On 3 October 1993, elements of Task Force Ranger launched a dramatic and daring daylight assault on a suspected Habar-Gedir clan leadership meeting in downtown Mogadishu, Somalia. The political fallout from this bloody firefight would forever cast doubt upon the extraordinary heroism and acts of valor displayed by the American soldiers. This operation was a complete tactical success mired by the political fiasco than ensued.

In February 1991, a multinational coalition launched the ground phase of Operation Desert Storm to free the people of Kuwait from the fist of the dictator Saddam Hussein. The stunning success of Desert Storm has forever changed the American public’s perception of modern warfare. The American public now perceives modern warfare as a bloodless battle in which there will be very few American casualties. This stigmatism by the American public impedes them from recognizing the 3 October 1993 skirmish as the tactical success that it is.

Task Force Ranger’s plan that fateful afternoon was a simple one. Four MH-6 “Little Bird” choppers would insert 32 Delta Force Commandos (D-Boys) on HA WL W Adig Road, directly in front of the target house. Once inside, 4 chalks of Rangers would fast rope from MH-60 Pave Hawk helicopters into blocking positions on the four intersections surrounding the target house. They would provide exterior security for the D-Boys inside the target house. The D-Boys would seize the attendees of the clan meeting and load them aboard the waiting convoy of 5-ton utility trucks and armored Humvee’s. The D-Boys and Rangers would then load up on the same convoy and deliver the prisoners for interrogation. The plan was a simple yet effective one.

The objective of the raid was the capture and return of the meeting attendees for interrogation. Task Force Ranger brought back twenty-one of the twenty-two Somali prisoners they seized at the target house alive. The only prisoner that was not turned over for interrogation suffered a fatal head wound in the back of the five-ton truck he was transported in.

Keni Thomas was a Ranger who took part in the 3 October 1993 raid in Mogadishu. He has since been discharged from the Army and is therefore able to talk about the actions that occurred during those fateful 14 hours. When questioned, he had this to say:

“Even when the Congressional hearings took place very little was publicized. I fully understand classified information and sensitive material. But I did not understand why the military would not want to share this story of a great military victory-regardless of the flawed policy that put us there.” [1]

American forces were withdrawn from operations in Somalia shortly after the 3 October 1993 skirmish. President Clinton said the following to the returning members of the 10th Mountain Division who took part in the rescue operation to extract the besieged elements of Task Force Ranger.

“If there are any debates still to be had about our mission in Somalia, let people have those debates with me. But let there be no debate about how you carried out your missions...You have shown the world what Americans are made of. Your nation is grateful and your President is terribly, terribly proud of you.” [2]

Operation Desert Storm is measured as a success because it achieved its mission-the removal of Iraqi forces from the nation of Kuwait. The 3 October 1993 mission was also successful because its mission parameters were accomplished. The political outcome is decidedly different. The American public was unable to comprehend this skirmish as a victory because they were unable to believe a military victory had been achieved, even though there were significant numbers of American casualties. The American public allowed the media to pass judgment about the success of the mission. This was severely hampered by the media’s quest for headlines and their nearly universal lack of tactical expertise.

On 14 November 1965, 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry conducted an air-mobile assault on landing zone X-Ray. Their mission was to seek out and engage suspected elements of the North Vietnamese Army (NVA). LTC Harold G. Moore was the Battalion Commander of this force. LTC Moore used his tactical knowledge and superior firepower to drive back a numerically superior NVA attacking force. During the first stages of the battle, Moore’s battalion was outnumbered 10 to 1. When Moore’s battalion was extracted on 16 November, they had sustained casualties of 79 killed and 121 wounded, nearly a 50% casualty rate. This battle was a tactical success because they achieved their mission objectives.

On 25 June 1950, the North Korean Army attacked southward across the 38th parallel into South Korea. By August 1950, the American 2nd Infantry Division had settled into the Pusan perimeter. Their mission was to hold the Pusan perimeter until a counter-offensive could be launched. The soldiers holding the Pusan perimeter experienced heavy casualties, but they accomplished their mission. They held the perimeter and afforded General Douglas MacArthur a port from which to launch the 15 September 1950 amphibious landing at Inchon. These landings allowed the American forces to cut the North Korean supply lines effectively halting their offensive. This battle is judged by history as resounding success because the 2nd Division accomplished its mission objective by holding the Pusan perimeter.

A mission is successful if it accomplishes it mission statement and commanders intent. Success is not to be judged by the casualties that resulted, or the flawed policies that led to the mission’s conception. The mission is a success if its participants achieve the objectives they are assigned. Task Force Ranger achieved the purpose of their mission, therefore, the 3 October 1993 mission was a military success.

Notes

[1] Keni Thomas, “Somalia Ambush”,(Internet: E-mail to Frontline, Accessed: 23 Jan 99), Available from http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ambush/talk/ranger3.html
[2] Kenneth Allard, Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned [Book Online], National Defense University Press, 1995, accessed 23 Jan 99; available from http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ambush/readings/conclusions.html

Works Cited

DeLong, Kent, Steven Tuckey, Mogadishu! Heroism and Tragedy, Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1994.
John Pimlott, James Harpur, ed., Vietnam: The Decisive Battles, New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1990.
Keni Thomas, “Somalia Ambush,”(Internet: E-mail to Frontline, Accessed: 23 Jan 99), Available from http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ambush/talk/ranger3.html
Kenneth Allard, Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned [Book Online], National Defense University Press, 1995, accessed 23 Jan 99; available from http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ambush/readings/conclusions.html
Korean War Events, accessed 03 Feb 99; available from http://violet.berkeley.edu/~korea/warevents.html
Mark Bowden, “Blackhawk Down,” Philadelphia Inquirer, 16 November 1997, accessed 22 Jan 99; available from http://www3.phillynews.com/packages/somalia/nov16/default16.asp

Other Sources for Research

SOMALIA ON FIVE DOLLARS A DAY A Soldier's Story by Martin Stanton 240 x 159mm. 368 pages; 36 illustrations, 2 maps. Hbk. ISBN: 0-89141-741-9. £21.50. (Presidio) SPIRIT,

BLOOD AND TREASURE The American Cost of Battle in the 21st Century by Donald Vandergriff 240 x 159mm. 368 pages. Hbk. ISBN: 0-89141-735-4. (Presidio) HOSTAGE RESCUE

MANUAL Tactics of the Counter-Terrorism Professionals by Leroy Thompson 216 x 185mm. 192 pages. 50 b/w photographs and diagrams. Pbk. ISBN 1-85367-472-9. (Greenhill)

Counter-Terrorism Equipment Revised Edition by Ian V. Hogg 154 x 213mm, landscape. 144 pages. 150 illustrations. ISBN 1-85367-497-4. Greenhill Military Manuals (Greenhill) The World's Elite Forces: Arms and Equipment Revised Edition by Will Fowler 154 x 213mm, landscape. 144 pages. 130 illustrations. ISBN 1-85367-495-8. Greenhill Military Manuals (Greenhill)

The World's Elite Forces: Small Arms and Accessories by John Walter 154 x 213mm, landscape. 144 pages. 136 illustrations. ISBN 1-85367-496-6. Greenhill Military Manuals (Greenhill)