A quick overview of McClellan's boyhood and early adulthood merges into his first promising successes in the American Civil War. It also brings him into contention with General Winfield Scott, who is soon dragging his feet concerning reforms in organization and training. This political battle, first with Scott but ultimately against the radical interests in Washington DC, was to dog McClellan and his grand strategy.

"It soon became apparent to McClellan that the government and its loyal citizens might never come to an understanding of the enormous scope of what would be entailed in putting down the rebellion. But what frustrated McClellan more than anything was that General-in-chief Scott also displayed no sense of urgency or comprehension as to the magnitude of what would be required to defeat the forces of disunity." (Pg. 74)

That McClellan was a top-notch organizer of the Union Army is not in doubt. That he had a grasp of grand strategy Ridgway contends is evident in the western successes of Grant and Buell--maneuvers carried out according to McClellan's plans. McClellan's end-around strategy in the Peninsula, it its purest form, would have ended the war in 1862.

History is interpretive, and thus Ridgway spends a considerable time analyzing the Peninsula Campaign. He outlines McClellan's "case of the slows" reputation. He argues McClellan conducted a competent campaign after being forced to change his base of operations from his original plan's base halfway up the peninsula to the far tip of the peninsula at Fort Monroe. The result was a slog across the Peninsula in horrendous rains and floods, instead of a short 12-mile march from Urbanna to the York River Railroad and a clean shot to Richmond against minimal opposition. McClelland's original plan would have also bypassed the extensive Confederate defenses down on the peninsula at Yorktown and been so quick, the Confederates would not have been able to to deploy their scattered forces to prepare an optimum defense of Richmond.

Worse, the radical establishment in Washington DC, fearful of any Confederate efforts to take the capital, withdrew an entire corps from his force. Although still outnumbering the Confederates, it was only a small superiority, which any reasonable commander would know, will not carry positions against an entrenched enemy.

"In McClellan's case, the pestering of the administration was not to gain new resources, but rather to recover that which had been authorized, and then not given. Critics gloss over the fact that what was originally promised McClellan for the campaign was minimal, especially considering the importance and magnitude of the endeavor. There were simply no excess resources marked for the campaign; the undertaking would not tolerate even small cutbacks, let alone an almost 40 percent reduction of men and equipment." (Pg. 187)

With a handicap such as that, Ridgway argues, McClelland is given a bum rap for his battlefield performance in the Peninsula. And his decision not to press attacks against entrenchments without adequate troops should be considered prudent, not slow.

"It has always been a mainstay of Sears and other McClellan critics to take up the post-war radical theme that the general was cautious in the extreme. This is a total subversion of the truth--whereas McClellan was ever proposing bold strategies, well thought out and meticulously prepared, it was the administration that was forever insisting of bland, tentative schemes. It was the administration that was terrified of, and lobbied against, McClellan's daring Urbana Plan...it was the administration that pushed for the unimaginative, and sure to be bloody, overland approach to Richmond, and only relented to permit the breathtaking waterborne flanking movement when McClellan finally acquiesced to the administration's demand that he start such a campaign from the ultra safe haven of Fort Monroe." (Pg. 202)

As Peninsula operations wind down after a series of battles and a change in supply head, McClellan is put out to pasture...and soon returned to the army after Pope's defeat at second Manassas. Hailed as a savior, he soon put the army into better morale. When he made his way to Antietam with tremendous energy and speed, it was to be the knockout blow to Lee.

As fate would have it, McClellan's plan to attack and pin the Confederate left, then punch through the Confederate right with Burnside's Corps failed.

"Without question, Burnside's wretched behaviour the past few days was, at this point, magnified by the gravity of the situation. While he brooded and found excuses for his delay in executing McClellan's repeated orders to press forward, the opportunity for a smashing victory slipped away. Like the pouting child who reacts to a parental scolding, Burnside gave a most literal response to his superior's wishes and nothing more." (Pg. 341)

Dismissed and unsuccessful as the Democratic presidential nominees of 1864, McClellan toured Europe for a few years, then settled back in the US to write his memoirs (the lengthy and well-documented original burned in a fire!), half-heartedly rewrote them, and finally passed away on October 29, 1885.

Ridgway employs a favorable focus in analyzing McClellan's military strategy and actions. He is, after all, writing a positive panegyric to the General, and so gives the benefit of doubt at each turn. The author's easy-going style mixes compelling prose with quotes from original source material. Every so often, to punctuate an ACW point, he'll insert an analogy from WWII and the Gulf War.

Ridgway certainly succeeds in writing a very readable and glowing profile of McClellan. If your view of McClelland follows conventional wisdom, you should investigate what Ridgway has to say. McClellan's reputation may indeed be the result of the "victor writes the history," but Little Mac certainly challenges those views, and challenges them passionately and eloquently.

More Info: Contact: E-mail James Ridgway

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