Despite the immense amount of interest in the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars that has always existed amongst the military fraternity and the general public alike, the tactics and grand tactics employed by the armies of the period from 1792 to 1815 have received surprisingly little attention.
During, and particularly towards the end of, the nineteenth century, they were the subject of intensive scrutiny in both France and Germany, but the works of such writers as Colin are hardly accessible to the general reader, whilst the lack of interest generally exhibited by the academic community in military tecnicalities has meant that few works of primary research have appeared to supplement these increasingly dusty studies (Two notable exceptions in this respect are Steven Ross's From Flintlock to Rifle: Infantry Tactics, 1740-1866, Associated University Presses, 1979, and John Lynn's Bayonets of the Republic: Motivation and Tactics in the Army of Revolutionary France, 1791-94, University of Illinois Press, 1984).
Setting aside the well-informed and very interesting debates that have frequently been conducted in the hobby press, in which respect such journals as Empires, Eagles and Lions have been especially productive, the first port of call for those interested in the subject therefore tends to be the general studies written by such authors as Gunther Rothenberg (The Art of War in the Age of Napoleon, Batsford, 1977).
These, in turn, may be supplemented by chapters devoted to the subject by such authorities as David Chandler, whose Campaigns of Napoleon contains a solid introduction to the tactics of the day, and to a few important articles, of which the most important are those of Sir Charles Oman and Paddy Griffith on the question of column and line (these may be found in Oman's Studies in the Napoleonic Wars, and Griffith's Forward into Battle: Fighting Tactics from Waterloo to Vietnam).
Main Outlines
Thanks to the existence of these works, a broad idea of the main outlines of combat in the Napoleonic era may be obtained relatively easily, but within these parameters a variety of recent controversies, both public and private, have shown that there are huge differences of understanding on many matters of detail.
To take just one example, there is the question of whether the French infantry attacked in line or column. Admirers of the British army have on the whole contended that, when deployed in column, French infantry made no attempt to deploy into line, but rather attempted simply to charge home in their original formation, relying for success on terror, speed, and impetus, the consequence of which was that Wellington's infantry was able toshoot them to pieces.
On the other hand, admirers of the French army have taken violent issue with such views, arguing that the French did not attack in column at all, but rather restricted themselves to an initial advance in that formation, deploying into line when they came to close quarters with the enemy.
Evidence can in fact be found for both positions, not to mention a variety of intermediate ones, the result has been deadlock, with debate at times deteriorating into a mere exchange of insults. From all this follows that the market is ready for more specialised studies that will allow us to resolve such sterile controversies and in the process advance our understanding of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic battle to a new frontier.
In this respect 1996 was a bumper year indeed, for it saw the publication of two works that both make an important contribution to the literature in this field in the shape of George Nafziger's Imperial Bayonets: Tactics of the Napoleonic Battery, Battalion and Brigade as found in Contemporary Regulations (Greenhill Books), and Brent Nosworthy's: Battle Tactics of Napoleon and his Enemies published by Constable (US title With Musket, Cannon and Sword).
Perhaps the first two points to make about these first two books is that they firmly establish what at first seems to be the elementary point that tactics really do matter. The mass armies of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic period could only be manipulated on the battlefield - indeed, could only operate at all - because systems of manoeuvre had been evolved over the course of the preceding century that allowed large numbers of men to be moved across the countryside in a such a fashion that they still retained their cohesion when they came to grips with the enemy, and were able to fight, not as a mob of individuals, but rather as part of a coherent whole that could respond to the instructions of its commanders.
Tactical Systems
Tactical systems, in short, are the very basis of battle, and to disregard, or at least gloss over, them, is to abandon any real attempt at the latter's understanding. That said, whether they are the be-all-and-end-all of everything is quite another matter. In his introduction George Nafziger tells us that his aim is 'to push through the mountain of misconceptions held by modern readers ... and provide them with a clear understanding of what transpired on the battlefield' (p. 17). Very laudable though this intention may be, one immediately comes up against an obvious difficulty. As every veteran of re-enactment - or, at least, of its exceedingly strenuous seventeenth-century version - knows, on the battlefield hours and hours of patient practice of both arms drill and manoeuvre are frequently reduced to a desperate scramble to stick together and 'pack in tight'.
If this is so in a situation in which combat is experienced but 'through a glass darkly', how much more so must it have been the case in the midst of the chaos, confusion and downright terror of real battle. Neither drill, discipline, nor adherence to regulations totally disappeared - for when they did an army could disintegrate in seconds, as witness, say, the Spaniards at Belchite, or even the French at Waterloo - but the practices of the parade ground were inevitably adapted to the demands of reality, sometimes subtly and sometimes less so.
We here come to the basic difference between Nafziger and Nosworthy: crudely speaking, the former has stuck to the drill book and the latter has not. Thus, Nafziger's book in essence consists of a detailed analysis and comparison of the many different drill books employed by the armies of Europe between 1789 and 1815. The author has unearthed over fifty of these manuals, some of the more prominent of which include the Austrian infantry and cavalry regulations of 1807 and 1808, the French infantry regulations of 1791, the Prussian infantry, cavalry and artillery regulations of 1812, and the Russian infantry regulations of 1798.
By dint of the most careful and painstaking work, Nafziger has from these sources been able to construct a very full picture of the tactical manoeuvres that were in theory available to the battalion and regimental commanders of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, and in this respect he has undoubtedly produced an interesting work of reference that will undoubtedly be of some value to students of military conflict.
Problems?
It has to be said, however, that there are serious problems with Nafziger's work. By extrapolating the time taken to cover a given distance from the length of pace used by each of the armies he has looked at, and comparing it with the size and organization of an average infantry battalion, cavalry squadron, and artillery battalion in those armies, the author has been able to come up with some very precise data as to the time it should have taken to undertake any given manoeuvre.
In 1806, for example, we find that a French infantry battalion could change from column to line in 1.9 minutes, and from line to column in 1.3 minutes, whereas its Prussian counterpart would take 3.9 minutes to do either. In its own way, all this is quite instructive: obviously, the efficiency of an army's system of manoeuvre is by no means an unimportant factor in its overall performance, whilst there is also some evidence that tactical systems were to some extent influenced by the nature of the opponents against which they were likely to be deployed (the masses of fast-moving cavalry employed by the Turks seem, for example, to have encouraged the Austrians and Russians to find some particularly speedy ways of forming square). However, equally obviously, these times cannot be taken at face value.
The morale and training of the troops, the competence of the officers, the nature of the ground, the situation of the unit, the actions of the enemy, the degree of combat fatigue, and the vagaries of the weather could all drastically affect the sort of theoretical performance which Nafziger describes, the result being that, whatever else he has done, he has not presented us with the 'clear picture of what transpired on the battlefield' alluded to above.
This is, perhaps, a little unfair - Nafziger does make some effort to relate his unrivalled knowledge of the systems of combat to the practice of battle - but the fact remains that he does not entirely succeed in his objectives. Far more satisfactory in many ways is Brent Nosworthy's rival, Battle Tactics of Napoleon and his Enemies.
Whilst Nosworthy is by no means unaware of the importance of different tactical systems, he at the same time argues that battle rests upon an extremely complex dynamic in which many different factors play their part, and, furthermore, specifically rejects the rather mechanistic approach adopted by Nafziger: as he spends an entire chapter pointing out, 'a sizeable gap existed between accepted theory and the realities of battlefield practice' (p. 417); meanwhile, 'When we look at the various contests that punctuated the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, we must concede that in a majority of cases the opposing forces enjoyed what amounted to tactical equality.' (p. 454).
Nosworthy's ability to adopt this position rests very largely on the fact that his focus is not the individual battalion, but rather the division, corps or even army. Thus, the first part of his book is very largely taken up with explaining the widespread success enjoyed by the French army in the period from 1792 to 1807 under the Revolution, for which the explanation, according to Nosworthy, is its abandonment of the linear order of the eighteenth century.
Thanks to the adoption of column formations that could be employed on the battlefield itself rather than simply during the march to contact, the French were able to employ their forces in a much more flexible and effective manner than their opponents: they were, for example, able to concentrate their forces on the proverbial 'vital point', and move up reserves to exploit a breakthrough.
However, if this suggests that unit tactics are relatively unimportant, as Nosworthy points out, this is anything but the case. As it was now far more likely that they would be threatened from the flank and come up against a variety of different situations than would have been the case had they simply been deployed shoulder to shoulder with their fellows in the old-style line of battle, units would to have to change formation in the course of a battle far more often, the data provided by Nafziger therefore once more coming into its own.
At Close Quarters
What happened, however, when two enemy forces came to close quarters? What comes over most strongly from Nosworthy's work, which is based, be it said on a range of evidence that far outstrips anything else which is on offer, is the sheer variety of practices that were encountered even within a single army.
Thus, infantry might or might not attempt to close with the enemy without firing, and might or might not employ column for the final approach; columns might be 'closed' or 'open'; cavalry might charge knee to knee (en muraille), or in loose order (fourrageur). Arguments, say, that the French infantry only attacked in line, or, alternatively, that they only attacked in column, are therefore shown to be completely sterile.
That said, however, a number of salient points do emerge. Except in certain circumstances, for example, Nosworthy tends very much to downplay the value of firepower. Thus, whilst a single volley delivered at pointblank range might devastate an opponent, prolonged firing by troops on the defensive would be unlikely to inflict many casualties and would simply lead to confusion and disorder.
Equally, troops on the advance who stopped to fire - as was common practice in a number of continental armies - could generally never be got moving again, being prone simply to blasting away at the enemy until some other factor intervened to break the deadlock. Combat, in short, was above all a psychological contest in which victory went to the side that best kept its nerve, whether this involved maintaining its advance at all costs or holding its fire to the last possible moment.
In weighing up the relative value of these two books, let me conclude with a relatively lengthy quote from Brent Nosworthy. Thus: Perusing the various manuals and treatises ... one is struck by their starkness of treatment. Almost without exception they are extremely mechanistic in both approach and content, limiting themselves to routinized procedures such as the drill, manual of arms, the position of troops in formation, and a few very simple 'evolutions' ... What they did not provide is just as illuminating ... Little attempt is made to explain what the troops are to do in various types of commonly occurring situations. No effort is made to provide a rationale for whatever is prescribed or why it is effective and when it should be used. (pp. 35-6)
To be fair, Nosworthy is here referring to the manuals of the eighteenth-century, whilst Nafziger provides excerpts from several documents that offer extensive commentaries on the basic tactical regulations, and in the process supply some of the wants of which the former tends so much to complain. Nevertheless, the distinction is clear enough: for a detailed analysis of the theory, turn to Nafziger; for a detailed analysis of the reality, turn to Nosworthy. As such their two works complement one another perfectly, the Revolutionary and Napoleonic field being much the better for their publication.
Editor's note: Both Nafziger's Imperial Bayonets and Nosworthy's Battle Tactics are still available. Ross's From Flintlock to Rifle and Lynn's Bayonets of the Republic have recently been re-issued in paperback. Check with your local bookshop for these and the other books mentioned.
Rebuttal from Nafziger and Nosworthy (AoN 24)
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