The similarity of weapons during the period of linear warfare is. . remarkable and to be expected considering the nature of technological development, during the 18th and 19th century. The low technology of weaponry made the duplication of successful weapons relatively simple and the small variations between nations did not effect battlefield performance, duplicating a smoothbore musket is decidedly easier than duplicating a Harrier jumpjet.

The secret weapons of the Napoleonic period, such as the Shrapnel round and the Congreve rocket, did not have a significant impact on battlefield results. The Austrians also had field and siege rockets and like the English found traditional artillery to be preferable.

Since the nations paralleled each other in weaponry and the weaponry had largely remained unchanged for centuries it should be expected that each nation's training with those weapons evolved along similar lines. The subtle differences of national preference for the style of sword cut-and-thrust or the ramming-andloading of a musket or cannon did not significantly differentiate the casualty rate of one nation from another. However, the leadership of the men aewing the weapons enabled the soldiers to produce significantly different results on the battlefield.

While the weaponry of the period did not significantly change from one nation to the other, the method of using the weapons of war varied considerably. National temperament of the soldiers and their leaders were displayed by the method of employment and in the tactics used by each nation when in battle.

National Reputations

The armies of the French Republic are an obvious example of a nation that preferred to attack, needing to quickly defeat an opponent and move on to the next enemy as coalition after coalition was formed against them. The tactics they employed, therefore, were ones most useful in the attack the infantry column, massed artillery batteries, and massed cavalry corps.

The Russian reputation for determined infantry on the defensive, especially when defending within Russia, was demonstrated in the Napoleonic period and again in the Crimean war. Even when on the strategic offensive, Russian armies often preferred to take a position valued by the opponent and then await the opponent's assault on their position.

The English, like the Russians, often deployed on the tactical defensive, however, the English frequently being inferior numbers to their opponent did so out of necessity and were quite successful on the offensive when equal in numbers to the defender. Possessing the financial resources that allowed more frequent practice with live ammunition, and being inferior in numbers on the battlefield, the English made the best use of manpower by deploying in a firing line that allowed every man to fire and were the only nation to repeatedly defeat the French during the Napoleonic period.

The Prussians and Austrians began the period using the traditional deployment in line and adopted the French style column during the wars.

The Spanish, clinging to the obsolete strategies of a previous era used a concentric deployment, whereby they placed as many men to the left of their center of gravity as to the right, which left them vulnerable to the eccentric concentrations of their French opponents. In addition the Spanish were horrendously short of cavalry mounts and therefore could not produce effective pursuits or effectively engage in exposed positions.

Battle Concepts

Prior to the Napoleonic period, the small size of the national armies were necessary due to the professional nature of the soldiers and the massive expense that they required. The refusal to place these armies at risk led to formal and set-piece battles. Placing their armies in concentric deployments, interspersing small cavalry formations with infantry and artillery, the intent of battles were not so much as to defeat an enemy as not to lose to an enemy.

With the advent of Napoleon, the aim of battle became not only to defeat the enemy, but to destroy the enemy in a single battle. Toward this sole purpose large concentrations of artillery and cavalry were created. Artillery to inflict overwhelming and disproportionate casualties, breaking enemy morale, and cavalry to pursue the broken foe, as striking a fleeing enemy produces decidedly disproportionate casualties.

Bayonet casualties being very rare and the casualties inflicted by cavalry being few except in pursuit - the majority of wounds inflicted in battle must be caused by the primary small arm of the period, the smoothbore musket, and by artillery fire. The momentum of the massed column and the much acclaimed moral victory of columns over lines, produced few casualties in their own right, but made available situations suited for pursuit.

Therefore the disparity of casualties inflicted on the battlefield, prior to pursuit, must be due to the ability of commanders to place formations in positions to inflict casualties disproportionate to their numbers.

When opponents use weapons that have similar ranges and require similar training, it is apparent that when two such formations face one-another they will annihilate each other, unless one formations flees. Although the smoothbore musket was the universal choice of firearm for the dismounted soldier, it has a rather poor accuracy equal to about 3% of rounds fired resulting in a casualty.

Firefights

The math of a firefight is simple. Multiply the number of men that are firing times the accuracy of the weapon to produce the number of casualties per volley (i.e. 600 men firing at 3 percent accuracy equal 18 casualties per volley). If one side has more men firing they will naturally inflict more casualties. Employing twice as many men in a firefight, as an opponent, will cause the opponent to experience twice as many casualties. Therefore, casualties inflicted are proportional to the number of combatants lif the ratio of combatants is 2 to 1, the larger force will inflict twice as many casualties).

Many things can be done to deflect the likelihood of superiority of numbers producing proportional casualties and overwhelming a position. One option, employed by the British army, was the use of a thinner firing line than the opponent assuming that all the ranks of an opponent cannot fire. The use of the two rank firing line allows for an army of inferior numbers to employ greater numbers of men in the firing ranks than would be possible with a three-rank line or column. If a 600 man battalion is deployed in two ranks, forming 300 files with two men per file, all 600 men could simultaneously fire their weapons.

If the same 600 men were formed in three ranks, deploying in 200 files of three men each, only 400 men could fire their weapons - if the historical assumption is true that the third rank could not fire. The three-rank formation has two options when casualties are received: the unit can maintain three ranks and reduce the unit frontage, or use the third rank as a reserve for the forward two ranks and feed the men of the third rank forward to replace losses in the front ranks while maintaining the length of their unit's front.

If the three-rankers shrink their frontage, they will only inflict 97 casualties while receiving 166 casualties in ten volleys, during a five minute firefight in which one volley is fired every 30 seconds with an accuracy of 30 of rounds fired.

At the beginning of the combat the two-rank formation has one- and-a-half ffmes as many men that can fire (600 men against 400 men) as the three rank unit; at its conclusion, the three-rank formation has 2.05 times as many troops ffring (503 men versus 238).

By using the third-rank as a reserve for the forward two ranks, the three-rank formation can maintain their firepower and inflict 120 casualties while receiving 164, in ten volleys. Therefore, whether the three-rank unit fills forward or attempts to maintain their frontage, the two-rank formation will inflict casualties disproportionate to the number of combatants.

Accuracy

Another method of inflicting disproportionate casualties is to maintain a superior level of accuracy. Since the weaponry of all combatants was virtually identical, any difference in accuracy over time, must have be due to superior training. The British army, during the Napoleonic period, allocated twice the ammunition for practice as their continental opponents. This additional experience with live ammunition undoubtedly will result in superior battlefield performance.

In a firefight between two 1200 man three-rank formations (800 firing men in each formation), increasing the accuracy a single percent, from three percent to four percent, will result in a 33% increase (320 casualties versus 240 casualties) in inflicted casualties over a ten volley firefight. Increasing the sustainable rate of fire from two rounds a minute to three rounds per minute will increase inflicted casualties by 500 from 240 casualties to 360 casualties. Training the 1200 man formation to a level of proficiency of three rounds per minute, instead of two, and a accuracy of 4% instead of 3YO will give the unit a 2 to 1 edge in inflicted casualties (480 casualties against 240 casualties).

It is to be expected as a firefight evolves that the involved formations will fatigue and accumulate casualties, the losses among the officers and NCO's being especially critical. Marksmanship will decline with the onset of fatigue and casualties.

Superior morale among the rank and file soldiers will result in formations standing their ground, remaining under orders, and maintaining superior fire discipline. Greater fire discipline will result in the retention of superior marksmanship and lessen any reduction in marksmanship that must eventually occur. Therefore, superior morale alone will result in the inflicting of casualties disproportionate to their numbers.

Unit History

The history of a unit may have an impact on its battlefield performance. The anticipation of results - good or bad - will lead the men of a unit to anticipate their ultimate victory or defeat, prior to the occurrence of any conclusive events.

A unit with a history of success will stay and fight longer, subconsciously aware that they have been successful in the past and sooner or later their opponent must flee. A unit with a history of failure will conclude from otherwise unimportant events that they are once again on the losing end of the engagement and retire early. It should be apparent that this will have the most impact on the very experienced and the very inexperienced units.

The history of a corp or army may have a similar effect. The advance of the French Imperial Guard rallied the remnants of the French line formations, enabling them to make one more attempt on the Allied lines at Waterloo. The reputation of the French Guard was such that it had never been defeated and the other units of the army that were too exhausted mentally and physically to continue were so inspired by imminent victory that they were able to form up and once more advance up the ridge toward the allied lines. This ability to get more out of men, than the opponent, makes disproportionate casualties possible.

Tactical Leadership

Tactical leadership may a significant role in obtaining disproportionate casualties. A brave and courageous officer will provide an example to the men. When troops would normally begin to drift away from the formation toward the rear, they will remain and continue firing. An intelligent officer will observe problems within the unit, before and during an action, and correct them, to maintain superior accuracy and rate of fire.

Conversely, a cowardly officer is likely to shy from combat in fear and intentionally retire from combat prematurely, inspiring his men to do likewise. Retiring not in fear but out of ignorance, an inexperienced officer may prematurely leave his position - thinking it to be untenable - intentionally bringing his men out of a superior position. Cowardly or incompetent offfcers will enable an opponent to inflict disproportionate casualties.

The formations on the defensive have a small advantage in that while the attackers are maneuvering their rate of fire and accuracy will be greatly diminished. Loading a smoothbore musket, while on the move, is extremely difficult This ability to stand and shoot gives the defender an advantage of several volleys over the attackers. This advantage of defending applies to both infantry and artillery formations, while the disadvantage of advancing artillery is even more critical as limbered artillery cannot fire at all.

In Firepower, Major-General B.R Hughes, C.B., C.B.E., cites statistics that show that a defending artillery piece can fire as many as 55 rounds against an attacking infantry formation, or 22 rounds against an attacking cavalry formation, before the attacker can get to grips, inflicting as many as 50 cavalry casualties or 120 infantry casualties per tube firing.

Attacking artillery cannot be so effective as defending artillery, since they cannot fire while limbered and by necessity must fire at longer ranges. In addition, attacking artillery, firing at longer ranges, cannot use cannister ammunition, because of the range and, therefore, must use roundshot that is less effective at producing casualties.

Cannister

When firing cannister, a six tube artillery battery will present firepower equal to that of a six hundred man infantry battalion. Each round of light cannister contains as many as 100 musket balls, if each artillery piece fires one such round this would present 600 musket balls in flight, equal in number to a volley from the infantry battalion.

However, an artillery battery can deploy on a frontage equal to approximately one-third of that required by an infantry battalion. Therefore, the defense with supporting fire of even a single artillery battery can quickly deploy firepower that will result in disproportionate casualties on a given frontage.

When firing at a target that cannot reply, artillery can always precipitate disproportionate casualties. Artillery firing roundshot can hit targets at 1500 yards, well beyond the range of any weapon that might be carried by an infantry formation. Since most cavalry formations were not capable of producing even significant skirmishing casualties, an artillery formation firing at a mounted formation will necessarily produce disproportionate casualties.

This lesson is amply demonstrated by the experience of the French cavalry charges at Waterloo. While many of the French casualties were a result of fire from the squares of Anglo-Allied infantry, the artillery batteries produced significant losses. The casualties among the British artillery batteries were considerable, but they were primarily a result of French artillery fire and French skirmishers, and in any event the casualties received were out of proportion to those inflicted upon the French.

The most definite manner in which to produce disproportionate casualties is by the employment of intervening terrain. The impromptu utilization of walls, hedges, or buildings as a physical barrier will reduce the number of casualties received by defending formations. By placing a man, standing erect, behind a waist high stone wall you conceal half of his body. Placing an infantry formation immediately behind the same wall will protect 50% of each infantryman and therefore reduce casualties by 50%.

Utilizing buildings may physically protect over 75% of each defender, reducing casualties by over 75%. Unfortunately, stone or adobe walls and buildings are rarely sufficiently protective to reduce or prevent casualties from artillery fire, therefore, prepared positions will often contain temporary or permanent defensive works of sufficient strength to reduce or prevent casualties from artillery roundshot.

Permanent positions are usually made of stone and are intended to deflect shot harmlessly over the head of the defender. Lacking the time and manpower to quickly develop stonework positions, temporary defensive works are made of earth thrown up into banks as much as 12 feet thick. Defensive earthworks are not intended to deflect artillery rounds, but to absorb the rounds making them harmless.

Defensive works may physically protect up to 75% of the defender, thereby reducing defending casualties by 75b percent from infantry and artillery fire. Reverse slope, sunken roads, and marshy ground may produce similar results by a different means.

Placing troops in a sunken road or on a reverse slope will remove the formation from the enemies line-of-sight and will act as a temporary earthwork in that artillery fire will bury itself without injuring the defending formaffon.

Artillery using roundshot fired the ammunition in an extremely flat trajectory (roundshot fired at zero degrees elevation will travel as far as 900 yards before coming to rest, having bounced several times). Placing defending formations behind marshy ground will cause the artillery round to bury itself in the soft ground, instead of bouncing, reducing or eliminating any chance of inflicting casualties with the artillery roundshot fire.

National Turf

Defending one's own national turf has a significant impact on unit morale. The desire to repel an invader will dilute the impact of adverse battlefield events on the morale of defending formation. Losses among the officer corp will not be as significant in the prevention of desertion under fire, because the line troops are more motivated to remain in the defense of their homeland than they might be to conquer anothers home, therefore, the men remain in position and continue to fire their weapons, producing disproportionate casualties.

Although maneuvering in and of itself does not inflict casulties, maneuvering into a position where an enemy formation's morale breaks may result in casualties if the broken formation is aggressively pursued.

Pursuit produces disproportionate casualties since it is very difficult to defend yourself when your back is turned and even more difficult to infict casualties when your not facing the enemy. Cavalry formations are particularly adept at inflicting casualties in pursuit, because of the difference in the rate of movement and endurance between cavalry and the pursued infantry formations.

Luck

Finally, luck may have a significant effect in the inflicting of disproportionate casualties. Unfortunately, Iuck cannot be planned or scheduled and is as likely to help an enemy as a friend.

Therefore, disproportionate casualties amounts to getting more from the men in combat than your opponent and can be produced by a number of techniques including, optimize the number of firing ranks the formation employs, raise the accuracy of the formation above that of your opponent, elevate the morale of the line troops, create an esprit de corps, utilize a competent and experienced officer corp, employ artillery at the point of attack (both on the offensive and defensive), fire at those formations that cannot return fire, utilize available terrain when on the defense, maneuver to break an enemy without engaging in fire combat, and vigorously pursue all broken enemy formations and armies.

The ability to inflict disproportionate casualties allows a formation to drive opponents to the point of morale failure more quickly than they reach it themselves, therefore, not only does the opposing formation lose more casualties from firepower, but the remainder of the enemy unit will be lost - those men remaining in the formation, after morale has broken, are effectively removed from participating in the remainder of the battle. The ability to get more from the men in the line formations, through disproportionate casualties, amounts to increasing the size of an army without additional expense.

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