Some people don't believe in bad luck or "hard" luck, but if a unit could receive such a designation, then the German 18th Panzer Division in World War 2 was it. The unit was formed on October 26, 1940 from elements of several other divisions to increase the divisional strength of the Wehrmacht. Its panzer element was initially two regiments, the 18th and 28th, whose battalions were composed of Panzer Battalions "A", "B", "C", and "D", specially formed panzer units with swimming/amphibious capability originally built for Operation Sea Lion, the invasion of Britain. These modified panzers, designated Tauchpanzers; or U-panzers, were Mark II, III and IV tanks. The Mark II's had a special floatation device that varied in shape to something that looked like canoe outriggers to a boat-like structure and were designated Schwimmpanzers. The other two models had wire-ribbed snorkels and inflatable collars. The plan called for them to be off-loaded near the British coast, where they would swim ashore at approximately 10K/hr. On March 1, 1941, the 28th Panzer Regiment was disbanded. The 2/28th became the 3rd/18th. Each battalion of the 18th contained the following: 1 Panzer Staff Company 1 Medium Panzer Company 2 Light Panzer Companies The Division at that time had this Order of Battle: 18th Panzer Regiment (3 battalions) 18th Schutzen Brigade (2 regiments of 2 battalions) 88th Artillery Regiment (3 battalions) Various support units, including the 98th Pioneer Battalion Its armor strength was 218 tanks of all types, mainly Mark III's. This included 12 Panzer Befehlswagen, or command tanks. Lt. General Streich, whose most recent command was 5th Light Division under Rommel, initially led the unit. Rommel had him relieved. The division was part of Guderian's Panzer Group 2. It participated in all major battles during Operation Barbarossa, its premier attempt being the underwater crossing of the Bug river by the Tauchpanzers. The Schwimmpanzers apparently were not used. The unit was among the first division to meet T-34's, with devastating results for the Germans. To compound their problems, Soviet infantry and artillery counterattacked, forcing its motorcycle battalion to be pinned down in trench warfare for ten days. Guderian was displeased with Streich, who had lost 60% of his unit's panzers in the first two weeks of battle. From a starting strength of 17, 174 men and 400 officers, 2300 men and 123 officers were dead or wounded at the end of Barbarossds third week. Casualties were so heavy that by mid-July all the replacement depot troops had been cycled through. Officers had high casualties as well. Six battalion commanders were dead or wounded. The Schutzen brigade was down to 600 men. The above-mentioned motorcycle troops were below half strength, nearly bereft of squad and platoon leaders. In a month, their casualties were 3200 men and 153 officers. Lt. General Walter Nehring, who had been on Guderian's staff during the campaign in France, relieved Streich at some point. High casualties among officers forced NCOs to be promoted, causing a lack of experienced enlisted leaders. Morale, and more importantly, esprit de corps fell and never recovered. A revolving door of commanders kept the unit in turmoil for the remainder of its life. By the time of Operation Typhoon, the unit was little more than an infantry regiment, having lost all its tanks and most of its motor vehicles. Relying on horse drawn wagons for supply, the unit mustered only 1963 men and 43 officers to face the Soviet counteroffensive in December 1941. It was reconstituted as 4 infantry battalions. Disease, constant fighting, poor food and shelter decimated the remaining troops. Reinforcements trickled in, as well as a few tanks and artillery pieces. The High Command refused to disband one of its vaunted Panzer Divisions. During the period January to March 1942, the unit suffered casualties of 6667 men and 120 officers. Total casualties since Barbarossa began were 9148 men and 323 officers. On May 15, the 18th Panzer Regiment was disbanded. The 3rd battalion was retained and redesignated the 18th Panzer Battalion. Its strength on June 29th 1942 was as follows: 1 Panzer Staff Company 1 Medium Panzer Company 2 Light Panzer Companies 47 tanks, mostly Mark III's 292nd Army Flak Battalion was added. 88th Recon Battalion was merged with 18th Motorcycle Battalion and was designated 18th Panzer Reconnaissance Battalion. Its combat strength was still little more than a reinforced regiment. The Soviets attacked the portion of the front held by the 18th in July of 1942, causing casualties of 1363 men and 43 officers in the first four days. Finished, the unit was withdrawn for rebuilding. It returned to the front early in 1943 in the Orel area. The Russians apparently had a knack for picking on the unit. They hit it continually, so that by March 1943, 18th Panzer lost 1994 of the 3000 men it had arrived with. Again, it was reformed as four infantry battalions of roughly 290 men each. High Command decided to try to breathe life back into the moribund division once more. The Flak unit was detached. The unit received 89 officers, 130 NCOs and 2571 replacements. During the next few weeks leading up to the Kursk offensive it looked like the following: 18th Panzer Regiment (actually one battalion of two companies). A 3rd company was added in June. Mark III's were phased out the same month so that all three companies had 22 Mark IV's each. 52nd Panzergrenadier Regiment (2 motorized battalions and support staff) 101st Panzergrenadier Regiment (same as 52nd) 88th Panzerjager Battalion 6th Reconnaissance Battalion 88th Panzer Artillery Regiment (3 battalions, one motorized) 98th Panzer Pioneer Battalion 88th Panzer Signals Battalion 88th Feldersatz Battalion 88th Supply Troop Truck Park Other (butchers, bakers, MPs, Medical, Administration and Post Office units) Further mobilization was planned. The 6th Reconnaissance Battalion became the 18th Reconnaissance Battalion and was revamped with halftracks and heavier support weapons. The tank strength of the unit on July 1, 1943 was 72, mostly Mark IV's. The unit was effectively destroyed after that in the ferocity of the Kursk offensive. It was disbanded on September 29, 1943, having suffered total losses since June 22, 1941 of 17,001, nearly all it's at start strength. The 18th Panzer Battalion became the 504th Panzer Battalion. This was not the end of the 18th as a division. East Front veteran Field Marshall Erich von Manstein, realizing that manpower and material losses could not be made up in the face of continuing Russian attacks, developed the idea of panzer "fire brigades", mobile units that could concentrate at Soviet breakthrough points and defeat them before they could rupture the main defense line. He learned through experience that concentrated Russian artillery had smashed German attacks in 1942 and 1943. The average German infantry division could muster only 27 to 36 artillery pieces, insufficient to halt a determined Soviet attack as well as direct infantry support. There were not enough guns to add firepower to each division, so Manstein spun the concept of the highly mobile Artillery Division. The High Command agreed with him, since his other innovations had been successful, and they set about building this "concept" unit. Immediately available were the staff, artillery regiment, signals battalion, reconnaissance battalion and Panzerjager battalion of 18th Panzer Division. They became the core of 18th Artillery Division. Other units were formed and added during the month of October. The 88th Light Artillery regiment had one battalion of Wespe self-propelled guns, the others being motorized 105mm howitzers. The 288th Heavy Artillery Regiment had two battalions of 150mm motorized guns, one battalion of 210mm mortars and one battalion of 100mm guns. The 388th Artillery Regiment had the 4th Light Observation Battalion, and the 740th Heavy Artillery Battalion, which originally was equipped with all 150mm guns, but later added nine 170mm long-range guns. Later additions included the 741st Sturmgeschutz Battery, the 88th Schutzen Battalion, 18th Fire Control Battery and the 88th Division Signals Battalion. Led by Lt. General Thoholte, the unit began training. On Nov. 16th, it was reorganized again as follows: 88th Artillery Regiment (4 battalions, one equipped with 12 Wespe and 6 Hummel SPGs) 288th Artillery Regiment (3 battalions, one with 9 170mm guns) 388th Artillery Regiment (3 battalions, one with 9 210mm mortars) 741st Sturmgeschutz Battery (10 Stug) 280th Flak Battalion 4th Observation Battalion 18th Motorized Fire Control Battery 88th Division Signals Battalion 88th Feldersatz Battalion 88th Supply Troop Administration, Medical, Post Office troops The Division was completely motorized. The Fire Control Battery was a new concept. The unit was built up and underwent training in the rear of Army Group South, developing a doctrine of quick response to local breakthroughs. The fully motorized Fire Control and Signals units were supposed to be able to form a network with the front line units, identify targets rapidly and accurately, and be able to bring to bear punishing artillery fire. To do this, the battalions were reorganized into two 6-gun batteries instead of three 4-gun batteries, cutting the bureaucracy without hurting firepower. The new units had some logistical disadvantages setting up and getting organized, but they were outweighed by the theoretical additional mass of fire. The final result was supposed to be a unit that could rapidly shift position to reinforce local artillery efforts and stop Soviet offensives along a projected 10km front by the use of armored observation units and quick communication links. Accurate counter-battery fire could be directed either by the organic division Observation unit or a front line Observation unit. Von Manstein believed he had the way to plug any hole made by a Soviet breakthrough. "Let the Monster destroy himself by his own exertions", was the belated thinking at Headquarters. Von Manstein sidestepped directives from Hitler at every chance when they made no military sense, and only his brilliance and audacity kept him in command. The Soviets began a massive offensive while 18th Artillery was forming and suddenly areas of the 4th Panzer army around Zhitomir were penetrated and the entire Dnieper bend defense line was in jeopardy. The Division was sent forward, not to support local units, but to actually stand in the gap and hold off Soviet armor breakthroughs. Every non-artillery unit in the division was thrown into the line as part of 48th Panzer Corps. Casualties mounted and the division was in danger of being swept away again when panzers luckily intervened. The unit's artillery components were stripped for other duties and it suddenly was reduced to being little more effective than an infantry division's artillery component. It did retain its signal capacity, but the signals unit lost its armored vehicles to other units. It was ill equipped and under- trained. During the fighting around Zhitomir, it was tasked to hold the town, and did little more than tie up vital roads used by counter- attacking Panzers. Major General Von Mellenthin remarks in his memoirs: "The division was a complete Misfit, and did nothing but block the roads and lose its guns. There was some idea in high quarters that it could be used as an armored division, but it proved a failure in attack or defense, and was quite incapable of holding Zhitomir." Reconstituted a final time, the unit finally lived up to expectations by being subordinated to Corps command. On several occasions during the destruction of the Russian 1st Tank army south of Cherkassy, the Division was able to command upwards of seventeen artillery battalions. Because the average breakthrough area had widened to 20 kilometers, the division was never able to mass that many battalions into one attack, but it was able to link them and do good service. At that point, only nine battalions were organic, the rest coming from local infantry divisions. It served with 48th Panzer Corps of the 4th Panzer army the rest of its career. Its days were numbered after March 1944, when Hitler finally got up enough nerve to fire Von Manstein after a series of setbacks caused more by the Fuhrer's idiocy and lack of troops than the Field Marshall's ineptness. Field Marshall Model apparently had no use for such an oddball unit, and on August 27th, 1944, the "hard luck" of the 18th finally ran out. It was disbanded permanently. The empire it served would last a bare eight months longer. Back to Table of Contents -- Against the Odds vol. 1 no. 3 Back to Against the Odds List of Issues Back to MagWeb Magazine List © Copyright 2002 by LPS. This article appears in MagWeb.com (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. 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