by Keith Raynor
This interesting letter, written by an anonymous German, gives evidence to the French Army's system of tactics employed during Napoleon's acendancy. Though the facts contained in the letter are sometimes at odds with actuality, there is neverless a thread of truth running through the contents. The main theme of the letter appears to be the combined use of Light Infantry, Artillery and Cavalry to break an opponents line at a given point, thus enabling the line Infantry to exploit the break and attack the opposition from the rear. Whether he knew it or not, what our correspondent was
attempting to describe was the organization of a French Corps
d'armee, and how it was used tactically on a battlefield. A Corps
d'armee is usually described as an army within an army, consisting
of three or four Infantry Divisions together with a Light Cavalry
Division and several batteries of artillery. Usually a Light Infantry
Regiment was attached to each Infantry Division. [1]
Each Infantry Divisional Commander had besides his Infantry Brigades, a battery
of Medium field artillery ( 6.8 pounders ), whilst the Cavalry
Divisional Commander had a battery of Light Horse artillery ( 4 or
6 pounders ). The Corps Commander also had a reserve battery of
12 pounders available to him.
A simplified theorical description of a French assault on
opposition (bearing in mind no two attacks were usually the same),
was for the French artillery to soften up the point of attack with a
prelimenary bombardment. Skirmishers, consisting of the various
Light Infantry contingents would then advance, sometimes whole
regiments being employed in this role. These skirmishe's would
weaken the enemie's line with their fire so giving advantage to the
following French columns of infantry, who on arrival near the
enemies line would rapidly deploy from column into line
themselves. A firefight followed, the French usually being
supported by accompanying artillery, and if all went to plan, the
opponent's line would be broken.
This tactical system meant French troops could be
retained in more versatile column formations for longer, giving them
greater flexibility than their opponents. It was also this system and
not the rate at which the French Infantry marched, which gave them
their reputation for speed in battle. These tactics were one of the
ingrediants which astonished, perplexed and had helped defeat
France's enemies by the time the following letter was written.
My Lord, An honest german stung and overwhelmed by
the aspect of the misery and degradation of his Country, but who
would think himself unworthy of and past regeneration, if on the
edge of despair even, he would not stedfastly look forward for better
times takes the Freedom to transmit, your Lordship the enclosed
sketch of the actual organisation of the enemies annies.
The same is the result of an unintermitted Investigation,
and also of occasional conversation, with some eminent, and most
instructed French Officers. To draw good and solid knowledge
from the enemy, is the first step and the easiest and surest way,
towards hurting and weakening him.
It is obvious, MY Lord, that the system adopted by the
French, will so long be triumphant, until their adversaries, adopt
the same mode, and until] they incorporate to their Forces, an equal
number of clever and expert sharpshooters to answer the same
purpose : as in such case, (provided the chief command be likewise
on an equal footing) the Fate and success of battle could be ruled
and mastered, or at least be reduced to be at the dependance of chance and fortune.
Your Lordship will I hope pardon my retaining the shield
of Anonymous. Your Lordship's candour will find the apology in my
civil situation. A man of honor in a free country, there I too will not boggle (i.e. hesitate) to show my face. I submit this sketch to your Lordship's strictest inquiry and powerful influence. Most happy, I Should be, nay, amply rewarded above my state of slavery, if I should experience to have furnished matter, to effect some good.
With the most profound veneration I shall never cease to
remain, My Lord, your Lordships devoted Humble servant.
To the Right Honble. Lord Viscount Castlereagh, etc, etc,
etc, London. A Look into the Modern Tactics of the French, being an
outline and account of the newly adopted organisation of the French Armies.
The Corps Elite of the French Land Forces, tho' well
known actually to exist, has ever since its establishment been made
an object of jealous secrecy by the French, and consequently a
subject of curiosity and speculation of the military men of Europe.
The nature and purport thereof has always been problematical, and
yet it is evident that the French are, but with very few exceptions,
merely owing to the new organisation of their armies, the last
uninterrupted Victories. The following sketch will it is trusted,
throw a sufficient and adequate Light on this question, and on the
mode, how they made it possible and practicable, continually to
appear Victorious, on the stage of hazardous war.
Each Marshall of the French Empire has a body of Two
Thousand men of sharpshooters ( Elite ) attached to his Corps
d'armee. Such sharpshooters, all of which being expert and skilled
men, are each armed with a small blunderbufs (arquebuse ), and
(are) allways sure to hit their mark, at a distance of one hundred
and fifty paces. [2]
In any case, when the whole army is concentrating for a general battle, the several bodies of sharpshooters, belonging to the Corps of each Marshall, are formed into ONE seperate Corps by itself, consisting together in sixteen thousand men.
Corps d'Elite
Now, on whatever point, the Commander in Chief, is of
intention, or thinks it best expedient, to break through the
opposing army, on such point or spot this select corps of 16,000
men is always sure to be placed and posted, in two lines or Files,
and according to the ground where the fight takes place, in one or
two divisions. In most cases, the firing, kept up by this corps, thus
placed is but an irregular one, yet each charge or shot never misses:
its object, and within a few minutes the lines of the opposite side
are shot down.
Immediately after, when two, three, or four lines of the
opponents have thus been disabled or killed in this manner, the
Columns of Infantry and Cavalry of the French (previously placed
behind and at the wings of the corps of sharpshooters) instantly
prefs and force forward thro' the openings, and speding to the right
and left, attack and take the neighbouring lines of the opponents in
the back.
As it is, this body of sharpshooters of 16,000 men may
within a short time destroy double the quantity, say an opposing
army of 30 to 40,000 men.
Besides this select corps of sharpshooters, each Marshall
commanding a body of Troops, has a certain number of skilled
sharpshooters attached to each company of Infantry, composing
the Regiments that form such body of Troops. The purport
intended by these shooters, consists exclusively to shoot dead the
artillery men at the guns, as also such Officers, as stand afront of
the lines, but more particularly to aim at the Chief Commander of
the opponents, being always sure to hit their mark at a distance of
150 Military paces.
But besides the Corps Elite of 2,000 Sharpshooters, and the sharpshooters attached to each company of Infantry, as has already been stated, each Marshall possess also, to the body of
Troops which he commands ( besides the usual Field Artillery uncommonly strong with the French ) Two most select Batteries of Light Artillery ( Artillerie Volante ) which in point of quickness of
motion, and expert dexterity at aimimg, may be fully placed in the same rank and class, of the Corps d'Elite, above alluded to. These batteries of Light Artillery, are but seldom seperated, but they are generally covered (masqued) by Cavalry and Tirailleurs; they are allways worked and employed, alone and independently, and so indeed a few general charges
with cartridges and grapes, is sufficient, to destroy, in a short time, a whole Regiment.
But, besides all this, each of the French Marshal's, does further possess, a corps of Chasseurs a Cheval; which have been found, may be employed with a deal of success, as well against Cavalry as Infantry. Each Marshall has still moreover a certain quantity of Voltigeurs kind of Rifleman which besides of their being expert and clever at climbing, and to leap with ease over broad ditches, and high moles, have also been taught and exercised to jump on a sudden, on the back of the horses, behind the horseman or cavalry and so being in full speed, carried to the spot where they are to fight, they here alight, and place themselves behind underwood, bushes, ditches or moles, to assist at the several particular engagements, when by dint of their safe and certain fire, they in most instances, procure the advantage on such occasions. [3]
In any case when a general battle is to be fought, the select corps of sharpshooters, the
Chasseurs a Cheval, the Light Artillery, in short all what is calculated, or tends best to destroy, is drawn together, from out of the several bodies of troops of all the Marshalls, to one concentric point, in order entirely to annihilate the center of the opponents.
And it is by this mode only, and not by the exclusive courage, boasted of by the French, that the Fate of battles, have since the last two years been decided.
It is finally to be observed that all the remainder of the French Troops ( except as above ) do only advance to prosecute, and to push the advantage so gained, but after the center of the
opponents, has thus actually been broken thro'.
The Original letter can be found in the P.R.O. Kew. Reference number WO 1/1114.
[1] The Light Infantry were supplemented from March 1804 by a
Voltigeur company being authorized for each Light Infantry
Battalion; And further strenghened from September 1805 when a
Voltigeur company was also authorized for each Line Battalion.
The author of this epistle though, might be trying to
indicate that the French Light Infantry used a different musket from
that usually issued to the Infantry and possibly mistook this
musket for a blunderbuss. Dempsey in his work on the Otto
Manuscripts writes, "Voltiguers in Light Infantry units ... were
supposed to be armed with a light, Dragoon model musket, in order
to facilitate their special tactic of riding into action mounted behind
cavalrymen, but such muskets were as rarely seen as the tactic itself".
Elting in his book has this to say regarding French
Muskets, "Napoleon on assaulting power, ordered a commission of
artillary officers to establish the necessary new models of individual
weapons. The resulting ,system of the year nine' (1800-180 1) was
basically an improved and simplified version of the 1777 models
and included a fusil d'infanterie, a mousqueton (carbine), a fusil de
dragon (dragon musket), a pistol de cavalerie and a pistol de
gendermerie. An improved cavalry pistol was introduced and some
improvements were made in musket design in the 'Year thirteen'
(18041805) ... The dragoon musket was issued to dragoons,
voltiguers and foot artillerymen ... Officers, sergeants and fourriers.
of voltiguer companys were to have 'rifled carbines' (carbine
d'infanterie, model of the year twelve) ... the difficulty of loading it
properly made it unpopular. Also it had no bayonet".
The Campaigns of Napoleon by D.G. Chandler
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