The following excerpts from The Expanding World by Esmond Wright, (Chartwell Books, Secaucus, NJ, 1979) provide a concise overview of diplomatic and political events leading up to the War of Austrian Succession in 1740. In brief, it gives us an idea as to who the major powers were, which ones were in decline, and provides a context for the wars that dominated the middle third of the Eighteenth Century.

Until the early decades of the eighteenth century, certain constant diplomatic factors had guided generations of rulers. The conflict between France and the Hapsburgs had polarized European diplomacy for two centuries, offering other states the clear alternative of joining one side or the other; and in eastern Europe, the struggle against the enemy of Christendom, Ottoman Turkey, was still older. Even the Swedish attempt to dominate the Baltic dated back to the 1640's.

By 1713 the familiar patterns had begun to disappear. France, exhausted by Louis XIV's wars and ruled in turn by a pacific regent, a pacific minister, and a feeble king (Louis XV) ceased to dominate Europe. With Spain no longer ruled by a Hapsburg, and imperial power negligible, Austria became a mainly east European power. The liberation of Hungary ended the Muslim threat to Christendom, and Turkey became more or less another member of the European state system. And at the Battle of Poltava (1709) Sweden was once and for all destroyed as a great power by the armies of Peter the Great.

(Editor: the Great Northern War, principally between Sweden and Russia continued until 1721, but Sweden was generally on the defensive after Poltava).

The traditional alliances were no longer satisfactory, though it was more than half a century before they were abandoned. For at least a generation, Austria, Britain and Holland had combined to resist France, whose traditional allies were Sweden, Turkey and Poland.

By 1748, the Dutch, like the Swedes and the Turks, were no longer a force in Europe, while Britain and France were increasingly absorbed in a struggle for empire outside of Europe. Even more important was the rise of two new states: Prussia, which rivalled Austria for primacy in Germany and Russia, which established a virtual protectorate over France's old dependent, Poland.

The Franco-Austrian rapprochment of 1756 was the first drastic realignment prompted by the changed balance of forces. It was the prelude to an even greater change: the division of Europe into separate diplomatic spheres: the west, where Britain, France and Spain fought intermittently for colonies; and in the east, where Russia, Prussia and Austria manoeuvered or combined to decide the fate of their weaker neighbors.

The Peace of Utrecht

The War of the Spanish Succession (1701-13) was effectively ended by the Peace of Utrecht (1713). Its chief results were that France, though almost brought to her knees in the last years of the war, secured the Spanish throne for Louis XIV's grandson, who became Phillip V; and that Spain lost all of her European possessions, most of which were taken over by Austria. Thus Spain passed from the Hapsburg family to the Bourbons, and Austria became the paramount power in Italy as well as acquiring the Spanish Netherlands (Belgium). The Duke of Savoy gained Sicily and some territory in mainland Italy; and various other provisions were made to contain France and reward members of the anti-French coalition. Britain's gains were mainly colonial, but her retention of Gibraltar and Minorca increased her power in the Mediterranean and ensured future conflicts with Spain.

Keeping the Peace

In 1716 the Austian armies under Eugene began a war against the Turks that culminated in the victorious peace of Passarowitz (1718). The most important event of 1716 was, however, the Anglo-French alliance, to which the Dutch also adhered (1717). Neither Britain's new Hanoverian king nor France's regent was entirely secure: and both countries were war weary. They had a shared interest in maintaining European peace.

It was partly Anglo-French diplomacy that brought the Great Northern War (1700-21) to an end, though it did little to affect its outcome: Sweden ceded her eastern Baltic possessions to Russia and fell from the ranks of the great powers; Russia, as later became apparent, joined them.

Before the pacification of the Baltic had been completed, the western Mediterranean became the potential centre of a new European war. Spain attacked and captured Sardinia (1717) and Sicily (1718). The powers reacted swiftly. The Austrians adhered to the BritishFrench-Dutch system (Quadruple Alliance of 1718); and a few days later a British fleet defeated the Spaniards off Cape Pessaro. Phillip was compelled to make terms by a French invasion of Spain (1719). The immediate result of the crisis was that the Duke of Savoy was compelled to cede Sicily to Austria in return for the poorer island of Sardinia, of which he became king. The self-imposed peace-keeping mission of France, Britain and Holland appeared to have succeeded.

In fact, nothing had been solved. Spain remained disatisfied despite the promises of territory in Italy. Charles VI of Austria, resenting his dependence on the maritime powers, attempted to get a share in overseas trade for Austria through his Ostend Company (1722). In 1725 Spain and Austria became allies -- the outstanding geopolitical absurdity of a period marked by halfhearted attempts to adjust to changed conditions. Faced by a British-French-Prussian combination, Austria backed down.

(Editor: more so to curry their support for the Pragmatic Sanction, which would ensure Maria Theresa's ascension to the Hapsburg throne after Charles VI's death).

Spain fought a brief war against Britain (1727), unsuccessfully beseiging Gibraltar, until French diplomatic pressure forced her to make peace. Charles VI abandoned the Ostend Company and collected British (Treaty of Vienna) and Dutch guarantees of the Pragmatic Sanction, which had now become his chief diplomatic aim. The ultimate success of Spanish policy demonstrated that, in a period when the great powers were concerned to preserve peace, a second-class power could exploit its nuisance value to make limited gains.

In the 1720's and 1730's British policy was directed by Robert Walpole and French policy by Cardinal Fluery, men of similar pacific outlook. While they stayed in control, Anglo-French relations remained good, though in the decade after 1731 Britain played little part in European affairs. The French war party, on the other hand, dragged the reluctant Fluery into yet another round of BourbonHapsburg conflict.

The War of the Polish Succession

War of Polish Succession is a misnomer for the conflict of 1733-35. France had no serious chance of opposing the Austro-Russian candidate, Augustus III; and she embarked on what was primarily a war against Austria in order to compensate herself for the loss of influence in Poland

(Editor: see Mitchell Allen's three part series of articles on this subject in Vol. IV No.4 and Vol. V No.s 1 and 2 of the SYWA Journal).

The French overran Lorraine, but Italy, where France, Spain and Sardinia fought in alliance, was again the chief theatre of war. The Austrian armies suffered several defeats, and the peace terms were unfavorable to the Hapsburgs. Stanislaus Leszczynski, Louis XV's father-in-law and unsuccessful French candidate for the Polish throne, received Lorraine, which was to become French territory at his death

(Editor: hmmm, this doesn't sound like a very effective life insurance policy for old Stan, does it?).

Francis of Lorraine, Maria Theresa's husband-to-be, received Tuscany in compensation. Charles VI received Parma and Charles of Parma became ruler of Naples and Sicily. One major objective of Hapsburg policy was acheived: France joined the other great powers in guaranteeing the Pragmatic Sanction in 1738.

(Editor: Once France was in the fold, Charles VI reneged on his promise to give the Duchy of Berg to Frederick William I of Prussia. Although feeling slighted, the Prussian king was not willing to go to war over the issue, but one suspects that he instilled a sense of revenge in Crown Prince Frederick).

The war was important for several reasons. Russia supplanted France in Poland, and in the virtual acquisition of Lorraine the French monarchy won its last great triumph before the Revolution. Eranco-Spanish co-operation began an enduring partnership that was geographically and dynastically appropriate - and was the first permanent feature in European diplomacy since Utrecht. The situation in Italy was stabilized: henceforth the south was ruled by the Boubons and the north by the Hapsburgs. This arrangement was sound and virtually lasted until the second half of the nineteenth century.

In the Turkish war of 1736-39 Austria lost all the territory outside Hungary that she had gained at Passarowitz, whereas her Russian ally was at least nominally victorious. The most serious aspect of this reverse was that Austrian weakness was revealed at a moment of dynastic crisis.

This then brings us up to the eve of the death of-Charles VI of Austria and the resulting War of Austrian Succession. We can see how the War of Polish Succession and the Turkish War may have highlighted the overall ineffectiveness of the Austrian army. This, combined with a lack of financial resources, resulting from the need to pay for two wars in a very short span of time, made Austria highly vulnerable to predatory neighbors and opportunists like Prussia and Frederick II. We can also see how the subtle changes in traditional balance of power diplomacy created an environment that would allow Frederick to seize Silesia with a reasonable feeling of assurance that he could get away with it.

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