The purpose of this paper is to examine the use of the skirmish line in Wellington's Peninsular Army and in particular to consider the part played by Riflemen. Recent interest has been raised as to whether the Rifle was disadvantaged as a weapon when opposed to smoothbore muskets in the skirmish line. This paper will endeavour to show that the Rifle was not outclassed by the musket and that Wellington's use of skirmishers fully utilised the benefits of the Rifle. A view exists that the Rifle, in the case of the British Army being the Baker Rifle, suffered from the faults of slow loading and excessive powder fouling, thus putting the weapon at a disadvantage. To a certain extent this is correct, namely,

1. the need for the bullet to be closefitting caused the riflemen to load with great care. A close-fitting bullet reduced windage, an error that bedevilled the musket.

2. the rifled (grooved) barrel, fouled up as excess powder built up in the weapon, thus hampering the loading operation. The same faults occurred in smooth bores.

It should be borne in mind that infantry small arms of the Peninsular war suffered from the same technological defects. These faults ranging from poor flints to the quality of powder in the cartridges. Current interest in the scientific approach towards weapons focusses on accuracy and rates of fire. The use of the familiar C19th musketry tests clearly indicates the inaccuracy of the musket at long range. (For the purposes of this paper I take long range to be 200yds. A range at which the skirmishers would commence serious fire fights). The musket, according to Muller, SCIENCE OF WAR, was 30% effective at 200yds in the hands of `trained' men, 18% by `ordinary' men. Picard gives the figure of 25% accuracy at 246yds for a trained man firing from a fixed rest.

Compare these figures against those of the tests for the Baker Rifle. Ezekiel Baker recorded 100% accuracy at 200yds during one of his tests. It is true to say that the Rifle was a highly accurate weapon, well sighted up to 300yds. The musket, as already shown, was inaccurate at long range. Given the theoretical performances and technological faults of both weapons some military commentators then consider the comparative rates of fire. Here the smoothbore gains in the rapidity of loading. A trained soldier being able to load and fire 5 rounds per minute against the Rifleman's 2 rounds per minute. Some commentators conclude that the Rifleman's slower rate of fire put him at a disadvantage when faced with a musket armed opponent.

This is not true when translated into the skirmish line, where range, tactical finesse, eye for ground, coolness and discipline were major factors. The musket depended on volume of fire to obtain hits in the target area. In the skirmish line the targets lacked density and the volume of fire did not reach the intensity of a line v column close range musketry duel. Another aspect overlooked in this argument relates to the training and weapon handling factors of the opponents. The British Rifleman and his allied counterparts were highly trained in weapons' drill and care of firearms. The British army of the early C19th carried out far more live firing exercises than did their French opponents. In the Rifle regiments from their earliest date, emphasis was placed on weapon handling. The 95th introduced a system of rewards to encourage marksmanship. This is not to say that the French skirmisher was not as proficient but certainly likely to be outranged by accurate marksmen before they could close to effective musketry range. Thought also needs to be given to the differing tactical doctrines of the opposing forces and to the differing national characteristics. The British officers responsible for controlling the skirmish line exhibited a calm and cool approach. Discipline and movement were tightly controlled and fire discipline was held in check.

Long range individual marksmanship often proved effective in harassing the French before they could reply. On the other hand the French officers preferred to lead in a flamboyant fashion urging their men to press forward to drive back the light infantry screen. The French Voltigeurs must have been hit hard by rifle armed Greenjackets or Cacadores at long range, subjected to casualties and discomfort at taking losses long before being bolstered by hitting back. Their officers, responsible for control of fire and movement, would also have made prime targets, as would the musicians (hornists) who transmitted battlefield signals, this would have the result of further reducing the Voltigeurs' effectiveness.

At this juncture, it appears that the Rifleman himself is the key factor in the argument of the superiority of musket over rifle or viceversa. Riflemen never considered themselves inferior to the Voltigeurs or felt that the Baker Rifle was in any way a disadvantage. Actual experience borne out in Riflemen's Accounts supports the view that the Baker Rifle was a superior weapon in the hands of well trained skirmishers.

An examination of the losses of the 95th from 1800-1815 show that casualties were heaviest at Waterloo, Badajoz and the Corunna Retreat. Light losses were incurred during skirmishes at other engagements. Tactically the Rifles were only disadvantaged when the French employed Light Cavalry in support of their skirmishers, such as the Coa 1810 or Sabugal 1811. Whenever the French manoeuvred and turned a flank the Rifles were usually forced to `fire and retire'. Heavier numbers or the involvement of close order infantry columns would also cause the skirmish line to concede ground. Artillery however did not cause undue problems to dispersed skirmishers. So much then for an introduction to the skirmish line topic. It now would prove necessary to examine in more depth the threads of the argument and endeavour to elaborate and clarify a reasoned account as regards skirmishing in the Peninsular War. The reader by now should be clearer as to the main thrust of this paper, namely

1. The Rifle was not disadvantaged by slow loading or powder problems. 2. The Rifles' training outweighed technical problems with the Baker. 3. Wellington's skirmish line tactics employing a mixture of musket and rifle armed troops successfully countered the French skirmish screen. This aspect will be examined more fully in the following section.

As the writer is mainly concerned in studying the Peninsular history of the Light Division with particular reference to the part played by the 95th Rifles, a slant towards the special qualities of the 95th is recognized.

RIFLE TRAINING

Readers are recommended to my articles in the following Journals of the Napoleonic Association as relevant background and supportive information viz. No. 22 Summer 1982 p58-59, No. 25 Spring 1983 p48-61 and No. 26 Summer 1983 p26-39.

It was acknowledged by those who trained the Experimental Rifle Corps and later the 95th and by those who served as Riflemen that the most important part of a rifleman's training was arms drill and discipline. Priority was placed on rifle practice and weapon care. It was recognised that Rifles were a costly piece of equipment and had a superior mechanism, hence the need for weapon familiarity. A regimental peculiarity, enforced in Standing Orders of 1801, was that neither man nor rifle be separated throughout service life. Indeed, recruits who failed to care for their weapon were transferred from the Rifles. Rifles were considered to be the most important possession of the soldier. As regards Riflemen on active service the care of arms and ammunition was given highest priority.

Every Rifleman was encouraged to keep his Rifle in first class condition as his life would depend on it functioning correctly. When in action the Rifleman would carry the minimum of equipment, priority being given to arms and ammunition. The weight of equipment carried on campaign was little different from that of any other infantryman in Wellington's army. Costello of the 95th carried 70-80lbs of equipment on the epic forced march to Talavera in 1809. It should be noted that Riflemen often fought in `light order' dumping heavier items with the regimental baggage until after action.

"That a corps of riflemen, should at all times be in the completest order with respect to their arms .... the stock of necessaries to be carried in the filed must not be too great, and no possible want of ammunition should occur, the greatest caution must be observed that the men neither lose their ammunition nor throw away their shot idley."

MANNINGHAM'S LECTURE 4. 1803

It was the practice during the early years of the Rifle Corps for the Riflemen to make their own ammunition. "Every individual must be instructed in the method of making up his ammunition, of casting balls, or covering them with rags or leather, and greasing them."

MANNINGHAM'S LECTURE 4. 1803

The following articles were carried by Costello in 1809, 1 belt and pouch containing 50 rounds, 1 ball bag containing 30 loose balls, 1 filled powder flask and 1 small mallet. Riflemen carried a powder horn slung over the shoulder. In the stock of the rifle was a brass `patch' box which stored greased rags in which the ball was wrapped prior to loading. Attached to the waist belt on brass chains were a picker and brush for clearing the touch-hole and priming pan.

An extract relating to the Rifle Corps can be found in the ENGLISH MILITARY LIBRARY 1801. It furnishes the following information.

"as every shot from a rifleman ought to succeed, it is intended generally to load with a greased rag, and running ball, which is found by experience to give a juster range than loading with cartridge." Evidence exists that it was intended to use a rifle capable of using musket calibre ammunition (14 balls to the pound). The idea did not find favour in the Rifle Corps and an improved model of the Baker rifle was issued.

On the subject of mallets, Ezekiel Baker (8th Ed. REMARKS ON RIFLE GUNS 1813) stated, "I supplied them (95th Reg iment) with a few hundreds of small wooden mallets to drive in the ball, but they found them very inconvenient and very soon dispensed with them ... The loading is performed equally well without them."

Interestingly the 5/60th requested "450 small wooden mallets ... being absolutely necessary in the field" when equipped with the Baker Rifle in June 1808. The 5/60th also asked for powder-flasks as issued to the 95th. As already noted Costello carried both items in 1809. Rifleman Harris, August 1808, remembered carrying eighty rounds of ball cartridge in his pouch.

The most important part of a Rifleman's training concerned arms drill. QuarterMaster Surtess, who joined the 95th in 1802 noted,

"We immediately commenced out light drill in which I took great delight, but most of all I liked shooting at the target." Rifles were costly pieces of equipment and care of them was rigidly enforced. Only the Armourers were to repair rifles, and if a man wished to clean any part of the firing mechanism, he was only able to do so under the watchful eye of the armourer serjeant. Strict punishments were issued if anyone tampered with the firing mechanism of the rifle (lock). "As riflemen are supposed to be soldiers of the greatest attention towards arms, no lenity will be shown to those who injure or spoil them. No locks are to be taken off, on pain of punishment, by any man who is not one of those who are permitted men by their Captain."

1801 STANDING ORDERS

"So serious indeed is the trust which it is expected may be put in a Rifleman, that if any man be found, after fair trial and instruction, a dull, stupid, careless character, valuing not his arms, and not improving at the target, he will be applied for to be exchanged out of the corps."

1801 STANDING ORDERS

Costello, had the experience of not being sent to Spain in 1808 with his battalion because he was not proficient with the Rifle.

"Shortly after my arrival, the regiment was ordered to Spain, the campaign having then commenced (1808). But not being perfect in my exercises, I was left behind at depot, until time and practice had made me a greater proficient in Light Infantry duty."

ADVENTURES OF A SOLDIER

As every rifleman was expected to possess marksman like qualities, target practice played a major part in their training. Target practice was divided into four ranges. The recruits fired at targets ninety yards distance. Subsequent targets being placed at distances of 140, 200 and 300 yards. Two types of target were used, a round target and a human shape. The Riflemen were divided into 3 classes. The first class were poor shots, the second class consisted of good shots, the third class were all marksmen. Marksmen only fired at targets beyond 300 yards.

As a means of encouraging the men to improve at the rifle range, a system of rewards was instituted. Marksmen wore a green cockade on their cap as a symbol of expertise. 2nd class shots were entitles to wear a white cockade. Should any man slack in his class he was placed one beneath. Attention should be given to the emphasis on live firing as an integral part of the Rifle Corps system of training. Recruits in other armies, or indeed in some line regiments in the British army of the period, did not have such an extensive or specialist weapons handling element in their training programme. The Rifles were unique in this respect and evidence is available to confirm that the pattern of training and arms drill continued at depot and on service until Waterloo. Lt. Col. Hamlet Wade, a noted rifle shot, commanded the 3/95th and depot for much of the Peninsula period and certainly influenced weapons' training. Riflemen were trained to fire over any type of country and even at moving targets. "In all target practice, the ground cannot be too much varied; woods, heights, hollows, plains, brushwood, water and every other description of surface should be fired over occasionally. Firing on the ground to be frequently practised."

1801 STANDING ORDERS

Rifleman Harris recalled field training at Cork 1808, whilst waiting to be transported to Spain. Over a six week period the expeditionary force was not disembarked "with the exception of our four companies of Rifles, who were every day landed for the purpose of drill .... we were skirmished about in very lively fashion." Harris described several useful snippets concerning skirmish line operations. At Rolica he recalled "loading and firing as I lay" something that a musket armed infantryman could not do, prone firing being encouraged in the Rifles. Also at Rolica, Harris remembered, "the barrel of my piece was so hot from continual firing that I could hardly bear to touch it, and was obliged to grasp the stock beneath the iron."

RECOLLECTIONS

At Vimeiro, Harris highlighted a drawback of the gunpowder era, "loading and firing away, enveloped in the smoke I created ... that I could see nothing for a few minutes but the red flash of my own piece amongst the white vapour clinging to my very clothes." He also added that the Rifles were "firing one moment, jumping up and running for it, the next" moving and firing from any cover and adopting a prone firing position.

So much for the training undertaken by the men of the 95th. There is little doubt that the Rifles were well equipped and trained for their role.

The men who served in the 1st and 2nd Battalions 95th in the Peninsula from 1809 (the Talavera period) were battle hardened veterans. Experience had been gained from active service in Germany, Copenhagen, Monte Video, Buenos Ayres, Rolica, Vimiero and Corunna. Losses had been made good by volunteers from the militia and from internal regimental movements of personnel when the 3rd Btn was raised in the Spring of 1809 following the Corunna campaign. Surprisingly this fact is overlooked in some quarters, the men who formed Craufurd's Light Brigade were veterans under battle experienced officers. Battlefield lessons; coming under fire, life under canvas, putting training into practice in life or death situations, all proved valuable elements in the acquisition of military proficiency. The officers and men of the Light Brigade were fully able to undertake the key roles of outpost and rearguard duty.

Often authors give elite status to the various Light Infantry units, marking them out as specialist formations. The Light Brigade, of which the 95th formed the spearhead, is one such formation to be acknowledged as an Qlite. When the Light Brigade was expanded forming the Light Division in 1810, the unit acquired a unique role in Wellington's Army. Where a unit of light troops would, at battalion level, act as a screen for its parent body, so the Light Division acted as a screen for the whole army. The 95th acted as a screen of the Light Division. It cannot be stressed enough that the creation of the Light Division comprising 7 battalions of light infantry was a unique move on Wellington's part. When the Light Division became acknowledged as an elite unit of the Peninsula army, it recognised the reputations and military proficiency of the individual regiments forming part. The records of the 43rd, 52nd and 95th were fairly well established pre 1810, the distinguished record of the Light Division 1810-1814 is unequalled. The success of rifle armed light troops gave rise to the trend of dispersing them as skirmishers throughout divisions in the army, thus spreading their specialist skill throughout the whole army.

The concentration of 5 rifle armed battalions in the Light Division is not matched anywhere else during the Napoleonic War, if it was then certainly it did not achieve the same celebrated status. If the concept of dispersing rifle troops throughout the Peninsula army is translated into skirmish line tactics, excepting the unique Light Division, what reason can be found? The break of the 5/60th (Royal American) Regt, largely German in origin, gave rifle companies to many divisions. Also with the arrival of the Brunswick Oels Jsgers in 1810, more rifle companies could be allocated. A further contingent of rifles could be found in the Cacadore units in the Portuguese brigades. At Divisional level in the Anglo-Portuguese army, using the 4th Division as an example (Salamanca 1812) Gen. Lowry Cole could deploy 16 companies of Light Infantry as skirmishers. Of these 3 were certainly rifle armed viz 1 comp 5/60th, 1 comp Brunswick Jsgers and the atiradore company of the 7th Cacadores. Later on it may have been possible to have armed more of the Cacadores with the Baker rifle. If an average figure of 50 is given per Light/Rifle company we arrive at a total of 1100 trained skirmishers out of a divisional strength of 5236-approx 20%.

Compare this figure against that of the French division Clausel. 10 Battalions (6362) giving 10 Voltigeur companies plus the possible tactical use of the 25th LQger broken up into skirmishers (which was rather unusual in the Peninsula theatre of war). A fair match, a parity of numbers was achieved at the skirmish line. The skirmish line when deployed in full was of considerable strength, particularly so, when the Cacadore battalion was used in extended line.

Command of the skirmish line at divisional level would pass to a senior field officer. It is highly likely that some light companies would act as supports for those fighting in extended order. In any case the 3 brigades of close order line infantry would be in supporting distance. The rifle armed skirmishers, at least 3 companies per AngloPortuguese Division (often more), could engage the French Voltigeurs and Chasseurs at long range before they could close to effective musket range. The Voltigeurs/ Chasseurs would be taking losses in officers and men before they could effectively retaliate. Should the range close, the volume of fire from both forces and the rates of fire would be fairly similar.

However, the Baker rifle fire, whether it came from a 5/60th, Cacadore or Brunswicker rifle, would in the main be an aimed shot. Wellington's use of thick skirmish screens combined the benefits of both weapons. The volume of musket fire plus the long range deliberate fire of the rifle. Events proved time and again that the French had difficulty driving in the Anglo-Portuguese light troops. When they achieved this, at cost, the steady British lines awaited their columns.

Returning to the case of the Light Division, how did it operate? Put simply the 95th and Cacadores provided the skirmish element, backed by the bayonet battalions of the 43rd and 52nd. When the tactical situation arose, individual companies or wings of the 43rd and 52nd. When the tactical situation arose, individual companies or wings of the 43rd and 52nd were added to the skirmishers. It was a highly flexible infantry unit capable of fighting in close order or in extended order. 

Kincaid of the Rifles wrote,

"we were the light regiment of the Light Division" and "the nature of our arm generally gave us more employment in the way of skirmishing ... we had only to look behind to see a line ... never was a corps of riflemen in the hands of such supporters."

Leach in his Rough Sketches was moved to state that the Light Brigade was "the finest and most splendid brigade that ever took the field. I will venture to go so far as to assert, that if it has been EQUALLED, it has never been SURPASSED, in any army, whether the materials of which it was composed, its fine appointments and arms, its ESPRIT DU CORPS, its style of marching and manoeuvring, and, in short, every requisite for a light brigade, be considered."

Leach picked up this theme later in his narrative, "Amongst a certain number of malcontents in the army, the very name of the `Light Division', or the `outposts', was sufficient to turn their ration wine into vinegar" and "The Light Division never did affect to place itself on a pedestal, as being superior to its comrades in arms." He added that they never shirked the dangerous assignments.

There were numerous occasions from 1810-1814 when the 95th Rifles distinguished itself. The action on the Coa, the defence of Barba del Puerco, the attack on the Petite Rhune, near Tarbes and Orthez, particularly stand to mind as events when the rifle proved a potent weapon in defensive and offensive situations. Barba del Puerco is the prime example of the effectiveness of the rifle over the musket. Craufurd sent the following division order 25th March 1810,

"In other Armies the Rifle is considered ill calculated for close action with an enemy armed with Musket and Bayonet, but the 95th Regiment has proved that the Rifle in the hands of a British soldier is a fully efficient weapon to enable him to defeat the French in the closest fight in whatever manner they may be armed." Returning to details concerning skirmishing, Simmons of the Rifles included the views of a French Light Infantry officer,

"Some deserters that came from the enemy stated that the French did not like the GREEN FELLOWS at all; we made sad havoc amongst them, particularly their officers. Numbers of our men are most capital shots. It would astonish you to see how coolly they go on and take the same aim as at a bird."

The following extract is from a French captain at Vimeiro,

"I was sent out to skirmish against some of those in green - grasshoppers I call them; you call them Rifle Men. They were behind every bush and stone, and soon made sad havoc amongst my men, killing all the officers of my company, and wounding myself without being able to do them any injury. This drove me nearly to distraction."

Towards the end of the Peninsula War, no less than 18 companies of the 95th Rifles were serving together in the Light Division. All three battalions were represented. It should be noted that the 95th altered its battalion organisation from 10 companies to 8 companies in April 1810. At Vitoria 1813, Harry Smith wrote that "Our Riflemen were beautiful shots, and as undaunted as bulldogs." Following the action at Tarbes March 1814, Smith outlined the effect caused by the three battalions of rifles,

"the loss of the enemy from the fire of our Rifles was so great that one could not believe one's eyes. I certainly had never seen the dead lie so thick, nor ever did, except subsequently at Waterloo." He also recorded Wellington's remarks on being asked to visit the site by Col. A. Barnard, "I require no novel proof of the destructive fire of your Rifles."

Rifles proved effective against light artillery, Cooke of the 43d Light Infantry described how they drove off the French artillery at Vitoria,

"Some companies of the rifle corps sprang from the ground, where they lay concealed, and darted forward, opening a galling fire on the left flank of the enemy's gunners, at great risk to themselves ... so well did this gallant band apply their loose balls, that the enemy limbered up their guns, and hastily retired." Another officer of the 43rd, Lt. Hennell, wrote the following about the 95th when they attacked "The Heights of Vera" October 1813;

"A company of the 95th opened the business. About twenty men, with twenty supporting, marched coolly up the hill .... to within thirty yards of the top without firing, and then by way of breathing gave a volley, loaded, and advanced to the top, the support just behind them." Hennell praised the rifles in the lines, "I firmly believe there arc no better troops in the world than the 95th; they take things so coolly and deliberately, and seem to know their business so well." It may be prudent at this point to include a comment found in Levinge HISTORICAL RECORDS OF THE 43RD LIGHT INFANTRY that the men of the Light Division invariably fought with their packs on except when storming breaches. The attack on the heights of Vera was "the only occasion on which the rule had been departed from". At night the knapsacks were carried up by fatigue parties. Cooke described how difficult it was to skirmish in the mountains when carrying equipment. Cooke took part in the attack on La Petite Rhune. The 43rd attacked as follows; two companies advanced in skirmish order, four companies advanced in line with four supporting in column. Cook recounted how the officers and soldiers gasped for breath "from the weight of their knapsacks and accoutrements."

The fighting was hand to hand, "the French using their bayonets and the butt ends of their pieces." Major W. Napier who commanded the 43rd at the Battle of Nivelle wrote in his Peninsula History that, "the men, exhausted by their exertions, for they had run over half a mile of very rough difficult ground with a wonderful speed, remained for a few minutes lying down and panting within half-pistol shot of the first stone castle .... when their breath returned they arose and with a stern shout commenced the assault."

An interesting anecdote concerning the skill of a Cacadore can be found in Gleig's THE SUBALTERN. Gleig served in the 85th Light Infantry during the Pyrenees campaign. Gleig recounted how this Cacadore had "posted himself considerably in advance of his own line, behind a large furze-bush." He deliberately picked off three Frenchmen. The French located his hiding place but "the Portuguese remained perfectly steady; he crouched down, indeed, to load, but the moment his rifle was charged, he leant over the bush, and fired." Even though the enemy closed to within twenty yards every shot they fired missed. "He knelt down and loaded again; he fired, and an officer who accompanied them, walked off the field, grasping his left arm in his right hand." That day, as Gleig recorded, the Cacadore killed or wounded eight Frenchmen.

Later in his memoirs, Gleig described a minor skirmish near the River Adour in 1814. "That house is full of light Germans, and almost every tree about it affords cover to a rifleman, who fires, as a good aim is presented to him .... occasionally, a single rifleman will steal on, running from tree to tree, till he has reached a convenient spot."

Kincaid quotes in his ADVENTURES IN THE RIFLE BRIGADE an extract from J. Blakiston TWELVE YEARS' MILITARY ADVENTURE (1829). Blakiston served with the Portuguese Cacadores, and was an eyewitness at Tarbes. "Nothing could exceed the manner in which the ninety-fifth set about the business .... Certainly I never saw such skirmishers as the ninety-fifth. They could do the work much better and with infinitely less loss than any other of our best light troops. They possessed an individual boldness, a mutual understanding, and a quickness of eye, in taking advantage of the ground, which, taken altogether I never saw equalled. They were, in fact, as much superior to the French Voltigeurs, as the latter were to our skirmishers in general." Kincaid justly recorded the following lines, "for there, perhaps, never was, nor ever again will be, such a war brigade as that which was composed of the forty-third, fifty-second, and the rifles."

SUMMARY

This paper has, hopefully, examined some aspects of the skirmisher's role in Wellington's Peninsula Army. In particular it has detailed some events concerning the 95th Rifle Regiment and the Light Division. It appears that the Baker rifle was not outclassed in the Peninsula period, its novel use in arming complete battalions, proved successful from 1808-1814. Wellington's use of light companies and rifle companies in the seven divisions of infantry proved a vital part of his battlefield system. The Light Division was rather unique in its composition and role. A follow up article on Tarbes 1814 might prove useful, but again, it is rather difficult to seek an objective stance on this issue, rifle v musket.

My own opinion, based on singular study of the Light Division, leans towards the fact that neither the British Rifleman or his weapon were inferior to the French Voltigeurs or smooth bore musket. I contend that Wellington used light troops effectively, the combined light/ rifle companies of each division well matched those of the French. I also consider that the Light Division was a unique creation. I place it on a par with Napoleon's Old Guard as the finest infantry in Europe between 1810-1814.

SOURCES

The following books were consulted in the compilation of this paper:

Harris. Recollections of Rifleman Harris. Kincaid. Adventures in the Rifle Brigade. Random Shots from a Rifleman.
Leach. Rough Sketches of the Life of an Old Soldier.
Simmons. A British Rifleman.
Smith. Autobiography of Gen. Sir Harry Smith.
Rifle Brigade Chronicle.
Cope. History of the Rifle Brigade.
Verner. History and Campaigns of the Rifle Brigade.
Oman. Wellington's Army 1809-1814. Hughes. Firepower.
Haythornthwaite. Weapons and Equipment of the Napoleonic Wars.
Gleig. The Subaltern.
Napier. Battles and Sieges in the Peninsula. Levinge. Historical Records of the 43rd Light Infantry.

[This-article was first given as a paper to the Research Section of the Napoleonic Association]