For those who know it, the name "William Augustus, Duke of Cumberland" invariably and all too frequently evokes a series of unpleasant images. Known as the loser of the battles of Fontenoy and Laffeldt during the War of the Austrian Succession, the vanquished general of Hastenbeck during the Seven Years War who "humiliated" his father-king by the Convention of Kloster Zeven, and, after his one signal victory during the Scottish rising of 1745, nicknamed the "Butcher" of Culloden, Cumberland has not been regarded very sympathetically by posterity. Now Rex Whitworth, who wrote Gunner at Large and Lord Ligonier, has authored a very readable account of the life of this controversial Duke which does much to restore some of the luster to Cumberland's tarnished escutcheon.

Born April 15, 1721, at Leicester House, London, Cumberland was the second, and favorite, son of George Augustus, the future George 11, and was the first of the Hanoverians to regard himself as a true Englishman.

He showed an early aptitude for things military and was with his father at Dettingen, in 1743, with the rank of major-general. In this battle he was seriously wounded by French grape shot just below the knee. Although he recovered, his wound never properly healed and was to plague him for life, periodically reopening during times of ill health. Rising quickly through the officer ranks, he was promoted in 1745 to the position of "Captain-General of His Majesty's land forces..." a position which had been last held by Marlborough.

Although defeated by the French Marshal Maurice de Saxe at Fontenoy on 11 May, 1745, Cumberland's reputation was nonetheless enhanced by his physical courage under fire and his concern for the well being of his troops during the retreat. After the battle, much of the blame for the defeat was laid at the feet of Brigadier Ingoldsby, who had failed to advance through the Barri wood with four battalions of infantry and seize a key redoubt. Later, the blame was shifted onto the Dutch troops who had allegedly failed to press home their supporting attack on the British left.

Upon Charles Edward Stuart's raising of the Jacobite standard in Scotland in 1745, Cumberland was called home with part of his army to try to halt the series of military reverses suffered by the government troops at the hands of the "Young Pretender's" army. 16 April, 1746, the day after Cumberland's twenty-fifth birthday, was to become the defining moment of his career. Upon the field of Culloden he administered the death blow to Jacobite aspirations by decisively defeating the army commanded by Charles Edward Stuart and Lord George Murray thus ending the last of the Scottish rebellions.

This victory propelled Cumberland to the height of his popularity. He was feted and toasted throughout England as the man who had saved his country from insurrection. Although Cumberland has been criticized throughout history for his alleged atrocities in the aftermath of the battle, it would appear that it was in fact the zeal of some of his less disciplined subordinates that led to the acts of cruelty for which various unrepentant Jacobites were to blame him. In fact, Cumberland saw things in simple black and white; he offered leniency to those who chose to lay down their arms and a speedy execution for those who did not. In light of the morals of the eighteenth century, this is not the attitude of an unfair man.

Once more he returned to France where he was again defeated by Saxe, this time at the battle of Laffeldt on June 21, 1747. Once again, however, his reputation was undiminished because the Dutch, again, and the Austrians were blamed for their failure to advance.

With the resumption of hostilities between France and England which became known as the Seven Years War, Cumberland was again in command of an army, however this army was not English. After several other candidates had been considered and rejected, Cumberland, at Frederick's suggestion, was placed in command of an army of Hanoverians, Brunswickers, Hessians, and other German states referred to as the "Army of Observation."

After a period of maneuvers, mostly retrograde on the part of the Army of Observation, The French Marshal le Comte D'Estrees brought Cumberland to battle at the town of Hastenbeck on the 24th through 26th of July, 1757. Fighting against a vast French army twice the size of his own, Cumberland finally broke off the engagement and ordered a withdrawal.

Cumberland retreated to a new position at Stade where he was given carte blanche by his father to negotiate a separate peace on George's behalf as Elector between Hanover and her allies and the French. On 8 September, Cumberland signed the Convention of Kloster Zeven with the Duc de Richelieu, the new French commander, thus putting a temporary halt to hostilities against the French.

When Cumberland returned to England, he discovered to his chagrin that George II was irate with him over what the Duke himself thought had been honorable terms. When an audience with the king failed to mollify the willful and petulant monarch, Cumberland resigned his command and title of captain-general and thus ended his military career.

Perhaps Cumberland's greatest contribution to his country, after Culloden, was his series of army reforms. Cumberland advocated a unified code of regulations for the regiments regarding nomenclature, replacing the regimental colonel's name with an identifying number, and standardizing uniform and facing colors. He was also an early advocate of a standardized drill for all regiments and encouraged promotion of officers through merit rather than the buying and selling of offices. He showed a great interest in engineering and artillery, and both of these disciplines were professionalized during his tenure.

In his private life, Cumberland was a patron of the architectural and horticultural arts, spending thousands of pounds on redecorating his estates and introducing hundreds of species of trees and other plants to their grounds. He was also a fastidious judge of horseflesh and an enthusiastic breeder of race horses, doing much to rejuvenate the bloodlines of England's racing stock.

If any major criticism is to be leveled at this biography, it involves the lack of proof reading that went into the final product. In addition to the usual typographical errors, there are several places where a sentence which is split at the bottom of one page does not continue at the top of the next. Also, several other sentences, or parts thereof, are repeated twice in a row. One would hope that these problems will be corrected in future additions.

Another criticism is that Mr. Whitworth obviously admires Cumberland (maybe a bit too much) and tends to gloss over some of his failings. It is all too convenient to blame the defeat at Fontenoy on the alleged lackluster advance of the Dutch (whose left flank was being bombarded by French siege artillery from the other side of the river Scheldt while they attempted to advance on two fortified towns), or on the timidity of Ingoldsby in not advancing through the woods of Barri (with troops trained to fight in the open). Cumberland has been faulted by at least one other historian (Col. H.C.B. Rogers, The British Army of the Eighteenth Century, page 199) for attaching himself to the column of Anglo- Hanoverian troops which advanced against the French center, thus placing himself out of communications with the rest of his army. This criticism was not addressed at all. In fact, Mr. Whitworth tends to gloss over the low points of Cumberland's military career ands devotes the most detail to his victory at Culloden.

Only a nation of masochists would wish to linger overly long on each minute tidbit of every military misforturie. Nevertheless, history demands a reasonably complete accounting of martial failures as well as successes.

William Augustus: Duke of Cumberland is available from Articles of War bookstore [Telephone 708-674-7445] for $35.95. It is 265 pages in length with illustrations and maps. Although no detailed orders of battle are provided, it is well worth the price for providing a new insight on a controversial and often misunderstood commander who was certainly no butcher and, but for the timing of his birth, may have made a good king.