The quality of a Napoleonic miniatures battle system can be measured by its treatment of the infantry. While the cavalry and the artillery are certainly more glamorous and dramatic, the fate of the battle will always turn on the actions of the infantry. Historically, this was certainly the case, and in virtually every battle using this system, the outcome is decided by a line of infantry being broken. The elegance of this system is confirmed by the process by which this climactic event occurs. While one might quarrel with isolated details in this system, the flow of the events of battle appear to mirror accounts of the actions of the age, and therefore, those events have the feel of authenticity. Anomalies are both minor and rare.
A Napoleonic infantryman could only kill one enemy at a time and only at close range. He could never aspire to the lethal menace of a field piece, or to the terrifying ferocity of a hussar. But for every regiment of hussars, or battery of 6 pounders, there are at least five battalions of infantry to oppose them. Once a battalion in line has closed to 100 meters, it can dish out serious punishment with musketry. Neither artillery nor cavalry can afford to endure this volley fire for long. This battlefield reality reaffirms the timeless military maxim that to hold ground you must use infantry. This held as true in the age of Napoleon as at any other time in history.
The maxim is universally true, and therefore can never be so trite as to be considered a clich~. This quintessential characteristic of the infantry makes it the foundation of every maneuver on the field of battle. Poor judgment or carelessness in the handling of the infantry will break them, the backbone of the Army.
Of all the factors which come into play when fighting with infantry formations, the single most important factor is the quality of the troops. Battalions of foot soldiers come in such a wide variety; it is grossly negligent to treat them as interchangeable. There is just no comparison between Portuguese militia, and the 95th Regiment of Foot. This range of potential makes it absolutely necessary to KNOW YOUR TROOPS. The seemingly small incremental differences rapidly add up, and result in significant qualitative superiority for veteran and elite regiments. Assessing the limitations and capabilities of your men and those on the other side are the most important judgments you will make.
Basic Unit
The basic unit of infantry in From Valmy to Waterloo is the battalion. While the commander moves individual battalions, you must never lose sight of the effect that battalions can have on the larger formations of which they are a part. These considerations can be generally described as formation effects. The formation of the battalions, regiments, and brigades of an infantry division ought to reveal a unified system employed by the divisional commander. If it does not, the division will be much more brittle, and will not survive against a more coordinated command.
Brigade and divisional formations do not have immediate impact on the front-line battalions, unlike the formations adopted by the battalions themselves. And while it is necessary to be adept with battalion formations, it is even more important to integrate them into the bigger picture.
Even though the battalion was the basic unit for battle, the basic unit for staff purposes was the regiment. It is highly irregular to find a regiment in which the component battalions are not identical in training, morale, fire discipline, or melee value. Conversely, there is tremendous variety in regiments. But regimental integrity is the only battlefield effect founded in the regiment alone. A battalion must be able to trace a line of communication between itself and the closest battalion of its regiment, unbroken by either friendly or enemy units. If it cannot, their morale suffers. Integrity also has its brigade and divisional counterparts. These organizational matters are not merely for show.
The tactics of the infantry are designed to accomplish two different but related ends: take or hold ground; and maintain your line, while breaking that of your opponent. Ultimately, only infantry can accomplish these ends. The other arms, though often decisive, are always complimentary. The infantry defeats its opponent by destroying it with musketry or charging and making it run. The charge is more effective in that it causes disorder and may rout the enemy. However, charging also disorders the chargers, and if they fail, they may be running away instead.
The secret to success is to keep your men from running away. The longer you do that, the more likely your enemy will run first.
Most commanders are so focused on trying to rout the enemy, that they overlook how to avoid the problem themselves. If you are going to fight a battle, eventually your troops will be required to check morale. You can not take or hold a position without taking casualties or being charged. Battle inherently promotes terror and chaos. The commander who maintains and restores order will prevail. Naturally you seek to cause disorder in the enemy's army, but in so doing, you must not cause more of it in your own command.
The most useful technique to avoid rout is to keep damaged units from taking more casualties. That is easy to say, and hard to do. Once a battalion has taken 50% casualties it must check morale. At 50% losses it is already in trouble. The only practical way to relieve front-line battalions (especially if the division is on an attack order) is the rule for passage of lines. A battalion which has closed to 100 meters of the enemy may not withdraw voluntarily, except through passage of lines. The battalion can about face and make a full column move to the rear even if in line formation, and be replaced by a battalion of the same brigade. If your front line battalions reach 40% casualties, you MUST do this! Anticipate and be ready for it! If you fail, your front line will be charged and routed. Routed units and units at 50% strength are counted as lost for brigade and divisional morale purposes. You must do all that you can to keep your battalions intact for these formation morale checks.
If your front line routs, you must restore order. Do not allow a front-line rout to destroy your entire command. It often does, but if a division is properly handled much can be done to remedy the situation. If you have deployed and fought your division as a cluster of loosely related battalions, surging forward to overwhelm the enemy fine by force of will or elan, expect them to come streaming back and overwhelm your army with the panic and confusion they bring with them.
In order to restore order, there must have been order in the first place. Infantry commanders must integrate the handling of their regiment's battalions with the overall brigade and divisional formation structure. These considerations reveal themselves in the integrity, command and morale rules. Battalion formations are mandatory. The commander chooses a formation and the battalion adopts it and the effects are mandatory. On the other hand the formations employed by regiments, brigades and divisions are entirely discretionary. If you ignore integrity and command considerations expect to be beaten.
For each loss of regimental integrity, a battalion suffers a -2 to its morale. Being out of command is even worse. Therefore, an infantry commander who does not want to be killed by friendly fire or court martialled must know the integrity and command rules. Central to these rules are the brigade and division leader figures. In order to be in command, all battalions of the division must be within the command radius of the division leader. Similarly, if a battalion is outside of the brigade distance from the brigade leader, there is a loss of integrity. A very common mistake is merging the two concepts. They are independent of each other. Division leaders transmit nothing to brigade leaders. It is not a chain.
Thus, in order to have a sound and flexible brigade and divisional structure, the frontage of the division should be no wider than 1.7 times the radius of the leader. Similarly, a brigade frontage must be narrow enough so that the brigade leader does not have to be in the front line. If these leaders are in the front-line, they are much more likely to be killed. If it is possible, do not lead from the front. You must know your leaders as well as you know their troops, and good leaders help immeasurably. If the division has a sound structure, there should never be a loss of integrity, or a unit which gets out of command. Furthermore, if a front-line battalion routs, there ought to be a reasonable chance to rally it.
Regardless of the cause, when infantrymen panic, they head for the hills. If you are carrying a musket and have your gear on your back, how far can you get at full speed? If the fighting is left behind, after two hundred yards the effects of terror begin to dissipate. The men slow down and a commander has at least the opportunity to rally.
The doctrine of the age called for the deployment of an army in at least two lines of battle. The second line was almost always 400 to 500 meters to the rear of the first. This kept the reserves out of harm's way. More importantly however, was the security it provided to their comrades who were so unlucky as to be sent forward in the front-line to risk their lives. Such a deployment contains beaten and demoralized troops to the interior of the army. Here they can take heart from the presence of their comrades in good order. In such circumstances beaten troops would often reform, and fight on.
The morale rules give substantial bonuses for flank and rear support. Rallying troops get bonuses if they are within 200 meters of friendly troops in good order, and if they are in the same division or brigade the bonuses are larger. When an infantry battalion routs, it moves 500 meters to the rear. If the second line is 200 meters behind it when it runs, there might be interpenetration which is very bad. But even worse, the routed unit will flee beyond flank and rear support and friends in good order, thereby diminishing the chance to rally, and increasing the possibility of brigade or divisional morale checks.
Commanders are frequently seduced by the promise of overwhelming mass, and hurl entire brigades at an objective in one densely packed mass. Artillery will justly punish such rashness. As bad as the casualties are, the consequences of the resulting routs, interpenetrations, and losses of brigade and division integrity are much worse.
Leaders
With all these considerations in mind, the first thing an infantry division commander should do is study the unit cards and familiarize himself with his brigade and division leaders and their troops. Second, never, ever deploy a division of infantry in line of brigades. If the second line consists of battalions of a brigade which is different from the front line brigade, you effectively reduce the division to a brigade. The second brigade rarely gets a chance to fight. Such a deployment will never be able to use passage of lines, or get the maximum morale benefit of friends from the same brigade for rallying. To make things even worse, you expose an entire brigade to losses and rout, thereby maximizing the chances for the brigade to undergo a brigade morale check.
If the brigade routs, then in a typical two brigade division, the division will take a divisional morale check in the following turn at 50% losses. The entire division is likely to rout, retreat or retire. In any case it is neutralized. Experience has shown that the cascading effect of such checks, wins and loses battles.
The recommended division formation is for the brigades to fight side by side. In both attack and defense this permits the entire division to engage. Damaged battalions can be withdrawn and rallied, and fresh battalions moved forward to take their place. The brigades should deploy considering the regimental structure. Regiments come in many configurations, as do brigades, so that the possibilities are endless. When you consider terrain' objectives and orders, the actual formation of the division could be quite unique. But the underlying principle of deploying your brigades to utilize passage of lines and to aid routed comrades never changes and should always be the foundation of every divisional formation.
The formation decisions for individual battalions are primarily situational and can not be dictated by doctrine except at a very elementary level, i,e. square in the face of charging cavalry, engage in line for volley fire, maneuver in column. However there are a few principles which bear mention. Often a commander will deploy from column to line too soon. While column is a more inviting target, it spends less time in the field of fire. As a general principle wait until your battalion has reached canister range before your go to line if you are on the attack. Make sure that there is enough movement left to make the change. An infantry column getting hit with canister is not a pretty sight.
Open order troops are not equipped with the means to catch cannonballs and accordingly they do not block line of sight in most instances. This is unlike most other rule systems. Skirmishers are nevertheless effective in softening up the enemy through musketry. They are likely to inflict more casualties than they receive, and they provoke return fire and generate smoke. This diminishes the fire effectiveness of the enemy, which in an infantry battle is often the margin of victory. French legere regiments are particularly nasty in this regard. Do not underestimate them. They can evade virtually at will and their training and morale are uniformly high.
Pay attention to terrain effects, particularly disorders. These pesky annoyances make their victims more vulnerable, i.e. they create targets of opportunity. Veteran troops can overcome these problems. Conscripts will be destroyed by them, so be careful. Lastly, preserve your grenadiers. Fire combat kills them as readily as it kills militia. Reserve them for taking or defending your primary objective. You will regret their loss, if you are forced to send some boys to do the job of the men and find that the boys were almost but not quite up to the task.
For the successful infantry commander opportunities for brilliance and glory are very rare and can not be forced or created by design. Ultimately, the successful infantry commander is the one who steadfastly avoids making mistakes, and then recognizes and exploits those of his enemies. Mistakes in using your battalions are regrettable, but an error with an individual battalion is rarely significant. On the other hand, an error at the brigade or division level can be fatal.
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