To support his contention, Stolfi gathers a considerable amount of information from the opening of the war in 1939 to the end of year 1941. He compares the rate of advance, supply situation, opposing forces, and other quantitative data, adds a dose of psychological analysis of Hitler's actions and directives, examines the ability of the Soviet political and military to respond, and moulds it into his central thesis that the decision to turn south eliminated any chance of winning the war.

"No historian can justify a claim that the Soviets were in control of events in White Russia in June 1941. The Germans not only overran the technical means and physical avenues of command and control of the Soviet leadership, but they also exceeded the capacity of the Soviets to cope psychologically with the advance...Battlewise German troops at all levels observed that Soviet attacks came from illogical directions, repeated with mulish obstinacy at locations and times that made them self-destructive." (pg. 129)

Stolfi zeros in on the July battles, describing the thrusts and encirclements typical of Blitzkrig doctrine, and looks at the overall effectiveness of the armies.

The relevant facts of the combat in front of Army Group Center in June and July 1941 are that the Russians swiftly lost well over a million men killed, wounded and captured. They also lost staggering amounts of war material while being smoothly shoved back 700km into the Soviet Union, directly toward Moscow." (pg. 137)

All this analysis spirals in ever tighter to focus on a three-month period: August to October 1941. Stolfi extends his arguments against the backdrop of earlier campaigns, and most importantly, the post-Ukraine advance towards Moscow: Operation Typhoon. Comparing rates of advance with the Soviet defense, he delivers a strong argument that the Germans had the right men, material, and doctrine at the right place and right time to complete the conquest of the Soviet Union (European) and seize the important Moscow-Gorki mobilization area.

"Siege" Mentality

Entering into the decision to turn the panzers south instead of east was Hitler's economic "siege" mentality. Although capable of grand and sweeping political decisions beneficial to Germany, once started, Hitler's thinking quickly devolved into a bunker mentality--a sort of WWI holdover that drove him to try and keep everything conquered rather than go for the knockout victory.

Stolfi credits Guderian in France for virtually ignoring orders and constantly pushing westward. In the east, it becamse a different story as the economic potential of the Ukraine lured Hitler into his fateful--and ultimately fatal says Stolfi--decision.

"He [Hitler] determined to pace Barbarossa to the seizure of Leningrad, the eastern Ukraine, and the Crimea for economic reasons. It is the supreme irony that of his bold and unrestrained foreign policy from 1935 to 1941 that he was defeated by his restrained and realistically proportioned concern over the seizure of economic targets in Russia." (pg. 209)

Stolfi argues persuasively that Alamein, Kursk, Stalingrad were not the turning points changing Germany's string of victories into inevitable defeat. It was the two-month delay for the southward push, he contends, which frittered away time necessary to drive ever eastward, and postulates the results of an Operation Typhoon launched in mid-August with 20 panzer/motorized infantry and 25 infantry divisions against 16 intact Russian divisions and the remnants of the previously defeated divisions.

Hypothetical Attack

Stolfi lays out the hypothetical attack and advance in chapter 12, starting 13 August and includes a 31 August capture of Moscow, which would destabilize the Leningrad and Kiev fronts. The Soviet forces north and south of this central punch are dismissed, with Stolfi saying that smaller German forces could pin these troops in place, if not engage and destroy them, before Soviet high command orders them eastward. Part of the chain of events would include all Soviet reinforcements to Moscow, a week or so rest for the Germans, and an 11 September German attack eastward from Moscow.

Intermixed are statistics about industrial production, population base, and casualties supporting his contentions. Stolfi asserts the will to resist would probably continue after the Germans entrenched themselves on the Volga, although it would be at a considerably reduced capacity. An alternative would be a loss of Communist control as Stalin and company retreated eastward to a remote corner of Russia. The supply situation would be solved by a doubletracked railhead in Moscow coupled with captured equipment and aggressive regauging of tracks east of Moscow.

The great unknown question for Stolfi would be finishing the campaign, mopping up pockets and posting a large occupation force with mobile reserves and panzer forays eastward--to my mind much like the ancient Romans pursued when their borders were the Rhine and Danube Rivers and the eastern frontier versus the Persians and to Stolfi's mind like the ancient Mongol hordes did against Moscovite Russia.

Then, a 1942 push to the Urals and last significant Soviet industrial production area, would take out whatever threat remained from the USSR. Partisan warfare would flare up, probably all the grimmer given the German record, but from a strategic standpoint, the Germans would have "won."

What Ifs

Certainly the "what-if" factor of the Eastern Front battles of WWII provide rich material for simulations--computer, boardgame, miniatures, or otherwise. Whether modern day players will mimic the historical Soviet dispositions and movements are in question given the benefit of 50 years of hindsight. What Stolfi does, however, is introduce the quantitative measures, in some respects limited to support his thesis, to add data to emotional arguments.

If there's a disappointment, it is the all-too-short chapter 12. It's expansion would be welcome, for the analysis cuts off topics before they are permitted to full develop--the supply situation and the guarding of the now longer flanks. For example, what would happen if the Soviets launched major attacks against the flanks of Army Group Center instead of letting themselves be pinned or simply retreating eastwards? I'd like to see more data on supply vs. weather, increased mobilization, and faster redeployments from Mongolia.

Stolfi deserves credit for this enthusiasm, and since this was published in 1991, presumably an updated version would benefit from increased access to Soviet archives. Hitler's Panzers East is a good base to launch continuing discussions on the probability of a German vistory in WWII on the Eastern front.