Original Design by Mark Herman and Richard Berg
Reviewed by John A. Walker
For a long time in the Wild and Wonderful World of Wargames the accepted marketing theory was that you just couldn't sell "ancients": too static, too boring. GMT's "Great Battles of History" series has smashed that theory to smithereens, challenging the accepted theories by showing formed infantry armies and their battles as dynamic and varied, with SPQR becoming one of the best-selling games in the hobby. The latest installment, Great Battles of Julius Caesar, which provides players with all six of the battles of the Roman Civil War, manages to maintain the high level of variety with a somewhat diminished complexity. Physically, Caesar provides the same high-level graphic quality that MacGowan and GMT have used to ensure the system's popularity. Yes, MacGowan's distinctive counters have engendered much commentary, pro and con, but they do manage to convey a tremendous amount of information as painlessly - and colorfully - as any in the hobby. The little touches, such as using square background field in contrasting colors for each legion, and the use of size-different fonts for numbers and letters, are most appreciated. The maps are the usual classical-era stuff - except for the interesting Dyrrhachium-Lesnikia map - and the rulesbook is well laid out, with only a few "dark spots". Actually, most of the rules are the same as in SPQR (and especially SPQR II), except for some minor changes and one major alteration. Gone are the overwrought Stacking rules required by the mid-Republican Roman armies of hastati and principes, and similarly removed are SPQR's restrictive (albeit applicable) Line Command rules. The latter is the one major change in the system, with Caesar adapting a much stricter, hierarchal command system which, conversely, allows the combat units much greater ease and fluidity in execution. None of it will be unfamiliar to GBH aficionados … so much so that I think a deeper look at one of the system's major mechanics -- The Trump -- is warranted. Although he is not the only military commander to have beaten heavy odds, no one courted them to quite the same extent as Caesar. And since this is a game on military history's preeminent escape artist, it is particularly appropriate to examine the system's take on the power of higher commanders, as illuminated by the rule on Trumping. Trumping is the term used for attempts by leaders to jump ahead of an otherwise, preset activation queue. Trump attempts occur when a player sees a special advantage in either activating a particular legion or section before an opponent can do something, or in trying to stop an opponent from doing same. Success is based squarely on capability, as expressed by the leader's Initiative Rating, and an important play corollary of a successful trump is a reduction of the capabilities of all bypassed leaders. (The likelihood of a trump attempt failing ranges from 70% for all tribunes to from 60%-20% for cavalry praefects, section commanders and Overall Commanders.) At first blush, all of these effects strain credulity. The system seems to imply that an upward spike in efficiency on the part of the Trumper directly affects other leaders (and their units), units often located a considerable distance from each other. On the surface, there appears to be a disjunction of Cause and Effect. But do trumps actually cause the consequences that follow from them? In practice. I think not. It is misreading things to view the trumping leader as acting in some way directly on the trump-affected leaders. What really appears to be happening is a change in the Turn-Equivalent, with the "turn" becoming shorter for those leaders who cannot keep up, as it were, with the more efficient Trumpers. Ultimately, Trumping proves to be quite innovative, providing the system with extraordinary play value. Because even a failed trump attempt does not return things to the status quo ante, this makes every trump attempt - failed or successful - a dramatic event. As a result, the system continually tests one's ability to react to changing circumstances, the aspect of military leadership most open to wargame simulation. The other principal focus of the GBH system is combined-arms tactics. Wherein, in previous games in the system, there was much weapon/system differentiation, in Caesar virtually all units are legionary cohorts, raising a specter of monotony. Yet, the orders of battle, wherein the legions are now rated for ability/training levels (Veteran, Recruit and Conscript), the terrain, and the optional rules, provide more than enough variety to offset the sameness of organization. And considering its degree of detail, shock-execution is surpisingly fast-paced. It seems to me that the procedure has much less friction that fire procedures in gunpowder games, wherein the typical unit has several potential targets … and targetting (complete with LOS problems) is the sort of thing over which players tend to hesitate. Shocking targetting, by contrast, is comparatively self-evident. Add to this the paucity of discretionary DRMs, a CRT keyed to unit type and angle of attack, plus inter-locking ZOC's, rapid accrual of Cohesion Hits (the sole result of shock is disintegration of a unit's formation cohesion), and battles develop at a satisfying pace. Even the large scenarios, such as Pharsalus and Munda, are relatively "finishable". And those two scenarios are quite large, indeed. They are two of the three, set-piece battles in the box. (Thapsus is the third). While Pharsalus is certainly the most famous battle included, it is also structurally less appealing than either Thapsus or Munda. The mostly flat terrain and the limited field of maneuver of the non-cohort units is relatively monotonous. What is handled well in Pharsalus is the crucial element of the celebratedly disastrous Senatorial cavalry attacks and Caesar's "refused" fourth line. Even though the rule applied to this situation is "forced", it does permit Pompey to control the timing of his cavalry, and the entire affair is rendered playably, credibly … and accurately. Thapsus and Munda, on the other hand, are where the system shines. The optional (but recommended for play) rules for Numidian reinforcements restore balance to what was, historically, a blow-out, turning Thapsus into a seesawing, play-for-time situation. The mega-battle of Munda is also gameworthy because of its asymmetry, from the uphill terrain and the Senatorial camp, to the wide variety of leadership and orders of battle. The smaller Ruspina is not so much a game as a tactical problem, one which highlights both sides of Caesar's military personality: his almost indefensible risk-taking propensities, counter-balanced by his remarkable grasp of tactical niceties. Ruspina, a sort of mini-Carrhae, throws the spotlight on Caesar's vaunted ability to, time and again, slip the cuffs and escape annihilation. The sibling scenarios of Dyrrhachium and Lesnikia are most unusual within the pantheon of GBH battles. The terrain is highly particularized, with lots of woods, rivers and a host of camps, ramparts and assorted fortifications, complete with night and surprise attacks. Unfortunately, the fortification rules are somewhat opaque and underdone … and has anyone noticed the glaring drm glitch in the Lesnikia Night Detection rule? Regardless, while each battle in the set is an analytical tour de force, Dyrrhachium and Lesnikia take the palm in that respect. Enjoyable games on siege situations are rarities in the hobby; these two succeed by focusing on decisive moments in which movement and surprise become the important elements. Even with all of this, there are problems. Play would feel cleaner were there fewer markers, although the system has become fairly ingenious in terms of adding important historical elements. I also experience a twinge of skepticism about the depiction of skirmishers, which are now activated, en masse, in their own phase … which activation is charged against the OC! It seems to me that skirmisher usage should be more fragmented and unpredictable, and less OC-dependent. And Caesars most obvious weakness, which it shares with other GBH games, is frequent play imbalance. Only Pharsalus and Munda are balanced in the historical versions, as the designers point out. However, as was done with SPQR II, rules and suggestions for achieving competitive balance are abundantly included, and these go a long way to greatly enhance replay value. I am not, on principle, opposed to designed that subordinate some historical factors in order to enhance playability. The success or failure of that approach often depends on whether, and how accurately, the omitted variables affect elements directly simulated. In Caesar, however, the aim was to includes all important variables as discrete elements. Were it for diligence and historical insight alone, Herman and Berg would deserve an accolade; but those things, alone, would not have given them the triumph they have earned for Caesar. Many, highly heuristic games are merely ponderable. Caesar is more than that. As a game - a concept to which historical accuracy is integral - Caesar is a resounding success. Open the gates of Rome and let the legions in; let's all celebrate the consul's Triumph. CAPSULE COMMENTSGraphic Presentation: Top-notch.
from GMT
Back to Berg's Review of Games Vol. II # 14 Table of Contents Back to Berg's Review of Games List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1993 by Richard Berg This article appears in MagWeb.com (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other articles from military history and related magazines are available at http://www.magweb.com |