On March 4, 1944 the Soviets launched their massive Spring Offensive. The attack fell on the battered units of the German Army Group South. Unable to stand up to the force of the attack, German General Fritz Eric von Manstein fell back, trading space for time. Within days, the Soviets had regained much of German occupied southern Russia. However, they had not surrounded or destroyed Army Group South which was still an effective, if badly mauled force. The Allied landing at Anzio did not achieve its main purpose. The western end of the German 'Winterstellung' was not turned. Hitler ordered large reinforcements into central Italy and on 4th February ordered a heavy counter-attack at Anzio, which stayed but did not dislodge the bridgehead. Thereafter the position remained static. Meanwhile, the imminent landing on the Atlantic coast continued to exercise Hitler, who sought to strengthen defenses everywhere. On 19th January he had designated a number of areas from Holland to the Gironde estuary in south-west France as 'fortresses', and had issued special instructions for their defense. On 3rd March the Channel Islands were similarly converted into fortresses. But it was not only in the West that the shrivelling German empire needed fortresses. In the East the Russian armies were now preparing to move forward on all fronts, and the inland cities of the Baltic states, of Eastern Poland, and of the Ukraine were as exposed as the beaches of Western Europe. On 8th March Hitler issued an order defining two classes of fortresses. Four appendices (not printed here) gave or demanded further details. One of them gave a list of the new 'fortified areas' in the East: a chain of cities stretching from Reval [Tallin], on the Baltic, to Nikolayev, near Odessa, on the Black Sea. One of them was Vinnitsa in the Ukraine which less than two years ago had been the "Fuhrer Headquarters" for the conquest of all Russia. The 'fortresses' in the East were intended to hold the Russian advance roughly on the old Russian frontier - the frontier of 1938. In April Hitler still believed that this might be done. The Fuhrer. Fuhrer Headquarters High Command of the Army 8th March, 1944. Fuhrer Order No. 11 (Commandants of Fortified Areas and Battle Commandants) In view of various incidents, I issue the following orders: 1. A distinction will be made between 'Fortified Areas' [feste Platze], each under a 'Fortified Area Commandant', and 'Local Strong-points' [Ortsstutzpunkte], each under a 'Battle Commandant'. The 'Fortified Areas' will fulfil the function of fortresses in former historical times. They will ensure that the enemy does not occupy these areas of decisive operational importance. They will allow themselves to be surrounded, thereby holding down the largest possible number of enemy forces, and establishing conditions favorable for successful counter-attacks. 'Local Strong-points' are strongpoints deep in the battle area, which will be tenaciously defended in the event of enemy penetration. By being included in the main line of battle they will act as a reserve of defense and, should the enemy break through, as hinges and corner-stones for the front, forming positions from which counter-attacks can be launched. 2. Each 'Fortified Area Commandant' should be a specially selected, hardened soldier, preferably of General's rank. He will be appointed by the Army Group concerned. Fortified Area Commandants will be personally responsible to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army Group. Fortified Area Commandants will pledge their honor as soldiers to carry out their duties to the last. Only the Commander-in-Chief of an Army Group in person may, with my approval, relieve the Fortified Area Commandant of his duties, and perhaps order the surrender of the fortified area. Fortified Area Commandants are subordinate to the Commander of the Army Group, or Army, in whose sector the fortified area is situated. Further delegation of command to General Officers commanding formations will not take place. Apart from the garrison and its security forces, all persons within a fortified area, or who have been collected there, are under the orders of the Commandant, irrespective of whether they are soldiers or civilians, and without regard to their rank or appointment. The Fortified Area Commandant has the military rights and disciplinary powers of a Commanding General. In the performance of his duties he will have at his disposal mobile courts martial and civilian courts. The staff of Fortified Area Commandants will be appointed by the Army Group concerned. The Chiefs of Staff will be appointed by High Command of the Army, in accordance with suggestions made by the Army Group. 3. The garrison of a fortified area comprises: the security garrison, and the general garrison. The security garrison must be inside the fortified area at all times. Its strength will be laid down by Commander-in-Chief Army Group, and will be determined by the size of the area and the tasks to be fulfilled (preparation and completion of defenses, holding the fortified area against raids or local attacks by the enemy). The general garrison must be made available to the Commandant of the fortified area in sufficient time for the men to have taken up defensive positions and be installed when a full-scale enemy attack threatens. Its strength will be laid down by Commander-in-Chief Army Group, in accordance with the size of the fortified area and the task which is to be performed (total defense of the fortified area). 4. The 'Battle Commandant' comes under the orders of the local forces commander. He will be appointed by him, will be subordinate to him, and will receive operation orders from him. His rank will depend upon the importance of the position in the battle area and the strength of the garrison. His duties call for specially energetic officers whose qualities have been proved in crisis. 5. The strength of the garrisons of a 'Local Strong-point' will be determined by the importance of the position and the forces available. It will receive its orders from the authorities to which the Battle Commandant is subordinate. 6. The duties of 'Fortified Area Commanders' and 'Battle Commandants' as well as a list of fortified areas, and of reports on them submitted by Army Groups, are contained in the appendices. 7. All previous orders concerning Battle Commandants are hereby cancelled. signed: ADOLF HITLER Infuriation The loss of so much of terrain infuriated Adolf Hitler. He considered abandoning so many major cities and towns to the enemy without a fight to be both cowardly and militarily imprudent. After the German experience at Stalingrad, Hitler was certain that taking a defended city would take time and inflict considerable casualties on an attacker. This tactic would slow the Soviet advance much more efficiently than just retreating. On March 8, 1944, Hitler ordered that the towns of Ternopol, Proskurov, Kovell Brody, Vinnitsa and Peromaysk in the Army Group South Zone be identified as "fortified places". These cities would have a General appointed as the commander and would take orders only from the Army Group Commander. In addition, the towns could not be abandoned without the express permission of Hitler himself. Many of the cities were captured by the Soviets before anyone received the orders, others were simply abandoned in the confusion of the advance. Only in Ternopol did the Germans try to implement the concept. Ternopol was a garrison city far behind the lines. The town had no fortifications, no ammunition had been stockpiled and no unit had been assigned to defend the city. When Hitler's order was received the town had a defensive force of 4,600 men drawn from Waffen SS, 8th Panzer Division, Fusiliers from the Demba Training Ground and Galician volunteers. Most of these units were pure infantry. They had light machine guns and mortars with them but little else. There were fifteen anti-tank gun brought up from the training ground, three light 20mm anti aircraft guns, and four 88mm guns. There were also three 105mm and eight 150mm cannon. A few tanks, assault guns and self-propelled artillery guns were commandeered as they passed through the town but they were stragglers and of uneven quality. The town was under the command of General von Neindorf. General Neindorf had little time to get organized. Even as he took command the Soviet First Ukrainian Front under Marshal Georgi Zhukov resumed its offensive. Powerful Soviet forces pushed toward Ternopol. The Germans tried to maintain the line but the Soviet attack was simply too strong. By the evening of March 23, Soviet forces surrounded and cut off the town. Neindorf realized the gravity of the situation. He had a mass of disorganized troops, little ammunition, no antitank forces and little chance of standing up to the four Soviet rifle divisions assigned to take the city. He requested permission to withdraw. Hitler refused but did authorize 40 tons of ammunition to be delivered to the city with all due haste. While the resupply convoy assembled the Soviets pummeled the city. Neindorf and his men fought valiantly. Every Soviet attack was met by a determined defense. German troops fired from buildings, the rubble and cellars at the advancing Soviet troops. Enemy tanks were destroyed by the few tanks or antitank guns. When the antitank ammunition ran out the Germans used grenades or "Molotov Cocktails" to stop the enemy armor. Causalities on both sides were heavy but the Germans maintained control of the city. However, every attack was repulsed with a huge expenditure of ammunition. The situation was now critical. Neindorf and his men needed ammunition. The resupply convoy of 15 trucks, carrying 40 tons of ammunition and four ambulances was ordered to assemble at Lemberg, 120 kilometers from Ternopol on March 25. The trucks were to be escorted by an armored battle group. The battle group consisted of the 2nd and 10th Panzer Regiments and two battalions of Panzer Grenadiers. The trucks never showed by the time the armored task force set off The task force was hoping to open a road for the convoy to follow when it did arrive at the assembly point. The German attack quickly ran into the enemy forces surrounding the city. Although the Germans gave as good as the got, there were simply too many Soviets in the area. Less than 5 kilometers from the German perimeter around Ternopol, the armored battle group was forced to retreat back the way it had come. The situation inside the city was now growing desperate. The Soviets were sending the heaviest assaults in from the west, the route the defenders would have to take to retreat from the city. The Germans fought desperately but each attack inflicted more casualties, used more ammunition and gained a larger foothold in the city. On March 30th, Neindorf radioed Hitler that he was unable to hold any longer and requested permission to break out. The request was refused but Hitler ordered the town held until contact with friendly forces could be established. In desperation, Neindorf ordered an attack to clear out a Soviet intrusion into Zagrobela. The Demba Fusilier Battalion stormed the enemy position on April 1st and drove the enemy out. The door to the west and freedom was now momentarily open. However, the order to move out was not given and the grim German defenders stood and waited. They did not have to wait long. On April 3rd, the Soviets launched an all out offensive to crush the German defenders in the town. The town was pummeled by Soviet air and artillery units and then the men of four divisions charged the Germans. Even with this overwhelming force, the dogged German defenders hung on. Fighting at point blank range, and often hand to hand, they made the Soviets pay for every inch they gained. Although the Soviets were now in the town, their attack ground to a halt on the 6th. Artillery and air attacks continued to hit the defenders during the next four days. Finally, on April 10th the Soviets resumed their attacks. General Neindorf send out a desperate plea for help. He was short of ammunition, food and medical supplies. Since the start of the battle he had lost 16 officers and 1,471 killed or wounded. His units were about to be overrun. On April 11th, Army Group South tried one last relief attempt. The attack was led by the infantry forces of the 9th SS Panzer Division and was supported by 71 tanks, 27 assault guns and artillery. The attack went slowly. Bad weather slowed the advance for three days, a blown bridge accounted for another day's delay and by April 15th, the force was still 11 kilometers from Ternopol. It was by then too late. On the 15th General Neindorf had been killed throwing back an enemy attack. The remaining 1400 German defenders had been forced back into a 1,000 meter circle on the west side of the city. There was little left to do. After nightfall the men divided themselves into two 700 man forces and broke out of the city heading for their own lines. One group went west and the other southwest. The breakout took the Soviets by surprise and both groups managed to get through the enemy's lines. However, the alarm was sounded. Over the next hours, Soviet units hunted down and attacked the two columns. The men were broken into smaller groups and fought as best they could as they struggled to regain their lines. Few ever completed the trip. During the next two days only 55 Germans from Ternopol made it to friendly lines. Most were battered and bloody but happy to be alive. The Germans lost 4,545 holding the town and an additional 1,200 men were killed in the two relief columns. There is no record of how many soldiers and much equipment the Soviets lost taking Ternopol. However, the dogged determination of the Wehrmacht soldiers in the face of overwhelming odds is certainly a tribute to the discipline an outstanding fighting ability. Garrison at Ternopol Back to Table of Contents -- Against the Odds vol. 1 no. 3 Back to Against the Odds List of Issues Back to MagWeb Magazine List © Copyright 2002 by LPS. This article appears in MagWeb.com (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. 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