The traditional view of Bylandt's brigade at Waterloo is of a badly deployed Dutch-Belgium command that was decimated by French artillery and then fled as D'Erlon attacked. This account was first conceived by Captain W. Siborne in his "History of the Waterloo Campaign" and now appears seriously flawed. Nonetheless this version of events has persisted in many later accounts including the works of Chandler. More recently such authors as Uffindell and Hamiltion- Williams have challenged this view. They are of the opinion that Siborne's version of the role played by Bylandt is flawed, claiming that Bylandts command was not destroyed by the French artillery and actually fought for some time before being eventually overcome. If Siborne was wrong, why was he wrong and what was the actual role played by Bylandt's brigade during the battle of Waterloo? BYLANDT BRIGADE Major-General W. F. Count de Bylandt commanded the 1st Brigade of the 2nd Division under Lt.-General Perponcher. It comprised: 27th Jager - Dutch - (Strength 809 on 1 5th June 1815) 7th Line - Belgium - (Strength 701 ) 5th/7th/8th Dutch Militias - (Strengths - 482/675/566) Capt. Byleveld's Horse Battery. These troops had been heavily engaged at the battle of Quatre-Bras. Their performance here gives a good insight into the quality of the brigade. The 27th Jager formed a skirmish line along the Gemioncourt brook while the 5th Militia, supported by the 8th Militia defended Gemioncourt against the attacks of Foy. Indeed Foy was unable to take Gemioncourt until he was reinforced by Jerome. The remainder of the brigade (minus the 7th Line - held in reserve) were strung out holding the position. The French did eventually take these positions but certainly not with ease. Quatre-Bras shows that Bylandt's brigade could stand and that it fought long enough against superior numbers to allow reinforcements to arrive. The line and jager appear as solid, reasonably well trained units - even the militia units possessed fighting qualities. THE ROLE OF BYLANDT'S BRIGADE AT WATERLOO On the night of 17th/18th June Bylandt's brigade found itself on outpost duty on the forward slope of the ridge in front of Picton's Division, (to the left of La Haye Sainte). The brigade was still in this position on the morning of Waterloo. Siborne states it was..."upon the exterior slope between the knoll and the Genappe high road" with the 5th Militia and horse battery posted to the rear behind the hedge lining the Waver road. Most sources agree on this as the initial deployment position of Bylandt's brigade. Bylandt's brigade remained in this position throughout the morning. This appears odd as their outpost duties were now redundant and the rest of the army had taken up its battle positions further back lining the Wavre road or behind the ridge. The three main reasons given for this continued deployment are: 1. The xenophobic view - inferior continental commanders who cannot grasp the superior nature of Wellington's reverse slope tactics. 2. The spiteful view - Bylandt's troops had shown pro- Bonapartist sentiments during the battle of Quatre-Bras. They were therefore posted on the forward slope by Wellington as a form of punishment. 3. The oversight - Bylandt's brigade was used on outpost duty during the night of 17th/1 8th June - thus deployed forward of the main position. An administrative/staff oversight failed to return them to the main position. This third view seems by far the most probable reason. It is difficult to believe that Wellington would waste troops by deliberately leaving them to be killed when he was facing the greatest battle of his life. It is equally difficult to believe that Bylandt and Perponcher were useless foreigners following the so-called continental practice of forward slope deployment; even the most limited commander might ask a question or two as to why he had been left deployed forward of the entire army! Phase 1. THE FRENCH ARTILLERY BOMBARDMENT. Accounts vary as to the actual time the grand battery subjected the Allied left to bombardment - some sources say as early as 12.00pm, others as late as 1.30pm. It was, perhaps, not until well after midday. According to Siborne "Wellington, considering that some of the battalions along the right wing (his left) were too much exposed to the enemy's cannonade....withdrew them under the shelter of the crest of the ridge." This occurred at about 1.45pm - it seems very likely he would have issued this order fairly soon after the start of the bombardment. It is difficult to see a commander of Wellington's reputation leaving units exposed to the effects of a grand battery for nearly two hours before issuing such an order. What was Bylandt's position during the bombardment? According to the Historical Section of the Royal Netherlands Army General Perponcher ordered Bylandt's brigade to "move north of the hollow road to form one line with Pictons division". This was apparently ordered at 12.00pm. However, Siborne states that even after Wellington had ordered the withdrawal of Picton's units Bylandt remained on the forward slope - "was deployed upon the exterior slope of the Anglo-allied position". Siborne's view does not seem right - even if Bylandt had not retired as a result of Perponcher's order he would almost certainly have done so after Wellington's general order. The weight of evidence therefore points to the fact that either before or possibly during the cannonade Bylandt did retire with the rest of the Picton's units to the shelter of the ridge. Wellington had given the order for units to retire and Perponcher states he issued such an order to Bylandt, while Siborne fails to mention any of his usual sources for his statement saying they remained on the forward slope. Bylandt's new position would almost certainly have been on the Wavre Road behind the hedgeline, in-between - but forward of - Pack's and Kempt's brigades. This was the original position of Bylandt's reserves-the 5th Militia and Byleveld's horse battery as noted by Siborne -...."in the rear of the straggling hedge which lines the Wavre road". Even in this new position Bylandt would have suffered casualties as a result of the bombardment (as they were not completely behind the ridge) but they would not have been as badly damaged as is so often stated. The result of this cannonade on Bylandt's men was according to Siborne "severely felt", while Chandler says they "suffered grievously". There appears to be little evidence to support these statements. The vast majority of Picton's units were Iying down in order to lessen the effects of the artillery. This also included the men of Bylandt's brigade - Lt. Scheltens of the Belgian 7th Line stated that the men of Bylandt's brigade were laying down behind the hedge! This is in complete contrast to the view that Bylandt was deployed in full view of the grand battery and so "suffered grievously " as a result. Phase 2. D'ERLON'S ATTACK D'Erlon's lead divisions of Donzelot, Quiot and Marcognet attacked at about 2.00pm. Siborne states [and this is worth thinking aboutl that - "as the lead columns (of D'Erlon) neared the deployed line of Bylandt's brigade ... the Dutch-Belgians began firing....but with very little effect: immediately after which they commenced a hurried retreat, not partially or promiscuously, but collectively and simultaneously - so much so, that the movement carried with it the appearance of its having resulted from a word of command". Siborne goes on to say "the disorder of the troops rapidly augmented but on their reaching the hedge along the crest of the position an endeavour was made to rally then upon the 5th Militia." This attempt "completely failed", he adds that "the reserve battalion (5th Militia) and the artillerymen of Bylevelds battery....were quickly swept away. " Thus Siborne still has Bylandt deployed in his original position by the time of the clash with D'Erlon. We now know this is wrong. His view is further contradicted by both Belgium and British contemporary accounts (Lt. Hope/92nd & Lt. Scheltens/7th) stating that the men of Bylandt brigade engaged in close range volley fire with D'Erlons men at the hedgeline. Secondly the firefight is far more protracted and effective than Siborne states. Lt. Hope of the 92nd Highlanders wrote "the Belgians....returned the fire of the enemy for some time with great spirit," and how they then "retired from the hedge". His account and Sibornes couldn't be further apart. It was only after a series of firefights that Bylandts forces eventually gave way and retreated through Picton's second line (where they were booed by British units) to ultimately rally at the rear of the ridge where they remained for the rest of the battle. Siborne's Account. 1). 1.00pm - 1.45pm. Bylandt is deployed on forward slope to the fore of the hedgeline and is subjected to the full weight of the grand battery bombardment. 2) 2.00pm. Bylandts units, still deployed on the forward slope, are met by D'Erlons lead units. They put up little resistance (mainly due to the casualties suffered at the hands of the French artillery) and are easily routed. They fail to rally on the reserve at the hedgeline and stream back to the rear of the slope where they remain for the rest of the battle. Revised Account. (All timings approximate.) 1) 11.00am - Bylandts brigade still deployed in its outpost duty. Over looked by Picton/Wellington but noted by Perponcher. 2) 12.00pm Perponcher orders Bylandt back to the ridge. Probably not carried out until later. 3) 12.30pm -1 .00pm. Grand Battery opens fire. 4) 1.00pm - 1.30pm. Wellington orders units to withdraw due to the effect of the grand battery. Bylandt has either already retired or does so after Wellingtons order. 5) 1.30pm - 2.00pm. Bylandt has retired to take up a position slightly forward of and between Pack and Kempt's brigades. Basically lining the hedge along the Wavre road. Kempt was deployed 50 yards to the rear of the hedge. 6) 2.00pm onwards. Engaged the infantry of D'Erlon in a series of firefights at the hedgeline and eventually driven back in disorder - this is were Pack and Kempts' troops would have jeered them as they retire towards the woods at the rear of the slope. Gone Wrong? Where has Siborne gone wrong? I believe that Siborne has confused the real sequence of events and certainly mixed up his timing. He turns the protracted role played by Bylandt into a single incident. First he notes that Bylandt withdrew as if "by word of command" to the hedgeline after being attacked by D'Erlon, but his timing is wrong. This withdrawal is actually before D'Erlons attack and as a result of an order form Perponcher or Wellington. Siborne mistakenly combines it with the later firefight and retreat at the hedgeline. It is fused into the single incident of being driven in by D'Erlon at the start of the attack rather than an ordered withdrawal followed by a firefight, finally followed by retreat. The real detail of this episode is still very debatable - but Siborne's main account of Bylandt brigade is so completely contradicted by accounts from Royal Netherlands Army and contemporary British sources as to render it doubtful at the very least. Perhaps if Siborne had consulted more widely with allied sources as well as English sources the account of Bylandt and his Dutch-Belgium brigade would have been very different. Sources Chandler - The Campaigns of Napoleon. Chandler - Waterloo: The Hundred Days. Hamilton-Williams - Waterloo - New Perspectives. Siborne - History of the Waterloo Campaign. Uffindell/Corum - On the Fields of Glory von Pivka - Dutch-Belgium Troops of the Napoleonic Wars. 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