Editor: Peter asked me to fit in some additional commentary on Prince Waldeck's account of the Battle of Fontenoy, as trnslated by James Mitchell in the last issue, Volume VIII Issue No. 3]

Recently I researched the Dutch achievement in the battle of Fontenoy for an article in the British magazine Battlefields. Colin's work on Fontenoy was also one of my primary sources and I have also read Waldeck's account, referred to by James Mitchell. Acknowledging that James only presented a translation of an account, without defending it, he nevertheless has invited me with this to try to demonstrate that personal accounts of commanding officers who were present at a battle are not necessarally reliable sources.

When analyzing and comparing three major accounts (see below), it appeared to me that the Dutch commander, Prince Waldeck, either wasn't fully aware of things happening on the (other parts of) field, or he has tried to present a different view to his superiors, e.g. the States General. They give quite a different view on how, and in which order, things occued during the battle. I want to emphasize that the Dutch attack on the French right wing (between Antoing and Fontenoy) comprises three phases. Please refer to the accompanying map for the main positions.

(1) The Feint Attack

At about 5:30 AM Waldeck launched a feint attack from his position between Bourgeon and Vezonchaux, where the cavalry was deployed on the left flank, the infantry on the right. See position AA on the map. They advanced upon the left (from their point of view)side of Fontenoy. Coming under fire from the French artillery, the cavalry branched off to Peronne whilst the infantry retired. It was this feint, which actually revealed the French artillery positions to Waldeck as well as the three redoubts. This compensated for his (supposed?) lack of reconnaissance. The French accounts however, state that the redoubts were not completed at the start of the battle and were hardly suited to hold artillery.

(2) First Assault of Line Antoing-Fontenoy

This assault was launched at 9 AM as part of a general advance of the entire allied line. The deploying British on the allied right, had forced Waldeck to shift some battalions from his right to his left flank. The left infantry flank, commanded by the old-aged Cronstrom, eventually included 8 battalions and 14 light artillery pieces, and ended up deployed behind the cavalry (28 squadrons) near Peronne. This latter was commanded by the Prince HessenPhilipsthal. The right flank infantry, commanded by Waldeck personally, comprised 20 battalions and 14 light artillery pieces and was reinforced by 4 Hanoverian battalions. The latter were to assault Fontenoy at a 90-degree angle with his right flank infantry. As a reserve, 12 squadrons and six 6-pounders stayed behind on a hill near Bourgeon.

Troops were in this position at 7:30 AM (see positions BB on the map), but the attack was delayed until 9 AM because Waldeck couldn't find Cumberland and had to discuss the situation with the British general Ligonier. The assault of Fontenoy failed despite the bombardment of the battery near Bourgeon and the staunch attitude of the Hanoverians. It probably was the Dutch infantry who were to blame for the failure, but their task was almost impossible. On Waldeck's left, the infantry moved forward through the cavalry line, but was met by such devastating fire from the French artillery, that the attack soon grounded to a halt.

(3) Second Assault of the Line Antoing-Fontenoy

During the first assault De Saxe had ordered his dragoons to move from behind the redoubts to safeguard the escape route to the pontoons over the river Scheldt. Instead, some cavalry regiments had been ordered to move from the center to the right wing, as well as some infantry. Probably this redeplyment was going on at 11 AM when a second attack on the entire line Antoing-Fontenoy was launched by Waldeck.

To this end he ordered his cavalry reserve forward to fill the gap between his left flank and the river Scheldt. Also, 5 squadrons of his main cavalry force were ordered forward to till the gap between both infantry flanks, while the remainder of the cavalry stayed in the same position near Peronne. See positions CC on the map. 

It was only now that Waldeck's right flank infantry was reinforced by the Black Watch Highlanders (togeather again with some Hannoverian and British infantry). Up to that time they had been detached with Brigadier lngoldsby's brigade which had tried and failed to clear the Barri Wood and the Eu Redoubt on its edge (both on the allied center and right wing).

Once again, Waldeck's right flank infantry, consisting of 8 rallied battalions, failed to carry the entrenchments in and around Fontenoy. Again the Hanoverians and British almost managed to gain a foothold in the town suburbs, but were for a second time forced to retire because of lacking support from the Dutch. Waldeck's left flank infantry is credited by several French accounts, but was charged with an extremely difficult mission. The cavalry reserve on the left flank also soon retired under the artillery cross-fire as did the cavalry detachment between both infantry wings. From the latter, some squadrons even fled through their own camp. The main cavalry stayed unemployed near Peronne, just taking casualties from the French artillery. Soon the entire attack was to be cancelled.

Conclusion

Reading the above, one might wonder on what information Waldeck based his account. I do not wish to claim that my interpretation of the accounts in the bibliography below is the correct one. However, comparing this one again with Dutch accounts gives me the feeling of not being far from the truth. As for Skrine, I must say that his interpretation of the order in which events happened is a bit confusing, to say the least. I leave it up to you to decide which account represents the truth.

Bibliography

J. Colin: Les campagnes du Marechal de Saxe Vol. III (1906).
K. and K. Kriegsarchiv (Vienna): Der Osterreichischer Erbefolgekrieg 1740 - 1748 band IX (1906-1914). Skrine: Fontenoy and Britain's Share in the War of Austrian Succession (1906).

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