Negotiations on Founding the Fourth Coalition, April 26th, 1807
by Kevin Zucker
Much of Russian strategy in 1807 was geared toward bringing Austria into the Coalition. The failure, of Russia and Prussia to sign the other powers to this little- known resolution (unmentioned in the standard histories of the campaign) sealed their fate. Austria's active hostility would have made a French position in Poland untenable and both sides watched Austria closely. On October 26th, 1806, the very eve of Napoleon's entry into Berlin, he wrote to, his ambassador in, Vienna for confirmation that the Archduke Charles, despite Austrian neutrality, was collecting 80,000 men at Prague. At the first test of arms, Bennigsen convinced not just Russia and Prussia, but many other nations besides, of his victory at Pultusk, and in foreign capitals the people began to exude optimism over the further course of the war. The Viennese in, particular showed their joy openly, and nowhere more so than in the Habsburg court. Emperor, archdukes, ministers, congratulated each other. But soon arrived more reliable intelligence that dispelled this mood. M. de Lucchesini, who had left the Prussian court at the same time as the unfortunate Haugwitz, visited the court at Vienna on the way to his native city of Lucca, in Italy. As a member of the discredited peace party, he regarded the Prussian court as
deluded, and he gave a more realistic account of recent battles. Both sides were
paralysed by the mud, he said, and only this prevented the French from catching
Bennigsen's beaten forces. The French army was neither demoralized nor destitute, as
the Russians alleged, rapidly aclimatizing to the damp cold of Poland. Spring
would bring their total victory. This intelligence brought on a more
circumspect approach among the court of Vienna.
[1]
That court, to reassure Napoleon by a friendly gesture, and to have at French
headquarters an accurate informant, solicited an authorization to send the Baron von
-Vincent to Warsaw. Despite his refusal to allow such access to other dignataries,
Napoleon assented to this mission out of indulgence for Austria, and also for
hisewn propaganda purposes. [2]
To gain Austrian intervention, the Tsar needed to make a bold showing in the
campaign. This diplomatic imperative propelled Bennigsen forward to the battlefield of
Eylau and its bloody inconclusion. To justify, entering winter quarters after Eylau,
Bennigsen reported a glorious victory, which the Tsar celebrated in Petersberg with a
Te Deum Mass. Just as the French drew back fi-om Eylau, the long delayed winter
temperatures began to fall. By the beginning of March, the thermometer was reaching a
high of only 130 to 170 F. The troops would feel in March what might have been
expected in January, [3] and the armies settled
into their winter cantonments in earnest. The lull in fighting brought on a period. of
diplomatic activity, Alexander attempting to turn Eylau to account in forming a new
coalition.
Vincent arrived in Warsaw with instructions to offer mediation between the warring
parties. Napoleon accepted with good grace mixed with mistrust and regret, for he was
aware of the back-channel correspondence passing between the Russian General Essen
and the Austrian cordon on the Gallician frontier. [4] The Austrians immediately transmitted the offer to England, Prussia, and
Russia. The new English cabinet accepted, but Russia was less amicable.
The Emperor Alexander arrived at army headquarters at Bartenstein on the Alle,
just as the Imperial, Guard from Petersburg, and recruits from all over Russia, brought
30,000 reinforcements to.repair the losses of Pultusk and Eylau. The exaggerations of
General Bennigsen deceived the young Tsar into almost imagining that he had won at
Eylau, and tempted him to try again the fortunes of war. The Tsar believed that a single
battle would bring Austria to his aid, ensuring Napoleon's ruin.
The King of Prussia, on the contrary, had kept in touch with Duroc, and had better
information on the military situation than Alexander. He was more favorably inclined
to treat, hoping to recover the greater part of his kingdom. Arriving at Bartenstein from
Konigsberg, however, Frederick William allowed himself to be overawed. The
monarchs replied to the offer that they would be delighted if peace were restored
through the offices of Austria, but skewered the project by asking first on what terms
Napoleon intended to treat. The earnest Vincent put this in writing and despatched it to
Napoleon from his post in Warsaw.
Concessions
He was ready to make concessions. Napoleon replied, and would send a
plenipotentiary to any meeting place they cared to name. For a, time after Eylau, his
terms for Prussia were better than she finally had to take. But in the face of continued
belligerence he resolved to have his victory, wrapped-up before a congress could
convene. He had decided to seek not merely peace, but. an alliance with Russia.
Frederick William and Alexander, meanwhile, promised to fight on until the
whole of Prussia was restored. The Convention of Bartenstein bound them make no
separate peace. They swore to emancipate all Europe including Italy if Austria joined
them. Britain undertook to send 15,000 troops to join an equal number of Swedes in
Pomerania. But Austria was not persuaded.
Bennigsen!s inability to support Danzig showed that Napoleon's power was the
greater. Since the Austrians knew the true outcome Of Pultusk and Eylau, they left
Prussia and Russia alone in signing the Convention of Bartenstein on April 26. Their
only hope now was a real battlefield victory. The two sovereigns ordered their generals
to undertake the offensive as soon as possible, and returned to their respective quarters
at Konigsberg and Tilsit. [5] The disasterous, battle of
Friedland was the result.
Even after the calamity of Friedland, the Russian people lacked anydisposition to
make peace with Napoleon and it was uncertain whether they would fight on. Should the
war be prolonged, Napoleon had already determined not to cross the Niemen. His army
numbered only a third of that eventually absorbed in the Russian vastness. He would, in
case negotiations came to naught, await the eventual reappearance of the enemy
somewhere in Poland. Napoleon always viewed the destruction of the enemy army as
the aim of operations. With a defeated but unbowed Russian army in the field, with
Britain looking for a weak spot on the continent, and Austria threatening from the
wings, an uneasy feeling would be hanging over Napoleon's camp in Poland.
At the famous interview on the raft, during the Tilsit peace conference in
June of 1807, Alexander's first words were, 'I hate the English no less than
you do and I shall second you in anything you undertake against them."
Replied Napoleon, "In that case, everything can be settled and peace is
made." The Tsar cut his Prussian Allies loose, and Napoleon treated their
King with a thinly-disguised contempt, exacting large territories and
hundreds of millions of francs in tribute. "The King of Prussia, uninvited,
remained in disgrace on the right bank of the Nieman, his eyes fixed on the
tent in which his fate was to be decided." [6]
In Russia, only a small party supported the Tsar's Treaty. The aristocracy were
furious with him and chose to reinterpret the pact as a mere "truce." They regarded
Napoleon as a threat to the natural order and saw the pernicious influence of the
revolution in a proposed constitution, introduced by imperial secretary Speransky at
just that time. Napoleon likely would have obtained no peace agreement were it not for
the shattering victory at, Friedland.
[1] Thiers, Louis Adolphe, History of the
Consulate and the Empire of France under Napoleon, Philadelphia ' Lippincott, 1893, pp.
406-407
This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. |