Robert Craufurd
and the Irish Problem

1798

by Jane Craufurd Hoyle
based on researches by Iain Aiton
Map by Derek Stone


Robert Craufurd was at times his own worst enemy suffering from, to use his own words, attacks of 'the blue devils'- frequent bouts of depression. One such crisis occurred while he was in India. He wrote to his brother Charles, to whom he was very close, informing him that he was totally disillusioned with the Army and that he intended to sell his commission.

Charles advised him in vain against such a course of action. This advice was ignored and the proceeds of the sale, together with a small legacy, were invested in 1794 by Craufurd in a business venture which failed. As a result he was without a job and had no private means. So, to support himself financially, he helped his brother Charles to administer English subsidies to the Austrian army.

After a short while he found himself longing to rejoin the Army at his previous rank. This was not an easy matter. He ultimately resolved the problem by joing Hompesch's regiment, a Swiss mercenary regiment, and thence back into the British Army via the 60th. This solution returned him to active service, but did nothing to resolve the problem of loss of seniority which was to haunt him for the rest of his life. Having returned to the Army, he was appointed DQMG in Ireland in 1797 armed with useful experience gained from his work attached to the Austrian mission.

What was going on in Ireland at this time? By the spring of 1796, it was clear that the British government had no intention of granting emancipation to the Catholics which resulted in much lawlessness and crime. The country was verging on anarchy. The Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, Lord Camden, had few troops at his disposal to sort out this problem and those he had were from a poorly-trained, ill-officered militia and were scattered around the country. The French were keeping a watchful eye on events. At the end of 1796 they had tried to mount an unsuccessful invasion at Bantry Bay but to the disappointment of the rebels, not one soldier left the ships.

The situation continued to deteriorate and in 1797, Lord Camden, the Viceroy, asked Horse Guards, without success, for more regular troops. His problems were not helped by the Society of United Irishmen, one of the many rebel groupings, who were corrupting Irish recruits in British pay. There was a personnel problem too. The Lord Lieutenant considered that his current military com mander in chief, Lord Carhampton, had not sufficient talents to deal with military situation. The authorities in London were made aware of the need for an effective replacement for him. But nobody wanted the job: Sir Charles Grey refused, on account of his age; Sir David Dundas did not want to leave England and Lord Cornwallis, Master General of the Ordnance, disapproved of government policy towards Ireland. The post eventually went to Sir Ralph Abercrombie, who had recently returned from the West Indies, and on 12 December 1797 he reluctantly accepted the post.

First Job

Robert Craufurd's first job in the new regime was to accompany Sir Ralph on a tour from Dublin to Cork to take stock of the military situation and to prepare a topographical brief for the government. The report noted the fact that many of the fortifications were in a poor state of repair. One of the reasons for Sir Ralph's reluctance to accept the post of Commander in Chief was that the post was not an independent command, ie all military decisions had to be approved by the Viceroy in Dublin Castle. The London authorities denied this, but local commanders continued to address their correspondence to the Viceroy rather than the Commander in Chief, as they had always done. On his first trip it was clear that, to add to Sir Ralph's problems, discipline among the local troops was appalling.

On his return to Dublin Abercrombie issued a general order to all concerned. The drafting bears all the hallmarks of Robert Craufurd.

The very disgraceful frequency of courts martial and the many complaints of irregularities in the conduct of the troops in this kingdom have too unfortunately proved the army to be in a state of licentiousness which must render it formidable to every-one but the enemy. The commander in chief thinks it necessary to demand from all the generals commanding district and brigade, as well as commanding officers of regiments that they exert for themselves, and compel from all officers under their command, the strident and most unremitting attention to the discipline, good order and conduct of their men, as may restore the high and distinguished reputation which the British troops have been accustomed to enjoy in every part of the world.

Although the need for such an order was justified it caused consternation in official circles on both sides of the water. Craufurd realised that to recall Abercrombie at this stage would have been an unmitigated disaster and wrote to his friend William Wickham,

I most perfectly agree with you that Sir Ralph Abercrombie's recall or resignation in the present situation in Ireland would be in the highest degree prejudicial to the welfare of the Empire, whatever might be the cause. 6 The order which has occasioned so much dissatisfaction was given out, as you know, immediately after Sir Ralph's return from a tour through the southern and western parts of the kingdom, during which he had been forcibly struck with the great want of discipline in several regiments.

Camden, the Viceroy, was, however, determined that Abercrombie should be replaced by a strong and experienced successor but, in a surprise move, the Viceroy himself was replaced in June. The government had the good sense on l3th June to appoint Lord Cornwallis, despite the latter's earlier reservations, as joint viceroy/commander in chief. Strong leadership was indeed necessary as assassinations were becoming commonplace. The situation was further complicated when, on 20th May, Lord Edward Fitzgerald, the military leader of the rebels was betrayed by a colleague, arrested, tried and executed.

The peasants in Kildare, Wicklow and Wexford rose up. General Gerard Lake ordered Craufurd to collect a detachment of troops from Kilkenny and surrounding districts and to march against the rebels in Wexford, the centre of their activities. On reaching Kilkenny, Craufurd found no troops. He therefore joined General Johnson at New Ross, whose troops consisted of the County of Dublin Militia with detachments from the Clare, Donegal and Meath Regiments of Militia, the 5th Dragoons, the Mid-Lothian Fencibles and a detachment of Royal Artillery, together totalling 1,400 men. The reinforced garrison remained under arms all night on the 4th June, the rebels having bivouacked within 10 miles of the town. Early the next day the rebel leader sent a formal summons to Johnson to surrender the town. Unfortunately, the messenger was shot while the truce was in effect. The rebels were furious and moved quickly, driven by inspired fanaticism from their priests. Craufurd's account of the battle in a despatch to Lake tells the story of the battle.

The insurgents yesterday morning attacked the place in great force and with great vigour. They behaved in a manner that one could only have expected from them. In their first attacks they seemed quite regardless of fire. They succeeded in forcing part of the position and drew the troops who had been posted round the outside of Ross, quite back into the town, and they took four or five guns. By the great personal exertions of General Johnson, the troops were brought forward again and the enemy driven out of the town. They frequently renewed the attack, but with less vigour than the first. After an action of several hours, they were completely driven off and our guns retaken, and one iron gun from the ship's cannon taken from the enemy. Their loss in killed is very great.

The New Ross action was won and the rebels defeated. In his despatch to General Lake, Johnson stated that, among others, Colonel Craufurd is entitled to my fullest praise.

Notwithstanding this measure of approbation, Craufurd, not for the last time upset his commander. He wrote later to his friend William Wickham,

You will perhaps have heard that I have lately been tried by a court martial and honourably acquitted. I was accused by Major General Johnson of disobedience of orders and treating him with disrespect. I had the satisfaction to find my conduct in the whole affair perfectly approved of

His assessment of the rebels' capability before and after the action is worth noting Before the attack they made on us the other day, I had so contemptible opinion of them, but I have now totally changed my opinion. I never saw troops attack with more enthusiasm and bravery than the rebels did on the 5th.

On 21st June, Lake successfully attacked and defeated the rebel army at Vinegar Hill. This battle ended the insurrection as a serious movement for the time being although the Irish problems had not gone unnoticed south of the English Channel. Wolf Tone, an Irish folk hero, had been living in France, keeping the Directoire abreast of the nationalists' desire for independence, and soliciting their help. He made the point to the French authorities that by helping the Irish rebels the British Army would be tied down, easing military pressures on the French elsewhere in Europe. So in July 1798 the Directoire ordered 1,000 regular troops and three frigates to proceed to Ireland, setting sail under General Humbert for this purpose. On 22nd August, he landed unopposed at Killala Bay. On the 23rd August he offered arms and ammunition to 1,000 Irish volunteers. But he had not been well briefed. The people of Connaught had taken no part in the rebellion, and in any case, after the defeat at Vinegar Hill the taste for rebellion had left most of the United Irishmen. Nevertheless, Humbert moved inland, occupying Ballina, his total strength now being I 100 French regulars and by this time around 2,000 armed Irishmen.

News of the landing did not take long to reach Dublin and Cornwallis lost no time in taking measures to check the invaders. He ordered General Hutchinson, commander of the troops in Connaught, to march to Mayo to protect the bridges on the Upper Shannon while he and his troops set out by means of forced marches for Athlone. General Hutchinson, realising the urgency of the situation had not waited for orders but had collected all available troops from Galway, Gort and Athendry and then occupied Castlebar where he was joined on the 26th by Lake. At the same time, a small force of some 12,000 men under General Taylor was posted 12 miles to the north at Foxford, where it was guarding what was thought to be the only possible passage for an army across the river Moy.

Humbert resumed his march towards Castlebar. He heard en route that Taylor was at Ballina where he halted to rest his troops, anticipating an attack there. He had found Taylor withdrawn to Foxford. Because of this Humbert realised that the English were expecting him to cross the river Moy there and that their deployment at Castlebar was based on that assumption. Guided by an Irish priest, he marched across the hills by a little known track and by 6 o'clock the following morning, he had reached the heights above Castlebar.

Lake was warned of Humbert's unexpected route by a loyalist yeoman from a mountain farm who had been visiting his cattle. The ill-disciplined Irish militia of the Royal Army soon panicked as a result of a bayonet charge and fled to Tuam where Lake at last succeeded in rallying his army. The artillery, a small band of the 6th Foot and Lord Roden's Fencible Dragoons were the only soldiers who stood firm.

On news of the invasion reaching Dublin, Cornwallis sent Craufurd to join Lake at Tuam. Lake hoped that he would be able to restore the soldiers' morale, 'that the soldiers will get the better of their panic which is beyond all description.' Craufurd on arrival was placed in command of Lake's advance guard. This force consisted of a Light cavalry squadron, one of the few regiments that had remained steady at Castlebar, and Hompesch's Chasseurs Cheval (a Swiss mercenary regiment).

Initial Tasks

Craufurd's initial tasks were to gain positive intelligence of the location and strength of the enemy (an exercise at which he excelled in Spain in 1810) while Cornwallis and Lake manoeuvred their armies into a favourable tactical position from which to give battle. On arrival at Tuam, he received intelligence that a considerable number of insurgents were assembling at Ballinrobe and he set out to confirm this. His activities during the next 48 hours are best told in his own words.

About a mile and a half on this side of Kilmaine at Major Miller's house, I was informed that parties had been there an hour before, collecting arms. I observed several groups of them. I took two prisoners mounted with green ribands in their hats and very badly armed, a shot or two were fired at my flanks. In advancing from hence to Ballinrobe, I must have left a very boggy, difficult and apparently disturbed country in my rear. I therefore only sent a patrol to Kilmaine in which they found very few people. Their reports and those of every man to whom I spoke agreed with what had been before mentioned to me, viz that a considerable body of insurgents commanded by a Mr George Blake were in possession of Ballinrobe. Having ascertained this to my satisfaction, I judged it would be useless and certainly improvident to advance further in that direction without infantry and with horses much jaded. I therefore returned to the Hollymount road and arrived here a quarter of an hour ago. No French troops have ever been here, so all the people I have spoken to say the country east of the bogs that are on the left of the road going from Tuam to Hollymount does not appear to me to be disturbed. The inhabitants are in groups on the hills, but not armed, and I believe their leaving their habitation to proceed entirely from fear. A man just brought in tells me that he left Ballinrobe two hours ago and that he does not believe there are more than 100 rebels in that place. I hope to send accurate intelligence of the French tomorrow, I believe them to be still at or near Castlebar.

The following day he submitted two further reports Ballinrobe, 1 Sept, 1300 hours

    I yesterday sent Captain Taylor for your Excellency a report of my proceedings since I left Headquarters. I passed last night in the neighbourhood of Hollymount. This morning I had two objects, the one to ascertain the real state of Ballinrobe, the other to find out how far the French pushed their advanced posts. I therefore sent a patrol at daybreak to Ballinrobe, with orders to go very near the town, and then to join me on the great road leading from Hollymount to Castlebar.

    At the latter road I advanced about five miles. I saw no appearance of the enemy. I met successively three gentlemen's servants who had passed by Castlebar at different hours yesterday. They all said that the French had been joined by Clare, but particularly from the western and most mountainous parts of the county of Mayo, in which neighbourhood it is said that several of what they call gentlemen headed the insurgents. As to the numbers of rebels collected at Castlebar, the statements of the people I have examined are so very vague and contradictory that I do not think them worth repeating. After having satisfied myself as far as it was possible what I should be able to do with respect to the position of the French, I was next anxious to know more exactly the state of Ballinrobe. The first patrol reported to me on its return, that it had been within a mile of it, and had seen no enemy. I had also in the meantime been informed, though not by persons I could depend on, that part of the rebels had left it for Castlebar. I did not, however, think it prudent on such uncertain intelligence to go thither with a detachment so composed, particularly as I was obliged to leave some long and bad defiles behind me and knew possibly that many of the inhabitants were armed.

    I therefore sent another patrol with orders to ride full gallop into the town, and if they found it occupied by insurgents to get back to me as soon as possible. I thought the object worth the risk. They found in the place about sixty or eighty men. They killed ten or 12 of them, the rest fled. A French officer, a Mr Blake C) left the place this morning for Castlebar as did about 150 insurgents. They had got intelligence that we were advancing. In the course of my march I have industriously circulated a report that a very large force is at my heels, and it seems to have a good effect. My patrols ranged over a considerable extent of country. The dragoons I have with me appear to be excellent light troops.

    PS I found in the barracks, several blue-yellow uniforms which they had been making for the rebels.

Ballinrobe, 1530 hours

    After writing the enclosed, I was informed that a French flag of truce was coming into town. I instantly rode out to meet them, but unfortunately found that our young Dragoons officer of the piquet had sent them in without reporting to me and without even blindfolding them. So that they came within 500 yards of the place with a full opportunity of making their observations, and from their seeing no infantry I am afraid they may suspect our weakness and be tempted to attack us. I however think it very essential that I should not fall backjust now. I therefore without alluding to what he had or had not seen, told the Frenchman that we hadjust arrived with the advance guard of our column and that that of another was on the Hollymount road - that the army was close behind them and that General Lake commanded this. I did not let them into the town.

    I shall therefore, until I receive your Excellency's further orders occupy the posts in front of this place. I took advantage of the arrival of the French officer and told him that we had a numerous body of light cavalry patrolling throi the country in different directions, that he therefore might be attacked on the road and offered him an escort to his advance post which he accepted. When they return, I shall have the honour of reporting to your Excellency what they saw.

    The situation in which I now am with this detachment is certainly not a fit one to remain long in. Should your Excellency think it advisable to send forward a corps of Light Infantry to Hollymount and Ballinrobe, I am almost certain there would be no risk.

    PS I have so good a look-out on all the roads, I am certain that the French will have no opportunity of attacking me. But I cannot of course answer for what may happen from the country people.

    The dragoons have just now brought in two or three stragglers found near the town with firelocks in their hands. I forgot to mention above that the flag of truce brought two carbineers. The officer pretended to be surprised at finding us here, perhaps he was, but I rather consider his visit as proceeding from an intention of reconnoitring.

Meanwhile the main body of the rebels were still at Castlebar, sending out patrols on all the roads with their grenadiers bivouacking every night near the junction of the Hollymount and Tuam roads. Humbert had been somewhat surprised at his easy victory at Castlebar, but he was also disappointed at the Irish reaction to his success and the small number of Irish recruits who had joined his forces. On the 4th September, he announced his plan, to entrench Castlebar as if he was going to remain there. He then announced that once he moved, he would make for Sligo and the North, and then march as quickly as possible on Dublin, hoping to arrive there twenty-four hours before Cornwallis. Unfortunately for Humbert, news of his movements reached Lake that very day, for he had sent back a party of eighty prisoners to Cornwallis under the charge of Dr Ellison, the Rector of Castlebar, and on their way, they ran into Craufurd, who on being told of Humbert's retreat, immediately advanced to Castlebar, and at midnight on the same day despatched the following report to Cornwallis:

    This will be delivered to Your Excellency by Mr Ellison who can give you as much information as any other person that I have met with here. I have examined a variety of people, both of the loyal and suspected, and I believe the enemy has marched towards Sligo. One person, however, says that General Humbert last night said they were going to attack General Lake.

    They have left in this place several wounded officers and men; about 40 or 50 barrels (I am told) of powder and cartridges and an ammunition cart, some pikes and above 200 muskets. If the enemy does not march this way, it may be worth while to send a small party to destroy the ammunition. Being sensible how important it is that Your Excellency should be accurately informed of the enemy's movements, I shall follow them at daybreak. Should any accident happen to us, I trust Your Lordship will not blame me.

    PS If the army was to march tomorrow on the road to Sligo passing through Ballinamore (Mr Ormesby's) it would perhaps be as direct a route as possible towards the enemy, as well as the readiest means of effecting a junction with General Lake and would answer every purpose. I hope Your Lordship will pardon the liberty of suggesting it, at all events it appears to me that it would be as well that a patrol succeeded me here.

As a result of the rebels' move, Lake ordered Craufurd to harass and keep in touch with the French column. The next day (5th September) he set out with his detachment to follow hard on Humbert's heels. The latter meanwhile had received an unexpected check in an action with Colonel Vereker at Colooney, in which he had over 70 casualties; but by the evening of the 6th he had reached Drumkiern. It was here that Craufurd caught up with him during that same afternoon.

The following day, Humbert crossed the Shannon at Ballintra but was so closely harassed by Craufurd that not only did he not have time to destroy the bridge, but he was compelled to jettison his artillery in the river.

As the rebels approached Cloone towards the evening the detachment made a fierce attack upon their rearguard inflicting several casualties, forcing the French to deploy. At dawn the next day, Humbert continued his march, but he was unable to shake off Craufurd and finally at Ballinamuck his rearguard was obliged to stand and fight and his whole force finally surrendered. Fortunately, Craufurd's own personal account of this action still remains. During the action a pair of French and rebel colours were captured and later the question arose as to whether they had been fairly taken in action or delivered up when the enemy surrendered. Craufurdis account of the action is contained in a letter of explanation concerning the colours written to Captain Taylor, Cornwallis's Private Secretary, later the same year:

    Cork, Oct 5 1798

    Sir

    I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of 3rd instant, respecting a pair of french and rebel colours, taken from the enemy by a detachment of the regiment of Hompesch, under my command, in the action of Ballinamuck. You desire me to acquaint you, for Lord Corn wallis's information, ewhether these colours were actually taken in action or delivered up by the enemy when they laid down their arms?' In answering this question, I feel myself called upon, in justice to Captain O'Toole and the rest of the party, to state to you, shortly what passed on the 6th, 7th and 8th September. I experience infinite satisfaction in availing myself of this opportunity of expressing my opinion of their merit, the more so they say, from being so much advanced, were not fortunate enough to have anybody but myself and (in the last instance) Captain Pakenham, as witnesses of their conduct.

    When I got command of the detachment, it had just come off the march from Tuam to Hollymount; it consisted of Captain OiToole, Lieutenant Dienam, and about thirty chasseurs cheval of Hompesch, Lieutenant Smith, and twenty Dragoons of Roden. In forty-eight hours we marched ninety English miles, and arrived upon the enernyis outposts at Drumkiern, in the afternoon of the 6th, General Lake being then encamped three miles east of Coloony, and consequently fifteen English miles distant from us. The detachment passed the night within pistol shot of the enemy's pickets, and a mile from their camp, on the 7th at daylight, it pursued the enemy and remained close to him till dark, when it observed him encamped at Cloone. During this march, the detachment three times attacked the enemy's rearguard, killed a great number of rebels, and twice obliged the French infantry of the rearguard to deploy. Although they were posted as to make it impossible to charge them with effect after they had formed, yet the Chasseurs and Dragoons shewed the greatest desire to attempt it. This day a few French prisoners were taken.

    On the morning of the 8th, many of the horses were found to be lame, or quite exhausted with fatigue, and therefore, on marching off to follow the enemy, the detachment consisted of only about twenty-four Chasseurs of Hompesch, and twelve Dragoons of Roden. They came up with the enemy before any other of our troops were within three miles of him, they immediately attacked the enemyis rearguard, consisting of rebels, killed a great many, took a tumbril, and then advanced against the French infantry and skirmished with their tirailleurs, but it was not deemed advisable at that moment to charge. General Humbert, seeing this, made the French rearguard advance upon the detachment and return to take the tumbril. By this manoeuvre, and sticking close to them afterwards, the detachment delayed the enemy very much, and was the cause of General Lake's column being afterwards enabled to come up with them.

    Just as the greater part of the enemy's troops had passed the bridge of Ballinamuck, and between three and four hundred French infantry only, were still on this side of it, the detachment, favoured by the rising of the ground, arrived unperceived, within two hundred yards of them. The French infantry were instantly charged by the detachment, without a moment's hesitation, and being panic stricken at this sudden attack, they threw down their arms upon my calling out to them that we would give them quarter. The conversation that passed between me and them, was no more than what I had time to say at the moment the detachment was galloping in amongst them. Their throwing down their arms was the effect of the terror inspired by the brave and rapid manner in which the Chasseurs and Dragoons charged them.

    I believe it was at this moment that the Colours were taken, and they certainly must be considered as fairly taken in action, for when the detachment charged the French infantry nobody, I am sure, could or did foresee that they would not defend themselves, nor did a man throw down his arms, or make any signal of surrender, until the detachment was within two yards, and the Chasseurs just beginning to sabre them.

    For the accuracy of what I now relate, I beg to refer you to Captain Pakenham, who joined the detachment shortly after we had taken the tumbril, and afterwards most gallantly went at its head, I reported to General Lake that the number of French taken at this moment was upwards of two hundred, but I said eighty, for fear I should be thought to exaggerate, but I knew to a certainty that there were very near, and I believe, full four hundred,

    This action passed in sight of the whole of the enemy's corps and threw them into great consternation. During the whole of the little affair I have related to you, the detachment was perfectly alone, and no other corps whatever had, or were near enough, to have a share in any part of them. It was only after taking the three or four hundred French infantry that the detachment acted in conjunction with other troops. I am sorry to have troubled you with so long a letter in answer to your question respecting the Colours. I should have deemed myself ungrateful to the excellent officers and soldiers I had the happiness to command, if I had done otherwise.

    Should Lord Cornwallis be pleased, in disposing of these Colours, to confer any mark of distinction on Captain O'Toole or his party, I will answer for it that it cannot be bestowed on braver men. Captain O'Toole is in every respect a most excellent officer.

    The conduct of Lieutenant Smith of Lord Roden's and of his party, was perfectly meritorious, but the Chasseurs of Hompesch had the good fortune to take the Colours.

    I have the honour to be, Sir Your very obedient and most humble servant ROBERT CRAUFURD, Lieut Col

    PS Lieutenant Dienam of Hompesch's also behaved with distinguished bravery.

    To Captain Taylor
    Secretary to His Excellency the Lord Lieutenant.

Brilliant

Clearly Craufurd played a brilliant part in finally bringing about Humbert's defeat. Praise for him came from an unexpected, Humbert's ADC, who was full of praise for the way in which he had harassed Humbert on his march for Dublin. Lord Mount Norris wrote to a friend, 'We are anxious to hear from Lord Cornwallis, to whom Craufurd has shown the way to victory.' While Lake's official despatch was glowing in its praise, Captain Taylor, Cornwallis's Private Secretary, wrote to Wickham, I our friend Colonel Craufurd's talents and exertions were of the greatest use on the late occasion and he has risen very high in Lord Cornwallis's opinion' 0 'Lieutenant Colonel Craufurd, who commanded my advanced Corps, composed of detachments of Hompesch's and the Ist Fencible Cavalry by great vigilance and activity, hung so close upon their rear, that they could not escape from me, although they drove the country and carried with them all the horses', and the final sentence of the despatch read as follows, 'I cannot conclude my letter without expressing how much our success is to be attributed to the spirit and activity of Lieutenant Colonel Craufurd and I beg leave to recommend him as a most deserving officer.'

After the defeat of Humbert, Craufurd returned to Dublin and was sent with General Lake to Cork. However, on hearing of the arrival of the Brest Expedition at Lough Swilly off the northern coast, he was despatched to join the Brigade of Guards at Limerick. On news of the French Squadron being defeated by Admiral Warren, he returned to Cork and later made a further tour of Bantry Bay. After that he went to Castlebar to attend as a witness in the trial of Moore, one of the rebel leaders, who was condenmed to death.

Cornwallis wrote to the Duke of York recommending Craufurd for the appointment of Quartermaster General in Ireland. The post would have seen him considerably better off. Apart from being an ambitious soldier, he was contemplating marriage, and could have done with the considerable rise in pay that would have ensued from such an appointment.

But ghosts from his past returned to haunt him. The Duke of York wrote back I think you are planning a very rapid rise for Robert Craufurd. Only recollect that his recently having been brought into the Service as Lieutenant Colonel after having sold out, is one of the strongest measures of HRH's administration, that it has occasioned much animadversion, and that appointing him Quartermaster General over the heads of many General Officers that may be looking to the situation, is a circumstance that cannot and will not be defended, at least that is what strikes me on the occasion, and I request that this sentiment may be considered as proceeding from myself only. I know not how HRH considers the matter, he not having made any observation on it, on reading your letter.

And there the matter rested. Instead of the Quartermaster Generalship, Craufurd was posted to Switzerland as His Ma esty's representative, 'to cornbine the military movements of that country with the operations of the Austrian Army and to concert the measures necessary for this purpose with the leading persons in Switzerland who were sympathetic to the common cause.'

With the help and support of the Duke of Wellington in the Peninsula, Craufurd was later able to make the best of his lack of seniority, although Wellington's method of dealing with the problem did little to endear him to many of his peers. He became a Major General in June 1811 and was awarded two gold medals, one after Bussaco and the other at Ciudad Rodrigo. So honour was eventually satisfied.

Sources

Robert Craufurd to Wickham, Dublin, 19th March 1798, PRO HO 6676
Craufurd to Lake, New Ross 6th June 1798 - PRO HO 10082
Official despatch Johnson/Lake, New Ross, 7th June 1798, PRO HO 100-82
Craufurd to Wickham, Waterford, 3 July 1798 PRO HO 66150
Craufurd/Cradock (QMG in Ireland), New Ross, 7th June 1798
Craufurd/Cornwallis, Hollymount, 31st August 1798 PRO HO 100-82
These two reports were written on 1st September 1798, PRO HO 10082
Craufurd to Cornwallis, Castlebar, midnight, 4th September 1798, PRO HO 100-82
Craufurd to Cornwallis, Cork, 5th October 1798
Lord Mount Norris to a friend - 6th September 1798, 'The War in Wexford' (London 1810) p 268
Herbert Taylor (PS/Lord Lieutenant) to Wickham, 14th September 1798, PRO 100-78
Official Despatch, Lake to PS/Lord Lieutenant, Camp near Ballinamuck, 8th September 1798
Brownrigg to Taylor, Horse Guards 21st January 1799, PRO WO 1333 (The Brownrigg Papers)
Lord Grenville to Robert Craufurd, Downing Street, l8th March 1799, PRO FO 74-26


Back to Age of Napoleon 27 Table of Contents
Back to Age of Napoleon List of Issues
Back to MagWeb Master List of Magazines

© Copyright 1998 by Partizan Press.
This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web.
Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com