this sounds like some Schettler Clone, be advised that RS2 is anything but. Yes, it is detailed, but it- and the player - is not overwhelmed by the detail. There is a lot of cause-and-effect design and much insight without marginalia. This is a meaty, thoughtful, albeit slow-moving game. It will not be for everybody, and it's certainly not for those looking for a fast afternoon of cardboard slamming. It is an S&T worth buying, though. Which is more than Kirk Turner can say for The Game That Wouldn't Die - But Should Have: Zeppelin, from S&T #159. This was an original design from Bill Koff (and extensively reworked by Mike McVeigh) that is probably older than half of Command's subscribers. It bounced around from S&T editor to S&T editor, each convinced that it had unfixable flaws. You know what they say about test-taking? First Guess Is Usually Right. Well, Doc Decision finally let it loose of its moorings, and what we appear to have, as Kirk will tell you, is Hindenburg II. Having heard of the game's rather lengthy provenance, I was looking forward to it with the same glee I had reserved for Chaco, Clinton's Inauguration and a visit to the dentist. (Ed. Kirk is one, so he ought to know. Republicans and Root Canal two peas in a pod.) I was not disappointed. We have, yet again, another one of those minimalist maps from Mark Simonitch, this one covering the countries bordering the English Channel in 1918. Then again, he's only reproducing what they send him, so why beat on his head when we can bash some others. Let's look at the counters; then again, let's not. But what ho? Who did the Z counters? Why, it's none other than John Schettler branching out into graphics, it appears. Actually, they do sport a rather interesting font, rather spidery but flavorful. The colors are another thing, though AH 1970, red & blue, a veritable Kriegspiel Resurrection. We've also got 15 pages of rules and 8 pages of charts - 38 in all - and aids, the latter not boding well for your wrist. Toma pictures should make one of their low-budget specials on this one: "Dierolling Babes in Modifier Hell". I have a deep, philosophical question. Why does Decision take a complex subject, such as the Seven Days Battles, and boil it down to 2+ pages of Basic rules, and then take what should be a relatively simple, playable matter, such WWI air operations, and give it 16+ pages of what amounts to undroppable ballast? Not even the Montgolfier Brothers could get this bag of hot air off the ground. I become immediately suspicious when a Sequence of Play covers almost two pages, and you don't get to Movement until page 11. The rules are poorly organized, poorly written , and poorly edited. Three out of three; that ain't bad - for baseball. More a case of three strikes and you're out. Z is a tactical abstraction of air-to-air combat between Germany and Britain in WWI. The system is based on assigning missions and then executing them. The potential for something is here, but it is difficult, peering through the Channel Fog that passes as rules, to see what it might have been. Zeppelins get to fly to a map area on a specific mission, against which the opponent has arrayed a host of fixed-wing aircraft with a wide variety of "missions". If the mission allows enemy planes to "meet", air-to-air combat takes place off-map as a series of rounds. The CRT is quite linear, with results in damages and destruction. Interestingly, the same CRT is used for ALL types of combat: coastal bombing, sea base attacks, etc. One size fits all. There's lots to do here; you can rescue ditched crews, bomb a factory, sight submarines I guess if you consider doing any of these fun you might get something out of Der Z. I don't, and I didn't. Zeppelin is an over-ambitious project that tries to do too much with too little. It is neither elegant nor enjoyable. Oh the inhumanity of it all . From our Gallic brethren across the sea - Jeux Descartes - comes a special, wargaming only issue of the estimable "Casus Belli" (Hors-Sιrie No.7), complete with a Marengo game. True, it's in French, but if you took even one year of language and have ever read a set of wargame rules, you can muddle through this rather simple game. It will take some cutting-and-paste, as the counters are unmounted; they're also somewhat larger than the map's hexes for reasons best left to their next management meeting. The map is the best Marengo map we've seen and a deal more accurate than any other games on the subject. I pushed the counters around for about half a game, and I mostly found that it played about the same as the Marengo game in NFB (reviewed herein) - with one remarkable difference. The designer, Marc Brandsma's CRT is all retreats and routs; no "direct" losses! Units are eliminated only when they cannot retreat as directed. Interesting juxtaposition to the Miranda design theory in NFB (Ed. reviewed herein). Both games, though, are curiously similar in their disregard of cavalry's ability to avoid combat, although Brandsma gives his dragoons, cuirassiers and such a bit more to do. All fairly basic stuff, almost as if JD was afraid to tax the interest of their subscribers too much. As the editorial by mon ami, Laurent Henninger, wargaming's Camille Desmoulins, points out, this all-history approach is something of a "gamble" for JD, which often looks askance at wargaming as the weak sister of the hobby. They're not the only company. Diametrically opposed to this way of thinking is a new "epidemic": Multiple Title-Topic Syndrome. Last BROG it was Blood & Iron. Now we have two Korea '95 games, both on a (hopefully) hypothetical war in the near future and both reviewed by Carl Gruber. As Carl shows you, aside from their titles, these two games have little in common; but both have their merits. The fact that Counter-Attack #4 even came out is a re-affirmation of the efficacy of the Johnson's Dancing Dog Theory. The parent company, Pacific Rim, operates with all the secrecy, but little of the effect, of a Masonic Lodge. On a division and brigade level, this Korea '95, from the knowledgeable Charles Kamps, Jr., takes you through a hypothetical Korean conflict at a scale of 12 km per hex and 48 hours to the turn. As simple as GMT's K-95 is complex, this is a lean but solid design, with most of the systems using standard, familiar mechanics. The play turn is sequential, (North Korea goes first); combat is by odds/ratio, with results in losses, retreats, exchanges and eliminations. There is no unit step reduction which, given the lethality of modern combat, is probably very accurate. Only South Korea has any air power in this game, and it appears each turn as a random number of air points which are used as additional combat factors. Naval warfare is limited to a US Navy task group in certain scenarios. North Korea's bag of goodies consists of numerous UW (unconventional warfare) units, both airborne and marine, that keep popping up in the most annoying places, chemical warfare and tunnels. Both sides have a few helicopter units. The game does not have any rules for EW, missiles or any of the other accoutrements of modern war. Given the designer's previously shown expertise in this area, these have, no doubt, been factored into the game. Their absence, however, does sometimes make Korea '95 seem a bit WWII-ish. In spite of its otherwise standard features, Korea '95 does have some interesting twists. The North Korean side (only) has army headquarters, which allow increased stacking and which also provide combat support. Query: if the increased stacking limit under an HQ simulates better C3i [Ed. Carl's acronym, not mine but interesting, nonetheless], is the designer saying that the ROK forces have an inferior command structure? A unit combat matrix juxtaposes armor, marine troops, mech and infantry in open or rough terrain for combat die roll modifiers. There are no zones of control, but then again, who needs them in Korea's awful terrain, which is effectively represented on the detailed game-map. One of the game's better touches is a "second echelon advance" rule. After a successful friendly attack has either destroyed or dislodged enemy units from a hex, adjacent friendly units that did not participate in that attack get an extra movement phase. If you can set up effective attacks and back them up with reserves, the "second echelon advance" is a very effective way to break an enemy line. This is one of those simple-yet-effective rules that surprises mostly because it hasn't seen more use in division-level games. Another deadly device is ROK air interdiction, an especially good weapon to use against the North Korean HQ's which give the communist attacks so much extra punch. Militia point values for cities and combined arms assault brigades round out the list of "chrome" in this game. Although CA's K-95 does not offer anything like the detail and dash of GMT's, it is still a solid and challenging game with good graphic quality. The rules are tight and logical, and the charts and tables are easy to use. Magazine games are too often a case of making the foot fit the shoe. Korea '95 succeeds in avoiding The Format/Distortion Pitfall, proving a competent design in a small package. If GMT's version allows you explore all nuances and complexities of the situation, C-A's lets players explore the different strategies and avenues of attack without such baroque overlays. To use the old Auto-Anomoly, if the GMT game is a highly-tuned Jaguar (which usually needs regular trips to the shop to keep it up and running), Kamps' Korea is a Ford Escort. Nothing fancy, but it's solid, reliable and gets you from point A to B. Kamps shows you that simple games don't have to be simple-minded. And then we have Command #22, and Jon Southard's Antietam game. Jon is a much-admired designer with whom I have worked in the past. However, whenever dealing with an XTR product it is always difficult to tell where the designer ends and XTR picks up (or intrudes, as some might say). Here the results, although Command-familiar in many ways, are pretty good, albeit with a few reservations. Antietam is not the most felicitous gaming subject around, as I have found in two tries (win one, lose one). It requires a host of rules to hamstring the Union Player, and not many gamers like being told they can NOT do something. But it is a popular battle, especially with ACW gamers, and given all of this as background, Antietam presents a relatively ideal medium in which to examine the XTR design philosophy. I liked playing Antietam; in several, positive ways it is a quintessential Command game: fast, bloody, clean, crisp, easy to play, devoid of any errata of note, and it mirrors history rather well. On the other hand, it is also somewhat bland, begs several questions, raises a host of others, and, in general, follows the XTR Maxim of Designing for Effect, rather than Cause. I used the word "mirror", above, because a mirror "reflects", rather than reveals, which is what virtually all XTR games do. They show you What; they rarely help you to find out Why. I prefer games that do the latter; that is my inherent bias. However, it is not the only reason to play games; it is, however, a valid one, a validity which Ty is loathe to accept. A perfect example of "What vs Why" is the Antietam counters, of which there are lots 280+ of them. Why so many? Isn't this brigade level? Yes, but XTR eschews both Step Loss markers and Roster Sheets. Instead, if a unit has 6 steps, they give you three, back-printed counters for that unit. Very generous of them, but while eliminating paper work and counter stacks, it creates filing and sorting problems especially if you want to play the game more than once. The trade-off level does depend on what you prefer; give them credit for "erring" on the side of More is Better. However, that's not what I'm after here. As each brigade takes a step loss it not only loses combat strength (a point a step), it also loses Movement Points, again, one per step. I hesitate to say this is a bit loony - I remember the same rule in the old, but venerated, Iron Crown classic, Manassas, for the leaders, who suffered the same fate each time they got "hit" apparently wounds to the legs and arms - mostly because there is no explanation forthcoming. I assume it is an effort to design in the gradually reduced effectiveness a brigade suffers as it takes losses. However, no acknowledgement is made of the fact that many of the CSA units were almost walked to death when they arrived. 17 Confederate regiments had strengths of around 50 - or less; Warren and Grigsby's brigades (Jones' division) had no regiment - of the 8 present - with more than 100 or so men. As a matter of fact, several brigades were, while undoubtedly courageous and committed, so reduced as to be almost useless as fighting units. Yet, reduced as they are, they start with MA's of '9', one point higher than even the crackest of Union brigades. And, as a six-step brigade can be reduced to a MA of '3', that "bled dry", "bone weary" Confederate brigade can have a MA three times (3x!!) that of its much-reduced opponent. I cannot see any acceptable rationale for this, and I wish XTR/Southard had provided their's. Yet another example of effect without question (or answer) is the mystifying -2 dieroll modifier artillery is saddled with when firing at infantry. Almost every unit on the map is infantry! What's going on here? Do you mean to tell me that - using the game scales - two batteries of guns firing at 2500 men approaching across an open field, at a range of around 3-400 yards, is going to have NO chance of causing any effect of any kind? If this isn't an errata situation, I'd sure like some sort of rationalization/explanation. (Yet again.) Design Philosophy I think this is not so much strange as a pure exercise in Designing for Effect which gives me an opportunity to comment on a few aspects of Ty's design philosophy, as so definitively expressed in this issue. There was a lot to chew on Ty's column, so much so that, with what could provide some much-needed, self-deprecating humor, this could become a regular feature called "Ty-rade". I'll focus on just one, as it serves to illustrate a divergence in design philosophy with which Ty appears reluctant to come to terms. "Those are the kind [sic] of effects we try to model into all our wargames: we put the emphasis on the action, working in the (admittedly important) background stuff as limits or enhancers . I've rejected the complexity-fetishists' approach because it's ultimately self -frustrating [Ed: my emphasis) and unworkable. [S]tay away from the guy who must have ever more complex systems to satisfy his hunger for "real simulation." Those are the guys who win their games by being the first to memorize the newest craze . That's not my idea of "real" generalship or "simulation". But it may be someone else's, Ty, and that's the point you miss entirely. Everyone designing games out their has their own viewpoint on what a "historical simulation/game" should be, and each one of those viewpoints - be it Mark Herman's, Joe Miranda's, Dean Essig's, Larry Baggett's, or Ty Bomba's - is valid for that person, and for anyone who enjoys their work. I may not think a given designer was very successful in expressing his particular slant on his subject, but that does not invalidate what he was intending to do. And not everyone endorses Vince Lombardi when they play; there are other reasons. Ty, however, is unwilling to accept that anyone else might have a valid position. As he says, " there is a vocal group (centered around such producers as Clash of Arms, The Gamers, etc.) who feel it's these very rules - [the problems posed by command/control and logistics dealt with in lengthy rules sections and procedures ] - and those alone - that make what would otherwise be "just a game" into a "simulation". At the philosophical level, I've never understood that view." Ain't that the truth and isn't that the problem (if you're upset enough to consider this a problem). Bomba just doesn't understand, and if HE doesn't understand, neither should you. Furthermore, if you do, you are obviously in league with such gaming devils as the Evil Empire of Phoenixville and the Horrible D&D Boys (Dean and Dave) of Illinois. In insisting on the "rightness" of his view, in attempting to bring Enlightenment to the overwrought masses, he renders himself a sort of Zwingli sans portfolio, envisioning fire and brimstone for all of the unfaithful. I fully understand - and greatly appreciate - that Ty, like most others - takes his work seriously. What Ty should try and remember is that this is NOT serious work. There's a difference. That said, let it be known that I think Antietam is a pretty good game. Most of it is quite simple and familiar; Igo-Hugo with some rather nice trappings. The combat system is more subtle and evocative than one usually finds in Command games. In forcing the player into one-on-one attacks regardless of how many units are involved, and then providing two rounds of combat, Southard (we'll extend him the credit) gives the player the type of bloody battles of which Antietam was the most tragic example. That I think the Union will win about 2/3 of the time - try starting off by double-timing I Corps between Nicodemus Hill and the West Woods while doing the same for XII Corps east of the woods - even with their two-corps maximum activation (a rule somewhat more sophisticated than it appears to be on the surface), doesn't detract from its allure as real brutal head-basher. I didn't learn much about why anything happened the way it did, nor are there many opportunities for such insight. But there are other games on Antietam for that, and this is certainly the best of the brigade-level lot. Given the fairly high level of quality at Command, among other things, I can't wait to see what Ty and Company do with the next issue game which happens to be my design (on Sekigahara). Ty once told me - or was it Chris; memory fades - that they intend to make it into the "most popular Richard Berg game of all time." Can't argue with that sort of enthusiasm at least not yet. I note, in passing, the arrival of the four in-house magazines: GMT's "C3i", GR/D's "Europa", The Gamers' "Operations", and AH's "The General". They all contain marvelous support for their company's products, with C3i being the most visually interesting, by a fairly wide margin. Anyone who plays ANY of the games from these companies is missing out on a good thing if they don't subscribe. Whatever the cost of a sub, you'll get it back in extra information, new scenarios, and even extra counters. I also note XTR/Command's excellent product support; each issue usually contains extra counters for any number of past and future games. Back to Berg's Review of Games Vol. II # 9 Table of Contents Back to Berg's Review of Games List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1992 by Richard Berg This article appears in MagWeb.com (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other articles from military history and related magazines are available at http://www.magweb.com