The two great chains of defences north of Lisbon have received considerable attention from historians. The third chain of the Lines of Torres Vedras, around the small bay of St. Julian south of the capital has, on the other hand, all too frequently been ignored.

In some respects the third line was the most vital of them all. This was to be the British army's secure embarkation point. If Wellington had been unable to persuade the British cabinet that he could safely withdraw the army in the event of a serious defeat he would not have been granted permission to attempt the defence of Portugal.

Such was the anxiety of the Government for the safety of the army in the Spring of 1810 that the Secretary of State for War was obliged to tell Wellington "that a very considerable degree of alarm exists in this country respecting the safety of the British army in Portugal". Wellington's plans for a safe evacuation, therefore, were a prominent feature of his dispatches during this period. He informed Lord Liverpool that if he were provided with a "large fleet of ships of war, and 45 disposable tons of transports, I shall try , and I think I shall bring them (the British army) all off". [1] This did not allay Liverpool's fears, who replied that "the chances of a succesful defence are considered here by all persons, military as well as civil, so improbable that I could not recommend any attempt at what may be called desperate resistance". [2]

He consequently advised Wellington that he would "be excused for bringing away the army a little too soon, than, by remaining in Portugal a little too long, exposing it to those risks from which no military operations can be wholly exempt".

Many of the redoubts of the Lines were originally constructed entirely from earth, but after the first winter it was found that with any face that was cut at an angle greater than 45 degrees the soil was washed away by heavy rain.

To this, Wellington replied that "all the preparations for embarking and carrying away the army, and everything belonging to it, are already made, and my intention is to embark it, as soon as I find that a military necessity exists for so doing. I shall delay the embarkation as long as it is in my power, and shall do everything in my power to avert the necessity of embarking at all.

Earthen traverses were built inside many of the larger redoubts of the Lines to act as secondary defensive positions. In the background can be seen two stone-built powder rooms.

If the enemy should invade this country with a force less than that I should think so superior to ours as to create a necessity of embarking, I shall fight a battle to save the country, for which I have made the preparations; and if the result should not be successful, of which i have no doubt, I shall still be able to retire and embark the army .... (However), if we do go, I feel a little anxiety to go like gentlemen, out of the hall door (particularly after all the preparations I have made to enable us to do so), and not out of the back door". [3]

Wellington had indeed made his plans to "go like gentlemen". As early as October 1809, Wellington had reminded Colonel Fletcher, his chief engineer that "the great object in Portugal is the possession of Lisbon and the Tagus, and all our measures must be directed to that object. There is another also connected with that first object, to which we must attend, viz., the embarkation of the British troops in the case of a reverse". [4]

Because of the rocky nature of the coast of Portugal there are very few spots suitable for such a major operation, and only four places were given any serious consideration. Admiral Berkely, who commanded the Royal Navy squadron stationed in the Tagus, suggested the little bay of Paco d'Arcos. Wellington rejected this as it was within artillery range from the south bank of the Tagus, and it was Wellington's firm belief that the French would "attack on two distinct lines, the one south, the other north, of the Tagus." [5]

The second place to be investigated was Peniche. This was a small peninsula some forty miles north of Lisbon. It was already strongly fortified and was virtually impregnable. In December 1809, Peniche was inspected by Marshal Beresford's chief of staff: "The isthmus over which the peninsula is approached is covered with water at high tide, and from the line of works describing a sort of arc, very powerful cross-fires may be established on every part of it. There are nearly 100 good guns upon the work, the brass ones especially good. This is the most favourable position that can be conceived for embarking the British army, should it ever be necessary to do so. The circumference abounds with creeks and clefts in the rocks, inside which there is always smooth water, and easy egress for boats. They are out of reach of fire from the mainland: indeed, there is sufficient room to encamp a large force perfectly beyond the enemy". [6]

Peniche was favoured by the British Government who saw it as a second Gibraltar which "might be held by England, even if Portugal otherwise were in the power of the enemy... If it be the wish of Lord Wellington he can retire upon Lisbon, give battle in front of it, and if the day go against him. Retreat upon Peniche and defend it so long as he pleases". [7]

Wellington knew that he could hold Peniche against attack almost indefinately. But if the French attack was delivered between June and November, when the Tagus was fordable, the allied army could well be forced to withdraw eastwards for fear of of exposing its flank. A retreat to Peniche would then be impossible. In addition, the main Lines of Torres Vedras were only twenty-two miles north of Lisbon and Peniche would be well outside these defences. For this reason, despite its obvious strengths, Peniche was discounted as the final embarkation point.

The next place to be considered was Setubal. This town, now an important commercial and fishing port, lies over twenty miles south-east of Lisbon. Wellington calculated that Setubal could be held for eight days and would be a practical point for embarking the army. Being on the south side of the Tagus, however, meant that Setubal could be cut off by a French army operating in the Alemtejo. Although it was therefore unsuitable as the main embarkation point, Setubal was not completely ignored. The ground around the bay was fortified and prepared as a secondary embarkation area.

As none of these places was regarded as being satisfactory, Wellington instructed Colonel Fletcher to investigate the coast line South of Lisbon. Fletcher reported that the small bay of St. Julian, was far from ideal:. "at intervals, such a sea rolls in for days together that no boat can with safety approach the shore". It could, however, be made secure enough to allow an uninterrupted embarkation. Just a few miles below the capital, the bay was partially sheltered by a rocky promontory. Upon this was built the Sixteenth century fort of Sao Juliao de Barra. This fort "from its extravagantly high scarps and deep ditches", recorded Major John Jones, Fletcher's second-in-command, "can never be successfully assaulted against the slightest opposition". [8]

Notes