Cassell, 2001, $9.95, ISBN 0-304-35644-1, paperback, 275 pages

This reprint of the 1990 book provides a tidy little summary of the successful German conquest of France in 1940. It is written with a decidedly pro-British slant, with severe criticisms of French, Dutch, and Belgian leadership.

I suppose that should be expected, although Warner gives full credit to the Germans for their preparations, execution, and sheer audacity.

He also examines German leadership during the famous panzer halt outside Dunkirk, concluding it was a military decision arising from concern over an exposed flank rather than political partisanship towards Goring.

Of note is the siege and destruction of the 51st Highland Division at St. Valery-en-Caux, although Warner points out the division was under French high command, not British. He also notes the landing of the 1st Armored Division at Le Havre, Cherbourg, and Calais and subsequent attacks in early June.

Overall, Warner’s book provides a concise overview of the campaign--not flashy and not particularly exciting, but solid in its approach.