We wargamers and armchair generals don't like logistics. Our love for battles of the past started with tactics, then matured with strategy; but who cares about those rear-echelon quartermasters and their logistical tasks?

However, as soon as you start gaming with a realistic ruleset where the ammunition consumption is taken into account, you realize you have to make sure that those ammo trucks do reach your tanks from time to time. And if you play a campaign, instead of a one-off game, logistics becomes a major consideration. And rightly so. "An army marches on its stomach". Since I've developed an interest in the Spanish Civil War campaign of Guadalajara, I'll try to look at it from the logistical point of view, because I think logistics played a major part in its outcome; a part that is not always acknowledged. And I believe this battle can teach us wargaming strategists not to underestimate logistics.

THE CAMPAIGN: A SHORT SUMMARY

As we all know, the Italian Corpo Truppe Volontarie (C.T.V.) launched this offensive on March 8th, 1937. The plan was to advance in a north-east to south-west direction, along the highway to France (Carretera de Francia) on the Castillan plateau. Nationalist forces were already fighting in the south-western suburbs of Madrid, and this threat from a wholly new direction would complete the encirclement of the capital and, hopefully, lead to its fall.

The CTV had 4 small infantry divisions, a sizeable corps artillery and some armored assets; the armor was unfortunately made of the weak, MG-armed CV35 tankettes. A large proportion (well, large for the SCW) of the troops could be motorized. One of the division, the Littorio Infantry Division, was made up of regular Italian army units; the rest were Blackshirt "volunteers". A large, composite Nationalist division accompanied the effort on the right flank; the very good Aviazione Legionaria would also support the offensive from the air. The attack was launched on March 8th, notwithstanding the very bad weather.

The Republicans initially faced the onslaught with the 12th Infantry Division which, although ill-equipped and outnumbered, managed to delay the C.T.V. advance. Then, since the other fronts around Madrid remained quiet, the Republicans were able to shift their reserves in the Guadalajara area, including their best troops, such as the 11th and 12th International Brigades, El Campesino's Brigade, numerous air assets and virtually all the T26B Soviet tanks they had. Exploiting the cover offered by the Torija woods, the Republican stopped the advance on March 11th-12th.

On March 13th and 14th the village of Trijueque and the Palacio de Ibarra change hands, and the two front-line Blackshirt divisions are so worn out that they are replaced by the Littorio and the 1st Division. The weather is still very bad; the Republican air force carries out a lot of effective strikes against the C.T.V., while the Aviazione Legionaria is unable to intervene.

On March 18th the Republicans launch a heavy, well-prepared all-arms counterattack. The C.T.V. hasn't switched to a serious defensive stance. While the Littorio div. holds its ground, the Blackshirts of the 1st Division, or at least some of them, panic and run. In the following days, the C.T.V. has to withdraw several kms.

THE QUESTIONS

So much for the account of the events. But a lot of questions arise, most of them regarding the reasons behind those events. Why the C.T.V. was defeated? Was the strategy unsound, the planning poor? Was the tactics unsuitable, the execution ineffective? Were technical reasons, such as the manifest inferiority of the CV35 faced with the T26B, important as well? Morale was important? And what about logistics?

Logistics actually has more to do with this defeat than what could seem at a first glance. For instance, logistical considerations play a role in the answer to the following questions, too: what slowed the pace of the offensive from the very beginning? Why the Republican air force was able to intervene, and its counterpart wasn't? The Blackshirts panicked because their morale and motivation were abysmal to start with, or because of other considerations too?

A QUARTERMASTER'S NIGHTMARE

The C.T.V. logistics was exactly that, and from the very start of its operations in Spain. The C.T.V. was very much an improvised outfit. But even if it had been a regular army corps, the Italian army wasn't exactly rich on technical resources, stocked materials and well-trained specialists to start with; and many of those had been drained by the Abyssinian war. The problem was compounded by the extremely hurried deployment; for political reasons, a quick success seemed not only desirable, but also really possible.

The CTV had swollen to the above-mentioned strength just in a couple of months. Not even the Littorio Division was an organic unit trained as a whole. And, typically, the rear-echelon (logistical!) elements were the less cared for. For example, the lack of seriously trained specialists was sorely felt. Many of the truck drivers had had one week of training, and a very large number of trucks was therefore damaged in silly accidents during the initial movement from the debarkation port of Cadiz!

Notwithstanding the thousands of tons of materials sent to Cadiz, in January and February, the disorganization was such that some very basic materials, including spades or socks, had to be procured on the spot from Spanish sources; some couldn't simply be found, such as jerrycans. Actually, the very fact that 58 cargo ships arrived in a relatively well-equipped port as Cadiz in a short time span caused additional problems. The materials remained on the wharves while the undermanned logistics outfits frantically tried to sort them out.

The problems were further aggravated by the secrecy of the operation. Mussolini was trying to keep up the sham concept of Fascist volunteers who willingly came to serve the Nationalist of their own accord, and to keep the Italian army contribution under the counter. So, for example, a cargo ship, the Ernani, arrived in Cadiz in February, carrying 70,000 completely unmarked crates! That cargo included a lot of ammunition, but the shells had been shipped separated from their fuses for obvious safety reasons, and nobody was able to locate the fuses! This was the logistical background for the C.T.V. in the Guadalajara campaign.

A CHAIN OF UNDERESTIMATIONS

General Roatta, the C.T.V. commander, had a very simple plan for the offensive: in his words, "a straight-thrust attack". The plan heavily relied on motorization. It also included a difficult maneuver: after the Fiamme Nere Division had pierced the front line, the Penne Nere Division was to "cross over" on several fully motorized columns, and push forward. Any enemy resistance was to be "disbanded with quick fire actions" and the advancing units would halt and regroup in Guadalajara.

As you can see, the enemy was more or less expected to play dead. Roatta was underestimating his foes, because of the easy success at Malaga, or possibly because of ideological motives. Probably he was also underestimating the flaws of the "Guerra celere" (fast war) strategical doctrine. Being focused on lorried infantry, the "Guerra celere" was restricted to the road net; and it relied on its own speed and momentum to guard the flanks of the fast-advancing motorized columns.

So Roatta and most of the Italian officers also underestimated the logistical problems they had. Roatta expected to be in Guadalajara in three days at most, and he also hoped to be able to push on to Madrid. Therefore, there was no need for all the equipments and materials that a long-haul mission would require.

Roatta wrote: "troops that will wait to move until they are supplied with everything provided for by the TO&Es, will never move". In other words, you will move with what you have. More than that: sometimes you will leave behind what you do have. The Order n.3 to the Supply Services (March 4th, 1937) stressed the importance of speed and, therefore, of leaving behind all encumbrances. The Blackshirts entered the fight with food for one day. The most incredible example is that of the 3rd Division, which countermanded the Quartermaster's orders, ordered the emergency canned food to be used for the evening meal on March 8th, and left behind the ordinary supplies (meat, bread) and the kitchens.

The C.T.V. staff also underestimated the problems connected with the heavy motorization of its units, and with the lack of experience in motorized warfare. Motorization is a double-edged sword; at Guadalajara, the massing of trucks and other vehicles was such that they slowed down, instead of quickening, the movements, and the situation was worsened by the lack of experience and of traffic discipline. At times, the roads were jammed with queues of bumper-to-bumper trucks, with the echelons inextricably intermingled. Halted vehicles routinely remained on the roads. Trucks were always carried well within the enemy artillery range. But all of these problems were acknowledged only too late.

The last but not least underestimation by the C.T.V. staff regarded the environmental conditions. They should have been aware that in central Spain, on a plateau around 900 m. a.s.l., the first days of March can be very cold. They knew the weather hadn't been good. And they should have known that they had one good road only, the Carretera de Francia; most of the other roads weren't all-weather, some were just rutted tracks.

So the campaign plan was flawed by a chain of underestimations; some of them pertained to the strategy, but most of them to the logistics. And even the strategical misconceptions influenced the logistical ones.

THE ANSWERS

Now we can begin answering some of the questions. Yes, the strategy was inadequate; the plan resembled a travel march order, no thought was given to the possibility that the enemy could resist effectively, no "plan B" was devised, no serious maneuvering was employed. The strategy could work against the disorganized armed rabble Roatta expected to face, not against his actual enemy. But one of the major faults of the strategy was that it inevitably led to the underestimation of the logistical problems.

The tactics was more or less adequate, and even if local mistakes were made, their importance was relative. As to technical factors, certainly the C.T.V. was at a loss when dealing with the enemy armor, at least when on the offensive; but the rather heavy losses of T26B tanks when they were attacking makes clear that armor alone couldn't cause the C.T.V. collapse.

And the morale? Sure, the Blackshirts weren't as motivated as their enemies. But factor pertaining to the logistics also surely influenced the psychological breakdown of the soldiers in some units. All in all, the soldiers behaved creditably. And logistics played a key role in the defeat.

To start with, the initial delays on the very first day of the offensive weren't caused only by the bravery of the 12th Division's former militiamen, and by the tank counterattack at Almadrones. In fact, a traffic jam between the 2nd and the 3rd Division vehicles happened during the first hours. Road interruptions were a serious problem, in particular the blown-up bridge at Km. 104. The engineers did marvels with the few tools and supplies they had, but the heavier vehicles couldn't make it on their makeshift detours.

On March 11th, traffic jams are still very serious, and everything has still to travel on the one road available. Up to the day of the final Republican offensive, anything a C.T.V. officer needs - ammo, fuel, food, spare parts, tools, and to a certain extent even soldiers and weaponry - is likely to be bottled up a few kilometers back on the Carretera. The engineers have no barbed wire at hand, since this was an offensive. The few cumbersome and short-ranged radios become useless one by one as their batteries go dead, and spare batteries are somewhere in the rearguard. Telephones become useless too as soon as the wire reels are missing.

Meanwhile, the weather has further deteriorated. During the night, the thermometer often drops to -15øC, and freezing temperatures are prevalent through the 24 hours; when it's not raining, it snows. Now the choice to be "unencumbered", to leave those heavy kitchens behind, means the troops get no warm food - and sometimes no food at all. The decision to move without waiting for all supplies to be delivered means most soldiers have no adequate winter clothing. With those temperatures, both these factors certainly had an impact on the psychological conditions of the Blackshirts.

The bad weather also has another unexpected consequence. The Republican air force takes off form the paved airports of Madrid and Guadalajara, and, being so near its bases, can fly during the fair weather spells or even under the cloud ceiling. But the Italian and German aircraft, which should fly over the cloud-shrouded peaks of the Sierras, are grounded in their forward airfields, whose unpaved strips are flooded. So, starting with March 12th, Republican fighters and bombers are almost unopposed as they fly over the plateau. And what target would be better than that one, incredibly long column of vehicles, halted bumper-to-bumper on the coverless highway?

Of course those bombardments and strafings have both a material effect and further morale consequences. The bombardments considerably increase the combat wear of the two front-line divisions, which is already high both because of the enemy ground troops' action (obviously) and because of the weather conditions. Once Roatta decided to replace those worn-out division with his two other ones, he was left without reserves and there was little he could do after that.

Even the loss of materials and weaponry, often touted as a clear sign of a morale collapse, could be at least partially explained with this faulty logistics; two tankettes were abandoned in Brihuega because they were out of fuel, for example; and when the panicked retreat took place, several 75mm guns were left behind because their tractors had broken down and hadn't been replaced.

SO, A DEFEAT?

So, the C.T.V. was defeated. It wasn't the total Republican victory the propaganda machine vaunted. The "body count" difference wasn't very significant, and in the end the Republic had lost about 20 kms of front depth. However, the C.T.V. had been completely defeated in its objectives, it had been utterly disorganized and put out of action for a considerable time, and the morale effects, in both camps, were deep and important.

Am I saying that the one and only reason for this defeat was faulty logistics? No, of course not. As I said, the strategy was basically unsound, and the Republicans achieved a numerical superiority and they had a small but significant technology advantage. But yet, those unsound strategical evaluations and planning made the C.T.V. commanders overlook their logistical shortcomings; and these had a major impact on the outcome.

Nor am I saying that the Republicans had a better logistical organization than the Blackshirts. Of course they hadn't; it was worse, if possible. But, apart from their advantages in other spheres of warfare (better planning, numerical superiority, the T26Bs, higher morale) they also had significant logistical advantages. They weren't attacking, but defending; the more they withdrew, the closer they came to their bases; their airports' efficiency was a major logistical plus; and they weren't relying so heavily on fully motorized, gas-guzzling, road-jamming, "unencumbered" columns.

After Guadalajara, the C.T.V. top brass underwent a considerable shake-up, and deservedly so. Guadalajara remains an example of how NOT to conduct a campaign, and I hope I have demonstrated it is also an example of how not to organize the logistics of your next campaign.

Sources

La partecipazione Italiana alla Guerra Civile Spagnola 1936-1939, by Rovighi e Stefani
La logistica dell'esercito italiano (1831-1981), by Ferruccio Botti
La meccanizzazione dell'esercito fino al 1943, Vol. II, by Ceva e Curami
Guadalajara - la prima sconfitta del fascismo, by Olao Conforti
Italian Intervention in the Spanish Civil War, by John F. Coverdale