Though often dispersed in small detachments, most of these Rheinbund units would continue to serve together with honour throughout the Peninsula War.

The Division, including its 5,700 Germans (see Box 1), was initially designated the 2nd Division of Lefebvre's (later Sebastiani's) IV Corps and the marshal held the customary reviews to inspect his new troops. He found a number of organisational oddities. Most glaring was the intermixing of green and blue uniform coats in the Hessian Gross- und Erbprinz Regiment. This resulted from the peculiarities of the Hessian infantry organisation where the regimental equivalent was called a 'brigade' and consisted of two musketeer battalions clothed in blue and a single fusilier (light infantry) battalion in green.

En route to Spain, however, the regiment had been re-organised along French lines into two battalions of six companies each (including the standard grenadier and voltigeur companies). The unfortunate outcome was a hopeless intermingling of green and blue coats that irked Lefebvre. The Baden 4th Infantry was also unusual. When summoned to provide a contingent for Spain, the Grand Duchy had elected to send the 1st Battalion of the 4th Regiment (deep red facings) and the 2nd Battalion of the 3rd (white distinctions). Early in 1809, the two were designated as the new 4th Infantry (the corresponding battalions back in Baden became the 3rd), but the strange mismatch between battalion facings probably lasted until new uniforms were issued in 1810. [3]

Leval's men participated in a number of small combats and major battles through late 1808 and into the summer of 1809. Detached to Victor's I Corps during March 1809, their performance at Meza de lbor, Valdecannas, and Medellin left a good impression with their French commanders. After Meza de lbor, Leval told Nassau's General Konrad von Schaeffer that he and his brigade 'had decided the affair' and Victor reported that Leval's Division had 'attacked with the greatest impetuosity' at Valdecarmas. Formed into squares and interspersed between blocks of French cavalry, the Germans bore the brunt of the infantry fighting at Medellin and, again in Victor's words, 'demonstrated the greatest bravery'. [4]

Moreover, at least one contingent reaped a rather unusual reward. Assigned the odious task of helping to inter the thousands of Spanish dead, the Frankfurt Battalion took he opportunity to replace their worn-out breeches with brown cloth from their deceased foes. Combined with new coats of requisitioned and appropriated blue fabric, the Frankfurters thus effected a complete change of uniform from their original white breeches and coats trimmed with red to baggy brown trousers and blue coats (still sporting red distinctions). At some point in their peregrinations, they also disposed of their old bicomes and adopted French-style shakos. Curiously, this new uniform was also instituted among the troops back in Frankfurt and the Grand Duchy's men would march to Russia in blue coats and shakos.

Back with S6bastiani, the German Division stood in the front ranks at Talavera de las Reyna in July. This engagement also had a sartorial dimension for one of the German contingents. According to an officer in Baden's 4th Infantry, the musicians of his regimen somehow managed to gather up a number of helmets formerly worn by the unfortunate 23rd Light Dragoons, thereby allowing the Baden bandsmen to wear helmets long after their comrades had switched to shakos.' [5]

In other respects, however, Talavera was a less happy experience. Placed in the centre of the French line, Leval's men twice attempted to advance through thick olive groves against Campbell's battalions but could make no headway and suffered bloody repulse in both instances. From a strength of some 4,200, the battle cost the division over 1,000 casualties, including the courageous commander of the Baden regiment, Colonel von Porbeck. [6]

Despite the outcome, the Germans were praised in French accounts of the struggle: S6bastiani reported that they 'had covered themselves with glory' and made special mention of the Hessians.

The weakened division, now known officially as the 'Division de la Confederation de la Rhin', also received accolades from its French commanders for its contributions to the victories at Almonacid (11 August) and Ocana (19 November). Following Ocana, the Germans were assigned to escort the numerous Spanish prisoners back to France, many French evidently sharing Albert de Rocca's opinion that 'their national character and strict discipline rendered them vigilant and inflexible' when dealing with captives. [7]

Escort and garrison duties filled the remainder of 1809 and most of the following three years as well, although elements of the division took part in Montbrun's expedition to Murcia in December 1811.

Two months later, the Hessians departed the division's ranks to become part of the garrison of Badajoz. During the siege of that fortress city, they participated in the defence of the outer works, the 19 March sortie, and the bitter fighting at the main breach and in the castle on the night of 6/7 April. Of 9 10 Hessian infantry and artillerymen who entered the fortress in February, 444 surrendered and were transported to Lisbon and thence to England; poorly treated (according to an officer of the King's German Legion) and doubtless still suffering from the rigours of the siege, a mere 183 of these prisoners would ever see their homeland again. [8]

With the fall of Badajoz, various small Hessian detachments totalling about 245 men, were gathered up and returned to Darmstadt in time to participate in the gruelling 1813 campaign in Saxony.

The remaining contingents, Nassau, Baden and Frankfurt, now constituted a brigade in GD Jean Darmagnac's Division of the Army of the Centre. Under Baden's General-Major Karl von Neuenstein, they fought at Vitoria (21 June 1813) and in several rear guard scuffles during the long retreat back to France. The Germans were assigned to CD Eugene Villate's Reserve Division when Soult reorganised the army in July and gained a last small success under French command along the Bidassoa in August. Napoleon's star was fast failing, however, and as Soult withdrew towards Bayonne, Colonel August von Kruse, commander of the 2nd Nassau, received instructions from his sovereign to defect to the English at the first safe opportunity. [9]

Consulting secretly with his fellow Rheinbund commanders (Captain Damboer of Frankfurt and Major Henning of Baden) and establishing clandestine contact with old acquaintances in the King's German Legion, Kruse bided his time for several weeks. His chance finally came on 10 December during the combat on the Nive and, leaving their baggage behind, the Nassauers marched into the British lines and announced their shift in allegiance. The Frankfurt Battalion joined the Nassauers in their defection, but the Badeners (now only a battalion) remained with their French allies and were disarmed the following day. [10]

At the other end of the Pyrenees, two Rheinbund cavalry units were also disarmed in early December 1813: a squadron of the Westphalian 1st Chevaulegers and two squadrons of Nassau Reitende Jager. These troops had joined Suchet's forces in the autumn of that year after long service in central Spain, often in the company of the Division Allemande. Three squadrons strong (some 550 troopers), the Westphalians had arrived in the Peninsula in late 1808 and earned a reasonably good reputation for their participation in many of the large engagements of 1809, particularly for their contribution to the destruction of the 23rd Light Dragoons at Talavera. [11]

Armed with lances in 1812, they were reduced to a single squadron the following year before being transferred to Suchet (the cadres returned to Westphalia to help reconstruct the Kingdom's cavalry after the Russian disaster). The 2nd Squadron of the Nassau Jagers had also crossed the Pyrenees in 1808 and served with great distinction in central and northern Spain. Dressed in fur colpacks with green dolmans and loose brown trousers, they exuded the casual dash of competent professionals. GD Paul Thi6bault could not praise them enough: 'They are, in effect, a corps d'61ite or, more exactly, a small band of heroes'. [12]

The 1st Squadron, still wearing their Raupenhelms and hussar-style green uniforms, joined its compatriots in August of 1813, but in October both were reassigned to Catalonia where they were disarmed at the end of the year.

On joining Suchet, the Nassau and Westphalian troopers found a few small remnants of the thousands of Rheinbund soldiers who had served in Catalonia during the preceding four years. Napoleon viewed the province as nearly isolated from the remainder of Spain, a place of secondary importance where his Italian, Neapolitan, and German contingents could be employed in place of French troops. As a result, over 11,000 Rheinbund soldiers crossed the mountains from Perpignan in early 1809. Most would never return.

The largest of these contingents was the 2nd Westphalian Division under GD Joseph Morio, one of King Jerome's cronies to whom Napoleon reportedly said: 'You a general! In my army you would not be a corporal!" [13]

Composed of the 2nd, 3rd and 4th Line Regiments, the infamous 1st Light Infantry Battalion and two foot batteries, the division entered Catalonia in May 1809 and was assigned to GD Jean Verdier who was charged with besieging the fortress city of Gerona. Arriving before the city, the Westphalians found a brigade of Rheinbund troops already in the trenches. This was G6n6ral de Brigade (GB) Francois Amey's command, a mixed force consisting of the Wurzburg Infantry Regiment (2 battalions), the Berg Brigade (1st and 2nd Infantry Regiments, 2 battalions each) and the ephemeral Bataillon des Princes. This latter formation, doubtless one of the most colourful of the entire war, was composed of one company each from six different principalities: Schwarzburg- Sonderhausen, SchwarzburgRudolstadt, Lippe-Detmold, Schaumburg-Lippe, Reusse and Waldeck.

Small size, limited training, differences in drill amongst the constituent companies and questionable leadership were compounded by squabbles between the company commanders and their nominal battalion commander to make this one of the least effective Rheinbund units. A little over a year after its arrival in Spain, it was broken up and its few survivors (perhaps 100 men) distributed to the 5th and 6th Rheinbund Regiments of GD Rouyer's Division. [14]

In the meantime, the Berg, Wilrzburg and Westphalian troops played an important role in the long siege of Gerona. In addition to enduring the many privations attendant upon operations conducted in a desolate area with inadequate logistical support, German troops made up about one third of the assaulting force that attempted to storm the Montjuich fort on 7 July.

They suffered accordingly and the scenes before the breach recall those described by British veterans of Badajoz. One Westphalian officer remembered: 'The ditch was not even partly filled, either with earth or with fascines, and, as we climbed down, we made the distressing discovery that there were only a few, widely separated ladders along the wall under the breach, and that the ladders were too short by a mans height ... At the base of the ladders, we were received with every conceivable means of destruction: grenades, showers of burning pitch and oil, huge, plunging blocks of stone and exploding sacks of powder'. [15]

Casualties in the abortive storm, the steady drain of quotidian siege duty and, above all, the ravages of disease reduced the strength of most of Rheinbund battalions by half between June and September. The situation of the 2nd Westphalian was even worse: from a strength of 1009 on 1 June, it was down to 340 by 15 September. Nonetheless, Berg and Wurzburg troops participated in the storming of Gerona's walls on 19 September. Despite considerable courage (and further casualties: the Berg contingent alone lost 261), however, they were unable to establish themselves in the breach and three more painful months would pass before the city finally succumbed to starvation. [16]

The siege of Gerona wrecked the Berg, Wurzburg and Westphalian contingents. Despite the arrival of replacements, their first and only major combat operation in the Peninsula had left them well below 50 per cent strength and all three were reduced in size during the next two years.

THE RHEINBUND IN CATALONIA (MAY 1809)

German Brigade: GB Arney (French)

Wurzburg Infantry Regt.

Berg Brigade:
1st Infantry Regiment
2nd Infantry Regiment Bataillon des Princes
Note: a Berg foot artillery battery may have served with the brigade.

Westphalian Division: GD Morio

Brigade: GB, Boerner
2nd Infantry Regt
4th Infantry Regt

Brigade: Adjutant Commandant von Ochs

3rd Infantry Regt
1st Light Battalion
Two Foot Batteries
Note: 1st Chevaulegers were officially part of the division but never served with it.

By the spring of 1811, both the Westphalian Division and the Wurzburg Regiment had been reduced to small battalions (approximately 500 and 420 men respectively). And that autumn, the last survivors of the Berg Brigade, redesignated first as a regiment and then as a battalion in 1810, departed Spain to be rebuilt for the Russian campaign. The Westphalian Battalion, down to about 300 effectives, suffered a similar fate, returning to the kingdom in time for the 1813 campaign in central Germany.

One other Berg infantry unit, the 2nd Battalion of the 3rd Infantry, also served in Catalonia, but its tenure was brief (June 1812 to February 1813) and its combats minor. By the summer of 1813, therefore, only the Wurzburg Battalion remained of the original Rheinbund troops that had marched across the Pyrenees for Gerona four years earlier. [17]

Another German infantry unit was also still in Catalonia in mid-1813. This was the 1st Nassau Infantry (2 battalions) which had arrived with GD Marie-Francois Rouyer's Division of miscellaneous Rheinbund contingents in March of 1810. [18]

ROUYER'S DIVISION IN CATALONIA (March 1810)

Brigade: GB; Schwarz (French)

1st Nassau Regt
4th Rheinbund Regt (Saxon Duchies)
4Light Battalion (Weimar and Hildburghausen)
4Line Battalion (Gotha, Coburg and Meiningen)

Brigade: Oberst Friedrich von Chambaud (Anhalt)

5th Rheinbund Regt
41st Battalion (Anhalt)
42nd Battalion (Lippe)
46th Rheinbund Regt
41st Battalion (the two Schwarzburgs)
42nd Battalion (Reuss and Waldeck)

Sent off to Spain after its participation on the fringes of the 1809 campaign against Austria, the division lost heavily to desertion when the men learned of their destination; the 4th Rheinbund, which had performed well in the Tyrol, reportedly lost 200 men in a single night before crossing the border into France. [19]

Still Rouyer counted some 4,700 men his ranks when he reached Barcelona to assume garrison duties. Almost immediately, however, the 1st Nassau Regiment and elements of the 4th Rheinbund were sent off on an expedition to Manresa under French GB Francois Schwarz. Although they reached the town with little difficulty, they soon found themselves surrounded but Spanish insurgents and cut off from all succour. Several days of incessant skirmishing exhausted the force's food and ammunition supplies, leaving Schwarz with no option but to abandon his vehicles and retreat across wild mountain tracks under constant harassment from the guerrillas. Schwarz and his men finally regained Barcelona on 5 April having lost 929 men from an initial strength of 2200. Furthermore, an additional 140 of the division's men, Anhalters from the 1st Battalion, 5th Rheinbund, had been lost when guerrillas ambushed and destroyed a relief column en route to Manresa. [20]

After the Manresa fiasco, the Nassauers remained in Barcelona to recuperate while their comrades moved north to assume garrison duties in Gerona and other parts of the province. [21]

Despite reinforcements from Germany, the Division's strength was steadily diminished by sickness and encounters with the guerrillas.

In a particularly spectacular disaster, the 5th and 6th Regiments, guarding the coast near La Bisbal in September 1810, were virtually annihilated by a brilliantly executed Anglo-Spanish raid that cost the two weakened regiments over 1,100 casualties. [22]

Eviscerated by disease and battle losses, the grateful 'division' finally departed Catalonia in January 1811. The 1st Nassau, left behind in Barcelona, slowly rebuilt itself with replacements and convalescents, but the other three regiments, who had crossed the Pyrenees with over 3,000 men under arms, could barely muster 700 dispirited effectives when they returned to Perpignan. [23]

Like Rouyer's men, the Berg Lancer Regiment arrived in Spain after its brief participation in the war against Austria. This, however, was the second time Berg troops had ridden into Iberia. In the spring of 1808, when Murat, then Grand Duke of Berg, went to assume his duties as Napoleon's 'Lieutenant in Spain', he took with him two squadrons of his duchy's cavalry regiment. Then known as Chevaulegers and clad in pale-yellow uniforms with rose trim (in accordance with Murat's rather garish tastes), they left that summer when their duke went off to assume the throne of Naples. They returned in late 1809 dressed in handsome dark green and armed with lances. [24]

In this configuration, the regiment served with the Guard cavalry of the Army of the North for the next four years, participating in many small actions, the most famous of which is probably the discomfiture of Anson's Brigade at Villadrigo in 1812. Elements of the regiment returned to Berg that same year and the remainder departed the following spring.

Although they were not Rheinbund troops, two other German units deserve mention: the Legion Hanovrienne and the R6giment de Westphalie. Organised in 1803, the Hanoverian Legion included a 'light' infantry regiment of two battalions dressed in red and a regiment of Chasseurs-a-Cheval (4 squadrons) with a green uniform very similar to that of their French counterparts. The Legion's infantry, about 800 strong, entered Spain for the first time in the autumn of 1807 as part of the 3rd Division in Junot's '1er Corps d'Observation de la Gironde'. It took part in the dreadful march to Portugal but was assigned to garrison Santarem and thus missed the major engagements against the British expeditionary force. Evacuated with the rest of Junot's troops, the infantry returned to the Peninsula in December 1808 as part of Heudelet's Division. [25]

Assigned to Massena's army for the 1810 invasion of Portugal, the Hannoverians served at Almeida and Cuidad Rodrigo with the siege train and fought at Bussaco and Fuentes de Onoro. In the latter struggle, they formed part of the force that stormed the village of Fuentes on the first day and, at least according to Marbot, they suffered severely from the fire of French troops who were confused by the Hanoverian's red coats. [26]

Always prone to desertion, the entire Legion was disbanded in August 1811 and its veterans redistributed to the new 127th, 128th and 129th Regiments de Ligne as well as the 3rd Berg Infantry and the Regiment de Prusse. [27]

Unlike the infantry component, the cavalry regiment of the Legion did not arrive in the Peninsula until the autumn of 1808. Assigned to GD Jean Francheschi-Delonne's Brigade, the chasseurs participated in the Corunna campaign and later, under Pierre Soult, in Massena's invasion of Portugal, though they were not present at Fuentes. When the Legion was broken up, the troopers went to fill the ranks of the 1st Hussars and 9th Lancers.

The R2giment de Westphalie, raised in 1807, was originally intended to consist of four battalions but its strength was only sufficient for two. Of these, the I st marched off for Spain in the latter part of the year, while the 2nd remained behind on the Channel coast as a depot. As part of Moncey's corps, the battalion participated in the occupation of Spain and the marshal's expedition to Valencia (June to July 1808).

It seems to have taken heavy losses in the abortive storm of Valencia on 28 June and spent most of its remaining existence on garrison duty on north-central Spain. Redesignated the Bataillon de Westphalie (a redesignation which causes considerable confusion between this formation and the remnants of Morio's Westphalian Division) in January 1809, it was disbanded the following September and its members absorbed by the infantry of the Hanoverian Legion. [28]

Finally, it remains to account for the least known of those Rheinbund soldiers who served in the Peninsula: several detachments of train troops from W&zburg, Bavaria and (possibly) Saxony. During the campaign against Austria, General Junot had picked up 22 Wurzburg train troops as he passed through their capital en route to his embarrassing defeat at Gefrees. Subsequent events are not entirely clear, but the Warzburgers apparently became linked to some Berg troops (probably the Chasseurs-a-Cheval who were also assigned to Junot, or possibly the 3rd Infantry) and were dragged off to Spain in their company. There they remained until 1811, and only 8 of their original detachment ever returned to their home fires. [29]

The case of the Bavarians is slightly different. in 1808, the French demanded 150 Bavarians for use as replacements in French train battalions. After some negotiating, some deserting and some return of deserters, about 66 Bavarians duly joined the 3rd Train Battalion and went off with it to the Pyrenees. They continued to serve in the ranks of this French unit through 1814 (even after the other German troops had been disarmed) and a fortunate 27 of them finally made their way back to Bavaria. There are hints that 100 Saxons shared this fate, but the details of their odyssey are unknown. [30]

In reviewing the participation of the Rheinbund troops in Iberia, several general points are worthy of consideration. First, although their overall numbers were usually small, their presence was often crucial, particularly in 1809 when they played important roles in many of the large struggles in central Spain and provided about one third of the besieging forces at Gerona. Second, although some were weak or unreliable, many of the German units performed very well in the Peninsula, earning the respect and trust of their French allies.

SAMPLE STRENGTHS AND CASUALTIES
Unit	Autumn 1808	Repls	Cadres	December 1813	Losses
Frankfurt Bn	853	500	300	240	800
Wurzburg Regt	1,717	258	50	280	1,645
Note: 'Cadres' refers to troops sent back to Germany to help construct new units

As Victor said of Leval's division: '(It) has shown ardour and courage to which I cannot pay adequate tribute, Its officers and men are worthy to be allies of France'. [31]

Even in the prevailing wretchedness of the siege of Gerona, the troops committed to the two assaults did all that could be expected of soldiers and Verdier's sniping comment that 'the troops cannot be trusted' seems a shallow attempt to excuse his own failings. [32]

Third, as with France itself, the Spanish War was for the Rheinbund a bleeding ulcer that not only decimated solid military units that could have been employed elsewhere, but also attenuated the bitter resentment which many Germans were beginning to develop towards the alliance with Napoleon. War against Prussia or Austria might be explicabte and the troops could be expected to come home with their honour and most of their lives intact, but the Iberian experience was one of unrelenting misery, spilling German blood to no apparent purpose. small wonder then, that the Reuss troops of the Bataillon des Princes were stricken with dismay when the newspapers announced that their countrymen in Rouyer's Division were headed for the Pyrenees. [33]

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

Barkhausen, G. Tagebuch eines Rheinbund-Offiziers, Wiesbaden, 1900. Elting, J. Swords Around a Throne, New York, 1988.
Foy. History of the War in the Peninsula, Felling, 1989. Gasset, A. La Guerre d'Espagne, Paris, 1932.
Gouvion Saint-Cyr. Journal des Operations de l'Armee de Catalogne, Paris, 1821. Hagen, B. von. Das Reussische Militdr, Gera, 1904.
Helmes, H. 'Die Wurzburger Truppen vor Hundert Jahren', 1913 Hermes, S. and Niemeyer, J. Unter dem Griefen, Rastatt, 1984.
Horward, D. Napoleon and Iberia, Tallahassee, 1984
Horward, D. ed. The French Campaign in Portugal, Minneapolis, 1973.
Klessmann, E. ed. Unter Napoleons Fahnen, Bielefeld, 1991
Koch, J.B., ed. Memoires de Massena, Paris, 1850.
Larpent, F. S., The Private Journal of F. S. Larpent, London, 1853.
Marbot. The Memoirs of Baron de Marbot, London, 1905.
Madinien, A. Tableaux par Corps et par batailles des Officiers Tues et Blesses, Paris, 1984.
Meier, H. Kriegsrinnerungen des Obersten Franz Morgenstern, Wolfenbuettel, 1912.
Oman, C. A History of the Peninsula War, London 1902.
Picard, E. Preceptes et Jugements de Napoleon, Paris, 1913.
Pivka, 0. Napoleon's German Allies (1): Westfalia and Kleve-Berg, London, 1975.
Rocca, A. de In the Peninsula with a French Hussar, London 1990.
Runkel. 'Zur Geschichte der Besatzung der Burg Hohenzollern' in Mittheilungen des Vereins fur Geschichte und Altertumskunde in Hohenzollern, 1899/1900.
Sauzey, C. Les Allemandes sous les Aigles Fran~aises, Paris, 1987.
Schaumann, A. On the Road with Wellington, New York, 1925.
Schroder, K. Zwischen Franzesischer Revolution und Preussens Gloria, Eitorf, 1989.
Seebach, L. von. Geschichte der Feldzilge, Weimar, 1838.
Umhey, A. 'Das Infanterie-Bataillon des Grossherzogtums Frankfurt' in Der Bote aus dem Wehrgeschichtlichen Museum, 1985.
Xylander, R. von. Geschichte des 1. Feldartillerie-Regiments, Berlin, 1909.
Regimental histories. Zeitschrift fur Heereskunde

Footnotes

[1] The title is taken from the observations ofa Berg soldier a Gerona:'Grass and weeds were cooked; every living animal, often even dead ones which had already begun to decay, was greedily consumed. The battery 'l'Imperiale' was robbed of its sandbags to provide wrappings for [our] feet and, to make the misery complete, innumerable vermin, scorpions, mosquitoes, and insects of all types tortured us and left us not a moment's peace'. Quoted in Schroder, p. 178
[2] Other units sometimes served as part of the Division. As one example, a battalion of the Garde de Paris was included in its Order of Battle for part of 1809. In addition, the Westphalian Chevaulegers and Nassau Reitende leger were occasionally assigned to the Division.
[3] The facings of the 3rd Regiment were finally standardised in 1810; I am assuming the same applied to the 4th Regiment in Spain.
[4] Cited in Sauzey, vol.6.
[5] An officer named Rigel cited in Sauzey, vol.2.
[6] Von Porbeck had been appointed the regiment's 'Inhaber'(patron) at the beginning of July; General-Major Karl von Neuenstein would become the new Inbaber in October 1809.
[7] Rocca, p.83.
[8] From August Schaumann, a commissary with the K.G.L., who met Hessian officers in Lisbon (with thanks to Major Bob Burnham, USA, who helped me locate this recondite source). Figures from Sauzey, vol.6.
[9] Kruse, who led the Nassau troops in the Waterloo campaign, was also serving as the brigade commander, replacing von Neuenstein who had been recalled to Baden.
[10] Details ofthis curious incidentvary. Using good sources, Sauzey writes that the Badeners refused to defect until they had specific directions from their Grand Duke; this interpretation is also found in Hermes/Niemeyer. Moreover, this version is in accord with the reminiscences of Francis Larpent, who met vvith Kruse and other German officers immediately after their defection. Oman, however, whose list of sources includes Sauzey, says that Henning was the only Baden officer aware of the conspiracy and that he was absent on the day of the defection (owing to a wound) with the result that the Baden troops stayed with the French while their colleagues marched away.
[11] The Westphalians, however, apparently acquired an unpleasant reputation for bad behaviour during their march across France in 1808.
[12] This quote from Thiebault (Sauzey, vol.6, p.217) is only one of many instances where he praises the Nassau troops. The French usually referred to them as 'chasseurs a cheval'.
[13] Picard
[14] Strength of the Balaillon des Princes taken from the letters of a Lippe officer published in Klessmann. For an excellent piece on the battalion, see the Zeitschift fur Heeres- und Uniformkunde, Heft 61/63, 1934
[15] Meier, p.23.
[16] Figures for June to September are from Oman; Berg losses in the assault from Schroder.
[17] For the Westphalian, Wurzburg and Berg contingents, see: Lunsmann, Schroder and regimental histories.
[18] The Rheinbund numeration of Nassau and Wfirzburg regiments is a matter of some confusion. According to Napoleon's Correspondence (e.g., 14793, 21 February 1809), the 2nd Nassau (formed first) was the 1st Rheinbund and the 1st Nassau (formed later) the 2nd Rheinbund, while the WOrzburg Regiment was to be designated the 3rd Rheinbund. Some sources, however, make the Wurzburg formation the 1st Rheinbund Regiment and allot the numbers 2 and 3 to the Nassau units. For the purposes of this piece, I have used the national rather than the Rheinbund designations to minimise confusion.
[19] Seebach, p.274.
[20] Sauzey gives a detailed account of the expedition (see Vol.6).
[21] Note that Nassau's units also included the tiny contingents from Hohenzollern- Hechingen, Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen and Isenburg. They were completely integrated into the regiments and wore the same uniforms as the Nassau natives. By a contract arrangement, Nassau provided troops on behalf of Aremburg, Liechtenstein, Hohengeroldseck, and the two Salm principalities (that is, instead of providing soldiers, these princes paid subsidies to Nassau).
[22] This catastrophe figures prominently in the accounts of Lippe participants as well as the histories of the Anhalt Battalion: see Klessmann and Barkhausen. At the time, the thin brigade was under the command of GB Schwarz, the same officer who had led the Manresa expedition.
[23] The colonel of the 1st Nassau, von Meder, felt defection would bring dishonour upon himself and his regiment; as a result, the unit was disarmed and Meder requested permission to enter French service. His petition granted, he continued to serve Napoleon and was killed near Barcelona the following February.
[24] In the interim, the regiment had been transformed from yellow-clad chevaulegers to green chasseurs; they acquired their lances in Paris in the autumn of 1809 and received training in their use from the Polish Lancers of the Guard. Upon arriving in Spain, therefore, they were the 'Chevaulegers-Lanciers de Berg'.
[25] This information derived from Gasset, Horward and Oman. See also Elting.
[26] Marbot, Vol. II, p.463.
[27] Gasset cites the unit records as a clear indication of the desertion problem; Oman points out that he K.G.L. accepted over 160 deserters from the Legion during the first Portugal expedition alone.
[28] Information on the Regiment de Westphalie is taken from Gasset, Foy, Elting, Pivka, Runkel and Martinien (officer casualties at Valencia).
[29] Helmes. It is not clear what uniform these men would have worn: Wurzburg's artillerists had grey-brown coats and it seems likely the train would have been simi­lar or identical, but I have found no specific reference for the Grand Duchy's train troops. See First Empire No. 12 for an account of the engagement at Gefrees.
[30] Xylander, pp. 118-20.
[31] Quoted in Sauzey, Vol.1.
[32] Verdier's corps commander, Gouvion Saint-Cyr, was certainly of this opinion; he called his subordinate's assessment `unjust'. Both cited in Oman's account of the siege.
[33] Hagen

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