The Accusation Against Zieten
In 1844, the first edition of William Siborne's classic
'History of the War in France and Belgium in 1815' was
published. Being one of the most detailed works yet on the
subject, it attracted a considerable degree of controversy,
particularly from participants in that fateful campaign that felt
themselves slighted or misrepresented. It is interesting that
while both the Dutchman Knoop and the Belgian General
Renard felt it necessary to write an anti-Siborne in defence of
their countrymen, [1] the
Prussian General Staff produced no such work. Indeed, the
'Militair-Wochenblatt', the weekly organ of the Prussian
General Staff, carried a most extensive review of the work in
which, on the whole, Siborne was warmly praised for his
efforts in being factual and impartial.
[2]
Siborne started a constructive correspondence with a
Major Gervvien of the Historical Section, this exchange of
letters running through Bunsen, the Prussian ambassador
in London. These papers can be examined in the
Manuscripts Department of the British Library, in London,
where they form part of the 'Waterloo Correspondence' [3].
One of the issues raised by the Prussians was the
time at which Lieut.-General von Zieten, commander of the I
Army Corps in 1815, informed the Duke of Wellington in
Brussels of the assault on his outposts by the French that
commenced about 4 a.m. on 15 June. Zieten had been
accused of failing to inform Brussels of these events until
much later than he should have done, and various stories
were circulating at the time Siborne first wrote his work.
1st Edition
Indeed, in the first edition, Siborne's version of this
event read as follows [4] :
'It was between three and four o'clock in the afternoon
of the 15th that the Duke of Wellington received information of
the advance of the French Anny'. Siborne gave no source for
this information, so it is difficult to be certain of the origin of
this time. However, in 1842, Wellington wrote his
'Memorandum on the Battle of Waterloo' that was intended
as a guide for a review of Rauschnick's Life of Blucher that the
Earl of Ellesmere, a close associate of the Duke, was writing
for the 'Quarterly Review'.
The review was published in 1842, two years before
Siborne's first edition, so one can deduce that Wellington
himself was indirectly the source of this information. Thus, the
story that Zieten did not communicate these events to
Brussels until after 3 p.m., much later than it should have
done, and indeed actually did, appears to originate from the
Great Duke himself [5].
Gleig, another person that was closely associated with Wellington, made the same accusation against Zieten in his 'Story of Waterloo', published in 1847. The issue of what Wellington actually heard and when has been examined in recent articles by myself [6] and is put in its full context in my book.
The Prussian General Staff objected to this accusation of
dereliction of duty by one of its senior officers, and produced a
number of documents, examined below, in his defence. As
this correspondence shows, Siborne, assisted by Gerwien,
made every effort to establish the facts, and was quite
prepared to stand corrected.
At 11 a.m. on 14 June 1848, from his residence at 4
Carlton Terrace, London, Bunsen, presumably in reply to
an earlier communication that I have not been able to
locate, wrote the following letter to Siborne [7] :
As to the printed papers they will speak for
themselves, as you read our language so well. But as few
foreigners read our gothic written character, I give you here
an Extract as to this written of official report of Major Gerwien
of the General Staff of the Prussian army, I see it contains
first (p1 -3) the direct and indirect proofs, that the Duke
received the intelligence of the advance of the French,
through General von Zieten at nine in the morning of the 15th.
'The dispatch was sent on 15 June by 4 o'clock in the morning (3 3/4) by a Feldjager to the Duke, at Brussels. General Zieten wrote a letter on this subject under 21 January 1819 at the particular request of General de Grolman; which letter is presented in the Archives of the
Staff.
'According to this letter, the Feldjager arrived at
Brussels early at 9 o'clock on the same day. There exists no
filed copy of the Report of General de Zieten. The General,
in the letter alluded to, explains this by the circumstance
that having no Officer with him who could wnte French well
enough, he the General was obliged to carry on himself this
which correspondence with the Duke, & therefore there was
no time to have a copy. The courier was dispatched at 3 3/4
on the morning precisely.
' That the letter arrived by 9 o'clock. at Brussels
is proved by the Duke's own dispatch of that day to the
Due de Feltre (of 15 June 10 o'clock in the evening).
'The intelligence received by the Duke from
Charleroi (see p 3 of the Report), according to his own
letter, that day at 9 o'clock, can be no other than Gen. Z's
letter.
'Damitz therefore is not quite accurate when he
says, the letter arrived at 11.
' The other intelligence: "that the enemy has attacked
the Prussian posts" came from Blucher, and was sent by
him from Namur at 12 o'clock at noon. According to
Muffling's account it arrived at Brussels at 41/2 pm. Then
follows (p 4) Extract from M. Gerwien Journal, as a proof
there were on the fifteenth June two communications from
the Prussian Staff to the Duke. The difference as the time of
these two communications is to be explained thus:
'either by a not quite accurate recollection of
the writer:
or by some accident the intelligence of the fight of
the vanguard arrived only at 3 o'clock pm at Tirlemont
Hotel. after having been known many hours before
elsewhere, and by some other accident, the two Prussian
aides-de-camp were really only met [?] at 6, but only after
they had long time fulfilled their commission.
'p.b. [page below] contains following remarks on
Capt. Siborne's account of the events alluded to:
1. There is no account of Zieten's courier, altho'
both Wagner and Damitz mention it
2. Nor is there an account of Gen. Steinmetz's
communications to the commanding officer of the english
(clutch) [sic] vanguard, respecting the events on the Sambre
mentioned by Damitz.
3. It is assumed. that those events ought to have been
known at Binche, at the latest, at 5 o'clock in the morning.
4. Upon this assumption is founded the reproach to
the clutch [sic] troops, acting there with the Prussians, for
not having been in the Brigade Quarters at 8 1/2 in the
morning.
'But, as to the assumption of no 3 it is to be observed,
that the Prussian troops in Binche had no intelligence of
those events before 8 o'clock in the moming. They had in
consequence of the wind being against them, not heard the
cannonade at Maladrie at h. p. [half past] 4 o'clock in the
moming. As to the real attack, they were only appraised of it
by the general officer sent to the Dutch General van Merlen
(at St Symphorien) when that officer (Major v Amauld)
passed through Binche. Thus the reproach founded upon
that assumption falls to the ground.
'Finally it is said (p 7) that certain numbers of the Milit.
Wochenbl. contain much authentic information which
may prove to be of interest for a new Edition of Capt.
Siborne's work.
'Baron Canitz has given order in consequence, that
the numbers quoted by Major Gerwien, should be added to
the expedition.
'These are the Numbers inclosed [sic]. As to Major
Gerwien he is the Chief of that Section of the General Staff,
which presides over the documents relative to the History of
the Wars.
' Hoping the communication may still come in time I
have only to add, that I am at all events most anxious to
know what your definite opinion on this interesting
subject will be. If you pass by Carlton Terrace any time
before 1 or after 4, I should be the most obliged to you for a
call, as I am almost bound to my room, in consequence of
the Influenza.'
The notes attached to Bunsen's letter, written
by Gerwien in Berlin on 13 December 1847, read as
follows: [8]
'Regarding the Reports of 15th June 1815 on the
events on the Sambre that were sent to the Duke of
Wellington in Brussels in the early hours of this day from the
Prussian side.
'From the files referring to the Campaign of 1815
regarding the report in question from the then commanding
general of I Army Corps, von Zieten, to the Duke of
Wellington on the attack of the French on the Prussian
outposts on the Sambre on 15th June 1815 the following is
beyond doubt:
"that this report sent from Charleroi at about 4
a.m. On 15th June was handed over in Brussels to the
Duke of Wellington by a courier. "
'General von Zieten confirmed this in writing in a
letter (in our files) to the now deceased General von
Grolman dated 21st January 1819. The latter specifically
requested this after he had already been informed of this
verbally, reaming at the same time that:
"the courier mentioned (on 15th June) arrived
in Brussels at 9 a.m. "
'No copy of the message in question exists. General
von Zieten explains this in the above mentioned letter to
General von Grolman, writing:
"as all correspondence with the Duke of Wellington had to be in the French language, and as in 1815, I had no officer that mastered French so well that he could write it, I had to conduct all correspondence with the Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington myself. This is why no copy of the letter that I sent by a courier whose name escapes me to Brussels at 3.45 a.m. on the morning of 15th June 1815. I take this opportunity Your Excellency to reply to the letter of 30th of this month."
'As you can see, General von Zieten made no comment about the time that this courier arrived in Brussels. It is not known where General von Grolman got the information that:
"the courier arrived in Brussels at 9 a.m. " However,
nobody can doubt this information, because in Gurwood's
"Despatches", Vol 12, p 473, the letter from the Duke of
Wellington to the Duke of Feltre dated 15th June 1815,
states the following: "Brussels, 15th June 1815, 10 p. m.
"Your Grace,
"I have received news that the enemy has attacked
the Prussian outposts at Thuin on the Sambre this morning
and appears to be menacing Charleroi. I have received
nothing from Charleroi since 9 a.m. "
' From whom other than General von Zieten could
have come what the Duke knew from Charleroi at 9 a.m. ?*
(In Damitz's work, the time of its arrival is given as 11 a.m.)
That this is an error can be seen from the above.' The later
"news that the enemy had attacked the Prussian outposts,
etc. " came from Prince Blucher, passed on to the Duke of
Wellington by General von Muffling who was attached to the
English Headquarters. This was sent at 12 noon from Namur
and according to General von Muffling's work "History of the
Campaign of the Anglo-Dutch Army in 1815' arrived in
Brussels at 4.30p.m.
'The "United Services Journal" 1841, Part II, pp 170
ff contains an essay regarding the "Operations of the hfth or
Picton's Division in the Campaign of Waterloo" in which, on
page 172, the writer states:
"About three o'clock of the afternoon of that day, our
officers were sitting at dinner at the Hotel de Tirlemont,
where we had our mess, when we heard of a commotion, or
greater stir than usual, having arisen in the city; presently
some Belgian gentleman came in and told us, that there
had been 'an affair of posts' on the frontier, and that the
French suffered a repulse. This was the picquet affair of the
Prussian General Ziethen, who had gallantly resisted the
enemy's advanced guard, coming in the direction of the
grande chaussee to Brussels, but was driven back, or in fact
he fell back as all outposts do, as a matter of course.
"After dinner we strolled, as was our custom in the
afternoon, into the park, where the great world
promenaded every evening. Towards six o'clock
sauntering about the walks, I encountered two Prussian
aides-de-camp, who had come from Blucher with
intelligence of the advance of the French army, pointing
towards Brussels, or in that direction; we were instantly
ordered to hold ourselves in readiness to march to the
front in the morning.'
'The above confirms the arrival of two messages
from the Prussians:
1. A message from General von Zieten in the first half
of the day. [Pencilled note (from Siborne?) reads 'Zieten's
messenger was a Feldjager - not an ADCamp'.]
2. A message from Field Marshal Prince Blucher
in the second half of the day.
'The differences in the apparent times of arrival of the
messages can be explained either by error or poor memory
by the English writer, or it could be that the rumour of a
skirmish at the border, after it had been circulating for
hours, actually did only reach the Hotel de Tirlemont at 6 pm
and that this meeting did actually take place with the
Prussian couriers, who had long since carried out their
orders. It should be noted here that Captain Siborne, who,
in his description of the Prussian part in
the campaign of 1815 otherwise follows the works of
Wagner and Damitz very closely,
1. has taken no notice at all of the sending of a courier
from General von Zieten to the Duke of Wellington,
2. has not considered the message from General von
Steinmetz to the commanding officer of the Anglo-Dutch
outpost at Binche regarding the events on the Sambre
also mentioned by Damitz, but rather
3. has accepted that these events must have been
known in Binche by 5 a.m. at the latest, which means
that
4. the Prussian troops there in close contact with the
Dutch troops are accused of not having assembled in
their brigade quarters by 8.30 a.m.
'There is no need to comment further on the first two
points as they have already been covered. On the third
point however it should be noted that the Prussian
troops in Binche did not have knowledge of the mentioned
events as, due to atmospheric conditions, they did not hear
the firing at Maladrie, where, at 3.30 a.m., the
enemy opened the attack with four cannon, thereby
alarming those elements of the 1st Brigade near there.
The news of the attack which had taken place was first
received by the Dutch General van Merlen (at St.
Symphorien) from the staff officer of 1st Brigade (Major von
Arnauld) who had been sent to him, as he passed
through Binche. The accusation covered under 4 is thus
not sustainable.
'If, by the way, Captain Siborne has the intention of
publishing a third edition of his work, then he would be able
to take into account what is contained in nos. 1 to 8 and 15
to 35 of the 1845 volume of the 'Militair Wochenblatt', in nos.
3 to 11 of the 1846 volume and in nos. 34 to 38 of the 1847
volume. It is all the more desirable and all the more
unavoidable as these contain a documented explanation of
many events which even in the works of Wagner and
Damitz are either not clarified or event not mentioned. To comment on the above, further investigations
by myself have established that Zieten's memory of the time
he wrote to Wellington was incorrect. Reference to Zieten's
journal, as opposed to his letter to Grolman, indicates that
cannon fire woke him that morning. As the French artillery
did not come into action until after daybreak, about 4 a.m.,
then Zieten could not have written his report at 3.45 a.m.
Moreover, Gerwien is equally in error to state that the
French artillery opened fire at 3.30 a.m. when it was still
too dark for them to see their target. What is more likely is
that the artillery fire commenced at 4.30 a.m., and Zieten
wrote his despatch to Wellington at 4.45 a.m. The message
he wrote to Blucher that arrived in Namur by 8.30 a.m.
mentioned hearing firing at 4.30 am As Brussels was a
longer distance from Charleroi, one would expect the
message to Wellington to arrive a little later. Thus,
Gerwien's reasoning that the news referred to by
Wellington in his letter to the Duke of Feltre was from
Zieten, was sound.
Reference to both Wagner and Damitz was made in the above letter. Wagner was the author of the Prussian General Staff history of the Wars of Liberation (1813-15), and volume four of this work covered the campaign of 1815. Damitz was a Prussian officer who wrote an account on the
campaign on behalf of General Grolman, one of the senior officers in Blucher's headquarters. Two other important works on the campaign that Siborne used were those by Plotho and Muffling. This Englishman thus made every effort to consult the Prussian authorities available at the time of writing. However, by including material that has become available since Siborne wrote, and cross-referencing it with the material available to him, it is possible to extrapolate the full sequence of events on 15 June 1815, which was as follows:
- 3 p.m. Behr's message to the Prince of Orange
containing that news, and Zieten's report to Muffling of the
news of the fall of Charleroi arrived in Brussels.
- 5 p.m. Blucher's report to Muffling confirming the
arrival of Zieten's news reached Brussels.
- 6 p.m. Confirmation of Zieten's first report reached
Brussels from Braine-le-Comte.
- 6 - 7 p.m. Wellington issued his first orders. These
were largely for the concentration, and not for the
movement of his forces.
-10 p.m. The news arrived in Brussels that Blucher was
concentrating his forces in the Sombreffe position.
Wellington issued his 'After Orders', for his troops to move
the next day. It is interesting to note Siborne's hypothesis at this
stage of the investigation. Either Muffling's memory was
considered to be incorrect, or the two Prussian ADCs seen
at 5 p.m. by the officer of Picton's Division were considered
to be the bringers of Zieten's despatch. However, in all
probability, Wellington did not take Zieten's news that
arrived at 9 a.m. seriously.
Thus, he did not communicate it to Muffling, who
himself first heard from Zieten only at 3 p.m. Furthermore,
at least one of the Prussian ADCs seen at 5 p.m. was likely
to have been the carrier of the news from Blucher. That
courier had just arrived in Brussels, while the other may
have been Zieten's messenger to Wellington, but was more
likely to have been Zieten's later messenger to Muffling.
Bunsen also referred Siborne to the
'MilitairWochenblatt' that, as mentioned above, provided
further information on the campaign that Siborne used in
the third edition of his work.
On 10 July 1848, Siborne then summed up the information received in a file note that read as follows [9]:
1. At 1/4 before 4 in the morning of the 15th June, Genl.
v. Zieten forwarded by a courier to the D. of Wellington a
report, which, however could not have contained any
information respecting an attack upon his outposts, and
must have been limited to the mere mention of his having
received accounts from the latter indicating that
French troops were assembling in great force in their front
and that there was every possibility of an approaching
attack. That this must have been the extent of the
information forwarded by Gen. v. Zieten to the D. of
Wellington is known by the facts that
2. It was 1/2 past 3 in the morning when the French who
were advancing, commenced their attack upon the outposts
beyond Lobbes, commanded by Capt. Gilihausen (Militair-
Wochenblatt p.36, No. fl 1846), and then leaving the latter on
their left, pushed towards Maladrie, upon which they opened
a fire from 4 guns at 1/2 past 4. Lobbes is 5 English miles
distant from Fontaine l'Evlque, the headquarters of Genl. v.
Steinmetz, and this place is also 5 miles distant from
Charleroi, the headquarters of General v. Zieten.
Consequently
4. [sic there is no point 3] When Genl. v. Zieten wrote to
the Duke of Wellington at 1/4 before 4 he could not have
been cognisant of the actual attack made upon the
Prussian outposts, at 1/2 past 3 and 1/2 past 4.
4. [sic]
'Hence it is not in my power to defend Genl. v. Zieten
from the reproach made against him that he forwarded no
report to the Duke of the French having attacked his
outposts. It is not stated in those papers at what time Genl. v.
Zieten first received from Genl. v. Steinmetz an official report
of the French attack, but I presume it might have been by 6
o'clock, though, if this supposition assumed in the notes at
p. 39 of the Militair-Wochenblatt No.9 1846 be correct, he did
not receive a report of it until nearly 8 o'clock. If he had even
then sent a report of the attack to the Duke, the latter would
have received it by 11 o'clock, he could have immediately
issued his orders for the concentration of his troops, and if he
had subsequently at 11 o'clock, forwarded a report that the
French had taken possession of Charleroi, crossed the
Sambre, & were advancing towards Gosselies, the Duke wd.
have read [?] it between 4 & 5 o'clock, & could then have
issued orders for the march of a considerable part of his
army that evening.
'According to the Notes at p. 21 of the Militair
Wochenblatt No.5 1846, Gen. v. Zieten appears to have
heard the firing at the outposts as early as 1/2 past in the
moming. Had he on perceiving that the fire was continuous,
forvvarded a report of it at 5 or even at 6 o'clock to the D. of
W. the latter cd. have issued orders by 11 o'clock for
holding his troops in readiness to march.
' The fact of Genl. v. Steinmetz having sent word of the
attack to the Dutch General Merlen is very satisfactory, but I
regret exceedingly that Genl. v. Zieten was not equally
prompt in communicating with the D. of Wellington.
'I shall not fail to avail myself of the opportunity of
making certain corrections for the new Edition of my work by
means of the numbers of the M. W. Blatt, which have been so obligingly forwarded to me. I was previously in possession of the journal for the year 1845.'
Siborne's initial deduction that, at 3.45 a.m. on
15 June, Zieten could not have sent news of the French
offensive because the artillery fire he would have heard
only started at 4.30 a.m. was correct. Equally, it was logical
to deduce that any message sent by Zieten to Wellington at
3.45 a.m. could not have been of the outbreak of hostilities.
However, Siborne's conclusion that Zieten failed to
communicate this event to the Duke was challenged by
Gerwien, as we shall see below.
Gerwien's Reply
At noon on 8 February 1848, from his residence in
4 Carlton Terrace, London, Bunsen wrote the following [10]:
'I lose not a moment to transmit to you Major
Gerwien's further communications, in reply to the
observations which you intrusted [sic] to my care.
'I add General v. Canitz's, my Chief's original dispatch
to me, which accompanied that Memoir, for your inspection
& occasional return.
'I am most anxious to know the result of the
impartial Historian's and Officer's meditation.
'It appears that G. [Gerwien] acknowledges the force of
your argument, that Ziethen could not report at 3 Y4 what
happened at 4 1/2. But his argument seems to be this
"There must have been, according to the documents and
facts which are incontestable, a mention of begun hostilities
in Zieten's reports because there was no occasion for
reporting early on the 15th what he had reported on the 14th.
Ergo &c i. 9. e. d.
'Then comes the force of the argument from Muffling's
evidence. Am I right in stating it so?'
Canitz's letter to Bunsen, written in Berlin on
30 January 1848 reed as follows: [11]
'Your Excellency's helpful letter of 19th of this month
arrived on 24th and I have passed it on to General von
Krauseneck, along with its enclosures from the General
Staff.
'General von Krauseneck does not doubt that this
refutation based on official documents contains everything
necessary to lay to rest all the doubts that Captain Siborne
had, and refutes his accusation against General von Zieten
that the latter had neglected to report to the Duke of
Wellington in good time the attack of the French on the
Prussian outposts. He also expressed to me the wish that I
too have that the respected author of the "Waterloo
Campaign " now no longer has any objections to take over
the defence of General von Zieten.' Gerwien's report, written in Berlin 29 January 1848, read as follows
[12]:
'If Captain Siborne believes that the despatch sent in the morning of 15th June 1815 by General von Zieten from Charleroi to the Duke of Wellington in Brussels was none other than the message telling of the assembly of the enemy in great strength before the Prussian front line and of the likelihood of a coming offensive, then this office is not in a position to refute that by producing a copy of this message as proof. The reasons for this are given in Zieten's letter of 21st January 1819. However, we do have other means of proving our case.
'On the morning of 15th (the time was not noted, but it was probably at around 5 a.m.) General von Zieten sent a despatch to Prince Blucher in Namur that read:
"that on the right flank there are cannon shots and now
also (thus for the first time - Gerwien's note) small arms fire,
but reports from there have yet to arrive. As soon as they do,
he, General von Zieten, would not fail to send these on.
Meanwhile, he is moving everything into position, and, if
necessary, will concentrate at Fleurus. "
'What makes it probable that this report was sent off at
around 5 a.m. (perhaps at 4.45 a.m.) is that at 9 a.m.,
Prince Blucher answered it as follows:
"He, the Prince, has received the report of the artillery
and small arms fire heard that morning. That night, the
orders for the 2nd, 3rd and 4th Corps to concentrate, the 2nd
at Onoz and Mazy, the 3rd at Namur and the 4th at Hannut
had already been issued, and they were expected to be in
position by that evening fi.e. 15th). It was a priority for the
General (von Zieten) to observe every enemy movement, its
direction and the strength of his columns, particularly in the
direction of Binche and the Roman road. In all further
reports, the General is to note the time at which they are
sent"
'The distance from Charleroi to Namur via Sombref[fe]
is almost five [German! geographical miles [about 35 km].
To cover this distance would have taken about 3 1/2 hours.
Thus, if this despatch had been sent at about 5 a.m., it
would have - and indeed did - arrive in Namur between 8
and 9 a.m. It is safe to assume that this time was needed to
cover that distance.
'From the two original documents in the
archives here, it is evident that:
"General von Zieten did not, as Captain Siborne
assumes, first wait for a report from Lobbes via Fontaine
l'Evique before reporting the commencement of
hostilities, but rather he made that report when he heard
the artillery and small arms fire in Charleroi. "
'The following is also evident from these documents:
"that General von Zieten reported this situation to the
Duke of Wellington at the same time. As an attack was
certainly to be expected here because the enemy had
concentrated on the right flank of the Prussian Army
between Maubeuge and Beaumont as well as opposite
the outposts at Lobbes and Thuin, pushing forward
strong detachments to Merbesle Chateau. Moreover,
intelligence from spies and deserters on 14th and 15th
indicated it was certain that an attack would take place here. "
'As General von Zieten had already reported this not
only to Prince Blucher but also to the Duke of Wellington on
14th, then why should he repeat this report on the morning of 15th?
'That General von Zieten sent such a report on 14th can
be confirmed by a letter in the archives here from General
von Muffling, himself attached to Wellington's Headquarters,
to General Count Gneisenau on the morning of 15th June
which states:
".... the reports from General von Dornberg have
confirmed that of yesterday's date from General von Zieten.
It is apparent from French newspaper reports that Napoleon
left Paris in the night of 11th to 12th June. His
current whereabouts are unknown. "As we were not
attacked yesterday, it would seem that the enemy wants
to deceive us and mask his front to hide his movements, ...."
'Here, there is mention of an attack on 14th that
General von Zieten has indicated is imminent and certain.
'As mentioned above, he had, on 14th, also sent
such a message to Prince Blucher, so the message of the
morning of 15th could be none other than to report that the
firing he had heard to convince the two commanders that
hostilities had indeed begun.
'That General von Zieten's despatch to the Duke of
Wellington arrived in Brussels at 9 a.m. is beyond doubt
as the Duke himself sent a letter at 10 p.m. on 15th June to
the Duc de Feltre as has already been mentioned.
'That the report in question is of the commencement
of hostilities, even if the above evidence were insufficient, is
further supported by the fact that in Brussels at lunchtime on
15th, rumours of a battle on the Sambre were already
circulating and came to be heard in the Hotel Trlemont by
English officers from Picton's Division.
' Who else other than the Prussian courier could
have brought this news and been the cause of its
circulation?
'Captain Siborne, if he wishes to be correct, will
now not be able to raise any more objections:
"to General von Zieten to the accusation that he, the
General, failed to send to the Duke of Wellington a report
of the enemy attack on the Prussian outposts on 15th
June. "
' Even if the time given by General von Zieten, 3.45 a.m.,
supports Captain Siborne's view that such a report could not
have been made, then this evidence is in no way irrefutable.
One would only need to show that General von Zieten's letter
to General von Grolman of 21st January 1819 should have
said 4.45 a.m. and not 3.45 a.m., the latter time being an
error. This can indeed be proved. In the message from
General von Zieten to Prince Blucher mentioned above, he
states explicitly that:
"There has been cannon fire since 4.30 a.m...."
' As is known, at 4.30 a.m., the enemy attacked
Maladrie with four cannon.
'At about 5 a.m. (perhaps at 4.45 a.m., as believed
above), General von Zieten reported to Namur that he had
heard shots, etc. on his right flank. It is beyond doubt that
General von Zieten reported this to the Duke of Wellington
around 5 a.m. (4.45 a.m.)
'But even if this message had been sent to Brussels
later than 4.45 a.m., it still arrived there at 9 a.m., and, as it
was reporting the commencement of hostilities, this was
then the most important point and is also here the most
important point. It could only have been that message!' The logic of Gerwien's argument together with the supporting documentation make it difficult to come to any other conclusion than to refute the charge against Zieten. The only comment I would add to the above is that due to the lack of access to other sources not available at the time Gerwien wrote, he did not tell the entire story. The fact is that between the arrival of Zieten's despatch in Brussels by 9 a.m. and the sighting of Prussian ADCs walking in Brussels
about 5 p.m., several other messages had arrived in Wellington's headquarters. These included Behr's report of the outbreak of hostilities to the Prince of Orange and Zieten's report to Muffling of the fall of Charleroi, both of which arrived about 3 p.m., as well as Blucher's and Dornberg's confirmation of the outbreak of hostilities, both of which arrived about 5 p.m. Thus, the two Prussian ADCs seen by Picton's officers were not necessarily the bringers of the first
news.
Writing on 7 February 1848, Siborne's final
memorandum on the subject read as follows [13]:
'I feel persuaded that it was through mistake or
forgetfulness that Gen. v. Zieten, in his letter of the 21st
January 1819 stated the time at which he wrote the
dispatch in question to have been 1/4 before 4 o'clock,
because, if anything of such importance had occurred to
induce him to write at that time to the D. of W., he would most
quickly have made a written communication to Prince
Blucher.
Now, as the first report received at Namur related to
the firing which Genl. v. Zieten heard from Charleroi in front
of his right wing, it appears to me very much evident that this
firing formed the subject of his report to the D. of Wellington.
Besides, supposing that Gen. v. Ziethen did actually write to
the Duke at 1/4 before 4 merely repeating the information he
had already forwarded to him the previous day, namely that
the enemy was assembling in great force in his front & that
this was very probably of an approaching attack, is it not
reasonable to conclude that upon hearing the firing at 1/2
past 4 he would have concluded it still more important to
communicate to the Duke this new fact?
The Duke, however, only received one report from
Genl. v. Zieten on the morning of the 15th, and I should
therefore infer from the above that this report was written at
the same time and contained the same intelligence as that
which he forwarded to Prince Blucher a little before 5 o'clock.
'As I fully agree with Major Gerwien in his view of the
question which has been raised, I find it unnecessary to
make any further remark than that I should no longer
hesitate to defend Genl. v. Zieten against the unjust
imputation which has been made concerning him, and that
I beg to express my sincere thanks to Generals v. Canitz
and v. Krauseneck, as also to Major Gerwien, for the
extreme kindness & cordiality with which they have been
responding to my wishes on this occasion.' In the third edition of his 'History', Siborne took the opportunity to correct the record, writing the following [14]:
Today, one hundred and fifty years after this thorough
investigation and Siborne's subsequent correction of the
record, it is surprising that even the latest English-
language account of these events continue to repeat these
unfounded accusations against Zieten. [15]
I wish to thank both John Houlding and Derek Mill for
kindly assisting me in deciphering Siborne's handwriting.
[1] Knoop, W. J., 'Beschouwingen over Siborne's geschiedenis van den oorlog van 1815 in Frankrijk en de Nederlanden, (Breda, 1846); Renard, Bruno Jean Baptiste, 'Reponse aux Allegations Anglaises sur la Conduite des Troupes Belges en 1815',(Brussels, 1855).
Siborne's Investigation
'Not one moment do I lose, my dear C. Siborne, in forwarding to you the papers received by this day's courier from Berlin.
'
Comments So Far
- 9 a.m. Zieten's news of the outbreak of hostilities arrived
in Brussels.
Siborne's First Conclusions
'From the official report of Major Gerwien and with its
accompanying printed papers the following facts are
deduced :
'My dear Captain Siborne,
'Reply to Captain Siborne's doubts about the message
regarding the commencement of hostilities by the French
that day that General von Zieten sent to the Duke of
Wellington in the moming of 15th June 1815.
Logic
Siborne's Final Conclusions
'I have attentively considered the arguments
adduced by Major Gerwien in his reply (of the 29 Jan 1848)
to my remarks respecting the precise nature of the
communication made to the Duke of Wellington by Genl. v.
Ziethen early on the morning of the 15th of June 1815; and I
am decidedly of the opinion that he has, by means of the
evidence afforded by the archives of the General Staff in
Berlin, and by aid of a well grounded sense of reasoning,
fully established the fact that the above communication
related to the actual commencement of hostilities.
Correct
'In the present edition I have given a somewhat
more minute description of the circumstances which
occurred on the morning of the 15th, and of the measures
adopted by General Zieten, because I think it but due to the
memory of this gallant and distinguished officer to defend
him from the imputation made against him by the Rev.
George Gleig, the author of a volume of the "Home and
Colonial Library," entitled "The Story of Waterloo," of
negligence in not having made any communication to the
Duke of Wellington of the attack by the French army.'
Acknowledgements
Notes
[2] Militair-
Wochenblatt (henceforth MWBI), Vol 29, (Berlin, 1845).
[3] Volume 6 contains these letters, shelf mark BL Add MS 34,708.
[4] pp76f.
[5] It is interesting to note that Wellington himself did not wish this 'Memorandum' to be published. Indeed, it was only after the Duke's death that his son had it printed in Volume Ten of the 'Supplementary Despatches'.
[6] See 'Age of Napoeon' no. 22 and 'First Empire' no. 33.
[7] BL Add MS 34,708 fols 265 - 268.
[8] . BL Add MS 34,708 fols 269 - 272.
[9] BL Add MS 34,708 fols 273 - 279.
[10] BL Add MS 34,708, fol 280.
[11] BL Add MS 34,708, fol 283.
[12] BL Add MS 34,708, fol 284-287
[13] BL Add MS 34,708, fol 281.
[14] p36 fn.
[15] See, for example, Uffindell, 'The Eagle's Last Triumph', p56. Sadly, his account is but one of several written subsequent to Siborne's correction that continue to repeat the misleading version of events originating from the First Duke of Wellington.
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