Published by: Naval Institute Press, 1996, $40

This book, which was originally published in Italian in 1993, examines the Confederate navy primarily from the perspective of its civilian chief, Secretary of the Navy Stephen R. Mallory, for whom the author has considerable respect and admiration. The focus is on the formulation and development of a naval strategy relying on new technologies (rifled cannon, ironclad ships, torpedoes, submarines) and on commerce raiding by warships (as opposed to the traditional but now outdated practice of privateering).

Luraghi concludes that this Southern strategy, which anticipated in several respects the strategy of weaker naval powers during the twentieth century (such as Germany), was the best one the Confederacy could have pursued, and was one which might have succeeded if the Southern industrial base had been just a bit stronger.

Southern Resources

One of Luraghi's most fascinating sections, which alone is almost worth the (very high) price of the book, is "Building and Outfitting Warships". This chapter surveys the industrial plant and potential of the Confederacy category by category. We learn, for instance, that the Confederacy contained only a single significant source of copper, from mines near Ducktown, Tennessee. The Confederate government seized these mines from their (northern and enemy) owners, and they operated in conjunction with the Tennessee Copper Rolling Works at nearby Cleveland, Tennessee until captured by the Union in late 1863.

This source produced about 500 tons, less than half the anticipated need; and after the mines were captured, copper had to be imported through the blockade. The South was already doing this for tin and zinc, of which it produced none whatsoever. One consequence was that late-war ironclads were built without copper sheathed hulls, which measurably reduced their performance. (The ironclad NORTH CAROLINA, for instance, sank at her moorings as a result of leaks caused by marine worms boring her unprotected hull.)

After describing the Confederacy's strategy and surveying the South's meager resources available for implementing it, Luraghi traces the naval campaigns of 1861- 62. His narration presents events in the context of the shipbuilding race between the two governments, both of whom began the war with naval power which was totally inadequate to carry out their respective strategies.

In the East the Confederates came very close to gaining an upper hand with the VIRGINIA (ex-MERRIMAC); but the North was able to complete the MONITOR just in time, doing so in an amazingly short period which dramatically illustrated the huge gap between the respective industrial bases. In the West, the North quickly seized the initiative with a fleet of river ironclads which Confederate forts alone could not hold back. An ironclad such as the ARKANSAS, operating in conjunction with fortifications such as those at Island Number 10, might have had more success, but the Union, at New Orleans as well as further up the Mississippi, simply moved too soon for the weak Southern industrial base to complete the ironclads needed.

Exciting Narrative

Luraghi's narrative is exciting; the outcome of the race was close enough to create some tension in the reader, wherever his sympathies may lie. Yet this reviewer wonders if Luraghi, much though he emphasizes the weakness of Southern manufacturing, is perhaps still too optimistic about the Confederacy's chances. It is true that the Confederates seemed very close to completing two massive ironclads, the LOUISIANA and the MISSISSIPPI, which might have made New Orleans impregnable if they had worked as planned. But other writers stress the inadequacy and unreliability of the two ships'power plants, and it seems reasonable to question whether they would ever have been effective, much less decisive.

In succeeding chapters Luradhi traces and analyzes in turn the development of commerce raiding, passive torpedoes, and aggressive submarine attacks at Charleston. He examines in some detail the Confederate combined arms offensive in North Carolina waters, using the ALBEMARLE. Throughout the book Luradhi does an excellent job of relating Confederate naval strategy to the South's national or "grand" strategy, particularly with regard to finance, diplomacy, and the competing needs of the Confederate army and navy for scarce resources. He concludes, reasonably enough, that the Confederate navy did as well or even better than might be expected, and that its leaders and personnel deserve our admiration.

Bottom Line

This book is emphatically worth reading. Is it worth $40 to own a copy? That very much depends. The book's fourteen maps are adequate and useful, but nothing special. It is noteworthy that the book is just over 500 pages in length, but that the text ends on p. 349. The remaining pages are notes (pp. 353-458) and bibliography (pp. 459-500). There is also an index.

The forty page bibliography is helpfully annotated in places, and may prove to be the most important part of the book to the serious student of the subject, and well worth the price. Those with a more casual interest, or who want primarily a detailed narrative of operations and battles, will probably be content to read the library's copy and spend their own money elsewhere.

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