For the German player to win the Kesselschlacht game, he must organize his air transport operations very carefully, delivering the largest possible quantity of fuel and ammunition, as quickly as possible, to his encircled First Panzer Army. Fighter groups must secure the critical airspace, and ground units the vital airfields, in order to facilitate the all-important airlift. The player must make every effort to coordinate these operations deftly and with maximum efficiency, because Soviet offensive pressure and the voracious expenditure of fuel and munitions by the trapped mobile Korps dictate that no opportunity for air supply be wasted. In 'real life' the successful withdrawal of First Panzer Army from its encirclement in the western Ukraine was attributable in significant part to the air supply efforts of the Luftwaffe. These operations, conducted on a 'round the clocV basis from March 25 (the day the 'Pocket' was formed) through April 8, 1944 (two days after First Panzer Army units first linked with relief forces of Fourth Panzer Army), provided desperatelyneeded fuel and ammunition to the 20-odd divisions trapped in the Kessel. Atrociously bad weather, an active and aggressive Red Air Force, occasionally fierce Soviet anti-aircraft fire, and steady attrition from heavy operational 'wear and tear', all had to be overcome by the severely overtaxed. Transportgruppen charged with supplying the Pocket. The Luftwaffe's Fourth Air Fleet had general control over the area of operations, with the air supply effort tasked specifically to the transport squadrons of Major General Fritz Morzik. Morzik had been in Odessa directing resupply efforts for 17 Army in the Crimea when he received orders on March 25 to coordinate air supply efforts for the Kessel. To meet this task he had available four wings of Ju- 52s, a wing of He-111s, and a wing of towed gliders (He-111s and DFS 230 gliders): All in all, a total of approximately 150 Ju-52s and 100 He-111s, operating generally from airfields around Lemberg (Lvov), about 180 miles from the (initial) center of the Pocket. Experienced air supply liason teams, operating in the Pocket itself, coordinated the selection and marking of improvised air strips and drop zones, while First Panzer Army ground troops handled unloading and distribution tasks. All of the Luftwaffe's transport operations were complicated by the fact that Hube's Kessel was a constantly moving one; as it drove westward each day, landing zones and airstrips had to be improvised and changed, repeatedly. For much of the crisis period the weather alternated between rainy, overcast conditions, and heavy snow, with occasional periods of blizzard. Despite the atrocious conditions, the Luftwaffe kept flying, even when the Red Air Force did not. Return flights were packed with wounded, a wellknown fact which greatly increased morale in the Pocket throughout the course of the withdrawal. From an early date the decision was made to deliver only fuel, ammunition, spare parts and medical supplies; the landsers had to find their own food by foraging the countryside. Although Hube's assault units operated with only a very lean cushion of fuel and ammunition, at no time did they run out completely for a period long enough to jeopardize their offensive capabilities. Given that the Soviets had general air superiority, most of the transport missions took place at night; in good weather, 3-4 sorties a night could be made. The Red Air Force failed to strike the staging airfields outside the Pocket in force; this greatly facilitated airlift operations. In the last stages of the withdrawal, no more airfields were available--supply runs were conducted exclusively by paradrop, or by dropping loads low over the snowy ground. Cargo gliders were used, but to little effect, in attempts to supply the beleaguered garrison of Ternopol, where no airfields--only rubble- strewn streets-were held by the Germans. Following closely after the bitter disaster of the Korsun Pocket, the successful fighting withdrawal of Hube's Pocket was a clear triumph for German arms. At no time was there panic or disorganization among the trapped troops, and the eventual restoration of the front greatly facilitated the prolongation of the war. Luftwaffe air supply efforts played a critical role in Hube's escape. Back to Table of Contents -- Against the Odds vol. 1 no. 3 Back to Against the Odds List of Issues Back to MagWeb Magazine List © Copyright 2002 by LPS. This article appears in MagWeb.com (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other articles from military history and related magazines are available at http://www.magweb.com * Buy this back issue or subscribe to Against the Odds direct from LPS.