A Narrative story of Napoleon's First War Against the Tsar After years of anti-French leadership under William Pitt (the younger), momentous events in Great Britain brought a real chance for peace. Upon the death of Mr. Pitt on January 23rd, 1806, the King appointed a new cabinet under Grenville. The long-time opposition leader, Charles James Fox, became foreign secretary. The new Minister quickly found a pretext of opening negotiations with Paris, when a soldier of fortune approached him with an offer to assassinate Napoleon. "Mr. Fox indignantly ordered him to be seized by the doorkeepers, and delivered up to the English police. He wrote immediately a very noble letter to M. de Talleyrand, denouncing the odious proposal which he had just received, and offering to place at his disposal all the means for prosecuting the author if his scheme appeared serious." [1] After the exchange of a few letters Mr. Fox enlarged the scope of the contacts by proposing to discuss "the interests of the belligerent powers," [2] with a view to arriving at the foundations of a lasting peace. He received the cabinet's authorization to proceed in March. The sticking point was Britain's insistence on upholding the terms of her alliance with Russia, by which she was bound not to make a separate peace. Napoleon absolutely refused to treat collectively with the partners in coalition. An agent to carry French proposals to Britain was found among British political prisoners being held at Verdun. Many of these civilians, imprisoned in retaliation for British seizures of French vessels, were now released by Napoleon in a goodwill gesture. The terms conveyed by the suddenly-liberated Lord Yarmouth to Mr. Fox, were that no power should contest, first, France's "natural territory,," that is, the Rhine and the Alps; second, her control of the whole of Italy, including recently-conquered Naples; and third, her alliances in Germany. In exchange, she would agree to restore the independence of Holland and Switzerland, and accept recent British territorial acquisitions (Malta and the Cape of Good Hope, taken from Napoleon's Dutch clients). Regarding Hanover, a part of the patrimony of the British royal family since 1713, "France gave to understand that in the end she should tell her secret, and tell it in such a manner as to satisfy the royal family of England. Napoleon had actually determined to restore it to George III, and it was the recent conduct of Prussia which had provoked him to this serious resolution." [3] The disposition of Hanover strained relations between all the states of Europe. France and Prussia had been on the point of rupture, in fact, since the last war. Though militarily unprepared.. Prussia had belatedly determined for joining the coalition in November of 1805, and actually despatched an ultimatum to that effect. [4] Count von Haugwitz's mission to Napoleon's camp on the eve of Austerlitz was derailed by the stunning defeat of the coalition some days later. He kept the ultimatum in his pocket, instead merely offering Prussia's congratulations. The Emperor, seeing in this maneuver extreme hypocrisy, pressed a treaty of alliance on Haugwitz, who signed it at Schonbrunn on December 15th, 1805. [5] He signed a similar treaty on the same terms at Paris two months later, [6] but did not dare present this document personally at the court of Berlin. [7] The treaty specified that Prussia would acquire Hanover, presently occupied by French troops. Upon Prussian acceptance of this longcoveted prize, Britain declared war against her. [8] In hope of justifying her seeming treachery, the court issued a string of manifestoes "tending to represent itself to the Hanoverians and to the English as an oppressed power which had been forced with the sword at its throat to accept a fine kingdom." When Napoleon heard of this, "he was for tearing that moment the treaty of the 15th of February, and obliging Prussia to replace everything on the former footing." [9] Just at that time, secret communications between Prussia and England came to light in the British press, revealing further hypocrisy of Prussian policy toward France. "Napoleon no longer considered Prussia worth the trouble of a prolonged contest with England; he was determined to restore Hanover to the latter, and to offer Prussia one of two things, either an equivalent to Hanover to be found in Germany, or the restitution of what he had taken from her, Anspach, Cleves, and Neufchatel." [10] The object of French diplomacy then turned toward Russia. "Mr. Fox could no longer insist on the principle of a collective negotiation" if Russia herself "set the example of renouncing it." [11] Another fortuitous incident allowed Tsar Alexander the pretext for following the lead of his British partners--whom he distrusted--in reconciling himself with France. When French troops began to move into Dalmatia, to take possession of this territory along the Adriatic Sea as prescribed by the recentlyconcluded Treaty of Pressburg, [12] a Russian naval force stationed nearby intervened under the initiative of its commander Admiral Siniavin. To resolve this confrontation, Alexander commanded the former secretary of the Russian legation, A d'Oubril, to depart for Paris, for the purpose of reaching an honorable settlement "of all the questions which had divided the two empires. ... It will be thought honourable, he was told, if something, no matter what, is obtained for the two habitual proteges of the Russian cabinet, Naples and Piedmont; for the two empires had, for the rest, nothing to dispute with each other, and were carrying on merely a war of influence. ... He had orders to concert with the English negotiator relative to the conditions of peace, but without requiring a collective negotiation, which, in fact, did away with the difficulties that had arisen between France and England." [13] Meanwhile, "Lord Yarmouth had returned from London with a private letter from Mr. Fox.... M. de Talleyrand had then informed him of the communications established with Russia, and had thus proved the inutility of insisting on a collective negotiation." Britain was amenable to the territorial claims of Napoleon. "It was tacitly implied that, in return for these various concessions, Hanover should be restored to England. But on both sides the matter was reserved without being formally mentioned." [14] Then, just at the moment when peace appeared within reach on a basis likely to guarantee French predominence at the expense of Prussia and Austria, new events in Germany placed all these chances at risk. The smaller states under French protection had fallen to bickering with each other. The established means of resolving such issues--namely the Diet at Ratisbon, all that remained of the apparatus of the Holy Roman Empire--proved incapable of functioning. The princes, naturally, appealed to Napoleon to resolve their difficulties. [15] Suddenly, Napoleon began to conceive of his rule as more than French Emperor, as indeed a new Charlemagne, measuring for himself the ancient vestments of Emperor of the West. He decided upon dissolving the diet and replacing it with a pro-French Confederation of the Rhine. In this grab for greater glory he condemned everything he accomplished and might yet have accomplished for France. His failure to conclude a final, lasting peace on the basis of the actual situation in April of 1806, left Europe without a continental power strong enough to counterbalance the future ambitions of the Prussian state. Without the disastrous wars which lay immediately ahead, Prussia might never have become so radically anti-French. A strong France actively protecting the interests of the German princes would have forestalled the German Empire as finally constituted in 1871. German nationalism--which King Frederick William reluctantly allowed to be stirred only to rid central Europe of Napoleon's armies--would have smoldered, no doubt, but it is likely that a European detente based on a reduced Prussian state might have checked the forces of "blood and iron" without two devastating World Wars. This was the cost to European civilization of a weakened and isolated France after 1815. When one dwells on the lost chances for peace in 1806, "the heart is filled with painful, inconsolable regret." [16] Mr. Fox concluded that peace was impossible, and in failing health he retired from public life after June 19th. He died three months later, and with him the last hope of peace, even as drumbeats sounded on the Elbe. About the Primary Source Material for the Narrative Though he writes as though he had been there, Louis Adolphe Thiers was only ten years old when the events in the narrative occurred. He wrote during his ten-year retirement from public life. His long career reached its climax in negotiations with Bismarck concluding the Franco-Prussian War. He served as the first President of the Republic, from August 30, 1871 to May 24th, 1873. He died four years later. His work has been criticized, partly by his political opponents, as sometimes unfair in its characterizations: "Although his search among documents was undoubtedly wide, its results are by no means always accurate." [17] Like any history, the author's biases must be noted where possible, they have been selected out. Diplomatic Events Leading Prussia into War, 1806 Prussia began to see herself isolated in this round of diplomatic activity, left completely in the dark as to the content of discussions in Paris. Yet all surmised that Hanover was on the table, and the prospect of a further disgrace at the hands of Napoleon was impossible to contemplate. While Napoleon went about creating the Confederation of the Rhine as part of his new system of Empire, he invited Prussia to create likewise a northern confederation. Saxony, surrounded by Prussia on three sides, demurred, and the elector of Hesse did likewise, although he added insult to injury by reporting that Napoleon prevented him from joining. Hearing of this, the King gave way to a violent irritation, helped along by the "war party" at court, including the enchanting Queen Louise and the King's charismatic cousin, Prince Louis. [18] His most trusted advisors cautioned against war with France: M. von Haugwitz, first minister, M. Lombard, the king's secretary, and M. de Lucchesini, minister of Prussia at Paris. [19] M. Lombard's duties included passing all confidential communications to the King. [20] Graf Christian von Haugwitz (1752-1832) joined the court during the reign of Frederick William U. With Russia, Haugwitz negotiated the second partition of Poland in 1793. In 1799 he tried to influence Frederick William III to join the second coalition against France. He withdrew from the court in 1804, only to be drawn from his retirement in 1805 to deliver the ultimatum to Napoleon. Marchese Girolamo Lucchesini (1751-1825) had served as Prussian ambassador to Paris since the days of the consulate. "A man of talent, but unsteady, insincere, living in Paris with all the enemies of the government, and being nevertheless one of the most assiduous of courtiers of M. de Talleyrand," [21] he believed that with peace Napoleon would "turn to the benefit of agriculture, industry, commerce and the arts all those pecuniary resources which war at once absorbs and besmirches." [22] At the same time that reports from the elector of Hesse had so angered the King, a despatch arrived from M. de Lucchesini, who "had picked up some days before the reports circulated respecting the lot reserved for Prussia." A hint obtained from the English negotiators relative to the restitution of Hanover appeared to him to crown all the threatening circumstances of the moment. In his ambiguous conduct-alternately the adversary or the partisan of French alliancethat had very recently supported the treaty of the 15th of February, even carrying it to Berlin), he considered himself likely to receive censure unless he made a gesture toward the opposition. He therefore exaggerated his reports in the most imprudent manner, sending them off from Paris by diplomatic courier on the 29th of July. "Arrived at Berlin on the 5th or 6th of August, he caused an extraordinary sensation there. A second, who arrived on the 9th, only added to the effect produced by the first. The explosion was instantaneous." [23] Frederick William mobilized part of the army that very day, and before the month was out the proud army of Frederick the Great marched with much martial splendor, cheered on by the beloved Hohenzollerns, to its grave in Thuringia. Footnotes [1] Thiers, Louis Adolphe, History of the Consulate and the Empire of France under Napoleon, Philadelphia, Lippincott, 1893, p. 143. The letter, dated the 16th, arrived in Paris on 20 Feb. [2] Thiers, p. 143 [3] Thiers, p. 147 [4] King and Tsar swore an oath on Frederick's tomb on Nov. 3rd or 4th, p. 17 [5] Thiers, pp. 96, 97; Ratification of the Treaty of Schonbrunn, p. 126 [6] Taken by Lucchesini back to Berlin, Feb. 15, p. 126 [7] Haugwitz's return to Berlin, and 2d treaty ratified, p. 131 [8] Thiers, p. 133 [9] Thiers, p. 147 [10] Thiers, p. 148 [11] Thiers, p. 146 [12] The peace treaty between France and Austria which followed Austerlitz. [13] Thiers, p. 150 [14] Thiers, p. 152 [15] The initiative came from the "Prince Primate" Karl Theodor von Dalberg. See Durant, Will & Ariel, The Age of Napoleon, New York, 1975 [16] Thiers, p. 145 [17] Encyclopaedia Britannica, 11th Ed., Vol. XXV1, p. 849 [18] Properly Ludwig, his cousin, Friedrich Wilhelm, and Queen Luisa. [19] Thiers, pp. 251, 252 [20] Thiers, p. 10 [21] Thiers, p. 206 [22] Durant, W. and A., The Age of Napoleon, p. 179 [23] Thiers, pp. 206-207 Back to Art of War Issue # 22 Table of Contents Back to Art of War List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1995 by Clash of Arms Games. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com