For many enthusiasts, 1996 will be the real start of the bicentennials as we mark the 200th anniversary of Napoleon's first Italian campaign. However, to the main protagonists of that year, Austria and Republican France, the most important theatre was Germany, which would experience its first large-scale French invasion of the Wars. Crucially, the princes of the Holy Roman Empire quickly demonstrated their lack of willingness to support their Habsburg Emperor. Francis II's forces were initially unable either to halt the French advance across the Rhine or the devastation which followed. Ten years later, the Holy Roman Empire would collapse.

At left, the Archuduke Charles leads his men forward.

After Wurmser's departure to reinforce the battered forces in Italy, the entire Austrian army on the Rhine was commanded by the 24 and 1/2 years old Archduke Charles. He was backed by an able staff led by Colonels Schmitt and Mayer. Charles' original command, the Lower Rhine Army, comprised about 80,000 troops, but his southern force, the Upper Rhine under Latour was reduced to 55,000. They faced two French armies, the Sambre-Meuse under Jourdan (78,000) and the Rhine-Moselle under Moreau (76,000). After a series of clashes along the Rhine during June and the first half of July 1796, Charles had left his right under Wartensleben (35,000) and 20,000 in the Rhine fortresses to hold off Jourdan's advance across central Germany, in order to reinforce Latour against Moreau.

Initially, the Austrians conducted a steady withdrawal until Charles and Latour fought a holding action against Moreau at Neresheim over 1st-3rd August to cover their crossing on to the south bank of the Danube. As Moreau fumbled around, Charles left Latour with 35,000 to continue the withdrawal, while he led his remaining 28,000 troops north back across the Danube to join Wartensleben. This combined force struck Jourdan at Amberg on 24th August, heavily mauling the French army, but most escaped the trap and retreated north. Meanwhile, Latour had been heavily defeated and driven back on Munich, forcing the Archduke to dispatch 10,000 reinforcements back south on the 29th. The force left under Charles' direction thus numbered less than 50,000 troops in 55 battalions and 132 squadrons, whose components were commanded by FZM Wartensleben, FML Sztaray, FML Kray and FML Hotze.

Pursuit

Charles decided to continue to pursue Jourdan, knowing that he needed a decisive victory, prior to moving south to fall on Moreau. While the Archduke's main body pursued the French down the Regnitz, Hotze pressed on North-West to seize the Bamberg-Wurzburg road. Forced away from this main road, Jourdan retreated north of the Main river towards Schweinfurt. Sending GM Elsnitz's division, (5 battalions and 17 squadrons), to observe the French main body, the bulk of the Archduke's force seized Bamberg and headed west down the road to retake Wurzburg. The town's loss earlier in the campaign had been a serious setback to the Imperial forces, as it commanded the major cross-roads in the area. Jourdan, who had left a garrison of a single battalion and other support troops in the town, (800 in all), also recognised the importance of the town. Both sides thought it inevitable that the next major clash would occur near the town.

On 1st September, Charles pushed Hotze and Sztaray's men across the Main bridge at Kitzingen, from where they advanced on Wurzburg. GM Kienmayer's troops, (2 battalions and 4 squadrons), crossed the Main again at Lindebach to cut the main Frankfurt road. At the same time as Hotze attacked the city suburbs with 6 battalions and 9 squadrons, the population opened the gates and the French battalion retreated to the citadel. Sztaray's force, (13 battalions and 33 squadrons), followed across the Kitzingen bridge. It then moved on to the Reppendorf hills, east of Hotze to cover the advance of Charles' main body from the area east of the Main river through Schwarzach.

Thinking that Moreau would be pressing Charles and that he would only face the Austrian left, Jourdan resolved to march south from Schweinfurt on 2nd September to regain the main eastwest road. Lefebvre's 12,549 strong division remained around Schweinfurt to guard the alternative northern route. They were observed by GM Elsnitz, so that the Austrians would number over 31,000 infantry and 13,000 cavalry against a total French force of about 30,000 in the only large pitched battle of the campaign.

Jourdan despatched Bonnaud's Reserve cavalry and one light squadron from Schweinfurt early on the 2nd and during that morning, they reached the outskirts of Wurzburg. There, they found two of Hotze's Austrian battalions already in possession of the town, with the rest on the hilly ground to the east, although the French garrison was still holding out in the citadel.

As the first French column, (Bernadotte - commanded by Simon, as Bernadotte was ill), arrived around Lengfeld in support around noon, the French launched a fierce assault. Combined with a foray by the garrison, this pushed the Austrians from the Steinberg and the Kurnach valley, although Hotze's troops hung on to the Galgenberg and the town suburbs. Thereafter, from 3 p.m., an artillery duel raged between these hilly positions until nightfall, covering a series of infantry assaults from both sides, all of which were fought off on reaching the opposing lines. In the meantime, Sztaray had moved his troops up on to the Repperndorf hills. His advance-guard under GM Lichtenstein, (3 light battalions and 16 squadrons) were in the Estenfeld hills mainly around the villages of Bibergau, Euerfeld and Erseldorf, linking with Hotze's outposts on their left. Bernadotte's division was formed up on the hills in front of Lengfeld, with 2 battalions and 2 squadrons on the Steinberg.

Jourdan advanced the other two columns of his main body down the Schweinfurt road from the north, still thinking he would face only Hotze and Sztaray. Championnet took position with his right on the Wurzburg-Schweinfurt road and his left stretched out behind Kurnach, which he was ordered to attack. Supported by his cavalry under Klein attacking Euerfeld, Championnet evicted the Austrians from Kurnach and camped along the line of the nearby stream, while his cavalry were moved back to better ground around Mainbrunn. Light infantry skirmishing continued in the area until 6p.m.

The rear column under Grenier took position during the night around Ober- and Unter-Bleifeld. Anticipating they would be his main reserve, along with Bonnaud's cavalry now positioned behind Bernadotte, Jourdan looked forward to a battle the next day where he expected to have superior numbers.

Austrian Main Body Manueuvers

However, the Austrian main body was moving to support Hotze and Sztaray. Archduke Charles had ordered a rest day on the 2nd for his two divisions around Ober Schwarzach, 25 kms east of the Main. However, when he received news of Jourdan's moves during that afternoon, Charles started moving Kray and Wartensleben (the Reserve), in from the east down the Bamberg road, arranged in columns of march. Orders despatched to Sztaray that day from Charles' HQ at Ober-Schwarzach, informed him that the main body would arrive around 10 a.m. on the 3rd. A later order issued at 5 a.m. on the 3rd instructed Sztaray to attack if he felt strong enough or await the main army.

To make room for the main troops, Sztaray was to shift his force west during the evening of the 2nd. Thick fog lay across the area during the early hours of 3rd September, reducing visibility to a few feet. Patrois from both sides ran into each other frequently, but the main advantage for the Austrians would be that it would disguise the advance of the main body. The terrain within the bend of the Main river was largely flat, although hillier and cut up by gullies and streams in the western half towards Wurzburg, making the eastern side more suitable for cavalry. Much of the ground was covered in cropfields dotted with small woods and in the valleys, small villages. Many of the hills were covered in vines.

From the noise and movement coming from the French, Sztaray became convinced they would attack early on the 3rd before reinforcements could reach him. Leaving 2 battalions to cover the Schwarzach pontoon bridge constructed the previous day, Sztaray concentrated his left in the hills east of Lengfeld, opposite Bernadotte's lead column, who were not even aware of their presence. He planned to advance to line up with Hotze's right or at least cause enough mayhem to delay the French attack. With Hotze initially in a defensive alignment supporting his left, Sztaray directed 6 battalions, 10 sqdns and 12 guns at Lengfeld. At the same time GM Kaim (3 Grenadier battalions, 2 Hussar sqdns and 4 guns) moved through the Estenfeld wood, while Lichtenstein marched between Kurnach and Euerfeld. Breaking camp at 3 a.m., Sztaray's men advanced in complete silence under cover of the fog.

The Fog at Dawn

By dawn (around 8 a.m.), they were close to Lengfeld as the fog lifted. Taken by complete surprise, the French found themselves under attack by Hotze's and Sztaray's forces charging in and put up little resistance. Supported by Kaim, Sztaray quickly cleared the Lengfeld hills. Jourdan was forced to evacuate Bernadotte's division from the steepsided valley of the Kurnach stream to a line behind the Schweinfurt road, with its left on Estenfeld. Championnet's light troops were also forced back, leaving the Austrians in full control of the valley down as far as Wurzburg itself. Sztaray knew he could advance no further because of the French numerical superiority and held his lines after positioning 17 guns on the Lengfeld hills.

Jourdan rapidly concentrated his troops and began a counterattack around 10 a.m. He attempted to drive a wedge between Sztaray and Charles, whose advancing troops were revealed by the clearing mists to be advancing from the east. Championnet's column overwhelmed Kaim's small force (Sztaray's right) and retook the Estenfeld Wood, pushing Kaim back to hills behind the Landleiten stream. Meanwhile, after a series of 7 assaults, Bernadotte's division evicted the Austrians from Lengfeld village, but failed to reach the guns on the hills to the east. The Austrian infantry were forced to fall back on to the surrounding hills around Rottendorf, while the French cavalry with artillery support fought their way into Euerfeld, driving out Lichtenstein's men.

As these Austrian light troops fell back, towards noon, Sztaray's reserve infantry arrived to halt the French thrust and steady the position. With Championnet driving into the Austrian right and Simon (Bernadotte's division) having stabilised his position, Jourdan seemed well placed to launch his fresh troops and break the Austrian position. Some time after noon, Bonnaud's Reserve cavalry was directed to move around Championnet's left and south towards Rottendorf to fall into the Austrian rear. Grenier's column was to form the second wave moving through Seligenstadt, backed by supporting artillery fire.

Not only had the thick fog delayed the march of Charles' main body, but it had also disrupted Austrian bridging operations. A pontoon bridge had been thrown the previous day at Schwarzach. Construction of a second bridge across the Main 4km to the west at Dettelbach could not progress until the fog lifted. This left just the Schwarzach bridge available for most of the morning. Kray, who had broken camp at midnight, was supposed to have crossed the Main ahead of the Reserve in the early hours. When Charles arrived with his staff that morning, he saw that all but a few of Kray's light troops were still on the left bank. Knowing of Sztaray's difficult position, Charles feared that further delays in the army's movements could severely compromise his troops close to Wurzburg. Urging his men on, Charles was able to speed the crossing up before riding to Sztaray, whom the Archduke reached around 1130.

Seeing the critical pressure these troops were under, Charles swiftly returned to Kray and set about rearranging his advance. Kray had got his cavalry (42 squadrons of Hussars and Dragoons) across some time after 10 a.m., but his infantry were still crossing. The Archduke decided to move the available troops to the critical open right flank. Kray was to turn his men north to Prosselheim, heading across the flatter ground towards Dipbach; from there he could attack the French left (Grenier) around the Gramschatz Forest and cut the Schweinfurt road. It would however be midday before the 14 infantry battalions completed their crossing. Meanwhile, Wartensleben had arrived at the Dettelbach bridge around 10 a.m. to find it congested with infantry and wagons.

Under orders to move his troops to Sztaray's centre-right as quickly as possible, Wartensleben knew he wouldn't be able to complete the crossing for some hours. In marked contrast to his past dilatory behaviour commanding the northern wing of the Austrian army, Wartensleben led his 24 squadrons of heavy cavalry across the Main, partly swimming and partly via a ford. He then headed for Bibergau whilst his 12 Grenadier battalions under FML Werneck used the bridge.

Noontime Decisions

At this juncture, around noon, Jourdan was preparing to launch Grenier and Bonnaud south against Rottendorf. However, to the north, Grenier's own position was already under pressure. Led by his 42 squadrons, Kray's column was now marching north up the road to Prosselheim extending the Austrian right wing to a position from where they could attack Jourdan's left and threaten his rear.

From 11 a.m., Kray's light cavalry patrols were running into Grenier's column as it wheeled south-east to anchor its left flank on the Main and begin its attempt to outflank Sztaray. Within the hour, that plan was in ruins, as by noon, the heads of both columns of Austrian cavalry began to deploy in the plain. As Kray's main body moved towards Prosselheim, the intensity of the fighting in the northern sector increased and Jourdan had to rethink his plans. Unable to advance further in the face of Kray's cavalry in the flatter ground, Grenier could only despatch an infantry regiment, 2 dragoon squadrons and some light cavalry to Championnet.

In the meantime, he established his own lines around Ober-Bleifeld. Championnet could similarly not advance having to confine his infantry in the woods and gullies to avoid the attentions of the Austrian cavalry. In front of him, Sztaray's tired Austrian troops fought on, ably supported by the artillery, although the rate of ammunition consumption had already drained their own supplies and twice-over, the immediate reserves.

Grenier's advance-guard was only just establishing itself in OberBleifeld around 1 p.m., when he saw Kray's troops moving beyond Proselheim towards Dipbach, still threatening to outflank the far French left. Despatching 2 battalions and 100 cavalry to defend the Heiligenstadt woods North-West of Dipbach, Grenier found his advance-guard under heavy attack. Leading 3 battalions and a Dragoon regiment to the hills to the right of the village, Grenier halted this first Austrian assault. He could not, however, prevent 2 squadrons of Hussars reaching his rear to carry off 5 guns. To the south, Wartensleben was marching the Austrian Reserve cavalry up between Euerfeld and Erfeldorf. Jourdan realised that the tide of battle was turning as reports came in that Grenier's infantry were faltering in the face of Kray's assault.

He decided to mass the available cavalry, (most of Bernadotte's plus Bonnaud), behind the Schweinfurt road. As this force then joined Championnet's left, it freed Klein's light cavalry, (his two regiments plus Grenier's Dragoon regiment) to attack Kray's left. This would at least slow the Austrian advance against the increasingly vulnerable French left wing. Frantic orders were dispatched to Lefebvre to send reinforcements, but to no avail as Kray's cavalry had already cut the road north-east to Schweinfurt. Distracted by skirmishing with Elsnitz's small force all day, and without specific orders to abandon his primary role of securing the line of communications to the Rhine, Lefebvre would fail to march to guns.

Clash of Cavalry

A mass Austrian cavalry assault at this stage would probably have decided the battle. Aware of his failure to destroy Jourdan at Amberg, Charles wanted to be certain of a crushing victory, allowing him then to move south against Moreau. He therefore decided to await his Reserve Grenadiers (Werneck) before launching his assault. Nevertheless, the Archduke could see the French light cavalry (Klein) preparing to move against Kray. As a preparatory measure, he ordered Lichtenstein to collect his 16 sqdns of light cavalry from their scattered positions across the flatter ground. They were then to be formed into a single line on Wartensleben's right. What each mounted unit did in the main cavalry battle is not entirely clear, but the decisive clash seems to have proceeded roughly as follows:

Sometime after 2 p.m., Klein's 3 regiments charged Kray's left, which appears to have been covered by the Blankenstein and Barco Hussars, (10 sqdns in all). To counteract this move, Lichtenstein's 16 squadrons led by the Szeckler Grenzer Hussars and Kinsky Chevaulegers were hurled into the enemy right flank. Klein's troopers were quickly broken and driven back. Gathering about 400 cavalrymen, Lichtenstein then attempted to get round the French left between Euerfeld and Seligenstadt, forcing them back towards the wooded slopes behind. There however he began to run into elements of Bonnaud's command and was in turn repulsed.

As this opening melee was getting underway, Sztaray's right was swinging west across the flatter ground. As the 12 Grenadier battalions led by GM Werneck reached Bibergau shortly before 3 p.m., the cavalry previously shoring up Sztaray's right (Riesch and Spiegelberg's 17 squadrons) could be extracted.

Around 3 p.m., Bonnaud's heavier French cavalry was advancing through the gaps between the Sperleholz woods and Charles ordered a line of heavy cavalry into action. A Dragoon regiment (probably Coburg, although Angeli says the Kaiser Carabinier) moved forward to help Lichtenstein's outflanking move, but running into heavy musketry fire and Bonnaud's regiments, they could make no headway and fell back. Similarly, on the main front, the Austrian cavalry tried to get round the French right, supported by the Mack Kurassier. By now, however, Bonnaud had most of his fresher cavalry (his Cuirassiers and those transferred from Bernadotte's division) in action and the French line held.

Kray was continuing to drive Grenier back towards the Schweinfurt road and Charles had been arranging the remaining Austrian cavalry in the centre. Bonnaud would have no time to regroup - Jourdan realised the danger and desperately ordered the buglers to blow 'Reform', as the Archduke moved his reserve forward. Dust was stirred up as 2 Kurassier regiments (Nassau and Zeschwitz) moved off and quickly broke into a trot. They were probably backed by the two Carabinier regiments - the decisive moment had come and Jourdan had no reserves left.

Smashing into Bonnaud's tired horsemen, the third wave of Austrian cavalry scattered the French squadrons, who fled for shelter behind the infantry squares. As fear and panic spread in the French lines, some of their infantry were also carried away.

Off to the south, Bernadotte's division had advanced through Lengfeld by this stage and was ready to drive the Austrians from the nearby hills. Jourdan, however, knew he had lost. Grenier was now separated from the other divisions. He ordered a general retreat to concentrate on Arnstein, 20kms north of Wurzburg.

General Advance

Realising what his opponent was doing, Charles ordered a general advance north-west along the entire front. Around 4 p.m., Werneck's Grenadiers were ordered to clear the Rotenhof area to secure the links between Sztaray's division and Wartensleben's reformed Reserve cavalry, who would move forward to support Werneck's right. Three Grenadier battalions attacked Rotenhof under heavy canister fire, but released the 2nd Slavonian Grenzer battalion and O'Donnel Freikorps to move up into the wooded hills beyond. To the north, Kray had reached UnterBleifeld, where his cavalry inflicted heavy losses on Grenier's rearguard.

The French commanders managed to re-establish order in the ranks and began a fairly ordered retreat, fighting determined actions all across the difficult terrain around the Bleifeld villages. In the more broken ground, with their heavy cavalry lagging behind in the third line, the pursuing Austrians frequently found it hard to maintain the momentum. However, around the edge of the Gramschatzer Forest, which could only be traversed by narrow paths, three French squares were cut up by Austrian Kurassiers and the survivors taken prisoner. The Barco Hussars broke another capturing a 12pdr gun, while Hadik led 8 sqdns of Hussars and Chevaulegers in capturing most of two battalions. Kray continued to drive north separating Grenier from the rest of Jourdan's troops to complete the victory.

After crossing the Kurnach valley, Charles halted the rest of his troops around Rimpar to re-form them and as twilight brought an end to the pursuit around 7p.m., the battle degenerated into a cannonade. The losses amounted to: French: 2,000 troops plus 3,800 prisoners (including the citadel garrison), 7 guns, 1 flag, several caissons and a balloon captured; Austrians: 1,469.

In his famous work 'Grundsatze der Strategie erlautert durch die Darstellung des Feldzuges in Deutschland 1796' (The Principles of Strategy illustrated by the campaign of 1796), Charles analysed both sides' strategies: "Jourdan was defeated at Wurzburg", he concluded, "because he pursued more than one aim at the same time and did not utilise his entire strength in achieving the main goal". Charles was also critical of his own moves: "Because of the rest-day at (Ober)Schwarzach on the 2nd, the Archduke remained too distant from Sztaray and thereby exposed a contingent, which constituted half of his army . . . the battle of Wurzburg belongs among the few of the last war of the 18th century, which was decided by cavalry".

Charles and Jourdan, II

Charles and Jourdan would clash again in late March 1799, when the Archduke defeated his opponent at Ostrach and Stockach, the Archduke's moves following the latter battle remaining a controversial subject. However, the Archduke's presence in Italy in 1805 was sufficient to persuade Napoleon to transfer Massena to take over from Jourdan, then the Viceroy's military adviser.

Charles wrote his account of the campaign supporting a discussion of military strategy in 1813, and it was translated into many languages over the following decade. It was this book, which Wellington frequently cited, but rarely sourced comments, about the Archduke's military prowess. In his book, "Conversations with the Duke of Wellington" (Vol 1, p. 338), Croker wrote that in 1826, the Duke quoted Charles' book and Croker asked whether he thought the Archduke a great soldier.

Wellington replied, "A great officer? Why, he knows more about it than all of us put together...(more) than Bonaparte or any of us. We are none of us worthy to fasten the buckles of his shoes, if I am to judge from his book and his plans of campaigns."

Prior to WWI, this campaign was written about by a number of British historians, but has been ignored subsequently, overshadowed by Napoleon's Italian campaign, despite being on a somewhat larger scale.

Wargaming the Battle

Not being knowledgeable about the mechanics of wargaming, I would only point out a few features of this battle and invite further comment. Budding Murats and Liuchtensteins among you have the opportunity to deploy large numbers of cavalry to great effect.

To balance out the forces, either add in Lefebre's division to the Army of the Sambre-Meuse as Kray moves north, or, further delay the Austrian bridging operations. A particular problem will be simulating movement in fog, so that could be deleted (and the [wargame table] observation balloon infalted) to give the French a better idea of Austraian numbers and deployments. Alternatively, to add an element of chance, roll a d6 each quarter hour or so to see:

• if the fog lifts, or,
• if the garrison in the citadel attempts a foray to divertthe Austrians' attention, or
• if couriers get through the LeFebrve.