The Six Days of Glory was a "sleeper, " which gradually gained momentum after its release, breaking the normal pattern, which is a steady decline after an initial burst. I ascribe a lot of this to the system's quickness and man- ageability in play. Ais reception inspired me to work some other designs in the same system. The first of these to be published was 1806 - and brand new is Last Days of the Grande Armee (see the notice in these pages). Enjoy!
Comments? E-mail me at kzucker@charm. net. For more about this game visit the OSG page at http:llwww.charm.net/kzucker/osg/
The 1806 campaign is one of the universally acknowledged masterpieces of Napoleon's military genius. The nowadays-famous battalion carr6 showed the world how a big army, advancing into enemy territory, could guard its own flanks, so that if one of the outer columns was attacked, the central one could intervene in support; speedily concentrate a substantial force in a single critical point of the engagement; and reduce attrition thanks to the low level of concentration of troops. Of course there exist some pre-conditions in order to meet the desired effects.
First of all, communications: the three columns must be in continuous contact to know each other's position, going ahead in unison. Second, with the real position of Prussian forces unknown, the French troops had to avoid seriously and jointly engaging in a fight which could divert the attention of the 'core' of the French troops from the critical point and crucial moment of the battle. Historically Napoleon gave a happy solution to all of that, and he managed to engage a divided and mostly immobile Prussian army (however much the victory is due to the brave Davout).
OSG's 1806 is a game which faithfully reproduces the aspects of maneuvering of the campaign, in a fluid and amusing manner. The well-thought-out command system appropriately simulates the relative ease of maneuver of the French side compared to a limited, but not absent, Prussian mobility.
While I maintain some minor reservations on the game as a whole (in the use of the Imperial Guard, ZOC and out-of-supply effects and Prussian mobility-see below), I think you receive value for money in: materials quality, enjoyment, possibility to implement different strategies and an overall balance between players. So what do I question?
As the Imperial Guard was rarely used in combat in 1806, the game perhaps should reflect this fact and limit its possible use as a 'normal' but powerful unit. This could be accomplished, for example, by giving the Guard units all the current benefits when defending, limiting the same benefits when attacking - or else leaving all the current benefits but enforcing the disadvantages for the complete army: for instance, if the Guard fails when attacking you loose the game, that's all!
ZOCs are hard ones: when you have to retreat in a ZOC you die. In effect the game presents an attempt to mitigate this fact but as it happens you may rarely use that rule. Of course the mortal ZOC effect is a necessary artifact to try to simulate a much more complex geometrical situation. But we must also consider that the surrounding maneuver was not so easy or frequent, because the target unit would react against any attempt to prevent such a terrible situation. One could think of a rule making surrounds more difficult - for instance, you cannot enter an enemy ZOC to 'surround an enemy unit' if the enemy unit rolls OK on its initiative.
Out-of-supply effects are not so heavy: probably you won't be able to reach victory, but if you are already in position to win you won't loose. Moreover the effects are not cumulative. When does it happen when you don't eat (or eat badly) for some days, you cannot drink a single cup of coffee and you cannot shoot your enemies? I think your mobility would be reduced and so your willingness to fight: the system should envisage this.
Finally, from a personal viewpoint, Initiative values for some of the Prussian units should be reduced. Otherwise you risk an overall less historical scenario (even if more enjoyable).
Even if the French player has many aces in his deck (the Guard, command, Napoleon, leaders' initiative), the Prussian player is not doomed at all and, with a shrewd and prudent strategy, he may smoothly close the match in his favor. I honestly don't know if this is an event which could happen in the real campaign, but it's sure it may in the game, so shrewdness and prudence are recommended virtues for the French too.
Some game elements may drive a single match toward a French or Prussian victory from the very beginning of a game. I will try here to describe some of them relating to the campaign scenario. Surely, as cited in the rule booklet, the campaign start date is one of these. An earlier start date is in favor of the Prussian player, as he may more easily choose and implement a personal strategy and perhaps avoid some historical mistakes.
In particular, if the campaign start date is the 8th or 9th of October, the Prussian player has all the time to avoid Tauentzien division's elimination - if, of course, this is part of his overall strategy - and to get him withdrawn toward more secure positions.
This important maneuver which may save a crucial unit from certain death may be accomplished, starting from the initial set-up, by moving Hohenlohe toward Zezschwitz and then, in the following turn, putting Tauentzien in command, relying on his initiative to reduce the distance from the commander. Bila's division may remain in its initial place, trying to destroy the bridge in front of it and sending a vedette to protect the bridge in hex 2714.
This maneuver, implying the probable sacrifice of Bila to save Tauentzien, may delay the advance of the French central column for some turns, allowing the Prussian player to rally his army in the selected place. Out of command units temporarily left behind by Hohenlohe are able to attend to themselves thanks to their high initiative values. Their task should be: destruction and garrison of the Saale bridges (remember that a single vedette is enough to prevent rebuild), the speediest possible withdrawal toward Hohenlohe's rallying point.
If the campaign doesn't start too late for the Prussian player, he has the chance to decide what to do with the Saale bridges. These bridges delimit an important play area because here all the Prussian units appear: for the Prussian to destroy these bridges and hold them may imply that the French player won't be able to cross the Saale and shall therefore proceed along the north direction toward a not-specified meeting point with the enemy.
That leaves the Prussian the faculty to decide at least the place and time of the battle, if nothing else. It's necessary to remember that the French player may win only with high Prussian losses matched with low personal ones. This has a strong implication: the French Player may simply not allow himself to engage all his army in a single clash with the enemy, with the risk of exchanging troops in favor of the enemy. He must therefore try to divide the Prussian army in more parts and search for favorable combats, where he can employ superior odds, Napoleon and the guard (within the current game terms). Taking the Saale bridges is the determinant for this strategy to succeed.
Afterwards during the central part of the game the Saale bridges will be fiercely fought over by the reinforcement troops of the two factions and this adds to the importance for the Prussian to garrison these bridges. The French player will have to try to force the Saale using his pontoons, so it's advisable for the Prussian to leave at least some vedettes with a good mobility to garrison his own banks of the river.
Davout is an important 'card' in the game, probably more than he was in reality. He is in command of the center column of the French army, advancing along the Leipzig direction. The center column is headed by the 'bravest,' Murat, who opens the road for Napoleon and his marvelous Guard. The right wing is headed by Soult and Ney's Corps while the left wing is entrusted to Lannes and Angereau, advancing in difficult terrain. Historically during the campaign Davout took the position most to the right of the French army. Surely Davout's troops are the ones which may arrive more easily and promptly at a direct fight with the enemy.
Even if he's clearly superior to Hohenlohe, he's surely not to Brunswick's combined I Corps and Reserve. Davout is able to give the first blow to the Prussian army, but his tactical attitude must be eminently defensive. A too-hurried engagement would risk exposing the complete French right wing to annihilation by the following Prussian reinforcements. And once Davout is put out of play, the French army may still be very strong, but, considering the difficulty to recover troops from elimination and the toughness of the Prussian forces, the Prussian player may easily play to a close assuming a purely defensive behavior.
Keep particular attention on the King and Queen of Prussia. Even if these illustrious souls give no victory points, their importance is crucial to recover lost Prussian troops, as much as to expose at least one of them near the front line just to have some troops recovered in a nice place to use them directly in a battle. The baggage trains must be constantly protected: it may be irreparable to loose it to the French player, especially in the first days of the campaign. The Prussian player has two of them, but it doesn't mean that one is to lose: remember that a baggage train is equivalent to demoralizing one corps in terms of victory points!
Generally speaking the French player must live with two obligations (and the Prussian one with two antithetical objectives): to constantly protect his lines of supply and to maintain the bataillion carre compacted. The three wings of the battalion must be thought of as 'the anvil, the stirrup and the hammer' of the French force. To unify them before the right time and being engaged with the enemy may signify the loss of the devastating benefits of their combined action.
OSG's 1806 puts you directly into the 'core' of the historical situation. Some minor extensions, in the form of optional rules for example, could give more historical accuracy. But you still have in your hands an amusing and easy to learn game (and system) whose most distinguishing, and pleasant, feature is its capability to reproduce the maneuver aspects of the era. This feature and the fact that you will rarely repeat the same game situation (also thanks to a number of scenario play options) may give you many hours of great entertainment!
Back to Art of War Issue #30 Table of Contents
Back to Art of War List of Issues
Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List
© Copyright 1999 by Clash of Arms Games.
This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web.
Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com