TAKEN FROM A THE DAIRY OF A GERMAN VOLUNTEER. EXTRACT FROM 'DER SPANISCHE BURGERKRIEG' PUBLISHED NUREMBURG 1987

The first Republican offensive was launched on the Huesca front in the second week of June 1937. Caballero himself had stated (I think) in April that the Government needed to win time in order to prepare itself thoroughly for large scale offensives. That was the government's strategy. In this context, the relationship between the government and the militias became even clearer - we had to refrain from launching large scale attacks so that the military impetus and material should not be expended prematurely.

Things changed with the encirclement of Bilbao. The supreme command finally had to move onto the offensive, partly to relieve Bilbao, and partly to offset the demoralising effect that would occur with a defeat at Bilbao by a success on another front.

By this time the governments high command was paying great attention to Huesca, and announced the plan of an offensive with Huesca as the objective. The big push would occur in combination with the militias of the POUM and the CNT. The united command for the eastern front had already been created in April. The militias had been paid since May by the Valencia government. The financial crisis of the Catalan Generalitat had resulted in its being unable to pay the militias after the middle of April. Incidentally, contrary to rumours spread by the PSUC, the refusal to pay the militias 150 PTAs did not create much fuss. The milicianos accommodated themselves without further ado to the unfortunate circumstances. Once paid by the Valencia government, the militias were recognised as an official army corps.

General Pozas, an old reactionary, an unpolitical soldier (as he owed allegiance to the PSUC) was appointed commander of the eastern front. His political commissar was Del Vayo. At the end of April, Pozas inspected the POUM militias on the Huesca front. He expressed his loyalty to the POUM. He had nothing to do with the political wrangling. He assured the POUM officers that their approach to the war could withstand any criticism from the professionals.

Pozas was most pleased with the results of his tour of inspection. He assured the command of the POUM's Lenin division that everything would be left as before, and the political commissars and officers would remain at their posts. Equally, from now the militia groups would be armed like the other troop units. Naive folk would have thought that everything was from now on straight forward.

We now belonged to the Republican peoples army, without, however General Pozas having to subscribe to the revolutionary soul. I do not know what position the POUM Executive Committee had adopted on it. Apparently it was in agreement with this 'solution'. The divisional command of the POUM seemed to find itself agreeing, without great discussion, with these conditions of the circumstances, once it could no longer 'talk itself out of it'.

The plan of the Huesca offensive was divided into two strategic tasks: firstly to cut off the Huesca - Jaca road, and secondly, to thrust beyond Huesca, regardless of whether it fell immediately or not, since with the road cut, Huesca would be starved out. A frontal attack on Huesca was to be avoided.

So far the plan seemed to be viable. A third operation provided for a thrust beyond Huesca up to the Ebro, in order to bring relief to Bilbao. This seemed rather utopian to us.

The main Huesca - Jaca road was the only lifeline of the almost besieged Huesca, along which flowed the towns sustenance. Cutting through it would expose the town to hunger. In such a precarious position, the enemy would be expecting an attack, and would place themselves outside Huesca for a battle. This would be far more favourable for our troops than making frontal attacks on the town. But we also had to reckon with the fact that an attempt to cut the towns lifeline would be resisted by the enemy with everything at its disposal. Every attempt by the militias to cut the road so far had been fruitless.

Much blood had been shed over this section of the Huesca front. The last attempt was by the CNT militias in April. It had almost climbed the long hillock overlooking the road, but it been repulsed with heavy losses. Had the CNT militias then possessed the material that was now employed in the Republican offensive, the objectives of the breakthrough would have been achieved.

The road was well protected. From Huesca the road rang along an incline of some hillocks, passed by the small town of Chimilla, and then dipped behind some long hillocks. The whole area lay immediately before the front line of the CNT and POUM militias. All the hillocks through which the Jaca traversed were occupied by the rebels as was Chimilla. After Chimilla there was a big hill, and from there a plain stretched out. We occupied a wood just in front of the plain, and this was the outermost end of our positions.

Considerable military forces had been concentrated for the offensive. There was the Garibaldi international brigade plus Republican army units, CNT and POUM militias, which were to intervene after the attack on Chimilla, large quantities of machine guns, hand grenades, mortars, 40 tanks, up to 150 aircraft, and adequate reserve army units such as intelligence troops, medical corps,etc. Neither the amount of equipment nor the number of personnel left much to be desired.

First Attack

The first attack was at dawn in the direction of Chimilla. Our side did not appear to have any artillery preparations on the previous day. On the other hand, the enemy which had observed our troop movements, maintained a powerful defensive fire throughout the day. The first thrusts already showed that the enemy had also concentrated its forces.

Despite extremely heavy counter fire, the International Brigade fought their way to the outskirts of Chimilla. We had carried out a feint attack during the night from our trenches to the left of Chimilla, well co-ordinated with the International Brigades attack from the right. Our field telephone reported that the first groups had infiltrated Chimilla before 9 am. Under the protection of tanks the Garibaldi shock troops had reached the first houses of Chimilla. A massive bombardment from our heavy artillery began to pound the surrounding hillocks held by the rebels. The government bombers flew in and attacked the enemy's artillery positions.

Victory seemed certain. With the occupation of Chimilla, the offensive against the rebel hillocks on the Jaca road had become possible.

But it became clear that the shock troops were unable to hold Chimilla. The reinforcements apparently could not be brought in quickly enough. Moreover, the rebels rapid withdrawal had deceived Poza's staff as to the actual strength and operational intentions of the enemy. We did not know what the enemy had been doing in Chimilla. It was not possible to take the town by a surprise attack.

We heard that the retreating rebels had regrouped and returned to Chimilla and were able to drive our troops out. They spared no energy in their counter attack. Once back in their positions the rebels let loose Heavy machine gun and mortar fire upon our now retreating troops, who were an easy target in open terrain. Our whole operation was a failure.

There was a respite from the fighting for the infantry columns. A new assault upon Chimilla had been prepared, this time making full use of the airforce and artillery.

Chimilla was subjected to intense bombing by around 50 or 60 government planes among them 5 Russian trimotors. These we saw for the first time. They seemed to be larger and more powerful than the Junkers. Again and again they circled over Chimilla dropping an enormous amount of bomb. Chimilla was veiled in smoke for two hours.

We thought that no stone could be left standing on another after that. All life seemed extinguished. The capture of Chimilla would be a walkover. The enemy airforce had not showed itself. The Garibaldis once more stormed the town, this time in broad daylight. Suddenly the enemy machine guns hammered out. They had escaped the bombardment. We learnt how the machine gun is able to triumph over heavy military equipment. It remains the most deadly of weapons. The rebels slew row after row of our attacking troops. The machine gunners must have been devilishly tough Civil Guards.

The intervention of our tanks could not delay any further the collapse of our attack .Their freedom of movement was severely restricted by the barrage from the enemies rapid firing guns. From our position we saw three tanks knocked out (we only had 8 in total out of the 40 we had been promised). The tanks were powerless in the face of such a barrage. They presented an easy target on the plain. They drove desperately to and fro, firing ineffectively at Chimilla's houses with their small calibre guns. Within range of heavy artillery the tank is a weapon of doubtful value.

A further attack that same night failed as well. Violent aerial battles broke out over the next three days. For a while 150 of our planes were involved against 50 or 60 rebel planes transferred from other fronts.

The offensive had cost us some 3000 lives. A few days later we heard that Bilbao had fallen.