The following paragraphs are direct quotes from the Pentagon White Paper to Congress, published in April 1991, immediately following the Gulf War. I will reserve commentary until the end of this article:
On Airpower:
As was demonstrated, airpower offers the ability to quickly and quietly respond to any crisis. F-15s were sitting alert, ready to fly defensive patrols along the Iraqi-Saudi border, 7,000 miles from their departure bases within 38 hours of notification to deploy. Within five days strategic airlift moved five fighter squadrons, a contingent of AWACS, and an 82d ABN Brigade to the CENTCOM area of responsibility (AOR).
Within 35 days, the Coalition Air Forces had a fighter force that equalled Iraq's fighter capability. The global reach of the Air Force allowed the United States to mass its military power rapidly and to immediately project combat power in this part of the world. Once combat power was in place, it could either defend friendly areas or attack an adversary.
The Air Force flew over 65,000 sorties during Operation Desert Storm accounted for 31 of 35 kills against fixed wing aircraft. It's estimated that during the Air Campaign, coalition forces destroyed over 400 Iraqi aircraft, including 122 that flew to Iran, without a single loss in air-to-air combat. The Air Force flew 59% of all sorties, with 50% of the assets, and incurred only 38% of the losses. The mission capable rate for Air Force aircraft was 92%- higher than our peacetime rate.
On the F-15:
During Desert Shield, F-15s provided the defensive umbrella that permitted the deployment of air, land and sea assets into the AOR. After D-Day, they shifted to offensive counterair attacks against the Iraqi Air Force and helped gain air supremacy within the first ten days of the war.
Every Iraqi fixed wing aircraft destroyed in air-to-air combat by the Air Force was a "kill" for the Eagle. Their success permitted coalition air forces to exploit the versatility of airpower over the entire battlefield. The 120 F-15C/Ds deployed to the Gulf flew over 5,900 sorties and maintained a 94% mission capable rate - 8% higher than in peacetime.
On the F-15E:
Forty-eight of these multi-role fighters were deployed to the Gulf. The F-15E's flexibility was the key to its success. F-15E proved its versatility by hunting SCUD missiles at night, employing laser systems to hit hard targets and attack armored vehicles, tanks and artillery . It proved unusually effective with the Joint Surveillance Target and Attack Radar System (JSTARS) for cueing on SCUD locations and using Low-Altitude Navigation and Targeting Infrared for Night System (LANTIRN) to locate and destroy the missiles and launchers. Its overall mission capable rate was 95.9% - 8% higher than in peacetime. These aircraft deployed with LANTIRN navigation pods (permits accurate navigation at night across featureless terrain to the target area without the need for active navigation aids). Subsequently the targeting pods were deployed. During Desert Storm, the F-15E accomplished Operational Test and Evaluation of the LANTIRN system with spectacular results. Their primary targets were SCUDs, command and control links, armor, airfields and road interdiction. While flying over 2,200 sorties, only two were lost in combat.
On the A-10:
The Air Force deployed 144 A-10s into the AOR. Air superiority allowed innovative employment of A-10s in a variety of roles. Primarily killing tanks in an interdiction role, the A-10 proved its versatility as a daytime SCUD hunter in Western Iraq, suppressing enemy air defenses, attacking early warning radars, and even recorded two helicopter kills with its gun - the only gun kills of the war. While the A-lO flew 8,100 sorties, it maintained a mission capable rate of 95.7%-5% above its peacetime rates. Despite numerous hits and extensive damage, the A-10 proved it could do a variety of missions successfully.
On the F-117:
Before CNN's initial reports of the air war over Baghdad, the F-117 was a stellar performer. Dropping the first bomb of the war on an air defense control center, the F-117 provided us the advantage of surprise. Often the Iraqis would not start shooting until the bombs exploded. With the ability to cruise to the target, identify it before surface threats became active, and hit it with precision, the F-117 was an extraordinary fighter-bomber. Although it represented only 2.5% of the shooters in theater that first day, it hit over 31% of the targets.
During the war, it flew almost 1,300 combat sorties, dropped over 2,000 tons of bombs, flew over 6,900 hours and demonstrated accuracy unmatched in the history of air warfare. The value of the F-117 was that it combined stealth technology and precision delivery. With the use of tactical surprise, the F-117 helped assure air superiority over the Iraqi skies as it destroyed command and control capabilities, the Iraqi Integrated Air Defense System, aircraft shelters, and valuable strategic targets in Baghdad and Iraq. Baghdad was more heavily defended than the most highly defended Warsaw Pact sites in Eastern Europe during the height of the Cold War.
The F-117 was the only aircraft to operate in this environment over downtown Baghdad. Precision delivery assured the F-117 could destroy those targets in a single mission with great lethality. Despite its heavy use, the F-117 had a mission capable rate of 85.8% for the war - 4% higher than in peacetime.
On the F-111:
Turning in an outstanding performance, the F-111 again proved itself to be a workhorse not only in the interdiction and strategic attack roles but across the spectrum of ground attack missions. With its FLIR (Forward Looking Infrared) and laser designation system, the F-111F attacked key military production facilities; chemical, biological, and nuclear sites; airfields, bunkers, C3 assets, and portions of the integrated air defense system with great success. Attacking bridges, hardened aircraft shelters, and individual tanks, armored vehicles, and artillery, it was a stellar performer.
In what became known as "tank plinking" the F-111s were credited with over 1500 verified armor kills. In over 4,000 sorties, the 84 deployed F-111s had a mission capable rate of over 85% -- approximately 8% higher than peacetime rates. One Wing Commander reported that his unit flew over 2100 sorties with no maintenance non-delivers. These platforms delivered the precision munitions on the manifolds which stopped the oil Saddam was dumping into the Gulf. Overall, the F-111 proved to be a versatile, precise, survivable platform which made significant contributions to the success of the air war.
On the F-16:
The F-16 Fighting Falcon proved itself to be a versatile platform which can attack targets day or night -- in good or bad weather. Two hundred and forty-nine F-16s were deployed to the Gulf. These aircraft flew almost 13,500 sorties -- the highest sortie total for any system in the war -- and maintained a 95.2% mission capable rate -- 5% above its peacetime rate. F-l6s attacked ground elements in the KTO, flew SCUD missions, and destroyed interdiction targets, such as military production and support and chemical production facilities, and airfields. The 72 LANTIRN capable (Navigation pods only) F-16s were a real success story. LANTIRN's mission capable rate was over 98%. Past emphasis on reliability and maintainability paid dividends here.
On the B-52:
The role of the large conventional bomber was revalidated. B-52s flew 1,624 missions, dropped over 72,000 weapons, and delivered over 25,700 tons of munitions on area targets in the KTO, and on airfields, industrial targets, troop concentrations and storage areas in Iraq. Despite being over 30 years old, the B-52 mission capable rate was over 81%-2% higher than its peacetime rate. B-52s dropped 29% of all US bombs and 38% of all Air Force bombs during the war. Through effective modification of the B-52, it remains a useful platform.
As Iraqi prisoners report, B-52 raids had devastating effects on enemy morale. Estimates show that from 20 to 40% of troop strength had deserted their units prior to the G-Day. While fighters employed precision guided munitions to destroy pinpoint targets, the B-52's success demonstrated the need to preserve the large conventional bomber's ability to destroy large area targets.
On Electronic Combat:
With EF-111 Ravens and F-4G Wild Weasels, the Air Force blinded Iraq's Integrated Air Defense System. The 18 EF-111s in, the AOR flew over 900 sorties with a mission capable rate of 87.5%; and the 48F-4Gs flew over 2,500 sorties with an 87% mission capable rate.
Because the Iraqis feared the F-4G and its HARM missile, they made brief, limited and ineffective use of their radars. When they did chose to operate these radars, the effective jamming of the EF-111 negated their ability to track, acquire, and target attacking aircraft. Every day the Weasels and Ravens supported shooters as they attacked their targets in Iraq and the KTO. One sign of their success was that after day four, all allied aircraft opporated with impunity in the mid- to high-altitude environment across the AOR. By decreasing the threat of SAMs to our strike aircraft, EF-111 and F-4Gs permitted aircraft to deliver their weapons from an environment where they can be very lethal.
On Munitions:
Aircraft get you to the target area, but effective munitions destroy the targets. Vital centers of industry were vulnerable to pinpoint attacks. Millitary equipment and infrastructure were destroyed across the width, depth and breadth of the battlefield with impunity and at a time of our chosing. Once air superiority was gained, every sanctuary was vulnerable to airpower. The success of the F-117s during the first few hours to blind and incapacitate the Iraqi military was the death knell in this war.
Denying the enemy sanctuary has always been a goal of airpower, and magnifies the effectiveness of an air campaign. US pilots used 7,400 tons of precision munitions with deadly effectiveness. Approximately 90% were dropped by the Air Force. F-111s employed GBU-12s to destroy over 150 armored vehicles a night during the last few weeks of the war. F-117s used GBU-12s to hit hard targets such as aircraft shelters, bunkers, and other strategic targets in Baghdad. F-111s and F15-Es used GBU-24s to destroy chemical, biological and nuclear areas; bridges, aircraft shelters and other strategic targets.
Precision munitions highlight the lethality of Modern air power. On several occasions, a two-ship of F-15Es with 16 bombs destroyed 16 tanks. When one bomb equals one shelter or tank-the message quickly spreads that every sanctuary had been eliminated by airpower. After the commencement of the shelter campaign, Iraqi pilots voted with their afterburners to get out of the war. But not every target requires precision munition. The ability to use the right weapon on the correct target shaped the outcome of the air war.
The Maverick missile, used by the F-16 and A-10, attacked armored targets. This missile has continually been upgraded to handle new threats and targets. The imaging infrared radar Maverick's performance was crucial in the armor war. Since it only took one missile to destroy an Iraqi tank, a $70,000 Maverick equated to a $1.5 million T-72 tank. It is important to note that Iraq had more tanks than Germany and Great Britain combined. It was the fourth largest army in the world.
It's hard to asses the success of the HARM missile due to the Iraqi tactics to counter it. The Iraqis understood that if a radar went on, a HARM was on its way.
This deterrent kept them from using their operable radars and control centers. Throughout the war, SAM sites would turn off their radars after launching their missiles, leaving SAMs unguided as they flew toward their targets. Lethal SEAD (Suppression of Air defenses) permitted us to operate from mid- to high-altitude where aircraft were beyond anti-aircraft artillery range.
The AIM-7 proved to be an effective air-to-air weapon. Twenty-two enemy fixed wing aircraft were downed by AIM-7s. Through an aggressive product improvement program, the AIM-7 has become a more lethal weapon with a bigger launch envelope. The AIM-9 destroyed six enemy fixed-wing aircraft, and worked as advertised.
On Air Refueling:
The rapid deployment of fighter aircraft to Saudi Arabia resulted from Air Force tanker capability. Within 38 hours of the deployment notice, the first F-15 aircraft had landed in Saudi Arabia and were ready to defend the Persian Gulf area. The Strategic Air Command deployed 256 KC-135s and 46 KC-l0s into the AOR during the war. In Desert Shield, tankers flew 4,967 sorties and 19,089 hours, refueled 14,588 receivers, including 5,495 Navy and Marine aircraft, and offloaded 68.2 million gallons of fuel. Tankers surpassed this effort during the six weeks of Desert Storm when they flew 15,434 sorties, logged 59,943 hours, refueled 45,955 aircraft and off-loaded 110.2 million gallons of fuel. Approximately 20% was used for Navy and Marine receivers.
Every aircraft fighter, bomber, airlift, AWACS, or JSTARS -- and every service and some allies used Air Force tankers to do their mission. One F-15 pilot commented about tanker accessibility: "There was more gas in the sky over Saudi than in the ground below" -- a testimony to the tanker force. No other nation has such a capability.
On Command and Control:
Desert Storm employed a wide variety of new Space and Intelligence assets to ease mission planning, command and control of the air war, provide realtime identification of ground targets for shooters, and assure the coalition gained and maintained the initiative. Both space and intelligence platforms were force multipliers in Desert Storm.
GPS provided accurate guidance to the target area for air, land and naval forces. Although the whole constellation will not be completed until FY93, American forces had three-dimensional coverage for 18 hours a day, and two-dimensional coverage 24 hours a day.
From 16 January to the cease fire, AWACS flew four continuous orbits to control over 3,000 sorties a day while maintaining a mission capable rate of 98% -- 9% higher than in peacetime. Despite multiple Air Forces and languages involved in the coalition, not one instance of friendly air-to-air fratricide resulted -- a tribute to AWACS effectiveness. It was an AWACS vector which positioned the Saudi F-15 to kill his two F-1s. Just as it patrolled the Persian Gulf skies from 1980 to 1989, AWACS proved to be an invaluable asset to control the air war. It was very effective in target pairing and declaring hostile threats.
JSTARS proved to be a spectacular success. These two aircraft flew 54 combat sorties, supported 100% of mission taskings with a system availability rate of over 80% and had a mission capable rate of 84.5%. JSTARS tracked everything that moved on the ground.
From D-Day to G-Day, JSTARS operators logged over 535 hours to locate, identify and target assembly areas, POL storage sites, SCUD areas and missiles, convoys, trucks, tanks, and even SAM sites and artillery for Allied fighters. Coupled with F-16s, JSTARS enhanced the kill box aproach to air interdiction which proved so effective in destroying Iraqi equipment in the KTO. When used with F-15s, F-16s, and F-111s, JSTARS effectively denied the enemy its night sanctuary and kept continual pressure on ground troops in the KTO.Every commander agreed it was a spectacular success.
The large investments in intelligence and space assets to provide command and control over the battlefield and to provide information for all coalition forces were wise expenditures of taxpayer money. Lives were saved, assets better employed, and the full weight of joint forces were demonstrated in Operation Desert Storm. These initial efforts to merge new command and control capabilities with near real-time data will define the modern batt1efield of the future.
On Areas for Improvement:
Regardless of the plan or the preparation, nothing ever goes as planned. This war was no exception. Clausewitz called these the "frictions" of war those forces which impede you from doing your job. One area involved the use of systems which the military cannot use during peacetime training -- to use them would compromisetheir capabilities. In Desert Storm some of these systems needed adjustments, but the deficiencies weren't known until the equipment was tested in the AOR. Quickly adjusted, these systems worked as advertised. Another area dealt with training munitions during the deployment phase. The Air Force did not deploy with sufficient training munitions. Without these assets, the ability to conduct training during the build up was limited.
Overall BDA was a problem. It was not always timely. In addition, the Video Tape Recorders in many fighters did not have sufficient quality to permit accurate BDA. Less than half of all air-to-air kills could be confirmed through this system.
The principal data recorded related to ground attack -- buildings, bridges, airfields, storage areas, tanks, artillery, trucks and armored personnel vehicles. Although these video recorders provided much of that data, with further refinement, new recorders could help overcome the BDA problems noted during the war.
Finally, tactical intelligence support was not always timely. Commanders complained about the excessive time it took to receive information at the units and the shortage of tactical reconnaissance assets. As we have increased the tempo and decision cycle of war, the ability to analyze post-mission data has not kept pace. Intelligence at the theater level to support themission with AWACS and JSTARS was excellent; but work is needed to ensure reliable, timely BDA.
These problem areas will not be the only ones which occured during Desert Storm; they are only the initial impressions of areas where we could have performed better. As we continue to study and dissect the lessons learned in the war, other problems will appear.
The Summary:
The Air Force's success in Desert Storm stems from quality people, equipment, training, and leadership. Today's airman is the best that has ever been recruited. Articulate, bright, and innovative, these people willingly accept responsibility, and operate sophisticated equipment with skill and pride. They are team players. An incident during the war will highlight this team effort. One F-15 Wing Deputy Commander for Operations praised the efforts of the only maintenance person available when his wing's aircraft arrived at a remote base: "The aircraft had to be turned and put on status, so the Chief did the only thing he could do under the circumstances - he enlisted cooks, cops and engineers, and had every aircraft ready to go inside an hour." This example attests to the fighting spirit and flexibility of Air Force people during the war. Numerous other examples abound as well.
The Air Force today has the "global reach" and the "global power" to support national security objectives. These comprehensive forces can exploit the speed, range, flexibility, lethality and precision of modern airpower. Desert Storm reflects a commitment to recruiting quality people, providing them with the best equipment and technology available, training them until they gain confidence in their ability and their equipment, and giving them quality leaders to direct them.
This formula was a winner in this war. Realistict training at Red Flag and other exercises prepared both pilots and support personnel for war and they performed munificently. When coupled with innovative planning, aggressive leadership, and near flawless execution, Desert Storm was an unqualified success.
J.D. Comments:
Obviously, as this is a report to Congress, the Air Force is loath to say anything bad about itself. In reading it, I sometimes feel it is overly self-congratulatory. The opposition wasn't that tough and we need to be careful in deriving lessons from this conflict. Odd things happened. For instance, A-10s, supposedly low altitude close-support aircraft, were used at medium altitudes like World War Two Stukas. The SAM threat, while there, was incoherent, intermittent, and not self-supporting. Our fighters seldom fought, but merely gunned fleeing cowards in the back (actually, nothing wrong with that in the context of true walfare). Our pilots and planes pelformed brilliantly and should not be considered to have had it easy; nevertheless, it is true that the Iraqis fell far short of their potential and it could happen that invalid conclusions will be drawn from our experiences in Iraq and Kuwait. I hope not. Reader comments and observations invited.
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© Copyright 1992 by J.D. Webster
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