On 1 August 1808 a small British Expeditionary Force landed on the Atlantic coast of Portugal. Its objective was to assist the Portuguese in expelling the French army under General Junot which had occupied the country some nine months earlier. The British force, led by Sir Arthur Wellesley, numbered approximately 14,000 men, whereas Junot had over 25,000 troops at his disposal.

Wellesley was informed that the French occupation forces had been divided into three main armies. General Loison, with 9,000 men was near Santarem to the east, Junot had 12,000 men in and around Lisbon, and at Obidos was a further 4,400 men under Delaborde. Wellesley realised that if these forces were allowed to combine he would be overwhelmed by superior numbers but two brigades of reinforcements were already on their way. He therefore decided to march directly upon Lisbon, keeping close to the coast so that he could cover the disembarkation of the reinforcements when they arrived.

At Leira Wellesley was met by 6,000 Portuguese, 1,600 of which under Colonel Trant joined the British in their advance upon the Portuguese capital. Near Obidos, two days' march south of Leira on the road to Lisbon, Wellesley's riflemen drove in a French outpost which retired upon its main body at Obidos. Delaborde subsequently abandoned the old walled town and retreated southwards towards a line of low hills in front of the hamlet of Rolica.

Wellesley was determined to bring the French to battle. He divided his army into three columns with the intention of encircling the hills and trapping Delaborde's small force. Delaborde, however, was an experienced commander. He had detached a contingent to the east of the position which was monitoring the progress of Wellesley's principal flanking column, and as soon as Wellesley's intentions were revealed Delaborde skilfully withdrew to a second position two miles further south.

This position was upon a steep-fronted range of hills south-east of Rolica. A direct frontal attack upon such a position would have been a hazardous operation and Wellesley decided to repeat his previous pincer movement. So once again Wellesley sent a strong column under Major- General Ferguson to the east and Colonel Trant with his Caeadores to the south-west. Wellesley advanced with the main column, pushing his light infantry to the foot of the hillside to engage the French tirailleurs.

Wellesley hoped to tie Delaborde down with his skirmishers and when his flanking forces had turned the French position to make his frontal attack up the four dry ravines that cut through the hillside. Suddenly everything went wrong. Colonel Lake who was in command of the 29th Regiment, which was one of the four battalions forming the British first line, either misunderstood or deliberately disobeyed orders. Instead of just throwing out his light company Lake arranged four of his centre companies in column and advanced up ravine in his front.

As Lake advanced he came under fire from the French troops on either side of the ravine, his own men being unable to reply. But the 29th continued to climb the narrow gully "nothing", wrote William Warre, "could restrain their impetuosity" and soon they found themselves behind the French front line.

Down at the foot of the slope MajorGeneral Hill, in charge of the British 1st Brigade, ordered the 9th Regiment to help the 29th. But Lake had placed himself in an impossible situation. He was stranded in the heart of the French position and his men were caught in a narrow killing ground. Yet instead of retreating he led his four companies out of the ravine and tried to deploy them into line. The 29th never stood a chance. Delaborde's left-centre swung round upon the isolated British regiment. A few escaped back down the hill, the rest were killed or captured.

Wellesley could not allow his battalions to engage the French individually and even though his turning columns were not yet in position he was obliged to order a general attack. Because of the severity of the slope the British were unable to maintain any sort of formation. However, Wellesley's superior numbers eventually began to tell and Loison abandoned his second position in a controlled, skilful fashion. Wellesley did not follow up his success as he had learnt that Loison's Division was only five miles away.

Rolica was hailed as an Allied triumph yet it was a hollow victory. Wellesley had failed to prevent the junction of Delaborde and Loison, and despite outnumbering his enemy three to one the French had escaped with little more than 600 casualties. Colonel Lake's impetuosity had cost Wellesley almost 500 men and the chance of a decisive result. It also cost Lake his life.

SOURCE INFORMATION

Fortescue, J. History of the British Army. 1906-20
Glover, M. Britannia Sickens. 1970
Oman. G A History of the Peninsular War, 1902-50
Warre, W. Letters from the Peninsula. 1909
Weller. J. Wellington in the Peninsula. 1962