Following the catastrophic defeat of the Prussian army at Jena and Auerstadt in October 1806, the Prussians retreated 200 miles over four weeks--from Saxony, downslope from the Thuringerwald to the sandy coasts of the Baltic Sea--with the French army always only one or two days' march behind. To reach the safety of East Prussia, they had to cross two great rivers--the Elbe flowing to the North Sea, the Oder to the Baltic.
They set out across the Unstrutt River as far as Nordhausen in the foothills of the Harz Mountains. From there they broke up into three columns and crossed the Elbe at and below Magdeburg. The French army also split into several columns, some of them following thePrussians, others making straight to Berlin. Marshal Davout's III Corps, Jean Lannes' V Corps, and Prince Murat's Cavalry Reserve crossed the Elbe upstream on a course parallel to the Prussians.
Moving on throug Berlin, Lannes and Murat caught up with them at Prenzlau, a cross roads only 25 miles from Stettin on the Oder. Prussian morale so deteriorated that three men could capture a squadron. Almost the entire Prussian Army went into the bag in 26 days. "Of Friedrich Wilhelm's 160,000 men who had entered upon the campaign, 25,000 had been killed and wounded, whilst 100,000 were made prisoners (Fuller. Decisive Battles, page 610).
After such a discouraging performance, the antistrophe was slow in coming. All hopesrested with the Prussian reserve corps under General Anton Wilhelm L'Estocq, approcahing from distant East Prussia. The remaining Prussians resolved to salvage their honor in the face of calamity, and with the support of the Russian armies of Generals Bennigsen and Buxhowden, finally learned how to stand yup to the french.
After discovering state documents in Berlin revealing Russian duplicity in its negotiations, Napoleon resolved to force Russia to the peace table. Freench public opinion regretted this decision. Had Napoleon made peace with Prussia alone, settling terms from Berlin, the Tsar's legions would have had no occasion to gain the vital experience necessary to defeat the French army, and would have avoided seeing the shock of seeing a renascent Poland on Russia's doorstep. Once Napoleon's legions entered the Polish territories of Prussia, the destinies of Poland and Napoleon were fatefully linked, and war with Russia amid the gravel hills and scattered lakes, muddy plains, and sand-bottomed rills of Poland became virtually certain.
Fight for Poland
The fight for Poland began with the French arrival in warsaw. Anchoring their farthest flank on neytral territory of Austrian Galacia, they turned 90 degrees to face East Prussia to the north. The Grande Armee was now spread along 200 miles of the Vistula and could choose to cross at any point. During the course of the campaign, Napoleon crossed in three different directions, progressively nearer to Friedrich Wilhelm's last bastion--from the south, based on Warsaw, from the middle reaches, based on Thorn, and from the Baltic shore, near the Prussian-held fortress of Danzig.
At first crossing, the Russians were driven back from Warsaw after administering a definite check on Napoleon's forward momentum. The second attempt issued at bloody Eylau where both armies were decimated before winter brought operations to a halt. Bennigsen employed the Fabian strategy, withdrawing from troops led by Napoleon, and seeking battle with his less-talented subordinates. He made an aggressive first strike in each of the three active phases of the war, catching Lannes, Bernadotte, and Ney individually. Napoleon gained his final victory at Friedland because his able opponent, Bennigsen, allowed himself to be caught laying a snare for Lannes alone.
Threee cities on the Vistula will play a paramount role--Warsaw, Thorn, and Danzig--besides Konigsberg on the Pragel, the only other city oin the theater of operations, and the last base in Prussian hands. Ostensibly, the Russians fought to preserve this refuge, but the Prussian alliance decreased in influence as their small force dwindled. Despite his flair for theatrical and gallant gestures, the Tsar fought in Poland to protect Russian interests and to keep Napoleon as far off his frontier as possible.
Ultimate Triumph
Napoleon's ultimate triumph brought a fragile peace. Eylau caused too much harm to Napoleon's vaunted military reputation. Had he conquered Russia in 1812, the 1807 campaign would have been a mere footnote to an otherwise illustrious string of triumphs. But since he failed in that catastrophic expedition, we can see the campaign in Poland as a dress-rehersal for 1812, where the Russian, aided by trackless forests, learned how to counter the new mobile warfare developed in the west. The constant fighting withdrawal from Jonkovo to Eylau proved a formative experience as Russian General barclay de Tolly, who in July and August 1812 would apply the experience as commander in chief. He received a serious would at Eylau and was fortunate enough to spend the remainder of the war recovering, conceiving his first toughts on the use of "Fabian Strategy" with which he would frustrate Napoleon's plans in July and August 1812.
The lack of new works on the campaign may have to do with a curiosity in the strategic situation that makes a less neat and orderly narrative than say, the Danubian or the Russian campaigns, which unfolded in a linear fashion from the frontier to the enemy capital. In 1807 and 1813 alike, a mighty river to his front doubled both as Napoleon's strategic screen and supply line. The Vistula in 1807 carried the barges which brought supplies to his base at Warsaw as in 1813 the Elbe fed Dresden.
The pivotal role of the river as the army's tenuous lifeline has been overlooked. Without an all-important geographic point such as Moscow, Vienna or Paris upon which to focus a narrative, historians of 1807 and 1813 have gotten lost in th details of operation. So instead of point--the enemy capital--let us have a line, the Vistula. The river and control of its crossing are the true focus. Once this line was completely secured, the campaign was over. In this light, the campaign of Friedland was mere coda, and bennigsen an actor whose role had already been played out.
Fine Study Subject
- The winter campaign of 1807 is a fine subject for study and reflection for any one who can appreciate the combinations of great men, and who takes delight in meditating upon them (Thiers. p. 439). In these campaigns I saw more, I understood more, I learnt more of war than I had in my preceeding campaigns, and even than I did in those which I saw afterwards. Napoleon owed there nothing to chance. Everything was arranged and foreseen. He did not seek to conquer only or to invade; he sought to surpass a great warrior who had operated before in those countries.
I have studied Napoleon in other theaters, but it is in this campaign that he seemed to me greatest, the man born a general, calculating calmly what was possible, difficult, or impossible. The last he left to the enemy; from the others he derived his own advantage and glory. (Petre, quoting S.J. Comeau, Souvenirs des guerres d'Allemagne p. 211-212)>
Finally, the campaign was a terrible human tragedy, far bloodier than any of Napoleon's prior campaigns. Despite the grand scope of events sweeping the lives of men along the snow-dusted roads, a history gains significance only when the human perspective is preserved, and the individual characters--Emperors, generals, staff offices, and foot soldiers--tell in their own words what it was like.
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