Why do men fight 'against the odds'? The reasons are almost always complex, and Model's motivations, whether expressed verbally to others or discerned by colleagues and historians, are no different. Perhaps Model's dominant motivation was his rigid, deeply felt sense of duty: duty as a German soldier [1] , duty as a subordinate to his nation's political leadership, [2] duty to his soldiers (both alive and dead), [3] duty to his profession of arms and the code of an officer. [4] Clearly, his devotion to duty, so Prussian in its thoroughness, was sustained by his strong religious faith. [5] Perhaps he kept fighting in the desperate hope that some miracle, such as a failing out among the Allies or the development of a 'wonder weapon,' would save Germany from utter defeat. [6] Model was intensely aware during the waning months of the war that boys and old men were fighting savagely in defense of the Fatherland, and believed that for him to fail to continue to lead them under those circumstances would be personally dishonoring. [7] His final refusal to surrender the forces in the Ruhr Pocket may also have been driven to some extent by his love of his family, and his clear recognition of what the National Socialist regime was capable of doing to a general's family when the general had acted 'disloyally.' [1] Another key to understanding Model's ability to fight (so often successfully) 'against the odds' is that he personally relished the opportunity to do so. [9] Commentators have remarked on his self-confidence and ambition, but none have posited from examination of Model's own words that he apparently desired, quite viscerally, to be 'the man on the spot.' For Model, a commander's ability to overcome all obstacles was not just a level of professional achievement to be aspired to, but an essential element of Model's own image of himself. [10] An admirer from his staff quoted a line from Goethe as an illustrative key to this aspect of Model's personality: "Den lieb ich, der Unrudgliches begehrt. " ("I love him, who craves the impossible." [11] Model developed a reputation as an optimist, a trait reflective of a man fully aware of his own abilities and of his absolutely essential role in bringing order to chaotic military situations. [12] Model's ambitions for high command caused some of his colleagues to perceive him to be an opportunist willing to subordinate his personal beliefs to the rancid ideology of the Nazi State. [13] Whether their condemnation was attributable to righteous contempt for Nazism or simple professional jealousy is an open question, but proper analysis demands that the historiography should be viewed with an eye on the motivations of the writer as well as those of the subject. [14] While fighting on 'against the odds,' Model's loyalty to the Nazi regime remained true long after most of the other senior German commanders had lost theirs completely. [15] It is not surprising, therefore, that those officers who survived the war but who failed (for whatever reason) to reject Nazism during its course, as well as those who broke with the Nazi leadership and suffered for it, would view his unswerving commitment harshly. On the other hand, Model never hesitated to stand up to Hitler, sometimes at great personal risk, when he considered it his professional duty to do so, and to our knowledge he never personally participated in the regime's atrocities to an extent greater than the typical German Army commander. [16] Indeed, the straightforward and unbending Model seemed to have the respect of the dictator, which a fawning or subservient character would not necessarily have earned. Model's overtly apolitical nature was so strong that the Fuhrer felt comfortable with his occasional opposition, did not deem it a threat to himself or his regime, and therefore kept Model in high command positions when other equally brave and outspoken commanders, such as Guderian and von Manstein, were sacked. [17] In any event, Model's normally optimistic outlook and ruthless willingness to fight on 'against the odds' were no doubt pivotal to Hitler's assessment of Model's special value as a field commander. [18] Model's unrelenting struggles 'against the odds' were those of a man who understood clearly (or at least clearly believed) that, for the German soldier, there was no going back, no 'future' after defeat. [19] The 'Fuhrer's Fireman' was not going to spend a comfortable retirement writing treatises for the Western Powers on how to fight the Soviets, or books detailing how, despite the best efforts of the German generals, the Fuhrer's obstinacy and foolishness had lost the war. [20] Like many German soldiers in the East, he had no doubts whatsoever as to what would happen to Germany in the case of a Soviet victory in the ideological, racial war unleashed by the Nazi State; his personal experiences in the East, and perhaps guilt over what he himself had wrought there, could only produce an unalterable resolve to fight on. [21] Perhaps Model was blind to operational reality, as some observers have opined, but surely a battle-hardened general such as he knew the military situation was increasingly hopeless. [22] Perhaps he was morally corrupt, a ,stooge' of Hitler or a 'dedicated Nazi,' but if so why was it Model, more frequently than any of the other leading generals (and not only after he became a field marshal), who had the moral and professional courage to defy or circumvent Hitler in the military sphere? [23] Maybe he was a 'coward' for being apolitical, or morally deficient for failing to draw the conclusion that the Nazi regime was evil and had to be overthrown. [24] The choices seem obvious to us now, but Model did not survive the war - he saw a Germany about to be overrun by the Bolsheviks, with all that would mean to its civilian population, and in his decision to fight on he was not alone. He did live long enough to feel bitterly betrayed by the regime he had served, to see his nation conquered and the army he loved shattered. [25] In this his experience was much like that of Rommel, but the Desert Fox's suicide is now regarded by most as a heroic response to a dastardly threat to his family, while Model's suicide is viewed, to the extent it is thought of at all, either as the final act of a fanatic or of a guilt-ridden coward. A reevaluation is in order. Ask the question: what should one do as a senior general when the 'Leader' is a monstrously evil, obstinate, opinionated military dilettante? If you are an 18 year-old Landser in the wrong place at the wrong time, you freeze to death, or are ground to a pulp under the treads of a T-34, or are broiled alive in your pillbox by an American flamethrower, or are hanged from a tree by a squad of 'remf' SS men with a placard around your neck declaring that you are a deserter and a traitor to your Fatherland. However, if you are a senior officer and you are lucky, maybe you whine so much about overwhelming numbers, ridiculous orders, inadequate supplies, absent aircover and nonexistent materiel that the 'Leader,' in exasperation, relieves. You, and you are chauffeured home in your staff car with an immaculate personal adjutant in attendance to eventually die in your sleep an old man in a soft, fluffy bed. [26] But if you are Walther Model, you do the best you can with what you have, and you placate, deceive, manipulate, defy or obey the 'Leader' as and when appropriate in a 3 1/2 year struggle 'against the odds' to save your soldiers and your nation." And when you are finally cornered in the Ruhr and out of options, if you are Walther Model, you take your pistol in hand and go down to the muddy trenches to join your 18 year-olds, because you are the last chance they have and they have faith in you, and to do so is to you not merely one alternative among many but rather your non-negotiable, personal duty. [27] NOTES [1] Von Mellenthin was Chief of Staff of 5 Panzer Army during the Battle of the Ruhr Pocket, and as such had the occasion to spend significant time discussing such deep questions with Model. Neither knew whether political negotiations were then being conducted at the highest levels to resolve the situation in the West, and Model "Was fully sensible of the argument that the Western armies must keep fighting to the last in order to protect the rear of our comrades in the East, who were involved in a desperate struggle to cover the escape of millions of German women and children, then fleeing from the Russian hordes." Von Mellenthin, Panzer Battles, p. 352. Indeed, at the time Goebbels was actively broadcasting that the Nazi leadership was negotiating with the Western Powers to make common cause against the Soviets, and millions of Germans believed (and reasoned) that this must be true. Kessler, The Battle of the Ruhr Pocket, p. 37. [2] Von Manstein reportedly despised him as a Nazi. D'Este, "Model," in Hiders Generals, P. 331. He was a convinced Nazi...." Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin: The German Defeat In The East, p. 138. But for a different perception of the nature of Model's 'loyalt/ to the political leadership, examine Model's personal reaction to the assassination attempt on Hitler of 20 July, 1944: "The forces fight, bleed and do the seemingly impossible, while in the rear an officer attacks his supreme commander with a bomb. This has never happened before in German history." Fraschka, Knights of the Reich, p. 2 11. [3]When Hitler, in Model's presence, made a disparaging comment in 1943 about troop quality, and was supported in this inanity by a staff officer, Model exploded in a way seldom seen in the normally sycophantic OKW. (To the staff officer) "What do you know of filth, mud, icy cold and barrage fire? And tanks, tanks! You have absolutely no right to criticize my soldiers. I forbid you to do that! Only one who has fought and suffered with those brave men can talk about the soldiers. But not a man like you, who can sleep every night in a soft bed." (Then turning to Hitler:) "I would like to ask you emphatically, mein Fuhrer, to see to it that neither the honor nor the bravery of the soldiers is questioned. Men who are ready to die for the Fatherland also have the right to be protected against such stupid twaddle and vile gossip!" Id, p. 213. [4] Outside of the Ruhr Pocket, the American general Matthew Ridgeway sent a personal missive to Model, requesting that he order Army Group B to lay down its arms given its obviously hopeless situation. Ridgeway's "emissary returned with one of Model's staff officers who replied that the Field Marshal's personal oath to Hitler not only forbade surrender but that even to consider such a proposal violated his sense of honor." D'Este, "Model," in Hitler's Generals, p. 329. [5] His calmness in desperate crises, so often remarked upon by observers, may well be attributable to his strong Lutheran convictions and religious faith. See Blumentritt, Von Rundstedt.The Soldier and the Man, p. 242 - Blumentritt, von Rundstedt's sometime Chief of Staff at OB West, described Model as "resilient, imperturbable." Amid the ruins of the Ruhr, Model wrote to his wife at Easter, 1945, "All fear comes from the Devil. Courage and joy come from the Lord." And a little later in the letter, "...we all must die at some time or other." Kessler, The Battle of the Ruhr Pocket, p. 114. The courageous patriot Pastor Niemoller, later murdered by the Gestapo for his principled Christian resistance to the Nazi regime, was a frequent visitor to Model's home in the pre-war years, and had baptized Model's children. D'Este, "Model," in Hitler's Generals, p. 321. [6] Following Model's appointment as Chief of OB West, his Order of the Day to the Western Army on 3 September, 1944, declared: "As your new Commander-in-Chief I direct this call to your honor as soldiers. We have lost a battle but I tell you we will win this war! ... Take thought then that at this moment everything adds up to the necessity to gain the time which the Fuhrer needs to bring into operation new troops and new weapons. They will come." Shulman, Defeat in the West, p. 176. If one wishes to dismiss this as simply Wagnerian bombast for troop consumption, then refer to the recollection of Model's Chief of Staff (of Army Group B) about Model's firmness in the Ruhr Pocket eight months later. General Wagener suggested to Model that Model radio Berlin to request permission to surrender, and received an emphatic "No." Wagener said Model felt that, "Such a request, from a general of his reputation and caliber, might well convince Hitler and the German High Command that they should stop the war at once. If so, Model would have been instrumental in losing the war for his beloved Fatherland just as a glimmer of hope appeared on the horizon." Kessler, The Battle of the Ruhr Pocket, p. 177. Such a conviction appears illusory or delusional to us today, but it was a real concern to Model at the time. For his belief in the existence of 'wonder weapons' (a belief shared by many of his soldiers), see Kershaw, It Never Snows in September, p. 76, and Goerlitz, The German General Staff, p. 443 ("He ... quite sincerely believed in Hitler's promises that new and revolutionary weapons would turn the tide of war."). [7] Id Fanatical scratch units were even then pushing back American bridgeheads over the Elbe. [8] Avoidance of the quintessentially Nazi concept of Sippenhaft (basically, "arrest of next of kir) was, as is well known now, the motivation for Rommel's suicide. Who knows whether Model's concerns for his wife (a refugee from the Allied bombing of Dresden in February, 1945), his son (then a major in the Grossdeutschland Panzer Division), and his two daughters may have led him to refuse to surrender the forces in the Ruhr Pocket? We do know that he was well aware of what happened to the Bomb Plot conspirators and its other victims (e.g., von Kluge, who received a blood transfusion from the SS in a desperate effort to resuscitate him from his suicide attempt so that he could be 'properly hanged'; von Stupnagel, blinded by his botched suicide attempt but hanged nonetheless; and Hoepner, the former panzer commander). See Kessler, The Battle of the Ruhr Pocket, pp. 22, 186. We also know that Fritz Bayerlein, commander of LIII Corps in the Ruhr Pocket, surrendered his Corps to the Americans, but made special arrangements to keep the details of his negotiations and the fact of his surrender secret in an effort to escape Sippenhafts awful reach. Id, at p. 185. [9] An American intelligence assessment of Model concluded, "He is known to be personally devoted to Hitler and likes nothing better than being asked to do the impossible." Parker, Battle of the Bulge, p. 36. Lt. General Hans Speidel, Rommel's Chief of Staff at Army Group B in 1944 and later Model's, said of the latter, "Ardent by nature, he had often dared fate and he believed that his skill at improvisation and his good luck would bring him success in the West too." Speidel, Invasion 1944, p. 130. [10] As Model said publicly on several occasions, "He who has not discovered himself, not organized, not changed things around to suit his own demands, has not known emergencies, is unjustified in trying to become a leader." D'Este, "Model," in Hitler's Generals, p. 323. Tellingly, at both the May, 1943 (Kursk) and December, 1944 (Ardennes) F4ihrer conferences convened to discuss the forthcoming Offensives, it was Model of all the other generals present (several of whom were senior to him) who made the key presentations to Hitler. Cf Seaton, The Russo-German War, p. 356, n.8, who points out that Model was not actually present at the 1943 conference (contra Guderian, Panzer Leader, pp. 306, 307), but that his objections to the proposed Kursk offensive had previously been submitted to Hitler in writing. [11] Kessler, The Battle of the Ruhr Pocket, p. 3. The origin of this line is often attributed, incorrectly, to Model himself. [12] An illustration of this trait involves the day Model assumed command of 9 Army, just west of Moscow, in January, 1942. 9 Army was then beset on three sides by a major Soviet offensive which had already encircled one of its component corps and was threatening the main supply route of all of Army Group Center. After reviewing the HQs operations maps and hearing the gloomy reports of the Army staff, Model immediately began describing a full-scale counteroffensive. His world-weary new Chief of Staff asked, "And what, Herr General, have you brought us for this operation?", to which Model replied simply, "Myself." Carell, Hitler Moves East 1941-43, p. 352. The meeting erupted in laughter, although it is doubtful that Model meant the retort entirely in jest. [13] D'Este, "Model," in Hitler's Generals, P. 322 [14] As Robert Kershaw noted in his seminal study of the Germans' operational reaction to Market- Garden, "It was Model's personal allegiance to his Fuhrer that has attracted the odium that clouds a clear perception of his abilities as a military commander." Kershaw, It Never Snows in September, p. 76. [15]When Hitler succeeded Field Marshal von Brauchitsch as Commander-in-Chief of the Army in the dark days of December, 1941, he announced, "The task of the CinC is to educate the army to be National Socialist. I do not know any army general who can do this as I want it done." Adair, Hitler's Greatest Defeat, p. 30. One way the Fuhrer used to secure his senior officers' loyalty was old-fashioned bribery: "Practically all field marshals and four-star generals received enormous sums secretly from Hitler, partly in huge sums and partly in regular monthly secret supplements to their already very high pay. It is understandable that most have displayed a discreet silence on this score." These payments were tax exempt, and were not awarded for special victories but were regular payments. Weinberg, Gerhard, Germany, Hitler and World War A New York, 1996, pp. 308, 309. There is no evidence that such payments, if they were made to Model, had any influence on him, and indeed he was the only field marshal who chose to kill himself at the end of the war. [16] "...Model was also one of the few who ventured to disregard Hitler's instructions and act on his own judgment." Hart, The German Generals Talk, p. 70. Model would also speak out on behalf of his soldiers - when Hitler remarked that the men of 1943 were not of the same calibre as those of 1941, Model retorted sharply, "Of course they are not, my Fuhrer. The men of 1941 are dead, scattered in graves all over Russia." Lucas, War on the Eastern Front, p. 12. [17] "... The secret of Model's successful relationship with Hitler was that he only challenged the Fuhrer on military issues, never politics." D Este, Model, in Hitler's Generals, p. 330. "Typically, Model was known to despise war stories and never discussed politics or the war with his wife." Id, P. 321. On the other hand, Model's independence was not one-dimensional, or limited to military matters only. General Bittrich, commander of II SS Panzerkorps at Arnhem, had been very outspoken about the disastrous manner by which the war was being waged by Berlin. Himmler wanted the veteran SS general to come to Berlin for "a talk," but Model absolutely refused Himmler's demands to send him, probably saving Bittrich's life. Ryan, A Bridge Too Far, p. 149. [18] Hitler, talking to Generals Krebs and Westphal at the Wolfchanze on 31 August, 1944, observed of the great Desert Fox: "The fact unfortunately is that, when successful, Field Marshal Rommel is a great and spirited commander, but when the slightest difficulties occur he turns into a complete pessimist." Warlimont, Inside Hiders Headquarters, p. 451. The Fuhrer never thought this way of Model, even though at that very time Model was advising him repeatedly that the military situation in the West was untenable. Hitler, "[L]ike many Germans of his generation, ...was convinced that Germany could have won [World War One], if only it had had the will to resist. He saw himself as the embodiment of that will, and acted ruthlessly against any German commander who did not show a similar enthusiasm for 'resistance to the death.'" Zaloga, Bagration, p. 15. His Fireman's ruthless determination to soldier on 'against the odds' thus fit Hitler's personal criteria for high command responsibility. [19] Model did not, in the end, enforce Hitler's 'destroy everything' orders, but instead acquiesced in Reichsminister Speer's efforts to avoid senseless non-military demolitions in the Ruhr Pocket. This was not a decision to be taken lightly, as at the time there were five Nazi Party Gauleiters trapped in the Ruhr Festung with Model, including at least two fanatical National Socialists. Von Mellenthin, Panzer Battles, p. 351; Kessler, The Battle for the Ruhr Pocket, p. 22. [20] "Following the collapse of the Wehrmacht, which to Model was synonymous with the crumbling of all his life's desires, aims and ideals, one can scarcely imagine any other end for him than the suicide he chose." Von Mellenthin, German Generals, p. 158. After his suicide two of his officers searched his pockets and found a card with the first line of a poem by the Roman military author Vegetius; "I will come as victor, or not at all...." Fraschka, Knights of the Reich, p. 216. [21] See Bartov, Hitler's Army, for a seminal study of the influence of Nazi ideology on the German soldier in the East, and the hypothesis that the thorough penetration of that ideology among the soldiers contributed greatly to German defensive tenacity in the years after 1941. Quoting the letter of a soldier; "It is the courage of the desperate, trying to defend what has already been won, the fear of falling alive into the hands of the enemy, and the instinct of self-preservation, which are the reasons for the willingness of the men fighting in the East to make this sacrifice. They do not give up." Id, p. 26. [22] Bodo Zimmerman, OB West's operations chief, reflected that although Model "was a thoroughly capable soldier," he often "demanded too much and that too quickly...," hence "losing sight of what was practically possible." Ryan, A Bridge Too Far, p. 45, fn. But see Speidel, Invasion 1944, P. 137- "Model clearly saw the hopelessness of the total situation.... [23] "It was useless to appeal to his sense of moral responsibility to the people, to posterity, and to the German military tradition. The worse the situation grew, the more Model sought the support of Germanys political leaders .... He was content to be responsible for obeying orders, and a 'revolt of the conscience' was far from his mind." Spiedel, Invasion 1944, p. 138. But see Frieden and Richardson (eds.), The Fatal Decisions, p. 216, quoting General Zimmerman on Model in the Fall of 1944: "The reports sent to Hitler, and the demands he made of Supreme Headquarters, became more and more drastic, being based as they were on the experiences of Army Group B. He did not mince his words; apparently he could address Hitler in terms which would not have been allowed to any other senior commander." [24] "During the short period of time when he [Speidell served with Field Marshal Model, he had found ample opportunity to discuss the general situation with him and to mention the political and military measures which in his [Speidel's] opinion ought to be taken...." Model declined to speak to Hitler about these matters, which he called "none of my business." Speidel, Invasion 1944, p. 137. [25] While the defenses of the Ruhr Pocket collapsed around them, Model and a group of staff officers traveled through the ruins amidst the detritus of the smashed Wehrmacht. On 20 April, 1945, the Fuhrer's final birthday, they listened to Goebbels' broadcasts decrying the 'verraterische Ruhrarmee' ('treacherous army of the Ruhr'). According to one of the officers present, Model went ashen, and "gave the impression of being someone who suddenly realized what sort of regime it was that he had served so loyally; what sort of man it was who had led Germany into this 'dark abyss.' " Kessler, The Battle of the Ruhr Pocket, pp. 206, 207. [26] Model frequently lost his patience with these types of officers. Appearing at a panzerkorps HQ prior to the Ardennes offensive, he immediately received a detailed recitation of all the supplies that particular HQ had been promised by OKW and of how few it had actually received. Model exploded: "... [H] e poured out reproaches about commanders who did nothing but raise objections and had become completely defeatist, so that one could no longer rely on them." Von Mellenthin, German Generals, p. 154. In disgust he growled: "If you need anything, take it from the Americans!", and stomped off, ending the meeting before it had hardly begun. His contempt was matched by that of its targets, as he was widely disliked in the officer corps. D'Este, "Model," in Hitler's Generals, p. 331. The latter wrote the books after the war: he was dead. [27] (Speaking of Model's handling of the disaster caused by Bagration in 1944:) "Model was too clever not to have seen the situation as it really was, ... Perhaps with his oft-repeated orders to attack he was trying to meet Hitler halfway, so that he could finally take the actions needed for the withdrawal without Hitler's opposing them." Niepold, Battle for White Russia, p. 203. See also Elstob, Hitler's Last Offensive, p. 33: "Although he owed his meteoric rise to the Fuhrer, Model was one of the very few who ever stood up to him. His method was to act first and ask permission afterwards and because he got results he got away with this. He understood the workings of Hitler's mind as well as anyone and handled him with consummate skill, always avoiding situations in which the Fuhrer could take up an uncompromising stand, for once he had done so nothing could shift him." [28] In the last days of the Ruhr Pocket he repeatedly sought death on the battleline. Von Mellenthin, German Generals, p. 157. His troops believed in him. Eisenhower, The Bitter Woods, p. 347. He was a 'father' to his solders, who idolized him. Fraschka, Knights of the Reich, p. 212. On the other hand, he had a deserved reputation as a strict enforcer of the rigid rules against desertion and defeatism, and many of his men were hanged or shot as a consequence. Kessler, The Battle of the Ruhr Pocket, p. 114. Back to Table of Contents -- Against the Odds vol. 1 no. 4 Back to Against the Odds List of Issues Back to MagWeb Magazine List © Copyright 2003 by LPS. This article appears in MagWeb.com (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other articles from military history and related magazines are available at http://www.magweb.com * Buy this back issue or subscribe to Against the Odds direct from LPS.