Infantry squares were intended as a defensive formation against enemy cavalry. Lacking the mobility of columns and the firepower of a line, these bulky formations were of very little use when facing enemy artillery or infantry. Any sizeable body of infantry encountering squares during their advance would simply stand off at one or two hundred paces and deliver volleys until the troops in the square were forced to deploy into line or retire. Artillery facing an enemy square would do likewise; only it would more quickly achieve decisive results.

Infantry in a square were also vulnerable to enemy skirmishers. This was especially true if the square was surrounded by swarms of skirmishers and some outside factor prevented the defenders from deploying out of the square to chase away the pests firing at them. Defenders caught in this situation would eventually be overpowered, if the skirmishers were left unchallenged. Drawn up three, and sometimes even six, deep, the square became an easy target for skirmishers who in extended order were spread out and presented less of a target.

The potential effects of this type of situation are dramatically illustrated by the destruction of a portion of the British 78th Regiment of Foot at Rosetta in Egypt. As they struggled to make their way back to Alexandria, three companies of the 78th were unlucky enough to become surrounded by a number of Albanian infantry in Turkish service. The Albanians, though in no particular formal formation, were able fire at the British infantry at long range. The Albanians' fire was anything but accurate, and the Albanian infantry, in general, were known to be "even worse shots than the trained soldiers of Europe." Their muskets were notoriously crooked, their black powder was substandard, and their musket balls apparently came in all shapes except round.

Notwithstanding these facts, over a period of time these rag tag group of irregulars were able to force the defenders into surrendering. This, even though the Albanians made no effort to close and settle the affair at close quarters. [18]

The susceptibility of squares to small arms fire had long been recognized. Continental and British tacticians writing in the 1780's & 90's devised a number of methods to use against squares. An anonymous article in the British Military Library, a military science periodical published during the late 1790's, recommended that when a large body of cavalry encountered isolated infantry in a square a portion of the cavalry dismount and deliver fire against the squares. The dismounted troopers would approacccch the enemy square until 250 paces, while those remaining on horseback acted as a screening force at a 300 pace distance from the enemy. They would be grouped into "platoons" of about 20 files.

However, there was to be a 12-pace gap between each of these platoons. Every second platoon would advance while the other delivered fire. If there were enough dismounted troopers, they could be deployed concentrically so that their fire could be concentrated against one face of the square. On the other hand, the intervals between the platoons stretched out their line so that the side of the square firing at them was not able to inflict many casualties on the dismounted troopers, when considered as a whole.

After a while, it was expected that the infantry square opposed by superior numbers on one face would begin to fall into confusion. As soon as this happened, the cavalry still on horseback would begin its assault and exploit the intervals between the platoons to pass through the friendly dismounted cavalry. The confusion in the defenders' ranks meant that the charging cavalry more than likely would destroy the square. [19]

Often, however, the cavalry couldn't wait until the square had been disrupvalry couldn't wait until the square had been disrupted by small arms fire and had to attempt to break the square immediately. Then, it was recommended that the attacking cavalry charge in waves, the second 150 paces behind the first. Should the first line of cavalry be repulsed, the second probably would still reach the defending infantry before it had time to reload and a good chance of breaking the square. The squadrons in the second line had to be separated by 30-pace intervals in order to allow the troopers from the first line to pass through should their attack fail.

If the defending square was a large 3 or 4-battalion affair, two of the squadrons in the first line were to charge one of the square's faces, while each of the two remaining squadrons fell upon an adjoining angle. Frederick the Great and his Prussian cavalry, incidentally, had used similar tactics when they encountered the occasional square during the Seven Years' War. The only difference that the Prussian cavalry frequently attacked en echiquier, that is, with a full interval between squadrons. The British tacticians felt, however, that its cavalry should eschew the attack in echelon and charge in lines four squadrons wide instead. They reasoned this allowed twice as much cavalry to be brought to bear. The attack in column was to avoided almost in any circumstances, the deep formation would suffer too many casualties and brought too few troopers to bear.

Different Tactics

The anonymous article in the British Military Library, recommended a different set of tactics when the cavalry attacking the square were accompanied by artillery. While still beyond small arms range, the cavalry was to deploy into line with large intervals between the individual squadrons. The regiment then would advance so that it surrounded the beleaguered sssssquare, still hanging back at a distance, however. The cavalry's cannon was then brought forward against one side of the square. It was not to advance against an angle. When attacking a side, the artillery would be subjected to the cannons on each endddd of that side. If it attacked an angle, it would have been subjected to defensive fire from three angles, instead.

The attacking artillery was to began firing when it had come within 600 paces. It would continue to advance, by alternate guns or sections: half the guns fired while the other half prolonged forward. The cavalry meanwhile remained stationary until a gap or some other weakness appeared in the square. In no case, was any cavalry to be placed behind the friendly artillery, since the defensive fire could cause double casualties. [20]

These were some of the anti-square tactics that had been developed prior to the outbreak of the French Revolutionary wars. Certain tactical advances in the use of squares forced the French to revise these tactics, however. As far back as the 1740's a large sophisticated type of square known as the quincunx had been experimented with and in a few cases actually used in the field. Unlike the ordinary square which was either a square or a rectangle, the quincunx was shaped like two rectangles placed so that they overlapped to form a cross.

The idea was that cavalry that attacked any one of its internal sides would be subjected to a deadly feu croisés, i.e., a cross-fire. It was an extremely clumsy affair, however, and its formation was beyond that of most the troops of the time who were just being introduced to cadenced manoeuvres. Besides, the cavalry would rather be so obliging and would attack the top or bottom of either rectangle and thus avoid any cross fire.

During the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars a much simpler way of achieving the same deadly cross fire was discovered. The method of placing squares à cremaillière. These squares were formed as follows.

Two rows of battalion squares were formed. The odd numbered battalions along the line were positioned formed the first row of squares. The even numbered squares formed the second row, approximately 100 to 150 paces behind the first. The squares in a row did not form a straight line, but were placed en echelon, instead. This meant when the cavalry attempted to circle any square it was subjected to the fire of battalion under attack as well as the next square in the echelon. At the same time, since the battalions were placed in a slanted series of formations, it was unlikely that the fire would inadvertently hit men in an adjoining square.

The French cavalry developed tactics to counter this formation. The cavalry was not to enter the spaces between the squares. The troopers were to attack one of the front corners of the leading square. They were to concentrate their efforts on this square. Once it broke they would then proceed to the next square in echelon and use the same tactic. This procedure was to be repeated until all the enemy squares had been overthrown, one by one.

Each assault was only to be delivered by only two squadrons, positioned in close column 45 degrees from its side and outside of musket range. In order to mask the actions of the squadron, twelve or so troopers would ride out in skirmish order until they were within medium range of small arms' fire. The squadron had been position so that it was looking straight at the square corner angle. As the squadron advanced at the trot one half wheeled slightly to the right and attacked the square's side in that direction, while the other half of the squadron wheeled slightly and attacked the other side of the square.

This was actually only a feint intended to draw the infantry's fire. The second squadron initially was also to advance at a trot. However, if either of the two sides of the square that were attacked opened fire, it was then to immediately charge at a gallop. In this case, it quickly sprung pass the first squadron, which, along with the twelve skirmishers, was to follow and serve as a reserve. This tactic had been designed so that the cavalry approached each of the two sides of the square at a very acute angle. This meant that the infantrymen along that face would only be able to direct an extremely oblique fire, which would prove as a result to be quite ineffective.

Notes