It is not possible to pigeonhole accurately Model's 'world-view,' character or motives. He was a bundle of contrasts, professionally and personally, and is not easily typecast. There is no doubt that to his colleagues, whether they wished him well or ill, he was an "extremely difficult man." [1] Adjectives such as 'cold,' 'calculating,' ambitious,' 'aloof,' ,temperamental,' 'impulsive' and 'abusive' abound in descriptions of his personality. [2] He had very few friends, lived (apparently) for his work, and although reportedly a man deeply devoted to his family, he exhibited very little social collegiality with his fellow officers. [3] Driven by both a fierce determination to succeed and an iron will grounded in religious conviction and Prussian professionalism, it is unclear whether this tenacious combat commander was motivated primarily by a firm adherence to National Socialism or by his rigid concept of duty, or by both in equal measure. Indeed, to even be able to juxtapose the National Socialist 'ethos' with Model's strong Lutheran faith highlights the dichotomies found in this brilliant, mercurial general. Model did not get along well with most of his fellow officers, and this unpleasant aspect of his personality has survived in the historiography. [4] He had no use for staff work or staff officers, did not tolerate bureaucracy, and lacked the social grace to conceal his distaste. [5] He came from a middle-class background and, while we have no evidence of any self-consciousness in this regard, his 'cut- throat,' 'no nonsense' approach to interpersonal relations with fellow officers may perhaps have been attributable to a deep-seated, rankling sense of social inferiority. [6] Because the historiography so clearly indicates that his negative attitudes towards others were thoroughly reciprocated, one can understand why we do not have a deferential biography of Model by a close colleague, as we do for von Rundstedt, von Manstein, Rommel and others. [7] Sharply contrasting with his personality fissure is Model's deep, sincere appreciation of his soldiers and the camaraderie of the front line. In reviewing his career, one gets the sense that he considered the battleground a home, seeking out both it and its inhabitants with each new assignment. [8] This trait would be typical of almost any junior combat officer, as it was for him in the Great War. It would also be natural perhaps for a disciple of Guderian, who taught that a panzer commander led from the front, with his finger ever on the changing pulse of the battlefield. But it was a trait rare in an army group commander, yet his career with Army Groups North and Center, and as commander of Army Group B in the West, demonstrated his affinity for the frontline. As Model himself often said, "He who leads troops has no right to think about himself." [9] His soldiers respected this difference from other senior generals, and honored him for it. [10] Certain of his colleagues thought that Model's lack of tact with his fellow (particularly subordinate) officers was deliberately exercised in an effort to curry favor with the ranks. [11] Indeed, Model always carried a reputation for sarcasm and derisive attitudes, and knowledge of his impatience with officious fools spread through the ranks and endeared him to the common soldier. [12] One favorite frontline story involved a massive traffic jam in the Ardennes, where Model, exasperated by the delays, got out of his car, removed his coat, and began shoveling snow with the Landsers. After a while a captain in a waiting car got out to yell at the soldiers to hurry up their efforts. Recognizing the Field Marshal, the hapless Hauptman snapped to attention. Model cut him up: "So, you would let a field marshal clear the road for you while you sit comfortably in your automobile - as from today, Kamerad, you are a private." [13] Personal dislike by his fellows often translated in the historiography to professional criticism of Model's methods of command. [14] It would be wrong to discount such criticism completely, as being only the residue of professional jealously or personal animosity, but it is certainly possible to view his professional "weaknesses," as identified by others, as being in reality strengths. For example, his subordinate commanders often commented adversely on his micro-management of the battlefield, his willingness to intervene at the smallest levels of command to 'make things happen." [15] Speidel, his one-time Chief of Staff at Army Group B, noted that, "...his keen tactical sense was not balanced by an ability to judge what was possible. He overestimated his own ability, was erratic, and lacked a sense of moderation .... His unbalanced nature had made him submissive to the ideology of Hitler, although he often knew better. [16] On the other hand, such a keen observer as von Mellenthin admitted that Model "possessed an outstanding talent for improvisation, and there can be no disputing the originality of his conduct of affairs." [17] In any event, it is not necessary to reach a definitive conclusion about Model's professional strengths and weaknesses; suffice it to say that he was universally "regarded as a troubleshooter.., a man with steady nerves in a crisis." [18] As General Niepold observed of Model's handling of the Bagration disaster: "Sandwiched as he was between Hitler's pipe dreams and the gloomy views of his subordinate commanders, Field Marshal Model ... showed himself to be a commander-in-chief of exceptional merit. His perceptiveness and great drive achieved the right result in the end." [19] NOTES [1] Von Mellenthin, German Generals, p. 158. Mellenthin observed that over a long association with Model, "one gained the impression that he trusted no one but himself. He wanted to have every single thing under his own control." Id. [1] Liddell Hart talked to a number of German generals who emphasized that Model both "was difficult as a superior and a subordinate." Hart, The German Generals Talk, p. 70. Model "conducted himself with confidence, precision and cold calculation that both frightened and impressed Hitler." D I Este, "Model," in Hitler's Generals, p. 330. [3] Model "allowed himself little time for leisure and recreation, and deprived himself of the opportunity to make close friends. His admirers described him as a deeply religious Christian, with a strong sense of family, domesticity, and a love of nature." Eisenhower, The Bitter Woods, p. 347. His son, then a major in the Grossdeutschland Panzer Division, went to see Model on the latter's 54th birthday; surprisingly, his father had been playing snowballs with his generals at Army Group B headquarters that day. Kessler, The Battle of the Ruhr Pocket, p. 2. [4] "Model may not have been a warm, approachable personality, but he was a sound commander." Kershaw, It Never Snows in September, p. 75. He was a stern disciplinarian, but often relented when it was time to punish: "This idiosyncrasy stemmed probably from a paradox in his nature -- an overweening sense of duty and fiery temper combined with a soft- heartedness beneath." Eisenhower, The Bitter Woods, p. 347. [5] Officers of his staff frequently had nervous breakdowns and many requested transfers. Lucas, Hitler's Enforcers, p. 93. His operations officer at Army Group B, Colonel Reichhelm, occasionally had to talk certain of Model's officers out of suicide. Eisenhower, The Bitter Woods, p. 346. One time Model went on leave, and his Chief of Staff immediately broadcast the code word "SchweinJurt" to all subordinate commanders. The word could, of course, refer to the German city of that name, or it could have been jargon for "the swine is gone." Kessler, The Battle of the Ruhr Pocket, p. 17. [6] "It was natural, therefore, that he was disliked and resented by the average General Staff Officer. His comparatively lowly birth and his coarse manner of speech made him no more dear to them." Shulman, Defeat in the West, p. 171. But see von Mellenthin, German Generals, p. 147 - "When he wished, he could be most charming." He was also about ten (10) years younger than most high- ranking German officers. Id., p. 148. [7] Alexander Stahlberg, a chief aide to Field Marshal von Manstein, remarked of the officers in Manstein's Operations Department that after the Field Marshal's dismissal, "[T]hey would never again work under a commander of his caliber, and were already dreading the thought of their newly- appointed chief of two days' standing GeneralFeldmarschall Model." Stahlberg, Bounden Duty, p. 343. [8] Model "installed Kampfwillen ('resolve to fight') in his soldiers by personal character and example at the front." Kershaw, It Never Snows in September, p. 76. "Model was stocky, without social graces, extraordinarily active mentally and physically. He hardly knew what sleep was , and was not afraid to visit the front during the heat of battle." Speidel, Invasion 1944, P. 130. [9] D'Este, "Model," in Hitler's Generals, p. 323. "He had a reputation as a drinker, but if it was earned it certainly failed to interfere with his habit of rising at 5:30 a.m. daily to begin his inspections of the front." Eisenhower, The Bitter Woods, p. 347. [10] Field Marshal von Manstein reflected on the qualities required of a field commander: "Strength of character and inner fortitude, however, are decisive factors. The confidence of the men in the ranks rests upon a man's strength of character." Von Mellenthin, German Generals, intro., p. viii. To the men in the ranks, "The necessary qualification for an officer's career was not the high school diploma, but exemplary ability; the true authority. Everyone who led a unit had to be the best man in his unit as well; not the uniform, not being in command, but example made the leader." Woltersdorf, Hans Werner, Gods of War. Memoir of a German Soldier, Novato, 1990, p. 206. "Everyone who knew him [Model] laid great emphasis on his personal courage." Von Mellenthin, German Generals, p. 158. [11] "He was inclined to curry favor with the troops at the expense of the officers." Speidel, Invasion 1944, p. 130. Contrast this derisive comment with the precepts of Truppenfuhrung"The example and personal bearing of officers and other soldiers who are responsible for leadership has a decisive effect on the troops. The officer, who in the face of the enemy displays coolness, decisiveness, and courage, carries his troops with him. He also must win their affections and earn their trust through his understanding of their feelings, their way of thinking, and through his selfless care for them." Condell, Bruce and Zabecki, David T (eds. and trans.), On the German Art of War - Truppenfuhrung, p. 18 (precept #8). [12] The Soviets, knowing that he flew around the front almost every day in his Fieseler Storch, sent an air raid to kill him at one of his stops. "At the start of the raid someone gave the order to take cover, but Model retorted that only those officers with red stripes on their breeches should do this. He remained seated because his trousers did not carry a general's red stripes." Lucas, Hitler's Enforcers, p. 9 8. [13][14] Alexander Stahlberg drew a pointed distinction between the command methods of his long-time chief, Field Marshal von Manstein, and Model, when he commented on the former's dismissal that Manstein would be replaced by "Colonel-General Model, who had a reputation for preferring to 'lead' through his personal presence with regiments and battalions rather than from his headquarters." [Note Stahlberg's trenchant use of quotations in the original text around the word lead.'] Stahlberg, Bounden Duty, p. 337. This classic Junkers and General Staff perspective of the feisty Fireman accorded with Field Marshal von Rundstedt's oft-expressed view that Model's rise to Field Marshal had been too quick, and that Model had the makings of a "good regimental sergeant major." Ryan, A Bridge Too Far, p. 37. [15] General Bittrich complained that during the Arnhem operation Model would show up on a daily basis at II SS Panzerkorps' headquarters, issue various demands and orders dealing with immediate threats, and then disappear to the front line. "Pragmatic, always demanding the impossible, Model visited me every day." Id., p. 379. Trapped in the Ruhr, with all operational hope gone, Model ordered the renowned panzer commander General von Luttwitz to send out Hitler Youths with Panzerfausts to destroy Allied tanks and trucks. When Luttwitz refused, Model flew into a rage and ordered Luttwitz' Chief of Staff, on pain of death, to carry out the order. "Even now he still believed that he would solve the overwhelming problem with these crazy, stopgap measures, as he had often done in the past." Kessler, The Battle for the Ruhr Pocket, P. 115 [16] Speidel, Invasion 1944, pp. 130, 131. But see, Hart, The German Generals Talk, p. 70, quoting General von Manteuffel: "Model was a very good tactician, and better in defense than in attack. He had a knack of gauging what troops could do, and what they could not do. His manner was rough, and his methods were not always acceptable in the higher quarters of the German Army, but they were both to Hitler's liking. Model stood up to Hitler in a way that hardly anyone else dared, and even refused to carry out Hitler's orders with which he did not agree. [17] Von Mellenthin, German Generals, p. 157. Von Mellenthin also commented on his time with Model during the last days of the Ruhr Pocket: "He was an interesting character - forceful and ironical - and was well used to desperate battles; indeed his reputation had been built up by his uncanny gift of improvisation. Time and again he succeeded in restoring apparently hopeless situations;... " Von Mellenthin, Panzer Battles, p. 3 51. [18] Kershaw, It Never Snows in September, p. 76. [19] Niepold, Battle for White Russia, p. 203. Niepold could make such an evaluation with the authority of personal experience, because during Bagration the tactical deployment of the component units of his own 12 Panzer Division had been the subject of repeated interventions by Model. Back to Table of Contents -- Against the Odds vol. 1 no. 4 Back to Against the Odds List of Issues Back to MagWeb Magazine List © Copyright 2003 by LPS. This article appears in MagWeb.com (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. 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