I wanted to include some additional commentary on the Battle of Brandywine for the purpose of adding context and clarification to the German diarists' accounts, as translated by Bruce Burgoyne.

The British Take to the Sea

Burgoyne notes that General William Howe transported his army by sea to the Head of Elk in the Chesapeake Bay for the purpose of attacking Philadelphia from the South. It was Howe's belief that a direct attack on the American capital would draw Washington into a decisive battle.

Howe embarked from New York City with approximately 15,000 troops on July 23, 1777. His brother, Admiral Lord Richard Howe, commanded the fleet of transports and warships numbering 260 vessels.

General Washington suspected that Philadelphia was to be the eventual destination, but mindful of the British amphibious attack on Charleston, South Carolina during the previous year, could not rule out an attack on any part of the Atlantic coast. Howe and the British fleet were out of sight from July 23 to July 30, when they were finally spotted off the Delaware Capes.

Accordingly, Washington moved his army closer to Philadelphia, at Coryell's Ferry on the Delaware River, just north of Philadelphia. On August 22, he received reliable information that the British fleet was in the Chesapeake Bay, so he expedited his movement south, eventually taking up a strong defensive position along the banks of the Brandywine Creek. some 20 miles south of Philadelphia (See Map I).

Washington's Position at Brandywine Creek

The Brandywine position covered a frontage of nearly six miles and blocked the mosl direct route to Philadelphia from Head of Elk. The creek flows from northwest to southeast into the Delaware River on a course parallel to the Schuyklll River near Philadelphia.

The Brandywine has two main tributaries, the East and West branches. The surrounding land at the time was characterized by a "succession of large hills, rather sudden with narrow vales" to use the description of Howe's chief engineer. Much of the area consisted of farmland, but the slopes of the hills in the Brandywine valley were wooded and steep. Brandywine Creek itself varies in width from 50 to 150 yards, and its varying depth require troops to use one of the seven fords to cross the water. Starting at the southern end near its confluence with the Delaware River and moving northward were Pyle's Ford followed by Chadds Ford where the main road from the south to Philadelphia crosses the Brandywine.

Following northward in succession were Brinton's Ford, Jones' or Painter's Ford, and Wistar's Ford. North of here the creek divides into the two forks, with Trimble's Ford crossing the west branch and Buffington's and Jeffries crossing the east branch of the Brandywine. Washington had to guard all of these fords in order to deny the crossing of the Brandywine to the British.

Washington deployed Armstrong's brigade of 1,000 Pennsylvania militia on the far left in the rugged terrain of Pyle's Ford, where the ground made an attack unlikely. Next came the divisions of Greene (1,754 men) and Wayne (1,750 men) in his center on the hills overlooking Chadds Ford. Proctor's Pennsylvania artillery was also posted on a hill overlooking Chadds Ford. The American right wing, commanded by Major General John Sullivan, comprised three divisions and had the task of defending all of the ground and fords north of Chadds Ford.

Next in line and north of Wayne's division was Sullivan's own division (1,750 men) of Maryland troops; followed by Stephen's division (2,000 men) and Lord Sterling's division (1,650 men). Sullivan's right wing covered a frontage of four miles from Chadds Ford on the South to Wistar's Ford on the north.

Brigadier General Maxwell's light infantry brigade of 720-800 men were posted on the road to Chadds Ford as a sort of tripwire against the expected British anack in the center. These troops were converged from the light infantry companies of each regiment in the Continental Army. Sullivan also posted the following detachment to watch the fords north of his position: Hazen's Canadian regiment deployed one of his battalions at Wistar's Ford and the other at Buffington's Ford, while the Delaware Regiment guarded Painter's Ford. In other words, all the fords of the Brandywine, save for lefferies Ford, were covered by the Contincntals. As one might guess, Howe's main column, commanded by Cornwallis, would cross the Brandywine at lefferies Ford and sweep in on the right flank of Washington's army.

Howe's Strategy

General William Howe did not intend to take the most obvious and direct route across the Brandywine, via Chadds Ford. Instead he drew on his success at outflanking Washington at Long Island the previous year and devised a similar plan of action at Brandywine.

One wing of his army, 5,000 men under the command of General von Knyphausen, was to demonstrate in front of Washington,s position at Chadds Ford, while the other wing, 8,000 men commanded by Lord Cornwallis, would march around the American right flank, crossing the east fork of the Brandywine at Jefferies Ford.

Howe's plan was carried out and executed according to plan, with Knyphausen driving in Maxwell's light brigade and then deploying as if to attack by ten o'clock in the morning. Concurrently, Cornwallis and Howe successfully negotiated their way across Jefferies Ford virtually undetected.

All the while, Washington was receiving conflicting reports about developments on his right flank. At one point, he ordered the divisions of Greene, Wayne and Sullivan to attack Knyphausen, in the belief that he could defeat the British columns in detail. Then he concluded that Comwallis was turning about to rejoin Knyphausen and called off the attack.

By 2:30 in the aftanoon, Cornwallis shook his column out of formation and into a line of battle near Birmingham Meeting House astride the American right flank. He advanced a short way to Osborne's Hill. There he rested his troops for an hour before launching his attack.

By now, Washington was well aware of Howe's intentions and he ordered the divisions of Sterling and Stephen to take up new positions facing to the north to counter the British threat on the right. The two American divisions formed up on "Ploughed Hill" to the southwest of the Blrmingham meeting house (Sterling on the left and Stephen on the right) in time to meet the attack of Cornwallis/Howe.

The attack commenced at 4:00 with a vigorous assault on Stephen's division on the new American right flank. Eventually, Stephen broke, leaving Stirling's division exposed to the entire British attack. Sullivan's division came up on Sterling's left, just in time to receive the brunt of an attack from the British Grenadier battalion. This caused Sullivan's division to break as well, and though several attempts were made to reform new lines, the American troops could not hold against the steady attack of Cornwallis. Te action on and around Ploughed Hill lasted about 90 minutes.

Washington had ordered Greene to pull his division out of the Chadds Ford position to reinforce Sullivan's entire right wing. This occurred at 4:30 and it was probably the move that saved Washington's army from total destruction. Greene formed his line around the town of Dilworth, and allowed the shaken troops of Sterling, Stephen and Sullivan to pass through his ranks.

Back at Chadds Ford, the withdrawal of Greene's division left Maxwell's light brigade, Proctor's artillery and Wayne's division to defend the crossing of the Brandywine. Knyphausen commenced his attack as soon as he heard the sound of gunfire from the north, indicating that Cornwallis' attack had begun.

Knyphausen now outnumbered the Americans by nearly two to one and his initial attack carried Proctor's artillery position, capturing four guns. Wayne and Maxwell carried on a running retreat from 4:30 to 7:00 PM, when darkness finally halted Knyphausen's attack. They were assisted by the relatively rugged terrain which also helped to slow down the Britsh attack.

The Americans retreated with considerable chaos toward Chester, under the cover of darkness. However, the confusion never did turn into total panic and after falling back some twelve miles, the flight was finally halted. Greene's and Wayne's divisions retired in good order.

Howe's casualty total came to 583, including 89 killed, 488 wounded and 6 missing. His estimate of American casualties was 300 killed, 600 wounded and 400 prisoners. Washington's army also lost 11 cannon, 2 of which had been captured from the Hessians at Trenton.

Battle of Brandywine Accounts (Part I)
More Battle of Brandywine Accounts (Part II)
Brandywine Order of Battle

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