Using cavalry is a hard to learn task. One is seldom able to read articles on the subject, although there is a wealth of information on infantry tactics. This article is a shot at filling at least part of the gap.

The first reference is from "A History of Cavalry" by Z. Grbasic and V. Vuksic, published by Facts on File Ltd., Collins Street, Oxford OX4 1XJ (1989). On p.145 we read that Napoleon increased the number of squadrons in a regiment to four, so that the regimental strength increased to between 800 and 950 troopers.

Since 1776, the French cavalry had discontinued the practice of using pistols in charges, and attacked with cold steel, as all other armies did. According to regulations the cavalry left its positions at a moderate trot, which was maintained for most of the time, in order not to tire out the horses.

They then changed to a slow gallop at approximately 200 paces from the enemy, and started to charge home at some 60 paces, after the trumpeters signalled the change to full gallop. In practice there were deviations from the rules. Parquin tells us that at Eylau the 20th Chasseurs received the Russian charge standing in their places. They mowed down the entire enemy front line with a volley fired when they were only six paces away.

No Rules

It was typical of the French that deviation from the rules was a rule unto itself. This was mostly due to an officer cadre of exceptionally high quality, who often proved that bad units with good officers were superior to opponents who had a reverse site ation: good soldiers and incompetent officers.

Regiments usually formed in line, with squadrons one beside the other, if there was enough space, or in column, with squadrons or companies one behind the other. Heavy cavalry usually attacked in columns formed by companies, with 25 men abreast; in this way, each company was formed in two lines. Another often-used formation was that of squadrons in echelon, also known as the chess formation (en echiqiuer).

In battle formation, the cavalry's place was on the wings, or in the centre, behind the infantry. It was usually strongest in the direction of the main thrust, which was executed in waves, and prepared and supported by artillery. The tactics of the French cavalry under Murat, Grouchy, Lasalle, Kellerman and other brave commanders were very simple: when a favourable position in relation to the enemy was achieved, the attack was launched.

Only in clashes with superior enemy forces was flanking attempted. The battle formation consisted of deeply echeloned masses of regiment or brigade width, which was not only a reflection of the new mass tactics, but of the insufficient training of lower units. Regiments, or brigades, were ranked one behind the other, with very little space in between, so that an attack looked like a series of repeated charges. In attacking enemy heavy cavalry, or a firm infantry front, the first line usually consisted of cuirassiers and the second one of dragoons. Light cavalry protected the flanks.

P. 176: In attack Russian cavalry used a formation of line in two rows, or column of platoons. The attack was started at the walk, changed to a trot and then to full gallop at about 100 paces from the enemy.

Next we have excerpts from "The British Cavalry" by Phillip Warner, published by J.M. Dent & Sons (1984). On p.89, talking about the 18th Century, "Another development which attracted attention at the time, and became a standard cavalry practice, was to change formation on the move, rather than to form up while stationary and maintain the same formation throughout the battle.

Obviously, if changing formation on the move went wrong, it could lead to an appalling disaster, but if properly executed would have an enormous advantage in speed and surprise. This innovation was made by Seydlitz, an outstanding Prussian cavalry commander."

P102 (1808): "Many of these brief brisk actions were recorded in the diary of General Slade. For example, 'Colonel Leigh, forming his small force into two lines, rode briskly forward, one squadron leading and the other supporting, till he gained the top of the hill. Here the men were commanded to rein up for the purpose of refreshing the horses after the ascent and they did so under smart fire from the French. But the horses had no sooner recovered their wind, than the word "Charge" was given and in a few minutes the French were overwhelmed."

p.104 (Salamanca, 1812): Grattan of the 88th (Connaught Rangers) "the smoke, rolling onwards in huge volumes, nearly suffocated us. A loud cheering was heard in our rear; the brigade half turned round, supposing themselves about to be attacked by the French cavalry. Wallace called out to his men to mind the tellings-off for a square.

A few seconds passed, the trampling of horses was heard, the smoke cleared away, and the heavy brigade of Le Marchant was seen coming forward in line at the canter. 'Open right and left' was the order quickly obeyed; the line was opened, the cavalry passed through the intervals, and, forming rapidly in our front, prepared for their work."

Wagram

John H. Gill in his excellent book "With Eagles to Glory" from Greenhill Books (1992) tells the following graphic tale: P295 (Wagram, 1809): "Moving beyond Raasdorf, the Saxons encountered more determined resistance from Liechtenstein's Cavalry Reserve. Gutschmid, pushing the advance guard towards Aderklaa at about 5 p.m., thus found himself opposed by GM Roussel d' Hurbal's Brigade of Cuirassiers (Herzog Albrecht and Erzherzog Franz) as he reached approximately the level of the Neu Wirtshaus.

The Austrians were in a position to threaten the left flank of the infantry and Bernadotte sent his Chief of Staff (GB Maurice Etienne Gerard) to Gutschmid with instructions to remove this threat to the Corps. Equally alert to this danger, GL von Zezschwitz simultaneously sent his Chief of Staff (Oberst Karl von Gersdorff) and ordered Feilitsch to reinforce the advance guard for a combined attack against the Austrian Brigade.

Gutschmid's two regiments were arrayed in echelon about 900 paces east of the Austrians. The Hussars were on the right, and somewhat forward, Prinz Clemens to their left rear. For some reason, this latter regiment, only about 250 strong, boldly but foolishly advanced to the attack before the rest of the Saxon cavalry was up and duly suffered a severe repulse at the hands of the numerically superior Austrian heavies. The white-coated squadrons chose to receive this charge from the halt rather than countercharging as was standard practice, a tactic which was to cost them dearly several minutes later.

As the Leib Kuirassier Garde rode past Raasdorf, therefore, they were greeted by the fleeing fugitives of Prinz Clemens. Speeding through the intevals between the Leib Kuirassier squadrons, the light horsemen almost tore away the outermost kuirassiers. The fresh riders held their formation, dressed their ranks and deployed for the attack under Gutschmid's and Feilitzsch's experienced eyes.

The Saxon commanders arranged their troopers in echelon opposite Roussel's ranks with the three Hussar squadrons at the right front followed in sequence to the left rear by the Leib Kuirassier, the Garde du Corps, the Karabiniers and finally the lone squadron of Herzog Albrecht, reduced to only about 60 men. At Gutschmid's signal, this impressive mounted force began to trot forward in disciplined order towards the waiting Austrians, breaking into a pounding gallop as they closed on the enemy. Roussel again chose to receive the Saxon charge at the halt, his front rank waiting to with bared sabres across their thighs, while the men of the second rank prepared to fire their carbines.

The discharge of these weapons at 20 to 30 metres distance however, caused the hard riding Saxons almost no casualties and did nothing to dispel the fury of their charge. The Leib Kuirassiers and part of the Garde du Corps slammed into the Herzog Albrecht Kuirassiers (Austrian) while the 2nd and 3rd squadrons of the Hussar regiment overlapped the Habsburger's left flank; the other half of the Garde du Corps, the Karabiniers and the Herzog Albrecht Chevauxleger (Saxon) plunged into the lines of the Erzherzog Franz Kuirassiers. A frenzied slashing melee ensued but, within minutes, the outnumbered whitecoats were fleeing for their lives leaving behind 85 prisoners and numerous dead. The Austrian toppers retreated behind Aderklaa to rally, Lederer's cavalry brigade holding off the Saxon pursuit.

The Saxon cavalry had effectively cleared the entire field between Raesdorf and Aderklaa and allowed the infantry of IX Corps to advance towards the latter village."

1870

Now for a clash outside the Napoleonic period, but, nevertheless appropriate to our subject: from "A Day of Battle: Mars-la-Tour 1870" by David Ascoli, Harrap (1987).

P198, 6.30 p.m., 16 August. "Beyond the Tronville copses, as the day slipped away, both sides had cause to feel apprehensive about their vulnerable flank to the west, although the clear advantage lay with the French, with their vastly superior numbers, provide that Ladmirault acted with the same resolution and dispatch which his opponent had already demonstrated; for not only did he have two scarcely scarred infantry divisions in the line but also, a little to the north beyond the Jarny road, a great phalanx of cavalry -- Legrand's division, de France's brigade of the Imperial Guard, and the remaining regiment of Chasseurs d'Afrique of Barail's reserve division, a total of more than 3000 horsemen.

To his left lay Leboeuf, and at Bruville Clerambault's cavalry division of 3 Corps. Faced by this formidable array, Voigts-Rhetz had concentrated his artillery and the battered battalions of 20th Division and Wedell's brigade behind the shallow ridge running west from Tronville. His only flank protection was provided by six regiments of cavalry: Barby's brigade from Rheinbaben's division, 13th Dragoons from Bredow's brigade, 10th Hussars from Redern's brigade which had provided the escort for Koeber's batteries none hours earlier at Tronville, and the 16th Dragoons, the divisional cavalry of 20th Division.This force lay to the south and west of Mars-la-Tour.

It was 6.30 p.m. and not a single German soldier stood north of the Verdun road. The scene was set for the epic encounter by which the battle of Mars-la-Tour is chiefly -- and quite superficially -- remembered."

At 6.45 p.m. Ladmirault chose to leave his infantry intact and ordered his massed cavalry to advance and roll up the German left. At the same time, Voigts-Rhetz ordered Rheinbaben to advance and roll up the French right wing.

Echoed Clash

"The two great masses of horsemen - 49 squadrons in close order - met with a clash that echoed east to Vionville and north to Bruville, and grappled together under a cloud of dust which obscured the view no only of observers but of the combatants themselves (thus, for example, a regiment of Legrand's division, mistaking the sky-blue uniforms of their own lancers for the enemy, fell upon them with fearful effect).

Within moments, all control was lost as squadron after squadron on both sides charged into the great cauldron of milling men and horses". "A mighty cloud concealed the various phases of this hand-tohand encounter of 5,000 horsemen, which gradually declared itself in favour of the Prussians. General Montagu, severely wounded, was taken prisoner, and General Legrand fell while leading his dragoons to the assistance of the Hussars.

On the German side, four regimental commanders were killed or disabledon both sides horses suffered many more casualties than their riders. This - the last great cavalry battle of modern times - lasted no more than fifteen minutes....General Clerambault's five regiments took no part in the charge."

From "The Anatomy of Victory: Battle Tactics 1689-1763", Brent Nosworthy, Hippocrene Books, New York (1992), we have: P.122: "As soon as each trooper (of the German cavalry) had discharged his firearm, he dropped it, and grasped the sword hanging from his right wrist, and then waited for the French cavalry to close in. When properly performed by resolute troops, this tactic could inflict considerable casualties among the first rank of the attackers, as was the case on this particular occasion.

However, even some of the officers who accepted this tactic admitted that it had one potential weakness. If the defender's files were not completely ordered and well closed, the defending line would fold. The men could not help but see the enemy quickly approach while they were standing still, and the men in the end files would often flee in the final moments. If the ranks were not sufficiently compact other would follow and the line would be overthrown.

Modern Standpoint

From our modern standpoint, we tend to view the use of firearms when fighting enemy cavalry as a feeble tactic, one that would invariably lead to the destruction of those using it. We have this view because we are aware of the cavalry developments that would lead to the defeat of the French cavalry using those tactics by the Allied horsemen at Blenheim, not to mention those that would allow Frederick the Great of Prussia to create the finest cavalry of the entire epoch. Be that as it may, the tactic of firing at an enemy before charging was a competitive one, at least up to the outbreak of the War of Spanish Succession.

To understand this, we must remember that this was before charges were conducted at the gallop. The enemy would advance at a normal or even slow trot; at the very fastest at a quick trot. These advances lacked both the physical and psychological impact of the later charges made at full speed, and it was far easier to succeed in getting man and horse to await the moment of impact.

Also, because each squadron in an advance was separated from its neighbour by 50 to 60 paces, there was a greater tendency for individual troopers to fan out in the final moments before collision, thus softening the impact of the oncoming horsemen.

The rationale was that even if the defending forces stood still, the enemy would be checked by the falling horses and men in the first rank who were unfortunate enough to be hit by the fire. Those in the French army that advocated this tactic felt that it promoted individual combat, something the French cavalry eagerly looked forward to."

Morale and the Method of Attack

P168: "Frederick (the Great) realised that there was a causal relationship between the troop's morale and their method of attack. This relationship was probably best described later by Colonel Dundas, a prominent officer in the British Army late in the eighteenth century: 'the spur tends as much to overset the opposite enemy, as does the sword which should complete the defeat'.

Frederick knew that his cavalry's advance to the enemy at the slow trot did nothing for his men's morale, and reduced the cavalry encounter to a chance affair whose outcome was entirely dependent upon the corps elan and the skill of the individual troopers in the action, rather than the ability of their leaders or the superiority of their doctrine.

Frederick observed that the slowness of the charge at the trot had two undesirable effects. It gave the trooper too much time to think, thus providing an opportunity for cowardice. At the same time there was a greater chance that that both sides would come to blows. This prospect displeased Frederick since this meant the melee would be a series of individual fencing matches, and he was always loath to have any outcome depend upon the individual skills of his soldier.

Consequently, when altering his cavalry's charge doctrine, Frederick sought to give his troopers a tool that would bolster their morale at the critical moment, while simultaneously serving to crush that of their opponents. Drawing upon the experiences and example of Gustavus Adolphus and Charles XII of Sweden, he concluded that this could only be achieved by increasing the speed at which his cavalry was advancing in those critical moments when both groups of hostile horsemen were separated by less than 50 paces. It was at this point that one side or the other would almost invariably swerve, break, or check their motion, handing the contest to the other side."

Fear Carries the Cowards

The Comte de Gisors said to him in 1745 "I make the squadrons charge at a fast gallop because then fear carries the cowards along with the rest - they know that if they so much as hesitate in the middle of the onrush they will be crushed by the remainder of the squadron. My intention is to break the enemy by the speed of our charges before it ever comes to hand-to-hand fighting: officers are no more valuable than simple troopers in a melee, and order and cohesion are lost.

On p. 169, Frederick is quoted as saying "So long as the line is contiguous and the squadrons well closed, it is impossible to come to hand-to-hand combat. These squadrons are unable to become mixed, since the enemy being more open than we are and having more intervals, is unable to resist our shock."

Soon, however, the distance charged while a the gallop was increased beyond the existing standards of the age." In 1742 the distance galloped was 100 paces. In July 1742 the gallop was to start 200 paces from the enemy.

P 170: "In 1748, Frederick demanded that they charge 700 yards (trot: 300, gallop 400). In 1750 this was increased to a total of 1200 yards (trot: 300; gallop: 400, and full speed: 500). this was increased to an incredible 1800 yards in 1755 with the last 600 yards at full speed.

This protracted charge developed by the Prussians during the 1751-1756 period was totally dependent upon a very high standard of horsemanship, especially in regard to moving and manoeuvring in large bodies." The Austrians became disordered after only 50 yards at the gallop.

P 171: The Prussian cavalry was made more effective by a second tactical development, one rarely discussed in modern literature. This was the use of cavalry columns to attack enemy infantry in formation not previously softened up by either infantry or artillery."

Genappe

From "A Voice From Waterloo", Edward Cotton, EP Publishing Ltd, East Ardsley, Wakefield, Yorks. (1974). R 22: Genappe, 17 June 1815. "Lord Uxbridge being present he ordered the 7th Hussars to charge (against French Lancers). ....We rode away from them, reformed, and again attacked them, but with little more effect than the firstin this affair my old regiment had to experience the loss of Major Hodge and Lieutenant Myer, killed; Captain Elphinstone, Lieutenants Gordon and Peters wounded; and forty two men with thirty seven horses killed and wounded." N.B., the 1st Lifeguards then cleared the street.

Gradually Increasing Speed

From "The Art of Warfare in the Age of Napoleon" by Gunter E. Rothenberg, Batsford (1977). R72: "The charge itself was delivered with gradually increasing speed, usually starting out at about 600 paces with the trot, changing at 400 to a canter, the next 150 at a restrained gallop, and only the last 50 paces before impact at full gallop.

When cavalry met cavalry in a countercharge there was much noise and commotion, but surprisingly few casualties.

'When cavalry meets cavalry', General Marbot concluded, 'the slaughter is much less than when it is opposed by infantry'. At Waterloo, Captain Mercer witnessed the clash of two cavalry regiments. They rode at one another, but the ranks opened and the men passed through, slashing and stabbing, but with little effect. (Editor's note: this is called 'Threading'.) whilst cavalry combats often saw units passing through one another with little damage, heavy casualties occurred when weapons were unequal or when one side was driven to flight."

P105: "In 1791 the heavy cavalry and the Dragoons had formed three squadron regiments, while the light regiments had four squadrons each. By 1798, Carabineer regiments fielded four squadrons, a total of 703 men, while the four squadron Dragoon regiments had an establishment of 943 officers and men. Light regiments had the same establishment, while the Line regiments, with only three squadrons, numbered 531 officers and men each."

P142: "Normally cavalry charges were preceded by a heavy bombardment and supported by horse artillery. Murat's great charge at Borodino was supported by 100 horse guns. Unsupported charges such as Murat's at Eylau, or the epic dash of the Polish light horse at Somosierra pass in 1808 were exceptional. "

"Reminiscences 1808-1815 Under Wellington", Capt. W Hay C.B., Simpkin, Marshall (1901). P184: "When we entered the field there were three squadrons numbering fifty four, fifty three and forty eight files each. All that were left, were formed into two. one of twenty four, the other of twenty three files - a sad havoc indeed!" "How truly dearly that short morning's work had cost the 12th." (N.B. most casualties appear to have been from cavalry v cavalry combat. The odds were 3:1 against. This combat took place before the charge of the Union Brigade.)

"In The Peninsula With A French Hussar", Albert Jean Michel de Rocca, Greenhill Books (1990). P75, 20 March 1809: "A little before our arrival, there had been an engagement between the mounted chasseurs of the 5th Regiment, who composed our advanced guard, and the Royal Carabineers of the enemy's rearguard, before that city (Truxillo). The number of killed and wounded on both sides was nearly equal. The Spaniards lost a field officer."

P 75, 21 March 1809: "Two hours before sunset, the advanced corps of the 10th Chasseurs reached the enemy's rearguard, which, finding itself close pressed immediately retired upon the main body of the Spanish army. The colonel of the 10th allowed himself to be carried away by too much ardour, and imprudently permitted his whole regiment to charge; it became animated, and pursued the Spanish cavalry for more than a league, along a causeway between rocky hills, planted with flex.

When a regiment or squadron charges in line or column, it cannot long maintain the order in which it sets out; the horses animate one another, their eagerness progressively increases, and the best mounted horsemen generally find themselves far beyond the others, which breaks the order of battle. The commander of an advanced corps should be careful not to make long charges, and should frequently form his lines, in order to let the horses take breath and have time to reconnoitre for fear of ambuscades.

Besides, at all events, when one is too far advanced to receive timely help from another body, it is right to keep at least half the corps in reserve, to sustain the other, and to form for the attacking party a sort of rampart behind which they may rally, if they should be repulsed and followed by a superior force.

Not far from the village of Mia Casas, the Spaniards had placed several squadrons of their best cavalry in ambush; this chosen cavalry fell unawares upon the chasseurs of our advanced guard, who were marching without order and separate, at considerable intervals behind each other. Our horsemen were overpowered by numbers: their horses, fatigued by an excessive long charge, could not form to resist, and, in less than ten minutes, our enemies destroyed upwards of 150 of the bravest of our 10th Regiment."

"1812", Antony Brett-James, Macmillan (1966) P124, Lieutenant Roth von Schreckenstein: "I had almost reached that part of the Saxon Lifeguard Regiment which was gradually giving up its pursuit of the Russian cavalry, when my horse fell back, pierced by several case-shot bullets which had been fired from somewhere to the leftColonel von Leyser was unable to halt this vigorous pursuit, and I believe I saw several detachments attacking infantry, while a small section of the Regiment pursued the enemy dragoons beyond Semenovskoye.....

Hope of Control

To control and halt a regiment under such circumstances is a pious hope. Men who are imbued with true cavalry courage and attack the enemy for as long as they can and anyone who imagines that one can invariably control and direct a cavalry regiment just as one pleases by means of one's voice or a trumpet, as if on peacetime manoeuvres, has never been in an action where all arms of the services co-operated."

Finally I shall use the work of Lieutenant-Colonel C. Clery, titled "Minor Tactics", published by Keegan Paul (London, 1880) to give some more examples and to sum up. Clery had been the Professor of Tactics at the Royal Military College, Sandhurst.

P.100: "The distinguishing characteristics of cavalry in action are the rapidity with which its force can be applied at distant points on the battlefield, and the effect, moral, as well as physical, produced on the enemy by the shock of collision.

Power of Cavalry

The power of cavalry lies in the impetus derived from motion. Accordingly, its action should in all cases be offensive. It should, therefore, never await an attack, should if possible forestall one, but in all cases should advance to meet it. This is a fundamental maxim which admits of no qualification.

Column is the formation in which cavalry will most conveniently manoeuvre - line in which it will fight to most advantage."

P122: "Marshall Marmont says on this subject that "as cavalry should always attack the enemy, and the men fight hand in hand Isic). it should never fight in column. Cavalry on nearing the enemy should deploy. A column of cavalry surrounded is quickly destroyed...The normal formation of cavalry is two ranks..."

P125: The fighting formation of cavalry is the line. This does not, however, imply that the whole of the attacking force should be employed in the front line. The period of a charge at which cavalry is weakest is the moment after collision with the enemy. The act of collision produces disorder, and this is further increased by success from the natural tendency to pursue.

A fresh body of the enemy's cavalry, attacking at this moment, would encounter their opponents when least fitted to resist; and if, on the other hand, the charge had failed, may make the disorder irretrievable unless there were at hand some means of checking his pursuit. A body of cavalry, therefore, unless very small, should never engage its whole force at once. A portion should be held back as reserve, either to support the first line, to take up the pursuit, or to check the enemy if the first line is repulsed. Murat, charging without a reserve at Leipzig, had no formed troops at hand to check the enemy when his first line fell into disorder. Ponsonby's Brigade, previous to charging a French column at Waterloo, was formed with two regiments in the fist line and one in reserve.

But the latter allowed itself to become engaged in the first line, and, the enemy being overthrown, took part in the pursuit. When the French cavalry in reserve attacked these regiments, the British commander had no reserve to meet them with, and, the whole force being caught in the disorder of pursuit, they were driven back with a loss exceeding half of the brigade.

In one of Kellerman's charges at Austerlitz his first line overthrew the cavalry opposed to it, and continued to advance until checked by hostile infantry. As he fell back the enemy launched some fresh regiments in pursuit, but his reserves advancing defeated these regiments, and so effectively covered his retreat that he at once re-formed and delivered another charge. Similarly, Nansouty, at the same battle, having overthrown the enemy's cavalry with his first line, completed their rout by launching his second line in pursuit.

Position of a reserve

The position of a reserve should be such as to admit of its intervening most effectively in the fight. It may be in the form of a second line only, or of a second and third line. The weak points of cavalry are its flanks. These must be secured by troops, for advantage of ground cannot be relied upon, as, the action of cavalry consisting in movement, they may at any moment have to be abandoned. The most advantageous position for the second line will usually be in rear of the flanks of the first.

At Austerlitz Kellerman's division made nine charges. It was composed of two brigades, each of two regiments. With one or at most two regiments in the first line and the remainder in the second line or reserve. The distance between the lines was generally about 250 yards.

The distance between the lines should admit of those in rear affording timely support. Yet they should not be so close as to allow of a reserve in front paralysing the action of the remainder. Sufficient space should also be preserved for manoeuvring, as well as to obtain effective impetus in a charge.

At the battle of Soor in 1745, the Austrian cavalry of 50 squadrons was formed in three lines not more than 20 yards apart. Charged by the enemy's cavalry, The first line was thrown back on the second, and that on the third, and finally the whole in disorder on the infantry.

P 128: At the action of Saalfeld, in 1806, Marshall Lannes, perceiving some wavering in the enemy's infantry, ordered two cavalry regiments to attack it. The regiment in the first line, while charging, was attacked in flank by five Prussian squadrons, but the regiment in the second line dividing into two parts, fell on both flanks of the Prussians, completely defeating them, killing a great number and driving the remainder in the wildest disorder from the field.

Warnery says that'in a fight the principal aim of a cavalry commander should be, after securing his own flanks, to seek to gain those of the enemy.' Bismark on the same subject says, 'Hostile cavalry seeks to gain each other's flanks - the side which succeeds in this is oftenest victorious.'

Jomini, in confirmation of the above, remarks 'With equally good troops victory will fall to that side which holds the last squadrons in reserve, and launches them at the proper moment on the flank of the enemy when engaged with one's own troops.' The cavalry action that decided the battle of Wurzburg in 1796 is a good illustration of these principles."

P129: "If a charge be successful it is important to follow it up and disorganise the enemy to the utmost. But it must be borne in mind that the victorious squadrons are, while so engaged, unfit to resist fresh troops. If, therefore, it is wished to pursue with the first line, part of it should be rallied at once as a support whilst the remainder follows up the enemy.

The heavy loss to the Union Brigade at Waterloo was due to the disorderly pursuit after a successful charge. if the defeated force is much disorganised and out of reach of support, the rally may take place to the front, otherwise the engaged squadrons should be withdrawn to rally. These should be reformed under the protection of other troops, but not retired further than will enable them to reform in safety."

One thing I believe should be learned above all from the foregoing is that cavalry should never receive the charge of enemy cavalry at the halt. Lastly, a very important point that does not come out of the above is that of TIMING. This can only be learnt from experience. So practice like mad and enjoy your gaming.