A series of articles designed to make us think about what exactly we are trying to recreate both in our re-enactments and on a wargames table. In the following article, Taylor Earle looks at the general tactical theories underlying the Horse and Musket period. Readers may have seen Taylor's other articles on tactics in recent issues of The Courier, the North American Wargames Magazine.

Infantry composed approximately 80% of the armies of the period of linear warfare, and the Napoleonic period was no exception. Infantry was required, as it is today, to take and hold terrain, therefore understanding the equipment of the infantry and the tactics that they employed are essential to the development of a successful attack.

The smoothbore musket was not the only long firearm to be used during the period. The rifling of a rifled-musket imparts a stabilising spin upon the musket ball that gives the weapon an excellent degree of accuracy in the hands of an individual trained in its use. Unfortunately, both the rifled musket and smoothbore musket become clogged with spent powder when in action. To impart the spin upon the ball the rifled-musket requires a tight fit between barrel and musket ball. It often required the use of a hammer to drive the ball down the barrel, so that the rifled-musket was even more susceptible to clogging than the smoothbore when in action. Despite the increase in accuracy possible to the rifled- musket, the flintlock was not reliable enough or rapid enough in rate of fire to displace the smoothbore musket as the predominant infantry firearm in the period of linear warfare. The smoothbore musket remained the primary infantry weapon until the mid- I 9th Century.

The smoothbore weapon was designed to have a musket ball that was slightly smaller in dimension than the interior diameter of the musket barrel; this gap between barrel and ball was called windage. A high degree of accuracy and long weapon range required a small amount of windage, which increased the problem of clogging during prolonged use. A large amount of windage, while decreasing the problems secondary to weapon fouling, resulted in poor accuracy and range. Each of the European military powers developed similar muskets that had a windage of about .05 inches and a musket barrel with an internal dimension of about an inch. The smoothbore musket was able to maintain a rate of fire, while in action, of two to three rounds a minute in a controlled formation volley.

To protect infantry formations from fast moving cavalry that might close upon them while reloading, the socket bayonet was developed. It could be quickly placed upon the barrel of the musket to perform the previous role of a pike and hopefully keep the mounted opponent at a distance. More important than the actual use of the bayonet in action, the threat of being bayoneted or sabred could turn the tide of battle.

These formations, to allow for controlled manoeuvring and to concentrate enough of the inherently inaccurate weapons to deliver effective firepower, led to similar methods of deploying and marching the battalions, regiments and brigades in all the major military powers. For these reasons, the use of dense linear formations that relied upon the use of massed infantry and their volleys to break the enemy's willingness to remain on the battlefield, and ultimately to take and hold terrain, was retained.

Since the nations had developed similar weapons and formations, it was only natural that they also developed similar methods of training. This similarity then led to similar performances on the battlefield. With few notable exceptions, such as Britain with a smaller standing army and a larger relative budget allowing for more practice with live ammunition, the national powers of Europe would produce similar rates of casualties. The similarity of the weapons and training led to a European accuracy with the smoothbore musket in the Napoleonic period that has been calculated by some historians to be about 5% of rounds fired.

Artillery of the period possessed several types of ammunition, including a solid cannon ball and canister rounds that resembled the shotgun shell of today. The latter contained a number of smaller balls that dispersed upon the discharge of the artillery piece. Canister rounds contained between 41 large balls or 170 smaller balls, depending on type. The larger balls possessed a longer range and the smaller balls could saturate the target to a greater degree.

At 1000 yards a cannon ball was dangerous to the target on a path that was only several inches wide. A canister round, on the other hand, would spread over several yards at a distance of 100 to 200 yards. The solid cannon ball thus allowed artillery batteries to inflict casualties upon the enemy at distances up to 1000 yards. Batteries firing canister rounds at shorter ranges resembled the massed volley of an infantry battalion.

To expand on this, the infantry of the period assembled in battalion units of approximately 600 men, and an artillery battery of 6 to 8 pieces each firing a canister round of approximately 100 balls, could each launch a equivalent number of balls towards the enemy, (i.e. 600 men x I round = 6 artillery pieces x 100 balls each.). For the purpose of this essay, therefore, infantry battalions and artillery batteries are equivalent in their ability to inflict casualties. There is no effort to differentiate on either their ability to inflict casualties or on their actual positioning on the battlefield to accomplish these casualties.

Cavalry formations, lacking an effective form of massed firepower, relied upon their ability to deliver quick massed charges in an effort to drive, either psychologically or physically, their enemy from the field. Usually an infantry formation that was the target of the charge had to already be in a state of disorganisation for the charge to rout the defender.

Cavalry charges, therefore, were most effective in the breaking of a formation that had previously suffered significant casualties and lacked the command and control, and the desire, to stand and deliver upon the horsemen. Alternatively, the cavalry could be used to pursue an already vanquished formation, utilising the superior speed of the horsemen to close and destroy the routing formation.

While each nation had its own elite units, these were in the minority, and, in general unit cohesion began to dissolve when the unit had absorbed between 33% and 50% casualties in a single engagement. This was caused by the natural response of individuals seeing their friends and companions being shattered on the field of battle, as well as the loss of command structure as both officers and N.C.O.s were lost to the enemy fire. This loss of cohesion might not present itself as a sudden flight from the battlefield.

It might first appear as an acceptance to remain in the current position on the field, refusing to advance further or deploy. This acceptance to remain would only last so long as the threat of the opponent's bayonet or sabre remained at a distance and did not approach too closely. This willingness to continue firing, but refusal to manoeuvre, would quickly disappear when an enemy unit that had not been reduced to this critical level of casualties approached to drive away the crippled unit.

The traditional defence on a 19th century battlefield divided the defenders into thirds. One third became the general reserve of the army, and often contained the best men and equipment that the army possessed. The other two-thirds were deployed in two lines, creating a three tiered defence. To penetrate the defensive deployment, an attacker would first have to defeat the front-line formation, then defeat the second line formations acting as the local tactical reserve. Finally, the attacker would have to engage and defeat any strategic reserve that had been dispatched to contain the penetration.

The offensive strategy of the early 1800's was dominated by the reluctance of generals to risk their well trained and expensive 'professional armies' on the battlefield. Warfare was often reduced to a series of sieges or artillery duels with little loss of life on either side. With the rise of Napoleon and his concept of victory through the destruction of the enemy's army, and therefore their ability to resist, warfare became more decisive. Napoleon's principles of war were developed around the concept of concentrating one's forces against a weak point of the enemy and crushing their army in a single battle. He would then pursue the defeated foe until it was forced to discontinue hostilities.

To accomplish this concentration, movement was predominately performed in a column that deployed into line before engaging the enemy with firepower - infantry's primary means of inflicting casualties. Due to the need for concentration, the Napoleonic battlefield compressed as many as 20,000 men into each mile of battlefield frontage. By way of contrast, by 1917 the improved accuracy of weapons would reduce this to as few as 2,500 per mile of front.

The battlefield of Waterloo, from Hougoumont to the Chateau de Frichermont, presented a front of approximately 2 miles. It contained over 76,000 Anglo-Allied troops, excluding the Prussians, and 74,500 Frenchmen - a concentration of over 37,000 men per antagonist per mile of front. Similar in effect to the principle of inertia in physics, the concentration of mass is even more important when the speed of movement is taken into consideration. The faster the concentration is developed and put into motion the more difficult the opposition will find it to blunt the attack. An attack that moves at a high rate of speed reduces the amount of time that it takes to cover intervening ground. The result is a reduction in the amount of time that the defender has to react to the sudden incursion.

To engage a single enemy unit that was unsupported by reserves with a single friendly unit would be to accept a measure of chance in determining the formation's fate, since the two formations are fighting on even terms regarding weapons and training. Often in such situations both formations would reach a point where they were unwilling to advance, unable to drive away the opponent. They would remain in position, developing a firefight of some 20 to 30 minutes before both formations eventually retired to be reformed or reinforced. The single formation engagement often resulted in an exchange of casualties and a lack of decision.

To confidently attack a position defended by a single formation unsupported by reserves, whilst expecting a reasonable chance of success in penetrating the defence, required a minimum of two attacking units. The first attacking unit advanced and traded casualties with the defender. The second attacking unit, not having suffered any previous losses, moved up and displaced the defender. This had by now been reduced to a critical level of control due to casualties suffered at the hand of the first attacker. Therefore, a 2 to I ratio of attackers to defenders was necessary to successfully engage an unfortified position that lacked reserves, without resorting to chance.

A defended position that had a unit in reserve required a minimum of three attacking units to successfully penetrate the defence. When the first engagement was resolved the attacker and defender would be left in a state of near collapse. The second, fresh, attacking unit drove off the first defender (since it had suffered some 33% to 50% casualties in the first engagement), and advanced to meet the second line of defence. These two units (second attacker and second defender) then become involved in the second firefight and reduced themselves to a state of near collapse. The third attacking formation then arrived to drive off the second defender, and could then advance to further penetrate the defensive position.

Attacking a fortified or developed position, such as redoubts and buildings, required even larger numbers of attacking troops in relation to the strength of the position. Because the defenders were protected by the position, with as much as 66% of their strength under cover, it required three times as much firepower to achieve the same number of casualties as if they were in the open. In addition, the security of the defended position could increase the level of acceptable casualties that the defender was willing to absorb before becoming unwilling to stand in position. This factor could allow the defender to remain in position longer than if he were in open ground.

To attack a position that physically protects the defender from the attacking firepower, three attacking units were required to advance and trade casualties with the defender. Each of the three attacking units, in turn, would become disorganised as an unacceptable number of casualties was absorbed. By the time that the third attacking unit had reached the level of disorder, the defender would have as well. A fourth attacking unit might then advance and expel the defender from the position.

When the defended position was supported by a local reserve, a fifth attacking unit was required. After the fourth unit drives off the original defender from the position, the local reserve would engage the fourth attacking unit.

The two opposing units would exchange casualties to the point of disordering themselves and the fifth attacking unit could then drive off the reserve and continue the penetration of the defensive position.

It is upon the principles of the equality of casualties, the ability of fresh units to drive away units that have absorbed significant casualties, and the traditional three layered defence that this essay is based. The general reserve, being consumed by reactions to feints, the containment of numerous attacks, and its distance from the site of local action, is not directly addressed. This will be resolved in separate local encounters as the reserve engages the penetrating forces of the attacker.

This description of events in the development of a local engagement is meant to be in the simplest of terms and not a definitive study of events. A large determinant of events on the battlefield was, and is, luck, and the events described are intended to minimise its influence. If plans are laid to minimise or eliminate the participation of luck in the determination of a victor in battle, then the intervention of adverse conditions will not prevent triumph. Equally, the appearance of an advantageous event will only make victory more certain.

Bibliography

Alger, John I., The Quest for Victory, London, 1982
Chandler, David G., The Military Maxims of Napoleon, London, 1987
Atlas of Military Strategy, New York, 1980
Hughes, Major-General B.P., Firepower, London 1974
Haythornthwaite, Philip, Weapons & Equipment of the Napoleonic Wars, Poole, 1979
Jones, Archer, The Art of War in the Western World, Chicago, 1987
Mitchell, Lieutenant-Colonel J., Thoughts on Tactics and Military Organisation, London 1838
Nofi, Albert A., Napoleon at War, New York, 1972
O'Sullivan, Patrick, Terrain and Tactics, New York, 1991
Ross, Steven, From Flintlock to Rifle Infantry Tactics, 1740-1866, London, 1979