[The following account of the battle was written by the Dutch commander, Prince von Waldeck. It is an excerpt from his journal and has been translated from Jean Lambert Alphonse Colin's three volume work, Les Campagnes du Marechal de Saxe, Paris, (1901-06). Volume III deals exclusively with the Battle of Fontenoy. Apparently Colin must have died before he finished his work, since the subsequent campaignes of de Saxe were not touched upon. Nevertheless Colin's treatment of Fontenoy is exhaustive and contains orders of battle, marching orders, dispatches, casualty lists, and numerous eyewitness accounts.

Prince Waldeck's description of the battle is one of the few Dutch accounts, but is perhaps one of the most important in that Waldeck was commander of all the Dutch forces. Most accounts of the battle, both British and French, lay much of the blame for the Allies' defeat squarely at the feet of the Dutch who are often accused of martial timidity or inept leadership. Very rarely, if at all, have the histories given the Dutch side of the battle. Few historians have noted that the Dutch were ordered to assault the most heavily fortified portion of the French line encompassing two fortified towns (Anthoing and Fontenoy) and the space between them which was protected by a sunken road and three redouts (or, as Waldeck describes them, fleches).

Waldeck's journal is interesting in that it characterizes the Dutch efforts as being far more energetic than conventional wisdom would otherwise assert. Waldeck comes across as fervently committed to the attack and ready for one more assault only to have his plans dashed by the news of the British retreat. He also sounds meticulous in his planning of the retreat of his army that followed. Nevertheless it is questionable as to how meticulous, or competant, he and his generals really were when one considers the huge numbers of Dutch artillery and wagons that were captured by the French immediately after the battle. Finally Waldeck concludes his entry with a brief reference to the panic which seems to have struck some of his cavalry during the battle. Such candor is rare.]

11 MAY

The 11th at 2:00 in the morning our army set in march in four columns, leaving the prepared camp, and, besides the regular guards, a lieutenant colonel and 500 men from each wing to guard the equipment and camp. These four columns marched in the same order that the detachment of the prior day had marched, but by new routes.

And the two columns of the right wing came to carry between the wood of Barry and the village of Vezon, which they had behind their left, in four lines: the first two of infantry and the last two of cavalry.

The two columns of the left wing were placed in battle in two lines, resting their right on the first two lines of the right wing, and their left on the wood of Peronne, which led to the Scheldt.

All our artillery was arranged by brigade across the entire front of the infantry. I left only a battery of cannon of 6 lb. balls on the height where the cavalry had been posted the previous day, which fired into the village of Fontenoy.

The enemy, who had passed all the night under arms and in entrenching, appeared for battle at the same time as we did, before his camp in several lines, supporting his right on the borough of Anthoing, which they had filled up with artillery and infantry. His left passed behind the wood of Barry, at the tip of which they had built two large redoubts replete with artillery and infantry. Before his center was the village of Fontenoy. They had put an entrenchment around the cemetery of this village, of which the situation was already very advantageous. In that cemetery, there were four batteries of cannon and some infantry, and behind this village several lines of infantry.

Between Fontenoy and the borough of Anthoing, they had built three fleches which were furnished with artillery. In front of these fleches ran a sunken road, almost from one village to the other; the depth of this road, which was filled with infantry, diminished on approaching Fontenoy.

From this village as far as the wood of Barry there was also a sunken road which they had filled up with infantry. 

There had been a very violent cannonade of some sort since 5:00 a.m. Our reserve corps, which had been placed to the right of our right wing, went into the wood around 7:00 a.m. and faced the enemy. Since the English and Hanoverian detachments were not sufficiently advanced the previous day, they had such a narrow front that it was a very long time before they could be put into battle. Thus I had to retire two battalions on the right of our second line and sent them to fill the gaps which were still on the left, and it was only around 9 o'clock that I urged general Ligonier to go forward with the right wing, and I then made the left wing march, after they had fixed bayonets. Around 9 o'clock, all our army moved off at the same time; our right was going to attack the left of the enemy and the first redoubt which was at the point of the wood of Barry; our center, where the Hanoverian infantry were, and the twelve Dutch battalions that I led myself, was to attack the village of Fontenoy, and the remainder of the left wing advanced with M. Cronstrtim until they were within long musket range of the enemy. The right wing pushed the enemy first, chasing him from the sunken road, and seized a few pieces of cannon, but the fire from the redoubt that they could not take, and from one of the batteries of Fontenoy that took them in flank, obliged them twice to retire.

The center first cleared the enemy from every house that was around the cemetery, upon which were made several useless assaults. While the assault was in progress, I sent one of my aides de camp with orders to M. Cronstrbm, who was on the left of our infantry, to advance with the eight battalions and to chase the enemy from the road which was in front of the fleches, in order to give an opening to our cavalry to attack the enemy position. The terrific fire that emanated from those fleches and from the village of Fontenoy, which took them in the flank, prevented them from advancing. I ran there to oblige them to advance and so ordered M. Cronstrom, who began to move them off; but since the main thing was Fontenoy, I returned there in order to encourage this attack, and in order to make it with more success, the battalion of my first regiment came from the reserve and someone also sent the Scots Highlanders. In the tour that I made on our left, having taken note that our advance in front of the ground had widened, and that they could no longer embarrass those who were between Anthoing and the left of our infantry, I ordered Colonel Eck to withdraw the twelve squadrons that were on the height, as reserves in place of the former, with Lieutenant General Coenders, in order to fill that void, and put Brigadier Schlippenbach with some squadrons between the battalions which were with M. Cronstrom and those that were around Fontenoy, in order to be ready to pass and take that village in reverse as soon as the attack that I had ordered to this general should succeed.

Finally, around 1 o'clock in the afternoon, I wished to make a fresh attack on Fontenoy to take it in reverse; having in passing noticed that the enemy was preparing to withdraw his artillery from the flech closest to this village. I had gotten my regiment to go there, and as I prepared to move it forward, someone came to warn me that the English were retiring. I went from there very quickly to the right wing where I found General Ligonier, who, having told me that his Royal Highness and M. the Marshal, seeing the impossibility of carrying the redoubt and the cemetery of Fontenoy, had ordered the retreat, I saw that in fact the right wing had withdrawn. I returned to my wing to order our retreat. During my absence, my regiment against my orders, attacked the cemetery again; but not having been supported by the regiments that were on its right, it withdrew into the houses in the village from where I made it retire. I ordered first the removal the artillery, but most of the horses had been killed or ran away, so that it was necessary to reclaim it by hand, a very lengthy and difficult piece of work, since the terrain was very uneven; I then had the infantry march, then the cavalry, and left as rear guard for one of the columns the regiment of the Foot Guards and that of the Dragoon Guards, and for the other column my regiment and that of the Carabiniers. In the meantime I received a small note from the Duke in which were these words:

"My Prince, I retire beneath the cannon of Ath;" signed: "William."

I ordered our generals who led the head of our two columns to retire at the small pace to our camp and make arrangements to strengthen our left flank which was exposed. Cornabe, one of my aides de camp, upon returning with the right, noticed five pieces of cannon and a howitzer that someone had abandoned near Fontenoy. He notified General Aylva of this who put the about-face to the regiments of Salis, Constant, Sturler and the one of Waldeck, and with detachments from this corps, those pieces of artillery were withdrawn and brought back by brute force.

The retreat of our wing was made in very good order and at the small pace; as soon as it had gone into the camp, I went to the Duke to deter him from marching this evening to Ath, but to postpone this march until the morrow, since it didn't appear that the enemy made any disposition to pursue us and that anything could happen in the muddle of a night march. After a lot of insistence, he only agreed not to march until 10 o'clock in the evening. I returned to my quarters in order to write orders and make marching arrangements around 7 o'clock in the evening; someone came to tell me that the English were already marching toward Ath; I returned in an instant to the Duke, for M. the Marshal had already left, to beg him to defer his march until arrangements could be made to insure that it could be made in safety. He told me that he had already taken his measures for the right wing, sending General Ligonier ahead with 1000 infantrymen and 400 horses in order to cover his march, and that if I didn't march in a half-hour, he would march.

Right after the action, I had sent Brigadier Schlippenbach with 500 horse to Leuze near which the enemy could have cut off our retreat and had arranged all the baggage to leave under a good escort. Finally, at 9:00 p.m., seeing that the English were marching, I put our troops in motion in two columns and made two rear guards: one of six battalions, commanded by General van der Duyn and two regiments of cavalry; and another of two battalions and a regiment of dragoons under the command of General Villattes, after whom were another 200 horses and 100 hussars. I marched with my troop as far as La Catoire where I passed the night; the English, and Hanoverians having gone straight to Ath; and the following day I arrived with it at 8:00 a.m. close by this position.

During the action, the regiment of Hess-Hombourg and a cornet and some Carabiniers had taken flight and had given the alarm to the camp and even robbed some of the camp guard; this was the reason that most of the camp guard had already departed for Ath when we withdrew to the camp.