( Michele is still researching this unit, and would like help or comments from any Abanderado reader. The unit was formed within the Ascaso Column, CNT)

Well-known members: Carlo Rosselli (commander until December 1936, Giustizia e Libert…), Mario Angeloni (republican), Camillo Berneri (anarchist), Aldo Garosci (Giustizia e Libert…)

Political leaning: Giustizia e Libert…, anarchists (majority), communists (small but compact minority), republicans, socialists (minorities)

Members from: mainly Italy
Formed: August, 1936, Barcelona
Deployment ; In the Huesca sector (Aragon)
Engagements: Monte Pelato, August 28th, 1936; Huesca front, August-October, 1936; Tardienta, October 1936; Almudebar, 17th-22nd November, 1936; Carrascal de Apies, April 1937.

The Colonna or Centuria Italiana was also known as Colonna Giustizia e Libert… or later Colonna Rosselli.

By the end of July, 1936, Carlo Rosselli, the leader of the Giustizia e Libert… movement, had clear in mind his idea of forming a volunteer Italian unit to fight fascism in Spain, and news of the Italian support to the rebels strengthened his decision. He was supported by the other founders of the unit: Mario Angeloni, the republican party secretary in exile, and the anarchist leader Camillo Berneri. In August Rosselli was in Barcelona, for organizational work, and by the end of that month the new Column was in line, in the Aragon front. The choice of Barcelona as a logistical but also political base was obvious, because of the political positions of the Catalonian local government.

Not withstanding the fact that the unit was at times called "Giustizia e Libert…" ("Freedom and Justice", a democratic anti-fascist movement in exile), the majority of its soldiers were anarchists or libertarians, and there was a small but compact communist minority.

The Colonna Italiana left Barcelona for the front on August, 19th. Within a month from the "alzamiento", it was going to fight the rebels. It went to the Huesca front, with the Ascaso Column. It was deployed on a height the Italians called Monte Pelato ("Bald Mountain"), in the Sierra de Galoche, overlooking the main road Zaragoza-Huesca, not far from Almudevar. The newcomers had been given the short straw: in their sector there were no villages and no woods to provide shelter from a blistering heat, and both flanks were exposed.

The Colonna Italiana had a fusilier Company, no LMGs to speak of, and 4 cumbersome tripod MMGs ("which we have to keep under guard") that were entrusted to an under-equipped MG Company; they immediately started digging trenches. On August, 28th the Colonna received its baptism of fire: a dawn assault that was pushed back, not without losses. One of the casualties was Mario Angeloni, co-commander of Carlo Rosselli, who had been commanding the MG Company. Rosselli was wounded; Giuseppe Bifolchi, a former career officer but also an anarchist, replaced Angeloni.

The Colonna slowly acquired experience during a month of positional trench warfare with little action save patrolling. Political contrasts emerged. The unit received reinforcements, and created a supply section; the initial revolutionary militias were beginning to receive a more military-like organization, which was opposed by some elements. By mid November, the front had been pushed forward a few kilometers; a more aggressive stance was becoming possible, and indeed it was a strategic necessity in order to relieve the Nationalists' pressure on Madrid. The local sector HQ planned an offensive on Almudevar and ultimately on Huesca.

The attack was a failure. It is described in some detail by Rosselli himself, and probably the reasons for this failure are typical of the fighting in this period: general disorganization, utter lack of cooperation between different columns/sectors, communication problems. Colonel Villalba (allegedly the same officer who later lost Malaga) repeatedly promised reinforcements, that never arrived. The Del Barrio Column falsely reported to have achieved its objectives, while its encirclement attempt around Almudevar had failed; then refused to support the Ascaso Column's attack. A Rojo y Negro anarchist unit stationed in Barbastro allegedly refused to be committed because they wanted to join their own column. The artillery fire couldn't be effectively directed because no telephone cable had been made available.

In the end, the Republicans managed to improve the line, and to draw Nationalist reinforcements to the area; but that was all. On December, 6th, Rosselli resigned his command. The anarchists in the Colonna Italiana had cast a no-confidence vote after the Almudevar battle.

Many G. e L. volunteers left with Rosselli, who also suffered from poor health; some anarchists decided to join Spanish anarchist formations. The Colonna was seriously depleted. The unit survived through the winter, but small groups of volunteers continued to leave it, usually joining the now operational Battaglione Garibaldi. The Colonna Italiana gave its last battle at the Carrascal de Apies, in April, 1937. The unit was then disbanded. Survivors went to the Battaglione Garibaldi, others (especially anarchists) remained with the Ascaso Column, or possibly joined the Batallon de la Muerte.

COLONNA ITALIANA - SUGGESTED TO&Es

August, 1936:

Approximately 180 men, no mention of LMGs, 4 MMGs, 18 pack mules.

COMMAND DECISION ORGANIZATION: Green, Morale 9 (Trained, Morale 8 after first engagement)

Fusilier Company: 1 command infantry stand, 1 infantry stand

MG Company: 1 infantry stand, 1 MMG stand

October, 1936:

More than 250 men, few LMGs, 6-8 MMGs, 3 105mm mountain howitzers, " a large number of pack mules".

COMMAND DECISION ORGANIZATION: Regular, Morale 8

HQ: 1 command infantry stand, 1 support stand, 1 pack mule stand
Fusilier Company: 3 infantry stands
MG Company: 1-2 MMG stands
Battery: 1 105L12 Mtn HWR, 1 crew stand (ds), 2 pack mule stands

January, 1937

Considerably depleted.

COMMAND DECISION ORGANIZATION: Regular, Morale 8

Column: 1 command infantry stand, 2 infantry stands, 1 MMG stand

Notes:
1) Standard SCW range penalties apply to Green and Trained troops.
2) It is unclear whether the 105mm battery was part of the Colonna Italiana or actually an asset of the Ascaso Column, attached to the Italian unit. It had mixed Italian and Spanish crews.
3) The battery should rarely have more than 3 rounds.

Main sources:
Oggi in Spagna, domani in Italia, by Carlo Rosselli, 1938,1967
In Spagna per la libert…, by Marco Puppini, 1986
La Spagna nel nostro cuore - 1936-1939, ed. by the AICVAS, 1996

Editors note:

This makes a very interesting wargames unit, so I would add the following for those 'Rapid Fire ' players using ' Rompan El fuego'. Note Rompan ... is still available from me at £ 5.50

August, 1936: RAPID FIRE ORGANIZATION: militia/poor,

HQ ; 4 figures, 1 pack mule
Fusilier Company: 10 figures
MG Company: 1 MMG, 3 crew, 1 pack mule.

October, 1936: RAPID FIRE ORGANIZATION: Regular,

HQ: 4 figures, 1 pack mule .
2 Fusilier Companies : each with 8 men.
MG Company: 2 MMG, each with 3 crew and 1 pack mule
Gun Battery: 1 105L12 Mountain gun, 3 crew, 2 pack mules.

January, 1937: RAPID FIRE ORGANIZATION: Regular,

HQ, 3 figures
Column: 8 figures, 1 MMG and 3 crew