by Raymond P. Cusick
Painting by Ian Storer
In America, the Seven Years War manifested itself as the
French and Indian War. It could be said to have begun on the 8th
July 1755 when General Braddock led an expedition [1]
that included the redcoats of the 44th and 48th Regiments, and the
bluecoats of Colonel George Washington's Virginians. Advancing
on Fort Duquesne (now Pittsburgh PA), they were ambushed deep
in the virgin forest on the Ohio river. A smaller force of French and
Indians firing from concealed positions, some using rifles,
[2]
decimated them. As a direct result of this tragic defeat and rout it
was decided by Horse Guards and an Act of Parliament to raise a
force with the express purpose of meeting these new forest tactics.
Included was a regiment of light troops [3]
that would become renowned and some fifty-five years later, the
scourge of the French in the Peninsular, the 60th Royal American
Regiment.
It was raised in 1756, in New York, with the recruits
drawn predominantly from German colonists in Pennsylvania, as
well as from the Electorate of Hanover. It had four battalions of
1000 men with two famous Swiss officers, Colonels Henri Bouquet
and Frederick Haldimand commanding officers of the 1st and 2nd
Battalions respectively. The four battalions eventually served all
over North and Central America, from Quebec down to the West
Indies and Nicaragua.
By the end of the 18th Century, enlightened military
thought was becoming more aware of the importance and
usefulness of light troops and skirmishers, and the value of the rifle
as a specialised weapon. General Jeffrey Amherst, the Colonel-in-
Chief [4]
had already ordered that certain companies in each of the
60th's battalions should be armed with rifles. This was a familiar
weapon to the majority of the O.R.s, many of whom were hunters
or backwoodsmen. It was these same colonists who introduced the
rifle to America. [5]
The 60th Royal American Regiment was a numbered and,
unusually for that time, a named regiment, and was also one of the
largest regiments on the British establishment. Because it relied
very much on the German recruits it was, in a sense, a 'German'
regiment in character and was known by many as 'that German
regiment'; it remained so until 1818. [6]
In 1797, a fifth battalion was added to the Regiment. This
action was prompted by the French Revolutionary Wars. With
many mercenary and auxiliary regiments formed from the
abundance of willing recruits from Europe, it was decided to form a
specialised light infantry battalion. By drafting into it a number of
these mainly German troops the 5th Battalion could become a
special jager or rifle unit. It was thought that these foreign troops
made 'natural' marksmen and were more suitable for the hazardous
work of skirmishing. Some who were not in favour of rifle armed
troops said that British troops ought not to be spared for such
dangerous work and that it should be left to the foreigners.
The 5th Battalion was added to the regiment by Act of
Parliament, 30th December 1797, and the order to raise it issued in
January 1798. The Act 38 GEO III cap 13 was passed as an
amendment to Act 29 GEO. III cap 5, under which the first four
battalions were raised. It empowered the King to 'augment His
Majesty's Sixtieth Regiment of Infantry, now consisting of four
battalions of One Thousand Men each, by the addition of a Fifth
battalion, to consist in the like manner of One Thousand men, or
other foreign Protestants who have served abroad as officers or
engineers. [7]
The Act speaks of the 'present juncture of affairs rendering
it expedient to facilitate the speedy raising of the battalion.' Those
enlisted for the first four battalions were attested for foreign
service only, which meant service on the American continent.
Those that were drafted into the 5/60th from the auxiliary
regiments had already been attested for general service and
therefore could serve anywhere.
The first phase in raising the 5th Battalion was the muster
of the foreign jager regiments and individuals at Albany Barracks,
near Cowes on the Isle of Wight. [8]
The majority came from Hompesch's Corps, amounting to
17 officers and 300 other ranks. Included among the officers were
notably the future CO, Colonel Baron de Rottenburg, and Lt.-
Colonel Robert Crauford ('Black Bob'). Others came eventually
from various depleted corps which included Hardy's York Fusiliers,
Ramsay's York Chasseurs or Rangers, Waldstein's Chasseurs and
Prince Lowenstein Wertheim's Chasseurs.
At the first phase, Lowenstein's Chasseurs were on active
service on Martinique as part of Sir Ralph Abercromby's force.
Before continuing into phase two, Colonel de Rottenburg took the
embryo battalion to Ireland, to serve under General John Moore in
the Irish Rebellion of 1798. [9]
Phase two occurred the following year in 1799 when
Colonel de Rottenburg arrived with the half strength battalion at
Surinam, which the Dutch held and which they were only too
pleased to quit. It was here that they were joined by 30 officers and
580 O.R.s from Lowenstein's Chasseurs, who came with a high
recommendation from Sir Ralph Abercromby.
'The raising of the 5th Battalion and the appointment of
Baron de Rottenburg to its command marked not only a distinct
epoch in the history of the Regiment, but an important stage in the
development of the British Army. Just as Bouquet, in 1756, had
introduced radical changes of dress, training and tactics into the
60th Royal Americans, so did de Rottenburg in 1797 introduce a
system, new to the British Army, which contributed not a little to
the successful issue of the Peninsular Campaign.' Thus wrote the
Regimental Historian. [10]
De Rottenburg had considerable military experience in
Europe having joined Count Hompesch's Fusiliers as major in 1795,
later rising to Lt.-Colonel. He was well known as the first leading
exponent of light infantry training and tactics in the British Army.
His excellent training manual was used freely by Coote-
Manningham, Sir John Moore and Colonels Stewart and Mackenzie
at the Shorncliffe light infantry training camp in Kent. De
Rottenburg also prepared the Regulations for the Exercise of
Riflemen and Light Infantry and instructions for their Conduct in
the Field for Field Marshal HRH Duke of York, the recently appointed Commander-in-Chief. It was
illustrated and originally written in German by de Rottenburg and
later translated by William Fawcett, Adjutant-General. It was
mainly influenced by the drill manual written by Oberstleutnant
Von Ewald who was well known for his tactical use of light
infantry in the American Revolution. [11]
Whereas von Ewald stressed the offensive role ('Always
surprise them; attack first.'), de Rottenburg's emphasis was on the
defensive or protective role.
The men of the 5th Battalion would at first meeting have
looked decidedly foreign in appearance. They would have seemed
more like a regiment of continental jagers or chasseurs with their
green jackets, blue pantaloons and their Austrian-style bell-topped
shakos. All of them followed the continental custom of sporting
non-regulation moustaches for the wearing of which the 5th
Battalion was given special dispensation. [12]
This was probably a privilege arranged by de Rottenburg
to further 'esprit de corps'. As the Marquess of Wellington himself
would later say of the 1812 uniform changes, '[t] hey did not
represent a very British silhouette when seen on the skyline'. They
were known by others as the 'Jaggers' which was the anglicised
version of jagers.
The first four battalions originally wore scarlet coats with
the blue facings of a 'Royal' regiment as their parade dress. In
deciding to equip and dress the 5th Battalion as j~gers it was
obviously Colonel de Rottenburg's influence that affected the final
choice of uniform design. It was, after all, very similar to that worn
by the Hompesch Fusiliers. [13]
Hardy's York Fusiliers also wore green jackets and
pantaloons faced with red. Dark green was a common or traditional
choice of colour by many continental jager and chasseur regiments.
The other common colour was that worn by Lowenstein's
Chasseurs, blue-grey with dark green facings.
The original uniform of the 5/60th was changed and
modified several times during its short life. There were
modifications made in 1806, 1812 and 1815. The first uniform for
other ranks consisted of a short dark green jacket, piped down the
front with red, red facings, green shoulder straps feathered in red,
with green wings laced with red. The jacket had a single centre
vertical row of white metal or pewter buttons. The pantaloons
were a pale to mid-blue with red piping down the seams and red
ornamented falls to the front and worn with short black gaiters and
black shoes.
In July 1801 (after the formation of the 95th Regiment), it
was decreed that all descriptions of riflemen should be dressed
alike, without distinction, except for buttons and facings. It took
several years to implement. In 1806, the blue pantaloons were
changed to dark blue and in 1812 to dark green. officers and men
wore blue overalls and blue ornamented pantaloons for full dress in
1814-15.
By 1812, the uniforms for all battalions of the 60th
Regiment, the 95th Rifles and the Light Battalions and
Scharfschutzen Korps of the King's German Legion complied with
the 1801 decree.
The uniform of the officers was inspired by that of the
cavalry. At first they wore the very dashing and elegant 'Tarleton'
headdress. They also wore the cavalry-style dolman and pelisse
tunics. A small black leather pouch, with a silver light infantry
horn on the flap, was worn with a black leather cross belt across
the left shoulder. The front of the belt was ornamented with a
silver lion's head with chain and whistle, and also a silver cross-
pattee plate or badge which was inherited from the Hompesch
Fusiliers. It is thought to be a Bavarian Order originating from the
Knights Templar. The cross-pattee is a variation of the Maltese
cross, which became eventually the regimental badge of the 60th.
The pouch was always worn when an officer was on duty in
place of the gorget. The latter had a bright surface and gave an
enemy sharpshooter a target. 'Shoot the officers, aim for their
gorgets' was a lesson learnt from the American Revolution. The
custom of wearing pouch belts when an officer is on duty still
continues with the Royal Green Jackets if the officer is in parade
dress.
The illustration of the officer's uniform accompanying this
article is based on a description given by Major-General Astley-
Terry, when he described the uniform shown in a portrait of
Captain John Wolff. Wolff went to the Peninsular with the 5th
Battalion on June 15th 1808. He was wounded at Talavera on 27th
July 1808 and taken prisoner. By the time of the 5th Battalion's
departure from Ireland to sail for Portugal the uniform had
undergone some modifications to conform to the decree of July 1801.
The short jacket was made of standard 'rifle' green material
with red facings. Dark blue pantaloons were now worn. The shako
was now a 'stove pipe', nine inches tall with a leather peak. It was
oval in section at the base (head shaped), rising to circular sectioned
top. There is no evidence of a tapered light infantry shako,
although the issued shako appears tapered when seen in side view.
By 1815 all battalions of the 60th were dressed in 'rifle' green.
Prior to the battalion sailing for Portugal in 1808, Colonel
de Rottenburg was appointed Brigadier-General and given a training
command at the Curragh. [14]
Major Gabriel Davy, his disciple, became the new
commanding officer who took the battalion to the Peninsula and,
like his mentor, was concerned about all matters to do with
equipment and dress. He was most particular about daily parades
on the line of march and in camp. No excuses would be taken,
whether the men had clothes or not.
The following order, issued in Portugal in 1809, makes this
clear: 'On halting-days the officers commanding companies will
inspect their men at eleven o'clock roll call, and they will pay
particular attention to the state of the arms, ammunition and
accoutrements. The blue pantaloons which have been torn upon the
march are immediately to be repaired, and those men who are under
the absolute necessity of wearing their white drawers must appear
with them well washed and cleaned. The stocks are to be worn, [15]
and the rosettes (cherries) and bugles which have been torn out
of the caps are to be replaced.' The order also mentions that
necessity had forced him to authorise the cutting away of the skirts
to patch the upper part of the jackets.
Unique
The 5th Battalion was unique in that it was the first
battalionsized unit in the British Army to be both specifically
raised as skirmishers and to be armed with rifles. Many did not
favour skirmishers, with their tactics based on independent action.
When the basic principle of battle tactics was the heavy weight of
mass fire from the large formations of disciplined troops, rolling
volleys were the answer. The concept of aimed fire at selected
targets was not considered important, indeed it was actively
discouraged as it slowed down the rate of fire. Scharnhorst
remarked after Prussia's disastrous war with France in 1806:
'Before the war we taught the men to load quickly but not well, to
fire quickly but without aiming. This was very ill-considered.'
The original intakes of the 5th Battalion came with their
own short, thick-barrelled rifles. They were of Prussian
manufacture and were known as the 'Hompesch Rifle', an example
of which can be seen in the Royal Greenjackets Museum, Peninsula
Barracks Winchester. It looks in outward appearance very similar
to the Baker Rifle. They continued to use these rifles until 11th
June 1808 when, based in New Barracks in Cork, they were
equipped with the new Baker rifle.
Evaluation tests of rifles from all sources had taken place
at Woolwich in 1800 [16]
and it was decided that the best rifle was the one designed and
built by Ezekiel Baker of Whitechapel, London. [17]
His rifle was thirty inches long in the barrel. It had a calibre of
.615 and had a flintlock. It carried a sword-bayonet called a
spadroon, which was twenty seven and a half inches long and was
always referred to a 'sword' [18]
The rifle was accurate up to 300 or 400 yards and a skilled
rifleman could fire three rounds a minute. To perfect the rifleman's
skills, Colonel de Rottenburg encouraged practice on the ranges, on
fixed targets, moving targets (mounted on trolleys), and on what
today are called 'snap targets'. Firing from different stances and
positions was practised, i.e. standing, kneeling, sitting, prone and
supine. The musket could be a formidable weapon at close range if
used by troops who had been well trained in its use. French
Voltigeurs had to close in to about 25 yards to make sure of hitting
a target. Unfortunately, many commanders did not encourage the
practical use of arms.
The troops went through the motions on the drill fields with
their manual drills, but many did not fire their first shot until they
were actually on the battlefield. The main issue in the opposition
to rifle armed skirmishers was the weapon itself. The criticism was
that the rifle took longer to load, two rounds per minute as
opposed to four or five with the musket, so that it was not a
suitable weapon for rolling volleys. In addition, the user was
vulnerable during the lengthy reloading procedure. De Rottenburg's
training plan allowed for this by ample practice on the ranges to
improve both their marksmanship and the rate of fire. The core to
his training scheme was 'pairing'. All riflemen were 'paired' and they
learned to train, drill and fight as partners. in action, one was
always able to offer covering fire, standing by, primed and loaded
whilst the second loaded his piece.
Officers were usually armed with personal pistols and they
carried a curved sword of light cavalry type, neither of which were
ideally suited for the actions generally experienced. Sergeants were
armed with rifles and were usually expert marksmen. many junior
officers preferred to carry rifles into action (as did James Wolfe
with his musket at Quebec in 1759). [19]
By this means they would be a useful addition to the
section's firepower and stand out less as officers.
As a testament to the calculation and accuracy of the 5th
Battalion's riflemen and the skill of Colonel de Rottenburg's
training, a report from Marechal Soult, French C. in C. in Spain, to
the Minister of War in Paris survives:
'The loss in prominent and superior officers sustained for
some time past by the army is so disproportionate to that of the
rank and file that I have been at pains to discover the reason, and I
have acquired the following information. There is in the English
(sic) army a battalion of the 60th consisting of ten companies. This
battalion is never concentrated, but has a company attached to each
infantry Division. It is armed with a short rifle; the men are
selected for their marksmanship; they perform the duties of scouts,
and in action are expressly ordered to pick off the officers,
especially Field and General officers. Thus it has been observed
that whenever a superior officer goes to the front during an action,
either for the purposes of observation or to lead and encourage his
men, he is usually hit. This mode of making war is very detrimental
to us.
Our casualties in officers are so great that after a couple of
actions the whole number are usually disabled. I saw yesterday
battalions whose officers had been disabled in the ratio of one
officer to eight men. I also saw battalions which were reduced to
two or three officers although less than one sixth of their men had
been disabled. You can imagine that if these casualties recur, it
would be very difficult to provide for the replacement of officers.'
Colonel Dumas, (on Soult's staff), claimed in support of
this that 'Les Riflemen' had been responsible for all the officer
losses between July 25 and August 31 1813, viz. 500 officers and
8 generals.
In another quotation, this time from the Battle of Vimiero,
August 21 1808, Colonel Leslie noted that, 'In this battle the 60th's
riflemen, who were all German, showed great tact in taking
advantage of the ground, and dexterity in the use of their arms. One
rifleman, offered a half-doubloon by his Brigadier (this must have
been Brigadier General Fane), for every French officer he brought
down, said as he downed a third, "By Godt I vill make my
vortune." Another, selecting a French officer as target rather than a
marksman who was alarming a visiting officer by his accuracy,
explained it coolly, "It vas more plunder". That frankness and
realism are surely in the rifleman's tradition.' He added that 'They
displayed that steadiness and cool courage so essentially requisite
to a rifleman, in not hurriedly throwing away their fore until there
was a positive chance of their fire taking effect.
During the same battle, Landmann of the Royal Engineers
recorded a conversation with a German rifleman of the 60th.
Asking the German why he did not shoot a Frenchman 60 to 80
yards away, the German replied, 'Ton't tisturp me; I vant de offizer
pecause for pe more plunder'.
As skirmishers they had to hunt and find the enemy, to
constantly worry and harry them. Their 'eyes of the army' duties
consisted mainly of scouting patrols, outlying piquet duties
vanguard patrols in the advance and as a protective rearguard in a
withdrawal. In action, riflemen were instructed to select targets and
to shoot officers so as to break the command structure, a lesson
learned from the American Revolution. That this order was
followed willingly is evident from the above quotations, as the
bodies were invariably plundered and officers offered richer
pickings. For all this, the attrition rate in the 5th Battalion amongst
all ranks was devastating. 33 officers and 1009 ORs embarked at
Cork in 1808. Few ever saw England or Germany again, as by 1814
there were only 259 remaining in the battalion.
The 5th Battalion, raised as a unit of skirmishers was
initially an experiment born out of expediency. Colonel de
Rottenburg was a very good organiser and disciplinarian, and he
swiftly turned the hotchpotch of German recruits into a highly
efficient and respected battalion. He created a new concept and a
new type of soldier, a thinking soldier, trained in all the special
skills of the Rifleman, to be the eyes of the army and deadly
sharpshooters.
Training
De Rottenburg's discipline and instruction was not
maintained by de-humanising, brutal treatment, with the constant
fear of being flogged which was the customary pattern at this time.
A more tacit form of discipline was encouraged, one that was built
on self respect and 'esprit de corps'. Basic training included not
only light infantry drill procedures and instruction but also line
infantry drill manoeuvres (such as forming part of the line, forming
square, etc.) to enable them to fight alongside line troops if the
situation arose. The training plan devised by de Rottenburg was as
laid out in his manual and concentrated on training in the field,
which included learning the 'calls'.
It was de Rottenburg who introduced 'manoeuvre by bugle
calls'. Because the men were often widely dispersed over the battle
zone, communication between company commanders and the junior
commanders of their sections and platoons was by the use of a
system of bugle calls. These bugle calls conveyed both information
and commands. Officers and sergeants also used whistles for close
signalling. [20]
The French General Foy wrote from the Peninsula: 'The
echoing sound of the Rifleman's horn answered
the double purpose of directing their movement and of signalling
those of the enemy'. This system was derived from the jagers
hunting horns. The practice continued for a hundred years. Drums
were not used in the Rifle regiments, neither were colours carried;
they had no practical purpose and would hinder their operations in
action. Training also included fieldcraft, a type of assault course,
physical fitness and swimming, as well as rifle practice on the
ranges.
All training was designed to simulate actual conditions. The
5/60th were the first to abandon the drills and rigid movements of
the Prussian march for the easy natural rhythm. The object was
maximum speed with minimum effort, 'to bring down the feet
easily without stamping and shaking the upper part of the body',
as de Rottenburg's Regulations said. Unnecessary words of
command were eliminated, including the preliminary order
"Attention". This practical form of drill went against the then
current trend to emulate the Prussian march and drills. The pace
was 140 to the minute and the 'balance step' was out. Verbal
commands, parade and field orders were given in German, as it was
the common language of the battalion. [21]
They continued to be given in German until disbandment in
1818.
The 5th Battalion embarked at Ramsgate on 31 August
1807 and sailed to Monks Town in Ireland from where they
marched to Cork. The battalion was to be part of a 9000 strong
expedition under Sir Arthur Wellesley which was to sail for South
America and attack the Spanish colonies. In the summer of 1808,
there was a political 'Right about face', bringing new orders to sail
to the Peninsula and save Portugal and Spain. The 5th Battalion
landed at Mondego Bay on 1st August 1808 as part of the 6th, the
Light Brigade commanded by Brigadier-General Fane. [22]
The first engagements of the Peninsula were at Obidos on
the 15th August and at Roliqa on the 17th. To counter the French
use of large numbers of voltigeurs Wellesley combined all the light
companies together into a light battalion under the command of the
60th. [23]
On the 18th August the companies of the 5/60th were re-
distributed: three companies with the H.Q. were left in the Light
Brigade and one company was attached to each of the other eight
brigades. This was done to give each brigade a skirmish force
capability. Dispersing the battalion throughout the Army had the
effect of involving some detachment in every action. That is how
some officers, such as Captain Schoedde managed to earn thirteen
battle honour clasps to their Peninsular Medals. [24]
It also meant that that their efforts were also dispersed.
They were thus unable to produce the big battalion 'set piece' of
the kind that that would add colour to contemporary newspaper
reports and to the later history books. The dispersion also had a
detrimental effect on discipline, especially at the low morale point
of Sir John Moore's retreat. The 5th Battalion was not in the
retreat but was divided equally with five companies attached to
Lord William Bentinck's Brigade and five companies to that of
General William Beresford's. [25]
Toulouse, 10 April 1814 was the last great victory for
Wellington and his Peninsula Army but it ended with heavy
casualties for the 5/60th. General Thomas Picton wastefully threw
his four rifle companies against the Garonne bridge. This was the
end of the 5th Battalion's most distinguished service against the
French, which had lasted unbroken from the first landing in
Portugal in 1808. There were only nine officers and 250 Riflemen
remaining after this final six weeks campaign. The company at
Bayonne had lost all its officers and was reduced to a strength of
40 O.R.s. The men who had served in the 5th Battalion had earned
15 Battle Honours and the General Honour 'Peninsular'. [26]
These men had fought their way from the coast of
Portugal, across the and plains of central Spain, to the mountains of
the Pyrenees and up to Toulouse over six long years. In doing so,
the battalion had lost 68 officers and 767 O.R.s killed and
wounded, with a further two officers and 225 O.R.s missing. The
Battle Honours won during these six years were Roli~a and
Vimiero (1808), Talavera (1809), Busaco (1810), Fuentes d'Onor
and Albuhera (1811), Cuidad Rodrigo, Badajos and Salamanca
(1812), Vittoria, Pyrenees and Nivelle 0 813), and Nive, Orthez
and Toulouse (1814).
In 1818, large reductions were made in the army and the
establishment of the 60th Regiment was reduced to just two
battalions. The 5th Battalion was disbanded at Albany Barracks on
the 25 July 1818 and many officers were put on half-pay. Of the
other ranks, the Germans and other foreigners were sent to Calais,
Ostend and Cuxhaven in the transport Crown, and the British were
drafted into the 2/60th who were then stationed at Quebec.
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