The Battles for Urfahr-Linz
Part 2

1809

By David Wright

Battles for Urfahr-Linz Part 1

Counterattack of the Württembergers

The lull had fooled Vandamme and his staff into expecting no further attack that day, but when the unexpected occurred, they reacted quickly. [15] See (Map 6).

Large Map 6 (slow: 195K)
Jumbo Map 6 (extremely slow: 303K)

While von Hartitzsch's Saxons formed up behind their cavalry, von Scharffenstein's Brigade, supported by von Brand's Garde-Reitende-Batterie, moved out from the fortifications in Urfahr and, picking up the Jäger from Steeg, advanced in line against Dornach, von Neubronn directly against the village, von Phull on their left and the Jäger on the left flank. Franquemont's Brigade followed from Linz in closed battalion columns, with Herzog Wilhelm in front of Kronprinz. The Saxon Husaren and Chevau-legers, vanguard of Bernadotte's Saxon Corps, arrived at the front with the Württemberg infantry. On the right bank of the Danube, the four guns of von Brogniart's 2. Fuss-Batterie moved into a position to enfilade the Austrian line.

At the same time the light infantry moved against St Magdalena. Oberst von Wolff sent Kechler's company round the Austrian right flank; the other two companies of the battalion climbed, sometimes in single file, up the steep slopes against the churchyard and village, both surrounded by walls and hedges.[16]. Von Brüsselle's battalion, followed by the von Neuffer Jäger company from the Haselgraben, moved on their left, Von Bartruff's 2. Reitende-Batterie supported the attack.

At this point the positions were approximately as shown on Map 6 [17]. As the Württemberg assault line moved east, the Jäger wheeled south to take the Austrians in flank. At this the Merveldt Ulanen moved forward to threaten the left flank of the Jäger.

Up to now, the Württemberg cavalry had been stationary near Steeg. Owing to the difficult ground, the Jäger-Regiment zu Pferd Herzog Louis had its squadrons somewhat apart from one another, with the Leibeskadron in an advanced post. [18]. This squadron was ordered to attack the Merveldt Ulanen, with Münchingen's squadron in support.

The latter squadron was just to the left of Steeg, behind a ditch. The men surged over the ditch with the exception of their unfortunate commander, whose horse refused to cross. To save embarrassment, the men returned and the squadron galloped through Steeg after the Leibeskadron. The Württemberg cavalry caught the Uhlanen in front and flank. The Merveldt Ulanen broke and fled back to the hills around Katzbach, pursued by the Württembergers. The half 3. Bataillon Manfredini, advancing to reinforce the advance guard from the hill to the north of Katzbach, was broken in the pursuit and their second Oberst captured. The battalion standard was saved by a heroic defence from six Austrian soldiers.

Meanwhile, the Württemberg light infantry had forced the Peterwardeiner Grenz companies out of St. Magdalena and, after a short fire fight, compelled the 1. Bataillon Manfredini to retreat towards Auhof, followed by the company from the von Neuffer Jäger. Von Wolff's battalion reformed and moved down against Crenneville's right flank. The pressure finally caused Generalmajor Crenneville's badly outnumbered forces to retreat towards the eastern hills, hastened by part of the Jäger-Regiment zu Pferd König, the rest following the Ulanen. The main force of the pursuit was broken at the foot of the wooded hills, where the Austrian light infantry had settled, together with the flanking fire from 2 guns of the Kavalleriegeschüzbatterie.

At this point the Württemberg attack split into two prongs. Von Wolff's battalion, the Jäger-Bataillon König and part of von Phull swung against Auhof, while the rest of Scharffenstein's Brigade went straight on to Katzbach. Franquemont's Brigade also turned against Auhof.

Retreat of Vukassovich's Column

Katzbach was quickly torn from its defenders, but further advance was prevented by accurate fire from the battery on the hill to the north.[19] This battery was now cut off, but its commander bravely decided to fight on to cover the retreat of the others. His only support was the half 3. Bataillon Manfredini and the stragglers of Crenneville's advance guard in the adjacent woods. See Map 7.

Large Map 7 (slow: 195K)
Jumbo Map 7 (extremely slow: 330K)

Generallieutenant von Wöllwarth gave Major Graf Waldburg-Wurzach, the commander of Herzog Louis, the command to attack the battery. As the two squadrons already in action had not yet reformed, there remained only von Rassler's squadron and the Kommandeureskadron. Von Rassler's squadron rode straight at the battery, while the Kommandeureskadron, under Stabsrittmeister von Seebach, took the track to the right by which the battery had ascended. At the same time, Bernadotte gave Generalmajor Gutschmidt the order to attack the battery from the north with the Saxon Husaren-Regiment and the Prinz Albrecht Chevaulegers and von Milkau's squadron of the Jäger-Regiment zu Pferd König [20] rode for the escort through the woods.

At the foot of the hill, von Rassler's squadron hit a ditch - literally. Major von Rassler and Seconde-Lieutenant von Künsberg both crashed into the obstruction. As another officer was already out of action and a fourth seconded to Headquarters, the leadership of the squadron fell on the youngest officer, Seconde-Lieutenant von Adelsheim. It was in good hands: Adelsheim led the squadron up the steep slope, leaning over the necks of their panting horses, until they charged into the battery. A fierce struggle arose over the guns with the battery escort, during which Adelsheim was badly wounded. [21]

Help arrived in the form of the Kommandeureskadron, followed by von Milkau, the Saxons and 30 grenadiers from von Phull, who drove the Austrians into the woods. All six of the battery's guns were captured. During the melee, the commander of Manfredini, Oberst von Winzian, was recognised and captured by Unteroffizier Weiss of Herzog Louis. In 1805, Weiss was in Austrian service [22] and harshly punished by the same officer for a minor misdemeanour, so revenge was sweet.

With the capture of the battery, the pace of the Württemberg advance increased. The Austrians retired in good order and a series of skilful rearguard actions by the 1. Bataillon Manfredini above Auhof and the 3. Bataillon Karl Schröder above Katzbach prevented serious losses.

The Württembergers stopped at the foot of the hills, apart from a few sent in pursuit of the retreating troops, who finally stopped for a rest in Gallneukirchen at about 9 pm.

Advance of Somariva's column

At the seeming moment of victory, Vandamme and Bernadotte were shocked to hear the thunder of cannon from their rear. Somariva had arrived. See Map 8.

Large Map 8 (slow: 193K)
Jumbo Map 8 (extremely slow: 324K)

After a horrendous approach march over washed-out mountain tracks, in which he lost one gun with a broken axle, Somariva arrived on the Pöstlingberg in time to see Kolowrat's column in retreat. Realising that an attack alone was out of the question, he sent the two battalions of Würzburg and the Peterwardeiner Grenz back into the valley to cover any retreat up the Haselgraben.

The rest of his troops, 1 1/2 battalions of Wenzel Colloredo, the 5. Jägerbataillon, a platoon of Merveldt Ulanen and 40 Pioniere, he set up on both sides of the church on the Pöstlingberg and stationed his guns so as to fire on the only two visible guns in the Urfahr entrenchments.

The Saxon troops were in front of Urfahr. When von Boxberg's Brigade arrived at about 6pm, they took post behind von Hartitzsch's Brigade and all three Brigades moved forward slightly. Unfortunately, when Somariva arrived, they were all facing in the wrong direction. Nevertheless, Bernadotte sent a battalion each of the regiments Friedrich August and Dyherrn, together with 3 companies of Prinz Maximillian against the newcomers. Twice they climbed the slopes and were twice repulsed by the 5. Jägerbataillon and half a batallion of Wenzel Collored. [23]

As night fell, the fighting died down and the battle seemed to be over. Vandamme, however, was not one to let the Saxons rob him of the day's honours. Independently, he gave the exceptionally able Generalmajor von Hügel the order to take the Pöstlingberg.

Hügel had only the 3 company strong Jäger-Bataillon König and von Seeger's company of von Neuffer available. These were very tired, having fought continuously since 2 pm and had shot away all their ammunition. With fixed bayonets they climbed the hill in pitch darkness, surprising an Austrian sentry post without firing a shot. Almost at the top, they met a half Jäger company, but managed to convince them that they were Austrians. Six paces from the enemy their bluff was called and a salvo hit them, but in the darkness they created enough confusion to start the precipitate retreat of the Austrians and captured around 800 men, although only 9 officers and 375 men of these did not manage to escape in the dark.[24]

Somariva finally joined up with Kolowrat and St. Julien's columns in Freistadt.

Demonstration at Mauthausen

St. Julien's column arrived on the hills above Mauthausen after a skirmish with a picket from Bataillon Brüsselle that had been stationed there. From there he started a doubly ineffectual bombardment against 1/ Bataillon von Cammerer in Enns. Not only were the Württembergers out of range, but the cannon around Dornach made such a noise that nobody there heard them, so they had no effect on the Württemberg strategy. An Austrian detatchment sent to Steyregg to effect a junction with Kolowrat was driven away by well placed fire from von Brogniart's 2. Fuss-Batterie.

On learning of Kolowrat's retreat, St. Julien withdrew to Gallneukirchen.

Conclusion

The battle of Linz-Urfahr has been given little prominence, probably due to the lack of involvement of French troops, but it deserves far more. Had Kolowrat managed to cut Napoleon's communications and foment revolt in the French rear, then the Danube campaign would have taken a very different course.

Kolowrat's attack failed because his three columns could not coordinate properly due to the terrain. Individual units fought well, but were not used in sufficient concentration to achieve decisive results.

The part played by the Saxons was small, but significant: apart from the Husaren and the failed attack on the Pöstlingberg, they served to occupy ground and release the Württemberg infantry for battle. The Württemberg troops, particularly Hügel's light brigade and the cavalry, performed superbly against an enemy superior in numbers.[25]

König Friedrich of Württemberg awarded the Jäger-Regiment zu Pferd Herzog Louis a Standard of Honour (Ehrenstandarte). The Württemberg Corps kept 4 of the 6 captured cannon as trophies; the other 2 were, on Bernadotte's order, given to the Saxon Husaren.

Bernadotte's verdict was typically French. "What you have done," he told the Württembergers, "only bears comparison with the performance against the enemy that one is accustomed to expect of the finest French troops."

Casualties
ForceDeadWounded MissingPrisonersTotal
OfficersMenOfficersMenOfficersMen OfficersMenOfficersMen
Austrian247 62570124 2543033 858
Wurttemberg53010 219540 0020289
Saxon072 72001 6385

Glossary

Befreiungskriege Wars of Liberation, 1813-15
Capitaine Captain
Chevaulegers French and German light cavalry.
Comte Count.
Duc Duke.
Erzherzog Archduke.
Feldmarschalllieutenant Austrian Lieutenant-General.
Feldzeugmeister General.
Freiherr Baron, Lord.
Füsilier Württemberg infantry, theoretically trained as light infantry.
Fuss-Batterie Foot artillery battery.
Fussjäger Bataillon Light infantry battalion, partly armed with rifles.
Garde Guard.
Général de Division Lieutenant-General.
Generallieutenant Lieutenant-General, also called Generalleutnant
Generalmajor Major-General
Graf Count, Earl.
Grenz Light infantry from the Turkish border.
Hauptmann Captain (infantry).
Herzog Duke.
Husaren Hussars.
Jäger-Regiment zu Pferd Light cavalry regiment.
Kavalleriegeschützbatterie Cavalry battery. A mobile Austrian battery designed to support cavalry, but not true horse artillery.
König King (in a regimental title: King's).
Landwehrbataillonen Militia battalions.
Leib Body (in a unit title: Royal).
Maréchal de lEmpire Marshal, a French honour title, rather than a military rank.
Oberlieutenant First Lieutenant, also called Premier-Lieutenant or Oberleutnant.
Oberst Colonel, also called Obrist.
Reitende-Batterie Horse artillery battery
Rheinbund Confederation of the Rhine.
Rittmeister Captain (cavalry). Schloss Castle.
Stabs-Hauptmann Staff-Captain, an infantry rank between Oberlieutenant and Hauptmann.
Stabs-Rittmeister Staff-Captain, a cavalry rank between Premier-lieutenant and Rittmeister.
Ulanen Lancers.
Unterlieutenant Second Lieutenant, also called Seconde-Lieutenant or Unterleutnant.
Unteroffizier Sergeant (cavalry).
Zug (plural Züge) Half-platoon.

Bibliography

[26]

Binder von Krieglstein, C. Der Krieg Napoleons gegen Österreich 1809. Band 2, Aspern und Wagram. Berlin 1906.
Bredow, C. von Historische Rang- und Stammliste des deutschen Heeres. Berlin 1905.
Du Casse , P. Baron Le Général Vandamme et sa Correspondence 2. Tom. Paris 1870.
Exner, M. Die Antheilnahme der Königlich Sächsischen Armee am Feldzuge gegen Österreich 1809. Dresden 1894.
Friedrich 1, König von Württemberg. Politische und militarische Correspondenz König Friedrichs von Württemberg. Stuttgart 1889.
Hoen, M., Ritter von & Kerchnawe, H. Krieg 1809, Band IV: Aspern. Vienna 1910.
Kraft, H. Die Württemberger in den Napoleonischen Kriegen. Stuttgart 1953.
Kurz, F. Geschichte der Landwehre in Oesterreich ob der Enns. Linz 1811.
Müller H. Geschichte des 4. Württembergische Infanterie-Regiment Nr 122 Heilbronn 1906.
Muff & Wencher. Geschichte des Grenadierregiments König Karl (5. Württembergisches) Nr 123. Stuttgart 1889.
Neubronner, von. Geschichte des Dragoner Regiments König (2. Württembergisches) Nr 26 Stuttgart 1905.
Niethammer G von. Geschichte des Grenadierregiments Königin Olga (1. Württembergisches) Nr 119. Stuttgart 1886.
Nübling, von. Geschichte des Grenadierregiments König Karl (5. Württembergisches) Nr 123. Berlin 1911.
Pfister, A Denkwürdigkeiten aus der württembergischen Kriegsgeschichte... des 8. Infanterieregiments. Stuttgart 1868
Pritz, F.X. Geschichte des Landes ob der Enns von der altesten bis zur neuesten Zeit. Linz 1846-7.
Rühle von Lilienstern O.A. Reise mit der Armee im Jahre 1809 Rudolstadt 1810.
Saski, C. Campagne de 1809 en Allemagne et en Autriche 2. Tom. Paris 1900.
Schempp, O, Horn, O & Hardegg R. Geschichte des 3. Württembergischen Infanterie-Regiments Nr 121 Stuttgart 1891
Schmahl & Spemann. Geschichte des Württembergischen Feldartillerie Regiments Nr. 29 Prinz Luitpold von Bayern. Stuttgart 1901.
Schuster, 0 & Franke, FA. Die Geschichte der sächsischen Armee. Leipzig 1885.
Stadlinger, L.J von. Militär-Handbuch des Königreichs Württemberg. Stuttgart 1836.
Starklof, R. Geschichte des Königlich Württembergischen zweiten Reiterregiments. Stuttgart 1867.
Starklof, R. Geschichte des Königlich Württembergischen vierten Reiterregiments Königin Olga. Stuttgart 1867.
Strach von Weisenbach Geschichte der Königlich Württembergischen Artillerie. Stuttgart 1882.

Notes

[15] The Württemberg Generaladjutant, Generallieutenant Graf von Theobald states in his report to his King that Vandamme panicked and left the conduct of the battle to Oberst von Kerner, his Chief of Staff. (Kraft, p177).
[16] Kraft, p175.
[17] The units are placed as accurately as possible from the available sources, but there must inevitably be some speculation, particularly with respect to the artillery.
[18] Starklof (zweitenten Reiterregiments), pp130-1.
[19] Württemberg sources place this battery on the Pfennig Berg. Krieg 1809, (p 253), considers this impossible as Katzbach is either out of range or in dead ground from viable gun positions on this mountain and the cavalry charge would have met Austrian units, none of which reported it, and would have had to pass through an almost impenetrable wood. The position they favour did have a battery on it, could affect the attacks on both Katzbach and Auhof and had all the features described. It is, incidentally, also the position shown (incorrectly) by Schuster & Franke (Band II, Skizze 18, Tafel VIII) as the Pfennig Berg.
[20] Starklof (zweitenten Reiterregiments), pp135-7; Neubronner, pp17-20; Exner, p31; Kraft, p176.
[21] Adelsheim was in so deep a coma that he was thought to be dead. Only a slight movement of his hand while being placed in his coffin prevented him being buried alive. He made a full recovery. Starklof p141.
[22] Weiss was born in a part of Austria which was transferred to Württemberg after the Treaty of Pressburg in 1805 (Starklof, p131). To add to the comedy of the situation, the Oberst's orderly loyally followed him into captivity with his spare horses!
[23] Some Saxon sources state (Exner, p32) that the Pöstlingberg was captured by the third attack, but in view of the account in Krieg 1809 (pp 259-61), including Somariva's own report, the comments of Vandamme and Bernadotte (never one to play down the contribution of his own troops, c.f. Wagram) and the fact that decorations were only given to the cavalry, makes this unlikely. Schempp (p229) says that the Saxons held the woods and the Austrians held the buildings on the Pöstlingberg. Perhaps the retirement of the Austrian outposts and the troops sent by Somariva to the Haselgraben were interpreted as a general retreat.
[24] Kurz and Pritz also mention the capture of a gun, but Krieg 1809 and Württemberg sources do not confirm this.
[25] Perhaps this is partly explained by the higher percentage of officer casualties in dead and wounded (Württemberg 5.7%, Austrian 2.6%, Saxon 2.4%).
[26] French works tend to ignore the Rheinbund troops or portray them as fighting bravely (but not up to French standards) under the eyes of their beloved Emperor. Many German works (written after the Befreiungskriege) show them as fighting bravely (but reluctantly) for the oppressor. Krieg 1809, being Austrian, is more objective in this respect, as well as being extremely detailed with 28 pages (pp235-262) on the battle. Information comes from Generals' battle reports and Regimental Histories on both sides.

Kraft adds more detail on Württemberg movements from that country's archives, but is very anti-Vandamme, between whom and the Württemberg Officer Corps (if not the men) there seems to have existed a mutual antipathy. Napoleon indeed initially agreed to give the command of the contingent to Feldzeugmeister von Cammerer due to the Württemberg dislike of Vandamme from the Silesian campaign of 1806-7, but reneged on the promise. Kraft is also rather in disagreement with Binder von Krieglstein.

Starklof has a long account, obviously concentrating on Herzog Louis. Krieg 1809 finds that some of the anecdotes conflict with Austrian accounts, but has managed to compromise well on these. Nübling also has a detailed report on the actions of the two Württemberg Fussjäger-Bataillonen. The other sources, apart from Saski which is useful for the contemporary letters and reports from French commanders as well as Orders of Battle, have less detail, but provide odd interesting items or viewpoints.

Battles for Urfahr-Linz Part 1


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