It was the summer of 1808, and in the lands beyond the high Pyrenees French troops patrolled the streets of Lisbon and Madrid. Napoleon had invaded Iberia, but he had yet to conquer it. The French generals controlled most of central Spain and some areas in the north, but in Andalusia, far to the south, the Spanish armies remained undefeated and the population unbowed.

Here was the great cannon foundry of Seville, the arsenal of Cadiz, the strong army of Castanes, and the regular garrisons of Grenada, Cueta and Algeciras. To subdue this rich and powerful province was sent General Dupont with 10,000 men and eighteen pieces of artillery. It was also arranged that at Seville he would be reinforced with 3,500 men and ten guns from the French army in Portugal.

Dupont marched across La Mancha and over the Sierra Morena, reaching Anclujar on 5 June. At Andujar Dupont heard that the whole countryside had taken up arms against the invaders and he sent a message to Madrid for further reinforcements. Dupont continued his march toward Cordoba but found his advance barred by a Spanish force of 3,000 regulars and 10,000 levies at the village of Alcolea.

Here the road to Cordoba crossed the River Guadalquivir and the Spanish commander, General Echevaria, had fortified the bridge-head and placed twelve guns in battery on the opposite bank. A vast cloud of armed peasants also hovered on the hills behind the French, ready to fall on their rear when they made their attack upon the bridge.

Despite the odds Dupont stormed the bridge and drove Echevaria into Cordoba. The peasants came down from the hills during the battle but they were beaten back by the French cavalry. Dupont then attacked Cordoba and after a short, confused fight in the streets of the city, Echevaria's men fled down the road to Seville, pursued by the French Chasseurs.

The arrival of the fugitives at Seville caused widespread despair amongst the inhabitants and if Dupont would have pressed on with his advance the city would have fallen to the invaders, and Andalusia would have been lost. But the French commander, magnifying his danger, remained at Cordoba and repeated his earlier appeals for reinforcements. This was the first of the many mistakes that Dupont was to make which led to the most decisive defeat suffered by a French army since the Revolution. These letters were intercepted by the partizans, giving them fresh hope, and as the days passed and Dupont continued to linger indecisively at Cordoba their fear evaporated and plans were made to surround the French.

For ten days Dupont waited at Cordoba for help to arrive until, on 17 June, he decided to retreat. He had made his decision too late. The Spanish General Castanos, in command of some 7,000 regular troops and nearly 30,000 fresh levies, had already sent detachments to occupy the passes of the Sierra Morena and to cut off Dupont's lines of communication with Madrid.

With a small Spanish force under Coupigny following cautiously in his wake Dupont reached the walled town of Andujar without serious incident, and he resolved to hold his ground at Andujar until he was reinforced. News at last reached Dupont that the first of the reinforcements, a division under General Vedel, was coming from La Mancha with a convoy of provisions, and Dupont sent a column to help Vedel force his way through the Sierra Morena. Vedel's approach, though, did nothing to dispel Dupont's fears. He had 600 men sick, the young soldiers in the ranks were thoroughly discouraged with their leader's lack of resolve, and Castanos' force was increasing with the passing of every day.

The approach of Vedel prompted Castanos into action before Dupont received any further reinforcements. It was arranged that Castanos with 12,000 men would attack Dupont at Andujar whilst Reding and Coupigny, with 8,000 and 10,000 men respectively crossed the Guadalquivir upstream and descend upon Dupont from the rear. Before the action could begin, however, a second French column, under General Gobert, arrived from Madrid. Dupont now had a force of over 20,000 men in the area, but still he made no positive move.

On 14 July Reding drove in the French outposts at Mengibar whilst Coupigny occupied Villa Neuvo. Instead of concentrating his force to meet the Spanish threat, Dupont left Vedel's Division at Baylen and a contingent of Gobert's force at Mengibar. But the following day Castanos attacked Dupont, and the French commander called on Vedel for reinforcements. By the afternoon of the 16th Vedel had reached Andujar and Dupont now outnumbered Castanos yet still he failed to push home his advantage. Whilst Dupont dithered Reding routed Gobert's small force at Mengibar and advanced upon Baylen.

Upon receipt of this news Dupont, unbelievably, separated his command again and sent Vedel back to Baylen to hold Reding at bay.

When he reached Baylen, Vedel learnt that the remnants of Gobert's column had marched for La Carolina where a Spanish force was blocking the mountain passes and threatening to cut French communications. Assuming that this Spanish force was that belonging to Reding, Vedel set off in pursuit. The force at La Carolina, as it transpired, was only a band of armed peasants. Reding had in fact arrived at Baylen after Vedel had set off for La Carolina and he now occupied the town in strength. Dupont's army was not only separated, it was now cut in two!

Despite the continuing presence of Castanos in front of Andujar Dupont marched to attack Reding, arriving near Baylen on the 19th. To add to his strategical blunders, Dupont now committed a tactical error that no disciple of Napoleon's should ever have contemplated. The French troops, having marched all night, were strung out along the Andujar road, but fearing that Castanos might fall upon his rear at any moment Dupont sent his battalions into the attack as they arrived on the battlefield.

Dupont's piecemeal assaults were beaten back with considerable loss, and by midday the French had incurred some 2,000 casualties, Dupont himself was wounded and the Swiss troops under his command had deserted to the enemy.

Dupont called off the attack and proposed an armistice. Reding, who was scarcely able to hold his ground, happily accepted Dupont's offer. Meanwhile Vedel, having marched from La Carolina during the morning, fell upon Reding's rear, capturing two guns and taking 1,500 prisoners. But Dupont, instead of taking advantage of this turn of events, sent an aide to order Vedel to disengage. On the following day, the 20th, Dupont sent two of his generals to Castanos to discuss terms.

The French offered to withdraw peace fully to Madrid but Castanos, thanks to another captured dispatch, was fully aware of Dupont's isolation and he demanded Dupont's and Vedel's surrender, which Dupont's emissaries calmly accepted! Even the detachments at La Carolina and beyond, who could have marched away unmolested were ordered to lay down their arms.

Under the terms of the Convention of Baylen Dupont's troops were to be returned to France but the Spaniards broke the Convention and, with the exception of Dupont and some of his generals, all the 18,000 men that surrendered became prisoners of war and never saw France again. "There has never been anything so stupid, so foolish or so cowardly since the world began," complained Napoleon. It is hard to disagree.

Sources

Esdaile, C. The Spanish Army in the Peninsular War. 1988
Gates, D. The Spanish Ulcer. 1986
Napier, W. History of the War in the Peninsula and in the South of France. Vol. 1. 1864
Oman, C. A History of the Peninsular War. Vol. 1. 1902
Read, J. War in the Peninsula. 1977